State commissions of Azerbaijan and Russia continue work to close the Gabala radar station. The parties reached agreement on all issues. This was announced today by Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Khalaf Khalafov.

According to Khalafov, all documents have already been signed.

“We carried out an inventory of Russian-owned property. All organizational issues regarding the transportation of property have been resolved. Now the process continues. Most of this property was delivered to Russia. There is a small part left, work in this direction is being implemented according to the schedule we have determined. This process will be completed shortly. In this regard, all conditions have also been created for the transportation of the contingent and its property,” the diplomat said.

Due to the fact that on December 9, 2012, the “Agreement on the status, principles and operating conditions of the Gabala radar station between the governments of Azerbaijan and Russian Federation", the Russian side sent a note to stop the operation of the radar from December 10 this year.

Let's remember the history of the station itself and the history of the issue of its lease.

For the first time in the world, the idea of ​​early (over-the-horizon) detection of aircraft in the shortwave range at a distance of up to 3000 km was proposed in 1946 by designer N.I. Kabanov. Subsequently, the Veer research work was carried out, which in 1949 culminated in the construction of a prototype of an over-the-horizon radar that monitored missile launches from Baikonur at a distance of 2500 km.

The need to create long-range detection radar stations designed to solve problems of warning about missile attack and detection of objects in space, was due to the advent of intercontinental missiles in service ballistic missiles(ICBMs) and spacecraft (SC), the tightening of US military doctrine and the growth of the arms race.

Work on the creation of a long-range detection radar (DLRS) began in 1954 by a special decision of the USSR Government, which was tasked with developing proposals for the creation of a missile defense system (ABM) for Moscow. DL radars were considered its most important elements, and a team of specialists under the leadership of A.L. began to work on the creation of them. Mintsa. These powerful stations at a distance of several thousand kilometers were supposed to detect enemy missiles, their warheads and with high accuracy determine their coordinates. In 1956, by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On Missile Defense” A.L. Mintz was appointed one of the chief designers of the early warning radar. In the same year, work was launched in Kazakhstan to study the reflective parameters of real warheads of ballistic missiles launched from the Kapustin Yar test site.

At the end of the 1960s. along the perimeter state border The USSR began construction of the first early warning stations “Dnestr” and “Dnepr”, which formed a continuous radar barrier with a length of more than 5 thousand kilometers. A command post was created in the Moscow region with communication lines to the Baikonur Cosmodrome, where an anti-space defense complex was being installed at that time. During the next tests, carried out in November 1968, for the first time in the world it was possible to shoot down a target satellite without the use of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, this modernized complex, put into service in 1979, received the name IS-1 (“Satellite Fighter”).

Radar units (RLU) and complexes (RLK) based on radars of the "Dniester", "Dnepr", "Daugava", "Daryal" and "Don-2N" types are the basis of the country's missile and space defense (RKO) and function as part of systems space control (SKKP), missile attack warning (SPRN), anti-space (ASC) and missile defense (BMD) defense. RLU satellite detection (OS) and early detection (ER) of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) solve the problems of their timely detection and subsequent issuance of information about them for targeting weapons. OS nodes of the PKO and KKP systems, consisting of several Dniester-type radars with high-performance computing systems, were created in Irkutsk (OS-1) and on Balkhash (OS-2) and are connected to the Central Command Post (CCP) of the PKO and KKP systems.

RO SPRN nodes (in Murmansk - RO-1, in Riga - RO-2, in Sevastopol - RO-4, in Mukachevo - RO-5, in Pechora - RO-30, in Gabala - RO-7), except RO- 30 and RO-7 were equipped with radars of the Dnestr-M and Dnepr types, complete with two sector radars. The RO-30 and RO-7 nodes were equipped with Daryal-type radars with high radiated power, spaced active transmitting and receiving phased arrays with digital signal processing for detecting and tracking targets. The RO-1 node (Murmansk) was strengthened by the introduction of a fundamentally new receiving radar of the Daugava type with a large-aperture phased array of the meter range, as a result of which an active-passive radar was created, operating on the basis of sounding signals from the Dnepr radar. This significantly increased the RO-1's ability to operate in complex rocket, space and jamming environments. Subsequently, the technical solutions used in the Daugava radar were used in the development of receiving phased arrays for the Daryal series radars.

