This myth still haunts numerous monographs dedicated to the Soviet aircraft carrier fleet. The designers of the “five” themselves claim that the creation of Project 1143.5 was not the result of the evolutionary development of ships of the “Kiev” type, but the third attempt to implement the design of a real aircraft carrier, which began back in 1971. The requirements for the new ship were revised with kaleidoscopic speed - the composition of the air group, aviation equipment, the number of anti-aircraft weapons and displacement changed. In 1980, the USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov (1908-1984) demanded that the displacement of the designed aircraft carrier be reduced by 10,000 tons, the catapults removed and it be reoriented to short take-off and landing aircraft, for the launch of which a springboard should be used.

In February 1982, the first Soviet aircraft carrier with a continuous flight deck was laid down in Nikolaev, on the Black Sea shipyard(ChSZ) under the name “Riga” (serial number S-105). However, a year later it was remortgaged under the new name “Leonid Brezhnev”. Then sea trials took place under the name "Tbilisi", but when Georgia declared sovereignty, the ship was given the current name "Admiral of the Fleet" Soviet Union Kuznetsov." On August 1, 1990, state tests began. During testing, 16,200 miles were covered and 454 aircraft flights were completed. In May 1990, the ship was temporarily included in the 30th division of surface ships of the Red Black Sea Fleet, and on December 25, 1990, eight years, three months and 24 days after laying, the acceptance certificate was signed. On January 20, 1991, it was officially enlisted in the Northern Fleet, and the naval flag was raised on it. On December 1-24, 1991, the cruiser sailed around Europe to its permanent base in Vidyaevo, Murmansk region.

The main technical and technical characteristics are as follows: displacement 55,000 tons, speed 29 knots, length 304.5 m, width at the waterline 38 m, greatest beam 72 m, draft 10.5 m, crew 1,960 people, aviation personnel 626 people. The main power plant is a boiler-turbine unit with a total capacity of about 200,000 liters. With. Armament: 52 aircraft (MiG-29K, Su-27K fighters, Su-25K attack aircraft, Ka-27 helicopters), 12 launchers for anti-ship missiles, eight launchers for anti-aircraft missiles, eight six-barreled 30-mm machine guns, two rocket launchers.

The ship has a through flight deck, which ends with a ski-jump at the bow. Cable aerofinishers are installed in the aft part of the flight deck - when landing, the aircraft grabs the aerofinisher cable with a hook installed under the fuselage and, experiencing an overload of up to 3.5 g, is slowed down, which reduces the distance after landing to 80-100 m. In the bow of the ship under the deck there are 12 vertical launchers of anti-ship missiles (ASM) "Granit", covered with armored covers flush with the flight deck.

The architecture of Project 1143.5 TAKR has become “more aircraft carrier-like” compared to its predecessors - with a through flight deck with an area of ​​14,800 m², a ski-jump with a landing angle of 14.3° in the bow, two onboard 40-ton aircraft lifts on the starboard side in the bow and stern from the island 13-tier superstructure (height above deck 32 m). The presence of developed sponsons and the displacement of the superstructure to the right made it possible to increase the width of the flight deck to 67 m. The landing section of the flight deck (205 x 26 m), including the left side sponson, is located at an angle of 7° to the ship’s axis. The entire surface of the flight deck and springboard has an anti-slip heat-resistant (up to 450 °C) Omega coating, and three sections (10 x 10 m) intended for vertical landing of the Yak-41 were lined with heat-resistant (up to 750 °C) AK-9FM slabs .

The fully welded hull has seven decks and two platforms in height. A continuous double bottom runs along the entire length of the ship. The main structural material of the hull, main watertight bulkheads, decks and platforms, sponsons and island superstructure is steel; Aluminum-magnesium alloys (with fastening to steel structures) were used for the manufacture of secondary partitions and bulkheads. The surface structural protection (SSP) is made according to the shielding principle; composite structures (such as steel-fiberglass-plastic-steel) serve as internal protective barriers. The main material of NKZ is high-strength steel. To protect fuel tanks and aviation ammunition magazines, local box-shaped armor was used. For the first time in the practice of domestic aircraft carrier shipbuilding, underwater structural protection (SSP) was used to increase the survivability of the ship, which significantly increases the unsinkability characteristics. Based on the results of numerous research projects and full-scale experiments, the depth of the onboard PKZ was taken to be within 4.5-5.0 m. Of the three longitudinal bulkheads, the second one was armored (on the lead ship it was a package, i.e. multi-layered, on the second - monolithic).

The hangar is a closed type, with a total area of ​​3,980 m² (153 x 26 x 7.2 m) - about 50% of the length and 70% of the width of the ship, used for storage and Maintenance up to 70% of the regular number of shipborne aircraft (LAV). It also stores travel tractors, ship gas-jet and fire engines, as well as a set of means for deck maintenance of the LAC. Transportation and placement of aircraft are provided with folded wing consoles, and helicopters with folded rotor blades. At all regular LAC parking places in the hangar and at technical positions, they are moored and grounded. The hangar is equipped with a semi-automatic system for chain transportation of LAC, which makes it possible to abandon the use of tractors and eliminate the contamination of the interior with exhaust gases. Tractors are required only for operations with LAC on the flight deck, when transporting them from the hangar to the lift platforms and back. The typical composition of the air group based on the Project 1143.5 ship includes 52 aircraft: 18 Su-27K and MiG-29K aircraft each and 16 Ka-27 helicopters.

To ensure the landing of high-speed aircraft on the deck, Svetlana-2 aerofinishers are used - four cables stretched across the deck, located at a distance of 12 m from each other and connected through blocks with four hydraulic brake machines designed to dampen kinetic energy. In the operating position, the cables rise above the deck to a predetermined height to catch the landing aircraft with the brake hook, ensuring its complete stop after 90 m of travel with a longitudinal overload of no more than 4.5 g. The fourth cable, counting from the stern, is combined with the Nadezhda emergency barrier. The cable of the first aero arresting device is located 40 m from the stern. In the middle of the second aero arresting device on the deck there is a white circle with a diameter of 17 m - the place where the aircraft brake hook is recommended for pilots to touch when landing.

The main power plant of the TAKR almost completely replicates that used in project 1143.4: four-shaft, steam turbine, with a total power of 200,000 hp. With. The increased fuel supply made it possible to increase the cruising range to 18 knots. travel up to 8,000 miles. The power was increased due to the installation of new boilers. Thanks to this, with an increase in standard displacement by 10,000 tons, it was possible to achieve a full speed of 29 knots. Steam is produced by eight KVG-4 boilers with increased steam capacity. Steam for needs not related to the movement of the ship is obtained through extraction from the main boilers, so an auxiliary boiler installation was not needed. The ship's propulsors are four bronze low-noise five-blade propellers fixed pitch with a diameter of 4,260 mm and a weight of 12,524 kg each.

