Navalny looks like a young Yeltsin. Towards a passively obedient majority: Gennady Burbulis on the comparison of Yeltsin and Navalny. Why step on the rake twice?

"USSR, 1956, Sverdlovsk. Boris Yeltsin, foreseeing his fatal mistake with his successor, sends his younger self into the future to correct it."

Yeltsin and Navalny act in completely different historical circumstances, a comparison of which, however, is useful in order to understand the mechanism of the opposition’s rise to power.

Yeltsin had been moving along the party line for more than 20 years and was part of the political system when in 1987 he criticized the leadership of the CPSU. He started to get into trouble, but he was not expelled from the ranks of the nomenklatura. In 1989, Yeltsin was elected people's deputy of the USSR, receiving more than 90 percent of the vote in Moscow. In 1990, he became chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, and a year later he was elected president of the RSFSR. In the same year, 1991, as a result of the collapse of the USSR, all power in Russia passed to him.

Navalny, compared to Yeltsin, is a person outside the system. He never held the position of an official and was not a deputy. He played a leading role in mass protests; in 2013, when he was allowed to participate in the Moscow mayoral elections, he, according to official data, received over a quarter of the votes, taking second place. His current presidential campaign is facing strong opposition from the authorities.

Gennady Burbulis, one of Yeltsin’s closest associates and the head of his campaign headquarters in the presidential elections of the RSFSR, considers the comparison between Yeltsin and Navalny artificial:

His road to the 1991 presidency was qualitatively different

– There was a qualitatively different situation – historical, political, and sociocultural. Boris Yeltsin has been in politics for decades; in 1989, he triumphantly won the largest constituency in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, as a deputy of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. He was first in terms of the number of votes compared to all the deputies of the congress. And then his career developed triumphantly: a year later, Boris Nikolaevich was elected as a deputy of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in our native Sverdlovsk district. We began the struggle to have Yeltsin elected head of the republic by the congress. From that moment on, serious opposition from the Kremlin and Gorbachev began. In May 1990, there were three rounds at the congress in the election of the chairman of the Supreme Council, and only in the third round did Yeltsin gain plus four votes in relation to the quorum. His road to the presidency in 1991 was qualitatively different than what we could now, even with the most interested and benevolent analogies, build [in relation to Navalny].

One more important circumstance. On June 12, 1990, that is, two weeks after this fierce struggle [in the election of the Chairman of the Supreme Council], the congress almost unanimously voted for a declaration of state sovereignty of Russia, accepting in principle the text and platform put forward by Boris Nikolayevich. That is, we then had a unique consensus and leadership, Yeltsin’s authority, influence and trust in him were consolidated. It is possible to some extent, if we are already looking for inspiring parallels, to talk not about the political biography of Yeltsin and Navalny, but to compare typologically: today’s Navalny may seem to someone identical to Boris Yeltsin in his focus on power, uncompromising attitude towards the regime, systemic struggle with deep and the centuries-old evil in the form of corruption - there is something in some format. But beyond this, everything will be, it seems to me, a big stretch. A very different prelude to these presidential tests.

The so-called “will of the majority” is inadequately assessed

– This is just important for understanding the current situation. Navalny is outside the system, but Yeltsin was part of it for a long time, and then a split occurred within the system. This is not applicable to current realities, because there is no split in the current system? What brought Yeltsin to power simply does not exist now?

– Now, of course, the situation is fundamentally different. The dramatic split in views on the fate of the Soviet Union and Russia’s place in it, our position - to push and support Gorbachev not in perestroika talk, but in real reforms - all this gave energy to create the authority of both Russia and Yeltsin as a leader. Today there is a deep need for the unity of the thinking part of society in Russia in finding ways to return Russia to the constitutional space. If you wish, the formula that Boris Yeltsin uttered when leaving: “Take care of Russia” becomes the password to the unity of the active, thinking part of the population. We are in a difficult, complex, traumatized society, which, in my opinion, completely inadequately evaluates the so-called “will of the majority.”