Separate radars, radar units and radar complexes, command posts located along the perimeter of the country and thousands of kilometers apart from each other were combined into a single missile attack warning system. After the modernization of the radar complexes of the OS-1 and OS-2 systems of the PKO and KKP systems, they were included in the unified early warning system. Since the mid-80s. development and improvement of the PRN, CCP, PKO and ABM systems was carried out within the framework of unified system missile and space defense of the country.

Currently, ground-based detection means are available: Pechora, Murmansk, Minsk, Gabala (Mingechaury), Balkhash and Irkutsk nodes; long-range detection means from the missile defense system; main and spare gearbox of the early warning system with the Crocus system.

The continuous development of air attack weapons has increased the requirements for the effectiveness of early warning systems. In this regard, RTI proposed a project for a new almost global space system for detecting ballistic missile launches and creating a dual-band peripheral radar field and a new heavy-duty noise-resistant radar for early warning systems. They were supposed to become the basis of new nodes and replace radars with existing ones, thereby “closing” the ring of the country’s peripheral radar field.

Two alternative projects were developed: the first (Daryal radar) was presented by RTI employees headed by V.M. Ivantsov (1971–1972), the second (“Daryal-S”) - NIIDAR employees headed by A.N. Musatov (1973). The station of the RTI project assumed the use of a new (phase) method of scanning space based on the use of a phased antenna array (PAA), the possibility of a technical and technological breakthrough in the field of creating high-potential radars. The radar of the second project retained the principles of constructing a station of the Danube family (frequency scanning method with continuous radiation), and also made it possible to use existing technological and production base, but did not promise significant progress in the field of radar technology. Despite the fact that both projects met the requirements of the task, the first project with the Daryal radar won, and V.M. was appointed its chief designer. Ivantsov, first deputy – A.M. Skosyrev.

The essence of the first project was based on the gradual development of the radar field of the meter-range early warning system, bringing the characteristics of all radar units to the characteristics of the Daryal radar. The basis of this program was the so-called universal receiving position (UPP) and standard transmitting position (TPP). The UPP made it possible to receive and process signals reflected from the target emitted by the Dnepr radar, and differed from the receiving position of the Daryal radar in its greater control and noise immunity capabilities. Further improvement of the node was ensured by replacing the Dnepr with a TPP, working in conjunction with the UPP previously created at the node.

The Daryal radar has an increased energy potential (radiation power of about 2 MW), which ensures detection of targets the size of soccer ball at a range of up to 6000 km in a viewing sector of 110 degrees. in azimuth, increased accuracy of parameter measurement, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects.

The station consists of 2 positions spaced apart from each other - a universal receiving position (URP), which had better control and security indicators in comparison with the receiving part of the Dnepr radar, and a standard transmitting position (TPP). Moreover, both positions are compatible with the positions of the Dnepr radar. This makes it possible to gradually upgrade the operating unit from the Dnepr radar to the characteristics of the Daryal radar. At the first stage, a UPP was placed at the ORTU, capable of receiving and processing signals emitted by the Dnepr radar, and at the second, replacing the Dnepr radar itself with the TPP. The transmitting center was a multi-story building about 100 m high, on the front inclined part of which there was a phased array, the basis of which was antennas measuring 40x40 m, consisting of 1260 transmitters. The receiving part of the Daryal radar was the world's first adaptive phased array of the meter range, consisting of 4048 receiving cross-vibrators with 8096 amplifiers. The antenna was located in an 18-story building. Many of the advantages of the Daryal radar were provided by a high-performance computing complex, which controlled the operation of the radar, controlled the functioning of its devices and automatically processed information, as well as solved other additional tasks. Testing of the radar was carried out on mock-ups of receiving and transmitting centers without creating an experimental sample. The Daugava radar was used as a mock-up of the receiving part, and the transmitting part was a mock-up (9 transmitters and an antenna of 27 vibrators) at the Sary-Shagan training ground next to the former TsSO-P radar.