The Russian TAKR has powerful missile armament: the Granit-NK missile strike system includes 12 ZM-45 anti-ship cruise missiles placed in below-deck silo-type launchers (the silo covers are made flush with the deck). Anti-aircraft missile weapons - four modules of the Kinzhal air defense system (192 missiles) and eight modules of the Kortik air defense system (256 missiles and 48,000 30-mm shells), located on the side of the sponsons and providing the possibility of all-round firing of air targets. Artillery weapons are represented by three batteries consisting of six 30-mm rapid-fire artillery mounts AK-630M (48,000 rounds). Initially, it was planned to place another battery of these machine guns under the nose edge of the take-off springboard for firing at the nose heading angles. Two embrasure cutouts were intended for their installation (they are clearly visible in photographs early stage construction of the lead ship), but they were abandoned.

Due to perestroika and the beginning of the collapse of the USSR economy, the commissioning of the ship was greatly delayed. The first landing on the deck of an aircraft carrier was made by test pilot Viktor Georgievich Pugachev (b. 1948) on September 1, 1989, while combat pilots began to master the deck of the Kuznetsov only in 1994 and already in the Northern Fleet. In 1996, the aircraft carrier made its first long-distance voyage from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean. During the voyage, combat training tasks were practiced; In the Mediterranean Sea, Russian pilots exchanged friendship visits with American colleagues from the air group of the aircraft carrier America, however, the Americans did not dare to land their planes on the deck of the Russian ship and sent a helicopter. From 1996 to 1998 was undergoing renovations, which were greatly delayed as a result of underfunding. In 1998, he took part in major exercises of the Northern Fleet.

In 1999 he went to sea twice combat training. In 2000, he participated in major exercises, during which the K-141 Kursk submarine was lost, took part in a rescue operation, which is why the cruiser’s second trip to military service to the Mediterranean Sea, which was supposed to take place at the end of 2000. From 2001 to 2004. was undergoing scheduled maintenance.

In 2004, as part of a group of nine ships of the Northern Fleet, including the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Velikiy, the missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov, the squadron destroyer Admiral Ushakov and support vessels, he took part in a month-long voyage to the North Atlantic. On December 5, 2007, as part of a naval strike group, it went on its second trip to combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, which lasted until February 3, 2008. According to representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the aircraft carrier requires major repairs, but due to lack of finances, repairs have been postponed until indefinite term. The ship's seventh long-distance voyage was completed in May 2014. From May 14 to August 20, 2015, the TAKR was under repair at the dock of the 82nd ship repair plant (Roslyakovo). On November 6, 2016, the TAKR set off on a cruise to the Mediterranean Sea as part of a group of the Northern Fleet.

Currently, the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov is part of the Northern Fleet and is the only aircraft-carrying ship of the Russian Navy. During cruises, the cruiser is based on Su-25UTG and Su-33 aircraft of the 279th naval fighter aviation regiment (based airfield - Severomorsk-3) and Ka-27 and Ka-29 helicopters of the 830th separate naval anti-submarine helicopter regiment (based airfield - Severomorsk-1). Thus, this aircraft-carrying cruiser can rightfully be considered a full-fledged aircraft carrier. Not the same, of course, as the American nuclear giants such as the Nimitz, but quite equal in combat potential to, for example, the newest French nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. And in terms of the number of naval air group, Kuzya even has superiority: 52 aircraft versus 40 for the Frenchman.

In 1983, a decision was made to build a second ship, Project 1143.5, which received the name “Riga” (serial number S-106). The TTZ included the possibility of improving the project in the event of the emergence of new types of weapons and electronic means. Its construction began immediately after the launch of the lead TAKR: two 900-ton cranes installed the laying block (bow MKO) of a new order with two GTZA and four main boilers already mounted and covered. The ship was launched on November 25, 1988, and during completion it was renamed “Varyag” (June 19, 1990).

Initially, the 6th completely repeated the “five”, but already in June 1986, a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued to change some of the main elements of the cruiser, in particular electronic weapons (the ship was assigned the index project 1143.6). Thus, the Mars-Passat radar was to be replaced with a more effective new Forum, consisting of the Podberezovik radar with the ability to select air targets, two Fregat-MA radars and an information processing, target distribution and target designation system of the Poyma type. All this required the alteration of about 150 rooms, mainly in the superstructure. It was also necessary to correct a significant amount of design documentation, which led to a delay in the completion of the cruiser by approximately nine months. In addition, on the Varyag, unlike the lead ship, it was already planned to provide a base for the Yak-44RLD radar patrol and guidance aircraft (with the ability to take off from a distant launch position), which also caused a number of alterations. True, until the end of 1991, this work was not actually started due to the lack of data on the aircraft from the Design Bureau named after. Yakovleva.

“Varyag” was built for the Pacific Fleet with a delivery date of 1993. Even after the collapse of the USSR, until the end of 1991, completion proceeded in accordance with the schedule agreed upon and approved even before the abolition of the former Ministry of Shipbuilding and Industry of the USSR. To ensure the basing of aircraft carriers at ChSZ, they managed to manufacture and send to the Far East a special pontoon-berth, similar to the one that was previously delivered to Vidyaevo for the Admiral Kuznetsov. Taking into account the planned modernization, blocks of premises previously intended for Mars-Passat radar stations were cut off on the superstructure and foundations were installed for the Fregat-MA AP of the Forum radar.

But soon economic crisis in the former republics of the Union made itself felt at ChSZ - cable supplies were disrupted by the Amurkabel and Azovkabel enterprises, which, in turn, did not receive raw materials from Uzbekistan. Then problems arose with pricing and its impact on the cost of building the ship. Moreover, as always happens during periods of collapse of large states, this was accompanied by collapses in the economy, rising prices and galloping inflation.

Despite the cessation of funding (IV quarter of 1991), the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant (General Director Yu. I. Makarov) completed the construction of the TAKR at its own expense, hoping that Moscow would later reimburse the costs (more than 700 million US dollars in 1980s prices). . However, the former Soviet republics that became independent did not show any interest in completing the Varyag. Russia, which declared in 1993 that it was ready to complete the construction of the ship, also did nothing for this, limiting itself to fruitless negotiations. In particular, regarding the Varyag, it was proposed to create a special intergovernmental body with emergency powers that would coordinate the completion of the cruiser. Government delegations from Ukraine and Russia even came to Nikolaev to inspect it. But none of them, under the new conditions, had the means to complete the construction of such a complex ship.

Therefore, in March 1995, Russia officially refused to finance the construction of the Varyag, transferring it to ChSZ to pay off the company’s debts 1 . Ukraine, after considering various options for dismantling the ship, which was 67% complete, including the possibility of using it as a floating spaceport, was ultimately forced to sell the unfinished aircraft carrier abroad. Based on the results of the study carried out in 1997-1998. In an international tender, the winner of which was a Chinese company registered in Macau, Varyag was sold by the State Property Fund of Ukraine for only 20 million US dollars.

While its fate was being decided, the Varyag continued to remain at the plant, turning at the beginning of 2000 into the “goose that lays the golden eggs” for ChSZ - the Chinese paid the plant $5,000 a day for parking the TAKR. In the first half of 2000, it was expected that a contract would be signed with a Chinese company for the completion and conversion of the Varyag into a floating self-propelled entertainment and tourist complex (the contract amount was expected to be 200-300 million US dollars). But plans changed, and on June 14 at 5.30 am, tugs removed the Varyag from the factory waters and began towing it to China. His further fate will definitely be discussed in the corresponding issue of NiT.