What Alexei Navalny is doing can be welcomed. But he exaggerates his abilities as a singles wrestler. The potential for interest in him, for the support of people of different ages who understand that some urgent measures need to be taken in order for Russia to have a decent future, is incommensurate with Yeltsin’s. Therefore, the analogy is very, very artificial; it may have a noble motive, but be misleading in the essence of today’s situation. All these incantations that the opposition is mediocre, 10-15 people cannot agree among themselves - there is a lot of work, there is enough of it for all conscientious and responsible citizens of Russia. Navalny already has his own unique place, as, it seems to me, he also has some naive misconceptions as a novice politician who does not quite adequately assess both his role and his capabilities, but he deserves both appreciation and gratitude for his persistent efforts.

We forget that we are in the space of post-imperial syndrome

– This comparison, albeit incorrect, allows us to understand the system of the opposition coming to power. If we could transpose Yeltsin’s scheme of coming to power in modern times, it would have to look like this: say, Navalny first wins the post of mayor of Moscow, then he should become a Duma deputy, and then this gives him the opportunity to somehow fight while in the system , is it impossible otherwise?

– Here the most profound circumstance is often overlooked: Yeltsin was part of the Soviet totalitarian empire, and he was also the most active driving force in transforming this empire into a new quality - state, constitutional, legal, spiritual, cultural. The empire collapsed in December 1991, when we managed, under the most difficult conditions, to find the only opportunity to create the Commonwealth of Independent States. This document of world historical significance proclaimed that the USSR as a subject of geopolitical reality ceases to exist.

Today, 26 years later, we forget that we are in the space of post-imperial syndrome. This is the case when the disease not only cannot be cured, but develops deeply, sometimes this is classified inadequately - like Putin, imperial ambitions that today traumatize our reality, relations with Ukraine, we become outcasts of the global world. Here we must proceed from a subtle diagnostic position. We are in a state of illness, post-imperial syndrome. This disease manifests itself in different ways, from phantom pains to propaganda infusions about “danger from without,” “oppositionists are mercenaries of Western forces of influence,” and so on.

Today we have a passively obedient majority

Until we perceive this diagnosis as an important tool for understanding where we are, no amount of ascetic efforts will have any effect. The obedient majority, which was talked about at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - the famous formula of Yuri Afanasyev, "aggressively obedient majority" - today we have a passively obedient majority. Most people refrain from determining their degree of responsibility for the future. They are filled with fear of uncertainty, they have little understanding of what kind of inheritance they are leaving to their grandchildren and children.

This is a subtle, very sick organism of a mental socio-cultural nature, post-imperial, it must be kept in mind at all times by anyone who takes upon himself the responsibility to achieve some fundamental updates in our long-suffering life. Great responsibility lies with what we now call the intellectual class, when there are many expert conclusions and deep scientific positions, but they do not acquire the character of a meaningful and understandable text for different strata of Russian society. Therefore, there is a colossal risk when sincere people of good faith join in some initiatives, being right from a moral point of view, but not understanding the trauma in which we live. I think Navalny doesn’t fully understand it either.

People are drawn to simple non-newness

– If we follow what you say, it turns out that modern society in Russia is neither ready nor does it want change the way Soviet society wanted 30 years ago?

– You can say so, you just need to be careful in such categorical statements. At that time, the demand for change and reform was truly systemic and widespread. This was a colossal fulcrum for our activities, it was the foundation of our efforts. What succeeded, what failed – that’s the second question. Today, of course, the restoration surge of imperialism in a painful form has paralyzed a certain part of the population. People refuse to think about what is happening essentially; they are afraid to understand everything that concerns them. And these outbreaks - truckers, renovation, Kuban farmers - are also a sign of such symptoms.