According to the decision of 1975, 2 nodes were created on the basis of the Daryal radar - RO-30 (in the area of ​​Pechora) and RO-7 (in the area of ​​Gabala, Azerbaijan). In the spring of 1975, accelerated construction of the RO-30 unit began, which at the end of 1983 successfully completed joint tests, and in March 1984 was put into service. The Gabala radar (RO-7 unit) successfully passed tests by the end of 1984, and was put into service on 02/19/1985. The station is designed to detect ballistic missile launches in the Indian Ocean, is not capable of processing information independently, and works in conjunction with its reception and processing centers “Kvadrat” and “Schwertbot” near Moscow. With the commissioning of these units, the early warning system could detect attacking submarine-based ICBMs and ballistic missiles.

Radar "Daryal-U" ( chief designer A.A. Vasiliev) from the Daryal station was distinguished by a lower energy potential, 2 times less number of transmitters at the transmitting position and a significant increase in the ability to manage this potential. At the same time, optimal distribution of emitted energy was ensured in the viewing and target tracking mode due to signal fragmentation. The range resolution, noise immunity (due to the implementation of the receiving phased array adaptation mode), and the power of the computing complex based on the M-13 multiprocessor computer were increased (up to 2.4 billion operations per second, which made it possible to implement digital signal processing and significantly improve the operating algorithm Radar).

The modified Daryal-UM radar (chief designer V.M. Ivantsov) was distinguished by changes in the receiving and transmitting positions. In the UPP, the scanning sectors were increased and losses at its edges were reduced, in the TPP, the scanning sectors were increased, the efficiency of the transmitters was increased, their design was improved, and more.

The radar monitors the territories of Iran, Turkey, China, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Australia, as well as most of African countries, islands of the Indian and Atlantic oceans.

A distinctive feature of the station is the ability not only to detect a missile launch in a record short time, but also to track the missile trajectory from the first seconds of launch and transmit data in advance for interception to the right point.

The "Daryal" type radar has a phased antenna array of a receiving center 100x100 m (almost 4000 cross vibrators) and a phased array aperture of the transmitting center measuring 40x40 m (1260 powerful transmitting replaceable modules with an output pulse power of each 300 kW), ensures detection of targets with EPR of the order 0.1 m at a range of up to 6000 km in a viewing sector of 110 degrees in azimuth. It is distinguished by increased accuracy of parameter measurement, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, and the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects.

During the Iran-Iraq War, radar detected 139 combat launches of Iraqi Scud missiles.

The Daryal facility is a 17-story building with a height of 87 m. Its creators were awarded the USSR State Prize.

Headcount service personnel- about 900 military personnel and more than 200 civilian specialists(an intergovernmental agreement sets a limit of 1.5 thousand people).

Voronezh - DM

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia leased the station from Azerbaijan, paying $7 million annually to rent the facility, which, in fact, was built by Russia.

Both Russia and Azerbaijan were quite happy with such a relationship: our neighbors received an increase in the budget, and we had a reliable facility for the defense of the country. Russia had plans to modernize the radar and extend its service life. According to the then Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, Russia is interested in maintaining the same rental cost, but at the same time wants to sharply reduce the territory occupied by the station. The station will be completely rebuilt; with its new appearance, a large volume of communications will not be needed. By 2020, it was planned to build a new generation radar station (Voronezh VP type) in its place.

Negotiations were underway between the two countries to continue the lease strategic object until 2025. But quite unexpectedly, Azerbaijan wanted to increase the rent to a fantastic 300 million dollars, that is, almost 40 times! It was clear that this was a poorly hidden desire to squeeze Russia out of Gabala. Naturally, we were not satisfied with this price, and at the end of December our military left the radar station in Azerbaijan.

On December 10, 2012, the Russian side suspended the operation of the Gabala radar station.

Now the versions explaining what happened. First: behind this unfriendly step are the intrigues of the Americans, who want to weaken our air defense system before the war with Iran. Well, from a geopolitical point of view, this is a completely reasonable explanation. However, dedicated people today suddenly have a different version, much more worldly. Let's explain it too. One of the major Azerbaijani businessmen was involved in the production chain for the execution of Russian state defense orders and had a very fat piece of the pie from this.