Initially, the cruisers of projects 1143.5 and 1143.6 were supposed to be equipped with steam catapults (one of them was even built and tested on land). But the developers failed to provide the necessary rigidity to the catapult track design, and it turned out to be inoperative. Therefore, as a necessary measure, instead of catapults, the ships received springboards. In the summer of 1982, in Crimea, at the Nitka complex, experimental work began on taking off Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft from a springboard, which ultimately ended in success.

In the used ski-jump scheme, take-off from the deck is carried out by accelerating the aircraft with its own engines in afterburner mode. At the end of the takeoff run, the plane reaches the springboard, which sets the required angle of climb and makes takeoff somewhat easier. Until the engines reach full thrust, the aircraft is held on the deck by special grips on the landing gear, which are then lowered below the deck in a strictly synchronized manner, making it possible to begin the takeoff run. To reflect the jet stream of an aircraft standing at the start, a protective deflector shield rises above the deck.

"Kuznetsov" has three launch positions, two of which are located on the deck, one after the other, at a distance of about 85 m. But since take-off is only from a springboard, several aircraft cannot take off at the same time. It is quite natural that to increase the speed of aircraft takeoff, rapid alternation of starts from the left and right positions is used. The speed of alternation is related to the speed of cleaning the deflector shield of the nearest starting position. The lack of catapults did not allow the cruisers to compare with modern US aircraft carriers in the ability to quickly lift an air group into the air on alert. The advantage of American aircraft carriers in this regard is that they are equipped with four catapults for launching aircraft, which are located in pairs at an angle to each other on the bow on a corner section of the deck. This scheme allows aircraft to be lifted into the air with an interval of only 15 seconds between them.

In 1984, the main opponent of aircraft carriers, Ustinov, died. Almost immediately after this, the Nevsky Design Bureau was again entrusted with the design of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier with increased displacement, more aircraft and steam catapults. Despite the fundamental difference from the Kyiv-class ships, the aircraft carrier still continues to be called the seventh TAKR - project 1143.7. When this ship was laid down at the ChSZ slipway in Nikolaev on November 25, 1988, it received the name “Ulyanovsk”. TTZ for its development in accordance with the weapons program for 1986-1995. The NPKB received it in December 1984. In 1986, the preliminary design was completed and approved, and in 1987, the technical design ( chief designer L.V. Belov, then Yu.M. Varfolomeev). In October of the same year, the main elements of ATAKR were approved: an air group consisting of 70 aircraft (Su-27K and MiG-29K fighters, Yak-44RLD radar and guidance aircraft, Ka-27 and Ka-31 helicopters), a ski jump, two catapults, arresting devices , new anti-ship missile system "Bolid" (later replaced by "Granit"), air defense missile system "Dagger", air defense missile system "Kortik", four-shaft nuclear power plant (280,000 kW), total displacement 73,400 tons, full speed 30 knots.

ATAKR was intended to impart combat stability to fleet formations in operationally important sea and ocean areas, as well as to destroy enemy naval groups in cooperation with other naval forces. Externally, it would differ from the ships of Project 1143.5 in the increased main dimensions, the presence of a third aircraft lift (from the stern on the left side), a reduced superstructure in length, and most importantly, the presence of two steam catapults. In general, continuity was maintained - the ship was equipped with a bow take-off ramp.

The creation of ATAKR was a qualitatively new stage in the development of the Soviet military shipbuilding and aircraft carrier fleet. Project 1143.7 ATAKR had no foreign analogues. In terms of aviation equipment, it could be comparable to the American nuclear aircraft carrier J. Washington", and surpassed it in the presence of strike missile weapons and anti-aircraft weapons. On the ship, to the maximum extent possible, samples of weapons, mechanisms, equipment and materials previously provided for ships of Project 1143.5 were used. 33 development work was carried out, 11 of which were carried out according to the plans of the Ministry of Defense (Navy and Air Force). The number and range of the naval air group increased. In particular, it was planned to create the Su-27KM multi-purpose aircraft, the Su-27KPP jamming aircraft, the Su-27KRTS target designation and reconnaissance aircraft, the Yak-44PLO anti-submarine aircraft and the Yak-44RLD radar patrol and guidance aircraft. A prototype of the Mayak steam catapult and a prototype of the energy complex that ensures its operation on superheated steam as part of a boiler unit, steam accumulators and condensers passed preliminary tests at the Nitka complex and were recommended for operation. In general, according to experts, the new types of weapons of the ship pr. 1143.7 should have corresponded to the world level of 1995-2000.

The ship's power plant was created on the basis of the KN-3 and GTZA-653 PPUs that were mass-produced and successfully operated on the Kirov-class missile cruisers (Project 1144). Implementation nuclear energy promised to give a significant reduction in the consumption of organic fuel, thereby providing the ship with an almost unlimited cruising range, the possibility of long-term maintenance high speeds progress and more than doubling the reserves of aviation fuel and aviation ammunition. Airplane landing conditions were improved due to the absence of the heat plume typical for ships of previous projects with CTU. At the same time, the corrosion of aircraft located on the flight deck was reduced.

The ship was to have the following main dimensions: maximum length - 321 m, waterline length - 280 m, maximum width (with corner deck and transition bridges) - 79.5 m, waterline width - 38 m; side height from the main line to the upper deck amidships - 27.5 m, in the bow - 33 m, overall height - 65.5 m; standard displacement - 62,580 tons.

The lead ATAKR, named “Ulyanovsk” (serial number S-107, senior builder P. S. Gerasimov), was laid down in Nikolaev on the slipway “O” on November 25, 1988. The slipway period was designed for 36 months, the total duration of construction was 105 months , delivery date to the fleet - 1995. The cost of the order was estimated at 800 million rubles. At Nitka it was planned to begin testing the ejection takeoff of the Su-27K and MiG-29K. In addition, they also planned to complete the construction of the previously mothballed BS-3 block for testing serial models of catapults and arresting devices intended for installation on ships being built by ChSZ.

The slipway work at Ulyanovsk was carried out using progressive technology, with the formation of a hull on the slipway from 27 large blocks weighing up to 1,380 tons, full of mechanisms, devices and equipment. To ensure nuclear shipbuilding at ChSZ, work began on the reconstruction and modernization of the entire production. It was necessary to build a number of special production units; for their placement in the water area of ​​the Southern Bug adjacent to the ChSZ, a fairly large area was washed with sand.

Work on forming the hull on the slipway progressed quite quickly. In total, they managed to install structures with a total weight of about 27,000 tons. At ChSZ, almost everything was ready for the installation of an automatic control unit, a technical department special energy specialist, responsible for the installation and physical start-up of a nuclear installation. It was planned to mount four reactors on the ship, combined into two 1,400-ton zonal blocks - for the bow and stern engine groups. For their assembly, a floating autonomous workshop with a sliding roof was specially built and installed on the ground at the stern of the slipway “O”. Upon completion of assembly, the blocks were supposed to be lifted by 900-ton cranes and installed on the ship. The bodies of four metal radiation protection tanks were welded, the shell of which was filled with lead. In 1990-1991 ChSZ received reactor vessels, steam generators, pumps, filters and pipelines. One of these blocks was welded, the second was assembled and prepared for welding. There were no problems or delays during the construction of the Ulyanovsk, and the ship could well have been delivered on time. It was also planned to build a second ATAKR (S-108), the laying of which was scheduled for 1992.