But my position is that the accumulation of energy for a thoughtful constitutional change in Russia in 2017-18 is certainly underway. But the times are different, the dynamics are different, the level of enthusiasm is different. The most offensive thing is that we were inspired by the image of the future that united us. Today, this most important component of the life of every person of different generations has been tragically lost. Many people are discouraged, afraid of uncertainty, they are worried about diversity, they are instinctively drawn to simple, accessible, supposedly consolidated innovation.

Patient accumulation of intelligence

We now need to rethink the experience of Alexei Navalny and many other conscientious and honest social figures, forget the banal and primitive complaints against each other, they are completely inadequate to the challenge that the country faces. The patient accumulation of intelligence and practical experience for joint consolidated activity has been and remains a major task for me. I call this the experience of acquiring consensus practices. They can be in the intellectual, educational, educational, charitable spheres, in different segments of the managerial and economic space. But it’s time to stop treating these problems according to twentieth-century patterns and acting impulsively, putting many sincere, conscientious people at risk. We need to be responsible for all this.

It’s amazing that the older Navalny gets, the more he looks like Boris Yeltsin.
In the literal sense of the word.
Everything fits together - the oval of the face, the flattened nose, the shape of the ears, the heaviness of the chin, the squareness of the mouth, the crooked smile with gums, the nasal, as if choking, manner of speech, even the famous “patamushta”.
Of course, slow-witted Yeltsin spoke slowly, with effort, three words per minute, and Navalny chattered briskly and smoothly, but this is the ratio of youth, health, good education and old age, lack of culture and callousness of the brain, dried out by alcohol.

I think the similarity is not accidental.
I think the matrix had a hand.

How do they do this??

Are they growing clones in baths of amniotic fluid?

Or are they stamped in batches in underground laboratories? Has this business already been put into production, or are individual copies only being made to order?

Or maybe everything is simple, and Alexey is a SON??

I wish I could find out.
No, really, I’m convinced that this is not a coincidence.

Navalny was groomed to become the new president of Russia during an internship at Yale University.
The famous Skull and Bones club is also located there, initiation into which includes strange rituals, for example, a night spent in a coffin.

Maybe Navalny has a microchip and they are mind-controlling him?
The fact that he is not acting on his own, but on a mission, is written all over his expressionless face with empty, colorless eyes.

And another question - why did they choose this archetype a second time? Do you think this image will resonate with the collective soul of the people?
Such a straightforward Russian guy who cuts the truth?

Yes, but Yeltsin is now being cursed!

In addition, as Zadornov wrote, “dalets” is what rakes were called in the old days.

Why step on the rake twice?

And it’s also interesting - what explains Navalny’s mystical immunity?

The forces driving him are so powerful that even Putin can't do anything?

So Limonov asks
“The question is, who are these people moving Navalny?
...
The opening of one Navalny election headquarters in a Russian city is a lot of money, millions of rubles, Navalny has already opened several dozen of them (and he is not going to participate in the elections), and this is already a billion or even two. Where does the money come from, Zin? Where to throw that kind of money down the drain?
I am inclined to think that the money is Russian, although people abroad may also feel joy about Navalny’s existence.

Navalny is untouchable, has two suspended sentences, has repeatedly grossly and impudently violated them, and is not in prison. I spent one night in a pre-trial detention center, you remember, and was released the next morning.
Yes, in all of Russian History, starting with Rurik, there is not a single precedent such that someone who received a fixed sentence did not go to serve it.
...

So think about it.
Navalny, I am sure, has the largest anti-rating in the country. But they push it on us against our wishes and if they force it on us, it won’t be with the help of selections. On which, since he has a huge anti-rating, you can’t even draw a winning result for him, because how can you draw a huge winning result for a person for whom no one feels affection except his fans? , the same as Spartak or Zenit...

If it is imposed on us, it will not be through elections, but through some trick.

We are a country of deceptions and conspiracies.
There's some kind of deception going on."