However, at some point, during the “redistribution of financial flows” (that’s what it’s called now, I think?) he was deprived of this piece, relegated to the sidelines of the process. And in revenge, the hot-tempered southern man pulled off a large-scale intrigue with the help of the Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev. As a result, through joint efforts, the intriguers convinced President Aliyev to raise the price for renting the radar station to Moscow to the skies. This is how, due to disputes between “specific” businessmen, Russia has to leave the Gabala radar station.

The next and main question is: how much will our defense capability suffer from such a step? For the answer, we turn to one of the authoritative military experts, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine Igor Korotchenko. His conclusion is not so fatal: after leaving Gabala there will be no significant losses for our defense capability. All tasks for monitoring the southern regions of the planet will now be assigned to a new generation radar of the Voronezh type, which began operation back in 2009 in Armavir. This is a station with a high degree of factory readiness with a modular construction principle, that is, it is more functional, modern and designed for constant modernization. The Armavir radar has a more expanded tracking sector, and it is impossible to hide from its watchful “eye” a single combat missile launch towards Russia.

Thus, the “kick-up” of our Azerbaijani partners only pushed the Russian Armed Forces towards further modernization (I say this seriously, without any irony). New stations are much cheaper, easier and faster to build - a year and a half instead of the previous seven years, which took to build huge concrete monsters.

New radars are the eyes and ears of our aerospace defense system, emphasized Igor Korotchenko, and Russia will build as many of them as needed for complete control over all missile-hazardous areas. As for Azerbaijan, let’s say it made a mistake. Russia greatly valued the trusting relationship that existed between our countries. Let's not forget that great amount Azerbaijanis live and work with us. However, the unfriendly demarche that the leadership of the republic made is unlikely to affect our attitude towards its citizens living in Russia. Nevertheless, in international relations there is a principle of reciprocity; in other words, what comes around comes around. I hope that our country will not take petty revenge on Azerbaijan for what happened, but will certainly take this incident into account in its policy...

As for visible acquisitions, according to our expert, Azerbaijan will become the full-fledged owner of a cyclopean structure, stuffed with long-outdated equipment and completely useless for the Azerbaijani (and any other) army. Firstly, there are no personnel in the republic to maintain the radar, and secondly, disconnected from the global Russian Missile Attack Warning System, this station is turning into a meaningless structure.

sources

http://www.arms-expo.ru/055057052124049056048054.html

http://i-korotchenko.livejournal.com/526608.html

Russia's loss of the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan occurred not as a result of an astronomical increase in rent to official Baku, as is commonly believed, but as a result of American blackmail about deployment plans new program like Star Wars.

At the end of 2006, the administration of President George W. Bush announced the creation in four stages of a system of elements of missile defense (BMD) in Europe, which would protect European countries from nuclear missile threats from rogue countries Iran, Syria and even distant North Korea.

The Russians have rightly stated that this program is directed against Russia's national security. And in principle they were right.

The Mystery of Star Wars

According to the announced program, at the first stage, ships equipped with Aegis complexes and Standard-3 interceptor missiles were already deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, a missile defense radar was deployed in Turkey. At the second stage, by 2015, Washington expects to transfer mobile batteries with Standard-3 missiles to the territory of Romania, and by 2018 they are expected to be deployed in Poland.

Finally, by 2020 it was planned to put into operation such systems that are capable of protecting the entire territory of NATO countries from intercontinental ballistic missiles. Only the last stage of the missile defense system, which provides for the interception of potential enemy missiles at the initial stage of flight, is today estimated at $500 billion. If implemented, it will cover the entire territory of Russia and practically neutralize the strategic missile and space forces of the Russian Federation.

Is Russia capable of presenting an asymmetric response to the Americans? Of course not. Just as the USSR failed to do this in response to the Star Wars program announced in 1983 by US President Ronald Reagan. The Soviets, which began to lag behind in power, were forced to reduce medium- and short-range missiles and reduce threats against Western Europe and American military bases.