By November 1991, the ship's readiness was 17-20%. After the collapse of the USSR and the cessation of funding, the slipway was blocked by the ATAKR corps, which did not allow it to be used for its intended purpose. Based on a real assessment of the situation, on February 4, 1992, an order was issued by the Prime Minister of Ukraine on the disposal of Ulyanovsk, and on February 5, an order was issued by ChSZ to stop work on the order S-107 (and S-108). The dismantling of the hull was completed by November2. Thus, the evolution of domestic aircraft carriers was put to an end... And Russia’s place in the elite club of nuclear aircraft carriers was taken by France, which in 1995 launched its first such ship, the Charles de Gaulle.

Since 1991, the implementation of projects for the construction of aircraft-carrying ships in Russia has been suspended. Around 1990 (1991?) an article “Do we need an aircraft carrier” appeared in Moscow News. This topic was picked up by dozens of “very specialized publications” - “Moskovsky Komsomolets”, “Echo of the Planet”, etc. Only the lazy did not write about it. On their pages, “experts” expressed only one thought - “the new democratic Russia does not need AVs, it’s better with this money...”. The result of this company was a reduction and then a complete collapse of the aircraft carrier program. But this does not mean that in the new conditions there was no reason to have such ships in the Russian Navy. The press noted that after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, there followed a transfer of the defense efforts of states into the interethnic space.

As is known, the length of Russia’s maritime borders is 38.8 thousand km (for comparison, the length of the land border is 14.5 thousand km), the area of ​​the continental shelf is 4.2 million km2. Along the entire maritime border there is a 200-mile exclusive economic zone with an area of ​​more than 6.3 million km2, in which sovereign rights and jurisdiction must be ensured Russian Federation and protection of its interests.

In these gigantic sea and ocean expanses, naval forces, ships of various purposes, classes, types, including aircraft carriers, must be constantly or periodically (on call, with aggravation of the situation, etc.). That is why, taking into account the increasingly increasing shortage of organic types of ship fuel in the near future, we will have to admit that there is no alternative to nuclear power plants for the military shipbuilding of industrially and economically developed countries for the next few decades. Of course, shipborne nuclear power plants require a high level of maintenance and strict compliance with requirements nuclear safety(structural, operational, environmental, etc.) Such experience and, most importantly, a system for operating nuclear power plants in the Navy and the country’s icebreaker fleet exist.

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Nuclear aircraft carriers are ships newest generation, which are available only to the leading powers of the world. However, they are practically not included in the composition. What's the problem? Why is the Russian Federation, which in many respects is the leader in the international arms race, lagging so far behind in this indicator? After all, the United States already has quite a decent number of such ships. Where are Russia's nuclear aircraft carriers? It is to this question that you will find out the answer in this article. You will understand why this aspect of the arms race in the Russian Federation turned out to be so weak. You will also learn about ships of this type that were produced in Russia, but for one reason or another did not end up in the Navy. You can also get information about the only aircraft carrier in service in the Navy, as well as whether Russian nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are planned in the near future.

Naturally, it is impossible to obtain specific information about such projects - on television the responsible persons may say one thing, on paper something else will be indicated, but in reality something else may happen. Therefore, information about the future of nuclear aircraft carriers in Russia is purely speculative.

Why are there no nuclear aircraft carriers in Russia?

Russian nuclear aircraft carriers are a very interesting topic, since one of the strongest powers in the world, militarily, is almost completely missing a large and important segment. How did this happen? The whole problem lies in the legacy that the Russian Federation inherited from the Russian Federation. The snag can be found when studying the military policy of the USSR - the fact is that the state completely abandoned the production of aircraft carriers, without even considering them as a concept for ships carrying air power.

Already during the times of the Soviet Union, the foundation began to be laid for the inequality of this aspect in the future Russia in comparison, for example, with the United States. As a result, at the beginning of its existence the Russian Federation did not have aircraft carriers and no plans or programs for their production, the country met the new millennium in exactly the same situation, and even today there are only rumors about when Russian nuclear aircraft carriers will appear and conversations.

Attempt to start production

This is not to say that the Soviet Union did not even try. In the early seventies, the USSR actually planned the construction of the first full-fledged nuclear aircraft carrier, which could mark the beginning of the recruitment of a real nuclear fleet. A project has already been created, which received the working title “1160”. The goal of this project was to create by 1986 as many as three full-fledged nuclear aircraft carriers that could give ejection takeoff to one of the most efficient Soviet aircraft, the Su-27 K. However, unfortunately, the plan was not destined to be implemented, since at that time the USSR was concentrating on the creation of heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, which cannot be called full-fledged nuclear aircraft carriers for many reasons. And it was then that a proposal was made to create the latest heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser with vertical take-off. It was then that the “1160” project was curtailed, and the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of domestic origin was never born.

By the way, the aircraft-carrying cruiser project, which replaced Project 1160, was a complete defeat. In 1991, it was completed, test launches began, which ultimately led to one of the planes falling directly onto the deck of the cruiser and burning out there. By 1992, the project was abandoned, and the Soviet Union was left without both nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and cruisers with a vertical launch system, and the Russian Federation, which appeared a year later, without any baggage in the field of developing nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

What is there now?

When it comes to Russian nuclear aircraft carriers, classification plays a very important role. big role. The fact is that there are no nuclear aircraft carriers in the country at all. And they were never created either in Russia or before that in the Soviet Union. But if we put aside meticulousness, then heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, which have already been written about, can be classified as aircraft carriers. And then you can trace the history of how those cruisers that were already operating in Russia appeared.

The first were the cruisers Kyiv, Minsk and Novorossiysk. They were launched in the seventies and decommissioned together in 1993. The first stood idle for ten years until it was sent to China, where it became an exhibit in a themed museum. The second one, two years after being written off, was sold to South Korea, where they wanted to disassemble it to obtain metal, but then it was resold to China, where, like the previous one, it ended up in a thematic museum. The third one was the least fortunate - it was sold to Korea for dismantling, but no one bought it back, so the cruiser was dismantled for parts.

As for more modern models, then it’s worth paying attention to the aircraft-carrying cruiser “Varyag”, which was launched in 1988. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it went to Ukraine, which sold it to China, where it was improved, completed and ready for use. As a result, it operates to this day under the name “Liaoning”. Another cruiser that is still in operation is the Admiral Gorshkov, which operated until 2004, after which it was sold to India, where it was reconstructed, converted into a classic nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and is still in service with the Indian Navy. There is another aircraft-carrying cruiser called Ulyanovsk that could operate in the Russian Federation - it was laid down relatively recently, in 1998, and was planned to be completed by 1995. At the same time, he could still easily serve in the Russian Navy, but the project was curtailed even before its completion, and what had already been assembled was dismantled back into metal. This is how Russia’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carriers never entered service with the Navy.