Bonus video:

Boris Mezhuev

Alexey Navalny made an appeal on the Internet that he was entering the 2018 election campaign and was going to create a real alternative to the current government in the upcoming elections, say what everyone is silent about, present a real development program and begin to fight stagnation and corruption. Why now? – observers ask. Why in frosty December and on the eve of the New Year, when Muscovites are already preparing to eat festive salads and watch “Prisoner of the Caucasus”?

It's actually clear why.

Because it is important for Navalny to enter the coming 2017, when everyone will only talk about the revolution, comparing, drawing analogies, making parallels, as a candidate for future presidents, as a living political alternative, constantly reminding of himself

As it has become fashionable to say now, as the main newsmaker. Of course, it will not be possible to silence him: all his statements will immediately spread across FB and LiveJournal, all his videos will immediately be rushed to the public attention by Echo of Moscow and RBC. So, Navalny makes it clear to the slightly relaxed Russian elite after an enchanting 2016 for them - with Trump, Fillon and Brexit - that there is no point in resting on one’s laurels, there is a young promising opponent in power, and he is going to the polls.

Does Alexey Navalny pose any serious political danger? Can he, if not win the election, then at least prevent the government candidate from avoiding a second round? At the moment, such an assumption itself looks fantastic. Navalny failed to defeat the mayor in 2013 Sobyanin in his native Moscow, despite the fact that Sobyanin practically did not conduct an election campaign. It is very difficult to admit that Navalny will defeat Putin throughout Russia, given the greatest disposition towards the presidential candidate. This was hard to imagine even in 2013, but today, after Crimea, when the lifting of anti-Crimean sanctions looms in the near future, when the united anti-Russian front of Western countries has wavered and, it seems, the Euro-Atlantic has really begun to lose ground, today we think that any opposition a candidate who did not support the annexation of Crimea may go beyond the maximum 10%, looks completely naive.

Navalny clearly understands this.

He is not a stupid person and, of course, is perfectly aware that he nullified his chances as a contender for something more than leadership in the rally crowd in 2014, when he found himself on the same side of the barricades with the Right Sector and on opposite sides of the barricades with the residents Crimea and Donbass

In 2011–2013, Navalny remained a symbol of the anti-regime consensus; everyone who, for various reasons, did not support the government, was ready to see him as a leader. In 2014, this consensus itself broke down, and Navalny joined the forces that were influential at the top of society, but extremely alien to its lower classes. That is, to those whom we, with some degree of convention, call “liberals” and for whom the best definition would be the expression “inner West.” The “Inner West” in 2011–2016 was always on the side of the external West in any of its conflicts with Russia: for the “inner West” NATO is right in everything, the CIA is never wrong, Russophobe senators deserve the most sincere respect. And Russia should accept other people's rules of the game and under no circumstances raise its voice against the injustices of the existing world order.

The problem, however, is that the times of this “blissful hostility” of the external West towards Russia are gradually becoming a thing of the past, and a thaw in relations between Washington and Moscow is not far off. It would seem that this can only strengthen Russian power. This will certainly remain the case for some time. If Trump and his new Secretary of State abandon the policy of sanctions and lend a hand to Russia in the common fight against global terrorism, Putin’s ratings will rise even higher, approaching the highest possible levels.

This, apparently, is what Navalny will try to use, who, apparently, is going to play the role of a kind of Tsarevich Alexei in his confrontation with the current Peter the Great. That is, the role of a moderate isolationist who will ask the power-building authorities all sorts of unpleasant questions about how much its international successes justify its internal difficulties? It will be useless to deny geostrategic achievements, questioning Russia’s actions in 2014 is suicidal, demonstrating the heroic experience of Euromaidan as a positive example is simply stupid, but to sound such an isolationist note - where are we, ordinary Russian people, in this great power future? – this will turn out to be quite possible.