The new Bush program scared the Russian leadership too much, which understood that the country's military-technical and economic potential was not able to keep up with the new arms race if it started.

USA Mystery

The bargaining chip this time was the condition of narrowing the range of Russian radar coverage in almost all directions along the perimeter of the borders of the Russian Federation. In this sense, it becomes clear why the radar station in Gabala occupied a central place in the anti-missile game.

This station carried out surveillance in a space vital for the United States from the Indian Ocean to the expanses of North Africa, where events of a geopolitical scale had already unfolded. The technical data of the station speak not only of its ability to track flying objects, as is commonly believed.

The Gabala radar, codenamed Daryal, was put into operation in 1985 and provided detection of targets the size of a soccer ball at a range of up to 6,000 km, and after modernization - 8,500 km. It has increased accuracy in measuring parameters, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, and the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects, including underwater ones. The station is not capable of processing information independently, and works together with its reception and processing centers “Kvadrat” and “Schwertbot” near Moscow. In practice, this is a powerful intelligence structure capable of tracking the actions of Americans throughout this entire space, which, of course, cannot be part of the latter’s plans.

The Kremlin tried in every possible way to retain this important intelligence facility, even under American supervision. It is no coincidence that on June 7, 2007, at the G8 summit in Germany, President Vladimir Putin offered the United States joint management of the station, which should have been a guarantee that Moscow was not spying on American actions in the region. Putin said: Russia offers America the joint use of the capabilities of the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan to conduct the necessary “anti-missile monitoring” (in particular for Iran) and if Washington accepts this proposal, there will be no need to deploy missile defense elements in Eastern European countries. This idea was rejected and the Russians, after tense negotiations, as subsequent events show, were forced to concede. The global financial crisis that broke out in 2008 put an end to this dispute, which forced Moscow to abandon not only plans for an asymmetric response, but also to narrow plans for rearmament of the army. conventional weapons due to a catastrophic reduction in funds.

The Mystery of Anne Derse

The final point on this issue was reached in the fall of 2011. This is also evident from the actions of the Azerbaijani leadership, which exactly a year ago raised the cost of renting the Gabala radar station from $7 million to $300 million. This step became a formal reason for stopping the station’s activities in the future. It is clear that official Baku could never put forward such a crazy condition for two reasons:

First, Aliyev, based on the possibilities of his potential, could not go against the will of Moscow;

Second, the absence of a Russian military presence would sharply narrow Aliyev’s maneuver between the United States and the Russian Federation and strengthen the influence of Washington, which insists on the demand for democratization, which is unwanted for Baku. Both the Americans and the Russians needed a formal diplomatic reason in the form of exorbitantly inflating the cost of rent. The latter is more to save face.

An argument in favor of the version of the necessary narrowing of Russian reconnaissance capabilities is also supported by the fact that the Voronezh radar station in Armavir, which is being commissioned, located outside the Greater Caucasus Range, is not capable of replacing the station in Azerbaijan. “This is a weak station and its capabilities are significantly inferior to the Gabala one, although the Russians claim the opposite... The Russians invested $1 billion in the modernization of the Gabala radar station, but only $70 million was spent on the station in Armavir. The range of the station in Armavir covers 2500 km, and Gabala - 8500 km ", WikiLeaks reported with reference to Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiyev, who spoke about this on March 14, 2009 with the US Ambassador to Baku, Anne Derse.

From the dispatch of Ambassador Ders dated March 19 of this year. it is clear that Moscow, after the proclamation of the American initiative to deploy a European missile defense system, conducted contradictory negotiations, including the abandonment of the Gabala station and the extension of the agreement in 2012. This indicated that the issue was always at the stage of intense bargaining between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Erdogan's mystery

The fate of the station was finally sealed on September 12, 2012, when the US National Research Council recommended that the White House and Congress abandon the fourth stage of deployment of a missile defense system in Europe. "Phase 4 should be abandoned because it is unnecessary for the defense of Europe and is less than optimal for the defense of the United States," concluded the report's authors, who are experts including retired military leaders, academics and former U.S. administration officials.