"Admiral Kuznetsov"

But are these all Russian nuclear-powered aircraft carriers? The review does not end here, because it is still necessary to look at one copy, which is the only one that remains afloat and in the Navy. What kind of ship is this? This is the Russian nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov - the only ship in the Russian Navy that can be classified as an aircraft carrier. However, at the same time, it can only be called a nuclear aircraft carrier conditionally, since it, like previous models, is a TAVKR, that is, like all other aircraft-carrying ships, it was built at the Soviet Chernigov shipyard. This ship was laid down in 1985, and in 1988 it was already launched - since then it has been operating and has managed to serve both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. It received its name only after the collapse of the USSR; before that it had several different names. Initially, it was given the name “Riga”, then it was renamed “Leonid Brezhnev”, after which it became “Tbilisi”, and only then the Russian nuclear-powered aircraft carrier “Admiral Kuznetsov” was born. What kind of ship is this, which today is the only one in all of Russia?

Ship specifications

As you can see, the Russian Navy does not have large numbers of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The technical characteristics of the only heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, however, may arouse interest. So, this is a ship with a rather impressive displacement - more than sixty thousand tons. Its length is 306 meters, its width is seventy meters, and its height at its greatest point is 65 meters. The ship's draft can be from eight to ten meters, with a maximum displacement of 10.4 meters. The armor of this ship is made of rolled steel, and the hull is duplicated with additional compartments. The ship is protected from enemy torpedoes by a 4.5-meter three-layer protection - the armor layer is capable of withstanding a hit with a charge of 400 kilograms of TNT. As for the engines, it is worth noting that four-shaft boiler-turbine technology was used, which is not used on full-fledged nuclear aircraft carriers. However, if we talk about dry technical characteristics oh, then four steam turbines produce a total of 200 thousand horsepower, turbogenerators produce 13 and a half thousand kilowatts, and diesel generators produce another nine thousand kilowatts. It is also worth noting the propulsion unit, which consists of four five-blade propellers. What does all this add up to? The total gives a maximum speed of 29 knots, that is, 54 kilometers per hour. It is also worth noting the combat economic and economic speeds - the first is 18 knots, and the second is 14.

How long can this ship sail without refueling? The range, naturally, depends on the speed: at maximum speed the range is 3850 nautical miles, at economic combat speed - a little more than seven and a half thousand nautical miles, and at economic speed - almost eight and a half thousand nautical miles. Regardless of the distance traveled, the navigation autonomy is also considered, which in the case of this ship is forty-five days. The crew of such a ship numbers a little less than two thousand people. This is a result that could easily be surpassed by modern Russian nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The characteristics were laid down about thirty years ago, so there is nothing surprising here. However, this is not all that you can find out about the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier currently in service with the Russian Navy.

Armament

Considering the fact that this ship is a combat ship, it has a large set of various weapons on board, this is what we will talk about now. “Admiral Kuznetsov” boasts the “Beysur” navigation system, which allows for maximum targeted fire. Before looking at the guns themselves, it’s also worth looking at the radar devices - there are plenty of them on the ship. There are seven different general detection radars on board, as well as two aviation control stations. It is also worth paying attention to radio electronics - on board there is a combat information and control system "Lesorub", a communications complex "Buran-2" and much more.

Well, now we can turn our attention to the weapons - first of all, it is worth noting the six anti-aircraft artillery installations, designed for 48 thousand shells. Among the missile weapons on board the ship there are 12 Granit launchers, 4 anti-aircraft missile systems"Dirk" and four "Dagger" launchers. The ship also has a method of attack or defense against submarines - these are two rocket systems designed to carry sixty bombs.

Aviation group

Separately, it is worth taking a look at the aircraft-carrying component of the technical characteristics. "Admiral Kuznetsov" is designed for fifty aircraft that could be transported on board. Moreover, it was assumed that helicopters would also be present there. However, in reality, everything turned out to be a little different, and today this ship serves as the base for only thirty aircraft, most of which are Su-33 and MiG-29K.

Future plans

But what next? Will Russia have a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier? Or will Admiral Kuznetsov remain the only representative for a long time? A decade ago, Russians were pinning their hopes on the upcoming revision of the decree, which took place in 2009. As with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation, ten years ago the government had no plans at all for this segment of the military market. In the same time main competitor, was already launching the tenth full-fledged nuclear aircraft carrier. But what happened in 2009? The plan was already drawn up until 2020, and nuclear aircraft carriers were still not listed there. So the new nuclear aircraft carrier of Russia has not yet appeared even on paper - it exists so far only in words, and even then in the press, and not in the statements of official authorized persons.

Prototypes

In fact, work on the design of aircraft carriers is already underway, but the Russian Navy will not receive a new generation nuclear aircraft carrier very soon. Certainly not in 2020. In some cases, sources report that other countries are working on aircraft carriers for Russia, but more often than not, a message flashes with a picture of a draft of what Russia's nuclear-powered aircraft carriers will look like. The photo shows which one could carry great amount aircraft by eliminating the bulky main structure and replacing it with small control towers.

Medvedev's instructions

However, people's hopes were revived in 2015, when Dmitry Medvedev ordered the Ministry of Defense to develop a plan for the introduction of nuclear aircraft carriers. This will not be the easiest task for the reason that you already know - full-fledged ships of this type have never been built on the territory of the Russian Federation or even the former Soviet Union. A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is not the same thing as a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, so completely different technologies will have to be used. However, one way or another, the most optimistic forecasts report that by 2020 a plan may be proposed to create the first nuclear-powered aircraft carriers intended for the Russian Navy.

In the distant future, the Russian Navy may receive an aircraft carrier built to a completely new design. Specific plans in this regard have not yet been formed, and the project for construction has not yet been selected. However, this does not prevent domestic and foreign experts from discussing interesting topic, and also make different forecasts. An interesting analysis of the situation and prospects for the Russian aircraft carrier program was presented by the English-language online publication Military Watch.

On April 7, the publication published the first part of a major article “Russia's SHTORM Concept Design a Worthwhile Investment? How Moscow Would Deploy its Supercarrier” (“ Russian project"Storm": a profitable investment? How Moscow will build its super-aircraft carrier”). It examined events of the past and present. On May 4, the second part of the publication appeared, the topic of which was the expected events of the foreseeable future and the prospects for the new Russian project.

Superaircraft carrier "Ulyanovsk"

At the beginning of the first publication, Military Watch recalls recent news. Earlier, the Russian military indicated the possibility of building a new aircraft carrier based on a design from the Krylov State Research Center. As a result of the implementation of such plans, Russia will become the only country in the world, other than the United States, capable of building and operating such large ships. The proposed project is said to be similar to a modernized version of the Ulyanovsk aircraft carrier, which was built in the late eighties.

The publication recalls that due to the collapse of the USSR, the construction of Ulyanovsk was stopped, and the finished structures were later cut into metal. The unfinished ship could have become the first aircraft carrier in the Soviet Union/Russia capable of operating in the ocean zone. In addition, this was only the second Soviet aircraft carrier project that could carry aircraft without vertical takeoff and landing. The first project of this kind led to the appearance of the ship "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov".