Simply put, Navalny will try to play the role of such a “Russian Trump” in 2017, just as Trump himself managed to brilliantly take on the role of the “American Yeltsin” - a populist ready to shake his own empire, since its abstract power does not quite coincide with that “greatness” ", from which millions of his ordinary subjects will feel calm and well-fed. I am sure that we will very quickly hear from Navalny about the urgent need to build a wall on the border with Central Asia and about the desirability of reconsidering trade relations with Belarus, and that Russia should stop military operations in other countries. In general, I am almost convinced that Navalny will do his best to pretend to be the real Trump, that is, according to our double analogy, the resurrected Boris Yeltsin, the Yeltsin who has returned to his homeland.

An indirect confirmation of this assumption of mine can be the words of Navalny, said in his televised address, that we have not had fair elections since 1996. In other words, the last legitimate president of the country was Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. The second, obviously, should be Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny himself

Of course he won't be. Navalny is not Yeltsin, and Putin, of course, is not Gorbachev. But nevertheless, the force that is currently betting on Navalny may well, with his help, significantly strengthen its position and its weight in the internal affairs of Russia. At the same time, the coming “global warming” will only play into the hands of this force - if there is no conflict with an external adversary, if the adversary suddenly turns from an enemy into a friend, then a whole series of arguments against those who were recently engaged in lobbying hostile interests are removed. On the contrary, these people have a free hand, while those in power, on the contrary, have their hands tied.

So the question is: can we protect ourselves today from our “inner Trump”, are we ready for a situation when exactly the same people who just yesterday literally prayed to come to the White House will call themselves “Trumpists” Hillary Clinton? Of course, speaking on my own behalf, it would be simply wonderful if the “inner Trump” came out of the “Crimean-nashist” environment, if, while supporting the government in the main things, the local Trump, nevertheless, disagreed with it in many secondary things - on issues reforming the economy, some aspects of foreign policy, etc. In this sense, there was hope for the so-called. the Party of Growth, let me remind you, the party of entrepreneurs - but this, apparently considering itself a very promising party, chose during the Duma election campaign not to associate itself with such an obviously unpromising candidate as the New York billionaire, and the election results, of course, completely confirmed all the wisdom of her electoral strategy.

So, the fruits of the overseas victory will be reaped in Russia by those who, over the past 25 years, have basically reaped all the available fruits - namely, the “Yeltsinists,” that is, those who brought down the “empire” in 1991, who benefited from this event the maximum of all possible dividends, has not repented of anything and is now ready to repeat his feat in 2018

More precisely, not so much to repeat - this, as we have already said, is impossible in principle - but to slightly frighten the authorities with this turn of affairs, so that again, as always, they remain in the bargain or, using a less criminal vocabulary, become kings.

No Navalny, of course, will come to power. Neither in 2018, nor in 2024. But, let’s admit to ourselves, it’s unpleasant to be left in the cold when all the trump cards were in hand. When the future American president walked into your arms, and in the end, the fruits of his victory will be used to strengthen themselves by those who longed for his shame and defeat. Well, what can we do, we sat down to play cards with professional sharpers and there is no need to be indignant at the unexpected appearance of an ace of clubs in their hands. Let's just think one step ahead next time.

In May 1987, after a loud rally on Manezhnaya Square in the very center of the Soviet capital, activists of the newly created chauvinistic anti-Semitic organization “Memory” were received at the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU by one of the most famous “foremen of perestroika”, a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, first secretary city ​​committee, a fierce denouncer of the inertia of the party apparatus, Boris Yeltsin. This meeting between a party functionary and ghouls did not go unnoticed - primarily by those who saw perestroika as a process of democratization and did not understand how one of the most prominent representatives of the “innovators” in the party leadership could communicate with complete reactionaries. Supporters of change were unaware that certain circles in power - primarily those associated with the special services - were already beginning to promote the Yeltsin project, the main goal of which would be to create a backup figure in the event of a complete and final collapse of the Soviet regime. And the main task of this figure is to preserve and strengthen the positions of the special services and the associated criminal world in the life of Soviet society.