Experts recommended moving the center of gravity of the fourth stage of missile defense, which is less expensive, far to the East. NIS recommended that, in addition to Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg in California, another silo-based interceptor base be established in the continental United States. They propose to place another similar base in the northeastern part of the United States. The conclusion of the expert council meant that the Russians abandoned the fight for Gabala in exchange for freezing the fourth stage of the American missile defense system in Europe.

On December 10, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan voiced an explanation that was not taken seriously about the suspension of the Gabala radar station: in the negotiations that preceded the closure of the station, a “willingness to continue cooperation with the Russian side” was demonstrated, but it was not satisfied rent.

From the text of the statement it follows that on December 10, the Russian Foreign Ministry submitted a note to Azerbaijan on the suspension of the operation of the station in connection with the “Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation on the status, principles and conditions of use of the Gabala radar station” that became invalid on December 9, 2012. The Russian radar lease agreement, signed in 2002, expires on December 24, 2012.

It is interesting that this decision of Russia was announced to the whole world not from Moscow, but from Baku, which confirms that the true background behind the decision on the fate of the radar station lies far beyond the borders of Azerbaijan.

On September 11, 2012, the Second Meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Azerbaijan and Turkey was held in Gabala, which ended with the signing of seven documents. In terms of their significance, they did not particularly correspond to the high status of the meeting: about metrology, television partnership, rescue services, seed production and others. The meeting was previously planned in Baku, but was unexpectedly moved to a place five steps from the Gabala radar station. This meeting, which took place almost simultaneously with the release of the US National Research Council's report on missile defense, became a symbolic message from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan that the military era of Russia in Azerbaijan is over.

Analytical service Turan

Gabala radar station (radar) "Daryal" (Gabala-2, RO-7, object 754)
- one of the missile attack warning stations (MAWS) created in the USSR to detect launches of ground and sea ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, as well as for continuous monitoring of outer space.
Construction began in 1976, and the unit entered combat duty in 1985.

The radar in Gabala is designed to track launches of ballistic missiles from Asia and the Indian Ocean, as well as monitor space objects in the southern sector at a range of up to 6000 km.

The Russian military uses the Daryal radar based on an agreement between the countries dated January 25, 2002. According to this document, the station is the property of Azerbaijan and has the status of an information and analytical center. Rental cost is $7 million per year. Russia pledged to use the radar only for “information and analytical purposes,” and also to share part of the information received with Azerbaijan. The agreement was signed for a period of ten years.

The radar's operating personnel number is about 900 military personnel and 200 civilian specialists.

According to the corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and international relations(IMEMO) Arbatova, the Gabala radar station is precisely the station that makes it possible, literally a few seconds after a rocket takeoff, not only to detect a launch, which satellites from geostationary orbit allow, but can track the missile trajectory from the first seconds, transmit data in advance for interception in the desired location point.
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/qabala.htm
psiterror.ru/p/content/content.php?content.82.8
Russia is interested in extending the lease period of the radar station in Gabala from Azerbaijan and intends to modernize it. This was stated by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.
“We need this station. We would like to modernize it, make it completely different, with different parameters. We have an understanding of how to do this,” Serdyukov said. The station's lease expires in 2012. Russia wants to extend the lease until 2025.
The radar station in Gabala belongs to the missile attack warning system. According to experts, the station is an important element Russian system missile defense, providing early warning of possible missile attacks from the south.
www.utro.ru/news/2011/11/18/1011688.shtml
In 2013, the radar station was transferred to Azerbaijan, Russian military personnel left the garrison, and all equipment was dismantled and taken to Russia.

Russia opposed increasing the rental rate for the radar from the current $7.5 million to $300 million per year, which Azerbaijan insisted on; a more advanced radar of the Voronezh-DM type is already being tested in Armavir

Gabala radar station Photo: AzerTAc/ITAR-TASS

Gabala radar station of the Daryal type 5N79 (RO 7, object 754) is one of the most important elements of the missile attack warning system (MAWS) former USSR, and now Russia. Located near the village of Zaragan, Gabala region of Azerbaijan. The radar is located at an altitude of 680 meters above sea level, higher than all populated areas located in the scanning radiation zone.