Currently, the Russian Navy has only one aircraft carrier. The Admiral Kuznetsov has a displacement of less than 55 thousand tons and, according to Military Watch, is poorly suited for combat work in the oceans. In terms of its combat capabilities, it is noticeably inferior to the American ships of the Nimitz and Gerald R. Ford projects. American aircraft carriers carry almost twice as many aircraft and are capable of launching them about once a minute, while the Kuznetsov can provide one takeoff every four minutes.

Nimitz-class supercarrier

Another advantage of American ships lies in the presence of steam and electromagnetic catapults, which increases the permissible take-off weight carrier-based aircraft. Due to this, fighter-bombers can carry more fuel and, in addition, the operation of E-2 Hawkeye early warning aircraft is ensured. Russian carrier-based aviation has no analogues to the latter.

The publication considers the Admiral Kuznetsov’s only advantage over American aircraft carriers to be its excellent anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons. Due to this, the aircraft carrier becomes less dependent on accompanying ships. In addition, there may be advantages in the performance and capabilities of carrier-based aircraft. However, as Military Watch notes, this is a merit of the aviation industry, but not shipbuilding or the aircraft carrier itself.

A Russian aircraft carrier was operating off the coast of Syria not so long ago, but lost two of its aircraft in accidents. American ships The Nimitz class, in turn, proved to be more effective in projecting force in similar operations. However, the new Russian concept project “Storm” provides for similar capabilities. It combines the characteristics of the older ships of the Nimitz project and the latest Gerald R. Ford. The Russian aircraft carrier of the future will receive electromagnetic catapults, which will improve the basic characteristics of aircraft. A deck measuring 330 by 40 meters and the ability to carry 80-90 aircraft will result in a significant combat potential.

The concept project of the super-carrier "Storm"

The publication recalls that the USSR did not build a powerful aircraft carrier fleet. In addition, due to the peculiarities of the military doctrine, he began the construction of a developed oceanic group rather late. The Soviet navy emphasized missile technology and submarines, and it made sense economically. One aircraft carrier cost as much as a thousand cruise missiles - and even a hundred of these items could be guaranteed to sink an enemy aircraft carrier at a long range. Progress in the field of anti-ship weapons has led to the fact that only one modern missile is capable of destroying a super-aircraft carrier with a displacement of 100 thousand tons. Aircraft carriers are still vulnerable to missiles. Unlike them, submarines, being a convenient means of projecting force, are more tenacious.

Aircraft carriers are unlikely to be the main weapon in a major war, but the doctrine of the United States is not without advantages. Ships with aircraft on board symbolize the military power of the country, and in addition, they are a convenient means of fighting opponents with limited capabilities. Near the shores of Russia, China or North Korea- in the reach of coastal missile systems - aircraft carriers are indeed at serious risk. However, they showed themselves well in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Panama, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and in the fight against Middle Eastern terrorists. Finally, aircraft carriers are a convenient means of monitoring ocean trade routes far from enemy shores.

Military Watch believes that countries with great military power should always be prepared to clash with each other. At the same time, they should not forget about the possibility of entering into minor conflicts. The last major war involving powerful powers was in 1953, and local conflicts occur regularly. As a consequence, capabilities in the context of small wars can be of strategic importance. Russian submarines are the best remedy to fight the US Navy and Army, while supercarriers are more convenient for fighting terrorists, for example, in the Middle East, as well as for projecting power in any part of the World Ocean.

Su-57 - fifth generation air superiority fighters

The Russian supercarrier could make friendly visits to ports in Southeast Asia or visit Latin American countries that have strained relations with the United States. Concluding the first part of its article, Military Watch notes that the political consequences of such actions and their impact on the prestige of the country cannot be underestimated.

The second part of the article “Russia's SHTORM Concept Design a Worthwhile Investment? How Moscow Would Deploy its Supercarrier”, published a few days ago, is directly devoted to the promising Storm project and related issues in the context of its future service.

At the beginning of the second part, it is noted that a Storm-class aircraft carrier can indeed be very useful, since it will give Russia a number of new capabilities. However, its construction may be associated with some problems that call into question the entire program. First of all, the doubts of foreign authors are related to the cost of the work. An aircraft carrier itself is expensive, and a large aviation group further increases the cost of construction and operation.

Light carrier-based fighter MiG-29K

As far as is known, in the future Russia has no plans to abandon air superiority fighters, which is a response to the composition of air groups of foreign ships. At the same time, the new Storm will not have to use Su-33 fighters, which form the basis of Admiral Kuznetsov’s aviation. Instead, the ship will receive newer MiG-29K multirole fighters already in service. In addition, a carrier-based modification of the fifth-generation fighter Su-57 is possible.

The promising aircraft will cost about $100 million, not counting development costs. However, thanks to it, the Storm will become the only aircraft carrier in the world supporting the operation of a fifth-generation superiority fighter. As a result, the ship will receive significant advantages over any potential opponents. Military Watch recalls that the Pentagon planned to create a carrier-based modification of its F-22 fighter, but then abandoned such a project. Thus, the United States will not have an analogue of the Russian carrier-based Su-57.

If Russia really starts building a new aircraft carrier, then the question of where it will serve will become relevant. He will probably not be able to join the Black Sea Fleet. Russian Ministry defense has repeatedly indicated that this fleet is capable of defeating any enemy forces in the region. In the Black Sea area, enemy ships find themselves within the range of coastal attack systems, and therefore there are almost no tasks left for the aircraft carrier. In addition, the deployment of an aircraft carrier in the Black Sea is complicated by current international agreements.

Chinese carrier-based air superiority fighter J-15

At the same time, the aircraft carrier could be useful to any of the other three Russian fleets. In their areas, the balance of power looks different, and the aircraft carrier is unlikely to remain idle. The ship can also serve at a distance from its base in certain regions.

To fight terrorists in Syria, as well as to reduce NATO's potential in the region, the Russian fleet has deployed ships to the Mediterranean Sea. However, Admiral Kuznetsov turned out to be ill-suited to work at such a distance from the base. The promising "Storm", in turn, will be able to show its advantages, as well as change the balance of power in the region. As a result, Russia will demonstrate its power, and a critical ally in Damascus will receive the necessary support. Russia is strengthening ties with the Gulf countries, and in the future this region could also become the target of another aircraft carrier cruise. In this case, the ship will also be a symbol of support for friendly countries.

Military Watch recalls that, according to open data, the Storm project provides for ensuring the ship’s operation at extreme temperatures, including in the Arctic. Now the Russian armed forces are building up their force in the Arctic and at the same time actually competing with the American and Canadian military. This strengthening of army groups is due to the desire of several countries to obtain uniquely large Natural resources region. The appearance in the Arctic of a new super-aircraft carrier with fifth-generation carrier-based fighters will seriously change the balance of power. At the same time, American aircraft carriers are unlikely to be able to operate normally in northern latitudes.

The deck version of the F-22 fighter is a project that was never realized

If the aircraft carrier "Storm" can really influence the situation in the Arctic and gain dominance in the airspace of the region, then at the same time it will help Russia take control of the most important resources. As a result, the aircraft carrier program will fully justify the costs of its implementation.