Now, 30 years after that memorable meeting, we can state that the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, a candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and a brave fighter against corruption (or whatever it was called then?) Boris Yeltsin coped with his task one hundred percent. But the system is again close to crisis and collapse. And exactly 30 years later, intelligence officer and new face of the “Russian world” Igor Strelkov proposes a debate to the head of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, a supporter of change, Alexei Navalny.

Context

Navalny's disastrous debate

Financial Times 07/21/2017

Navalny's games with Girkin

New time of the country 07/19/2017

Why does Navalny need debates with Girkin?

New time of the country 07/14/2017 The proposal is accepted. What is important here is not the fact of the debate. Here it is important to show the public—including openly chauvinistic, reactionary ones—that the future “leader” is capable of talking to everyone. The Democrats will wipe themselves off, just as they wiped themselves off after Yeltsin’s meeting with Pamyat. Democrats in Russia still have no chance of coming to power on their own; their hope for change is always connected with some next popular (read: KGB) favorite, whom the majority of “dear Russians” will support. And chauvinists will remember that you can talk to this person. For them, such debates are the same signal as Yeltsin’s meeting with “Pamyat”: they are their own man, a Russian, they can talk.

I am not at all going to claim that Navalny is an FSB agent. Navalny is a project of the special services in a much broader sense of the word. Yeltsin was also not a KGB agent: it was strictly forbidden to recruit high-ranking party officials - and the future president of Russia belonged to this closed caste. But it was not forbidden to communicate, collaborate, or seek interest. Yeltsin needed power—a lot of power, all the power. The security officers needed access to financial flows and maintaining control over the country - all control, without “party members”. The “tsehoviki” and enterprising Komsomol activists who turned into new Russian entrepreneurs and “oligarchs” needed money - a lot of money, all the money. These three forces destroyed the CPSU and the Soviet Union in 1991, finished off their competitors from among the apparatchiks in 1993 and established complete control over Russia, its inhabitants, its money: the Russians themselves did not notice how they turned into serfs.

Navalny, although he criticizes Yeltsin, says exactly what Yeltsin said before. What the average Russian, a chauvinist and obscurantist, wants to hear, but at the same time a small person with a childish psyche who simply dreams of living a better life. Therefore, discussing the foreign policy escapades of the oppositionist, his thoughts on Donbass and Crimea is a thankless task, this is just a conjuncture of the moment. Yeltsin was also a supporter of preserving the USSR - under his own power, of course, but at the right time he agreed with the independence of the union republics, and with the appearance of their own armed forces and currencies, and even pushed those who did not understand to final separation. Navalny, if he comes to power at a time of crisis, will agree not only with the withdrawal from Donbass and Crimea, but also with the independence of Chechnya or Tatarstan - the only question will be in which territory the groups associated with him will want to maintain their power, and in which - your influence.

Of course, the figure of Navalny is incomparable in scale to the figure of Yeltsin. Even at the first stage of his career, Yeltsin was a real politician and looked like a leader of the masses. Navalny doesn't look like it. But the possibility of regime collapse today is not as obvious and close to security officers as it was in the late 80s. Yeltsin was being prepared to replace Gorbachev, who was losing control over the state and did not want to change anything in the economy. Putin is not yet Gorbachev; he is, rather, a slowly aging Brezhnev or Andropov, falling into insanity and living in his own world. But if the security officers’ calculations are correct, this Brezhnev will inevitably be replaced by a new Gorbachev from the inner circle. Gorbachev, who will try to reform an unreformable system without seriously changing anything. And the system, as in the late 80s, will begin to collapse for real - especially since citizens will no longer fear this new Gorbachev as much as they fear Putin.

That’s when the security officers and bandits will really need Navalny - this one or some other one, it makes no difference, if there is a place, and a little man will be found. By this time they will have time to raise their new Yeltsin and agree on everything with him.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.