Intended for:

Detection of ballistic missiles on flight trajectories within radar coverage areas;

Tracking and measuring the coordinates of detected targets and jammers;

Calculation of motion parameters of tracked targets based on radar measurements;

Determining the type of goals;

Providing information about the target and interference conditions in automatic mode.

Radar composition:

Command and measurement center;

Transmitting Radio Engineering Center;

Repair and verification base;

Communication and information transfer center.

Lead developer of JSC RTI named after A.L. Mints", Moscow. Commissioned in 1983.

The radar controlled the territories of Iran, Turkey, China, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Australia, as well as most of African countries, islands of the Indian and Atlantic oceans.

A distinctive feature of the station is the ability not only to detect a missile launch in a record short time, but also to track the missile trajectory from the first seconds of launch and transmit data in advance for interception at the desired point.

The "Daryal" type radar has a phased antenna array of a receiving center 100 x 100 m (almost 4000 cross vibrators) and a phased array aperture of the transmitting center measuring 40 x 40 m (1260 powerful transmitting replaceable modules with an output pulse power of each 300 kW), ensures detection of targets with an ESR of the order of 0 .1 m at a range of up to 6000 km in a viewing sector of 110 degrees in azimuth. It is distinguished by increased accuracy of parameter measurement, high speed and throughput, noise immunity, and the ability to detect and simultaneously track about 100 objects.

During the Iran-Iraq War, radar detected 139 combat launches of Iraqi Scud missiles.

The Daryal facility is a 17-story building with a height of 87 m. Its creators were awarded the USSR State Prize.

The number of service personnel is about 900 military personnel and more than 200 civilian specialists (the intergovernmental agreement sets a limit of 1.5 thousand people).

After Azerbaijan gained independence and the radar became its property, Russia continued to use the station. In accordance with the bilateral agreement signed in 2002, the Gabala radar station has the status of an information and analytical center and is the property of Azerbaijan. Leased to Russia for a period of 10 years. The annual rent under the 2002 agreement is $7 million. The agreement expires on December 24, 2012.

The Russian Ministry of Defense announced negotiations with Azerbaijan to extend the lease of the Gabala radar station until 2025. According to media reports, Azerbaijan intends to sharply increase the price for renting radar stations. The conditions of Azerbaijan were an increase in Azerbaijani military personnel at the radar station and the transfer of food, trade and other services to local residents in the military camp at the station.

Russia was interested in maintaining the same rental price, but at the same time wanted to sharply reduce the territory occupied by the station. The station was subject to reconstruction. With its new appearance, a large amount of communications was not required. By 2020, it was planned to build a new generation radar station (Voronezh VP type) in its place).

Russia expected to complete negotiations before June 2012, since the new agreement must be concluded no later than six months before the old treaty expires.

On December 10, 2012, the Russian side suspended the operation of the Gabala radar station.

Expert opinion:

The Gabala radar station was important for Russia until it acquired a much more modern radar station near Armavir. This is the opinion in a conversation with a REGNUM correspondent expressed by Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis. According to him, today Russia does not need the Gabala radar station at all.

“I myself am categorically against the continued operation of this senseless facility. This would be a grave mistake,” the expert said. According to the interlocutor, the new radar is significantly superior to the Gabala radar in functionality and efficiency, and its more northern location does not play any (or almost any) role.

Answering the question about why, in this case, Russia conducted protracted and difficult negotiations with Azerbaijan regarding the extension of the lease of the Gabala radar station, Khramchikhin suggested that the loss of Gabala forced the commissioning of the Armavir radar station in a forced mode, which the Russian side would prefer to avoid . “In addition, perhaps Russia wanted to have two operating stations for some time. Let’s not forget that the Gabala radar station also made it possible to bargain with the Americans,” noted the deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

Regarding the possible impact of the decision to suspend the operation of the Gabala radar station on Russian-Azerbaijani relations, Khramchikhin noted that this is now a problem for Azerbaijan, since it was precisely because of its position that the lease was not extended. “Azerbaijan considered the Gabala radar station to be a lever of influence on Russia and decided to use it. This was his mistake, since there is no longer any leverage,” the expert concluded.