Military Watch considers the Asia-Pacific region to be the third location for possible deployment of the Storm. IN last years almost all new aircraft carriers in the world are sent to combat service there. China is now building its aircraft carrier fleet and sending ships to the seas near its coast, solving defense problems. At the same time, the United States, France and Japan are deploying ships closer to China as a show of strength and interest in the region.

In July 2017, the UK promised to join such work. Its defense minister, Michael Fallon, said that immediately after completion of construction and testing, two British aircraft carriers will immediately depart for the Asia-Pacific region. Apparently, this promise will be fulfilled in the near future.

Hypothetical carrier-based fighter based on the Su-57

Russia has its own interests in this region, and therefore is increasing its presence. Russian ships regularly come to the seas of the region, including to participate in joint exercises of the Russian and Chinese navies. Appearing near Southeast Asia, a promising Russian super-aircraft carrier could shift the balance of power and reduce the influence of NATO countries or Japan.

The military budget of Russia is gradually being reduced, and the burden on it is growing. At the same time, as Military Watch notes, the promising aircraft carrier of the Storm project is capable of changing the situation in any of the three regions of strategic importance. The military and military-political consequences of his service may lead to the Russian project becoming of interest to foreign customers, and this will lead to the construction of ships for export. So, potential client Russian shipbuilders can be considered India. It has already acquired one aircraft carrier from Russia and is interested in increasing the number of such ships. In addition, the purchase of the Storm could be beneficial to China, which is interested in copying technologies or design solutions in order to develop its own shipbuilding program.

Also, the Chinese military may show interest in a carrier-based modification of the Su-57 fighter. The adoption of such an aircraft will be a serious breakthrough in comparison with the J-15 type aircraft available to the fleet. However, it cannot yet be ruled out that the Chinese industry is developing its own fifth-generation carrier-based fighter. If the “Storm” with carrier-based Su-57s appears in the Pacific Ocean, then the results of such combat service could influence China’s future decisions, and the contract for the supply of equipment will allow Russia to at least partially cover the costs of its development.

The second part of a lengthy article from Military Watch ends with very optimistic conclusions. The authors believe that the largest cost of building a new Storm-class supercarrier will have to result in comparable strategic benefits. First of all, such trends will appear when the ship is deployed in the Arctic. The export potential of the project will also benefit. As a result, the benefits - both financial and military-political - will more than cover all the costs of development, construction and operation. Thus, the Storm aircraft carrier construction program has high potential and a great future.

Article "Russia"s SHTORM Concept Design a Worthwhile Investment? How Moscow Would Deploy its Supercarrier":
Part 1: http://militarywatchmagazine.com/read.php?my_data=70145
Part 2: http://militarywatchmagazine.com/read.php?my_data=70146

During the memorable years of perestroika, while communicating with one of the admirals of the US Navy, our leaders of the USSR Navy were shocked by his following statement. " Would any country risk arresting or capturing even one US citizen, because our aircraft carrier would arrive and everything would be decided as it should be? And even if we give you one of the Forrestal-class aircraft carriers with an air wing, this will not help, since in order to develop it we will have to pay with the blood of the pilots and “run” the path that we have covered for 60 years, but during this time we let's go even further».

So it turns out that the American taxpayer clearly knows: no matter what happens, “ his majesty aircraft carrier (AV)“The US Navy will not abandon him and will definitely try to save him. What do Russian citizens pay for? For the huge number of tanks that will not go to save our businessmen and tourists in Thailand or Singapore if necessary, and for the very illusory hope that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will save them?

Projecting force will bring clarity

If necessary, only the projection of force can save. AB and universal landing ship (UDC) are precisely those ships that are capable of projecting power into dubious regions. If a Russian AB and UDC with several escort ships were maneuvering in the South China Sea, relying on friendly Vietnam with a naval base in Da Nang, it is unlikely that the Thai leadership would extradite Russian businessman Viktor Bout to the United States. Most likely, he would have been “quietly” sent through the projecting force to Russia.

This is how this “respectable” Thailand quietly acted and will continue to act with American, French and other violators of its laws, and even with representatives of these countries who were caught trafficking drugs, although in Thailand itself the death penalty is imposed for this. But for this you need to have projecting power.

Thailand is not a NATO member, and its entire air force in 2011-2012 consisted of only 45 combat-ready multi-role fighters type F-16A/B, clearly unable to withstand 50 Su-33 or MiG-29K based on the Ulyanovsk type aircraft. There are smart people in Asia and why do they need a little “enforcement for peace”. But the Thai leadership, before and now, clearly does not pay attention to the periscopes of submarines. The Thai Navy has a small submarine and no submarines at all.

We can continue to recall the results of power projection in Yugoslavia, Libya and, finally, Syria. Somehow our only aircraft, which went on its last cruise with only 10 Su-33s (the rest of the aircraft were probably sent for modernization), got tired at the wrong time, and we had to assemble a “Tsushima squadron” from the ships of the Northern Army without it to help Syria. , Baltic and Black Sea fleets. What submarines will the anti-submarine ships included in our forces fight against? Will terrorists be afraid of this force?

Three companies of marines on our landing ships, defenseless from the air, will not scare anyone either. But the roar of the jet engines of the combat Su-33 or MiG-29K, constantly flying in the Mediterranean, could make many people pull their heads into their shoulders.

By the way, the question now becomes very relevant: who after Syria? And many experts believe that among them will be those countries that buy Russian weapons and into which they are actively penetrating or have already penetrated Russian capital. So our entrepreneurs with their taxes will have to finance, first of all, the Navy with its AB and UDC, as well as Russia’s strategic aviation. They are the ones who are capable of projecting real power in peacetime almost anywhere on the globe, as well as protecting domestic capital and our vacationing taxpayers.

Where should ABs be based?

Returning to future domestic aircraft carriers, we emphasize: We need a ship the size of Project 11437 Ulyanovsk AB with a displacement of 70–80 thousand tons. England is building two such ABs and France is going to build them. Is Russia really poorer than these countries? It must be admitted that the use of a springboard on our aircraft is not a scientifically based decision, but a tribute to those leaders of the USSR who wanted to fundamentally new technology and technology to receive the title of Hero of Socialist Labor of the USSR. It was the springboard that “ate” approximately 12–16 aircraft of the air group due to the impossibility of placing them in the bow.

This year, “Admiral Kuznetsov” is going to be sent for major repairs and modernization. Perhaps the new Navy command will be smart enough to remove all existing “nonsense” from the ship, enlarge the hangar and, consequently, the air group. And something needs to be done with the power plant and the “circus springboard”. Now, for the sake of funding from government orders, any foreign aviation company will use its aircraft to do everything that the military requires.

The USA and China have already produced electromagnetic catapults, the Americans are installing them on aircraft carriers, and these catapults don’t care how cold it is to work in. And the Russian Navy is engaged in a “circus” and can lift aircraft with a maximum combat load from the deck of its aircraft. The Chinese will soon surpass us in this matter; their electromagnetic catapult is already working, although for now on the ground, but they are going to build nuclear aircraft carriers with a displacement of 65–70 thousand tons.

We think that there is no need to once again emphasize the importance of AB, both in wartime (from the position of fans of global nuclear war) and in peacetime. Many today understand: The main threats to Russia come from the south. There must be one aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea or further south at all times, which means that, taking into account repairs, rest and combat training, the fleet must have at least three or four aircraft carriers. It is also quite obvious how many of these aircraft are needed and where they should be based. After all, not in the Far East, from where the restless south is several times further than from the north, the Baltic and, of course, the Black Sea.

It is probably quite obvious to large Russian taxpayers where and how many of their defenders should be, otherwise our military will again scare everyone with NATO, China and Japan. The military department continues to talk about the Sino-Japanese threat in the east. However, even schoolchildren understand that competition in this region is only possible for us economically. And the growing military confrontation here clearly does not affect Russia, since it is not she, but China that is moving into the “internal sea” of the United States - the Pacific Ocean and has already begun to put pressure on Japan.

Personnel issues

But if it becomes more or less clear why and what kind of aircraft the modern Russian Navy needs, it is worth considering the real problems of their construction and training. Before starting to build an aircraft, we must decide on a radical reform of personnel training for the Navy and, accordingly, we will have to fully or partially accept the system that exists in the United States and other aircraft carrier powers.

Of course, this primarily concerns the training of naval pilots. Candidates must be recruited from graduates of not only Air Force flight schools, but also regular naval schools. educational institutions and young naval officers who served on ships for several years. Here, only the flight training time will be different, but the total time is probably the same, since the Air Force pilots will have to be “worn out” for a long time to erase psychological problems relationships with seafarers.

Let us note one more aspect that is usually not advertised. The fact is that pilots have always had great respect for sailors, and sailors for pilots. It was probably these two relatively dangerous military specialties that brought them together.

The ranks of naval pilots are the same insoluble problem as the construction of aircraft. But it’s stupid to have, for example, the commander of a group of carrier-based multi-role fighters that solve almost all the main tasks of the fleet, an officer with the rank of “Major”, and the commander of an air defense system complex on the air defense system, who is not active almost all the time, with the rank of “Captain of the 3rd Rank” " It's time to return them to Russian naval pilots naval ranks, restoring justice violated during the Soviet era after 1917. Until this time, naval aviation had naval ranks.

Construction price

Now let's deal with economic problems construction of AB. What could be the cost of our new aircraft with nuclear power plants? Let's try to count them. There is no point in guessing about the contract price (illegal excess profits and kickbacks will begin to be included in it), and we will determine the real costs in our “market” economy by comparison.

Thus, in the USA, the latest serial Ohio-class SSBNs cost $1.5 billion, and serial Nimitz-class SSBNs, delivered at the same time, cost $3.5 billion. That is, one AB is equivalent in price to 2.34 SSBNs. The cost of the domestic SSBN Project 955 “Yuri Dolgoruky” is 23 billion rubles. If we design and build our aircraft similar in size to Project 11437 (Ulyanovsk) by analogy with the USA, that is, do not load it with useless things, then the price will be approximately 54 billion rubles or at the 2011 exchange rate - about 1.8 billion. dollars. Let's assume that due to inflation it will increase to 2–2.1 billion dollars.

Some may disagree with this approach, since the cost of converting the Admiral Gorshkov into a Project 11430 AB for the Indian Navy already exceeds $1.93 billion. But, firstly, this is the contract price and what else it includes, besides work on the ship, is unknown. Secondly, any major overhaul with re-equipment is always close to the cost of a new ship.

Just look at the work performed on the ship by Sevmashpredpriyatie (SMP):
— all old cable routes and many pipelines were removed and replaced with new ones;
— all hull structures were cleaned of rust, partially replaced and repainted, new hull structures were added;
— all boilers and almost all auxiliary mechanisms were dismantled, they were repaired or replaced with new ones, and then installed on the ship;
— Almost all weapons systems were dismantled and new ones were installed.

In short, simply installing a new mechanism, laying pipelines and cables is one job, but the work of dismantling them and then reinstalling them through new technological hatches costs twice as much. Cutting metal and making a body from it is the simplest and cheapest thing at a factory compared to installing and commissioning equipment.

For information:the costs planned at the end of the 70s for the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft of project 11435, 550–650 million rubles, turned out to be less in 1990 at the time of its delivery to the fleet and amounted to 521 million rubles.

Now about the cost of the air group (AG). If there is no AG in the absence of an air force, then it (the aircraft) will come under the control of the Air Force. And since it will still be necessary to attract aviation to operate over the sea, the state will also pay for these costs, but through a different structure. So whether there is an AV or not, you will have to pay for aviation.

We will not take inflated contract prices (also illegal excess profits and kickbacks) for modern foreign and domestic aircraft. Let’s determine the real cost of ship-based aircraft and helicopters through their cost in the USSR, since almost all of our “modern and latest” aircraft and helicopters were created in the 70s and 80s, and now they are only being improved. This will be useful for determining the real costs of government orders.

At the beginning of 1990, the estimated prices in millions of rubles were as follows:
- Su-27K (Su-33) fighter - 5.6
- multi-role fighter MiG-29K - about 5
— reconnaissance and target designation aircraft Su-27KRTS – 8–10
— AWACS aircraft Yak-44 – 20–23
— Ka-27 helicopter – 1–2.

The cost of the project 11437 aircraft under construction at Ulyanovsk in 1990 was 800 million rubles, and its air group, made up of the above-mentioned aircraft and helicopters, was estimated at 382 million. In reality, in fractions of the cost of the AV project 11437 will cost:
- multi-role fighter - 0.007–0.0125
- AWACS aircraft - 0.029
- helicopter - 0.0025.

Thus, truly, without deception, taking into account the price of a new aircraft for the Russian Navy is 2.1 billion dollars the price of planes and helicopters for him in millions of dollars will be:
- multi-role fighter up to - 26
- AWACS aircraft - 60
- helicopter - 5.

Therefore, if we take the maximum - 50 multi-role fighters (MCF), four AWACS aircraft and eight helicopters - the air group for the new aircraft will cost $1.58 billion. By the way, one of the authors of the article in the mid-90s participated in the inspection of one of the manufacturers of components for a new ship. When he quite easily found out that the cost of the components was inflated by 15–20 times, he was quickly recalled so that he would not interfere with the “cut” of money. In the parking lot of this enterprise there were brand new Mercedes of various denominations with verified salaries of the administration and workers, allowing them to be bought after 50–75 years of work.

In the USA, the number of air groups is one less than the number of aircraft carriers, but they have a lot of aircraft and reserve aircraft. Back in the 80s, domestic experts proposed having 1.5 air groups ready per aircraft. This would make it possible to ensure the continuous combat readiness of each operational aircraft with a different duration of operation of aircraft on domestic aircraft compared to the US Navy. Thus, the real cost of an air group for a combat-ready domestic aircraft will be $2.37 billion with 75 MCI, six AWACS aircraft and 12 helicopters.

Operating costs

Now let's define What is more expensive to operate - AB or other ships? Data have already been given that the cost of a domestic aircraft carrier is equivalent to two submarines, or 1.5 cruisers, or six patrol ships (frigates), or 35 RKA. Since the press has expressed criticism about the prohibitive operating costs of the Project 11435 Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft with a displacement of 60 thousand tons with 52 aircraft on board, we will begin with an assessment of the comparative cost of operation.

Around the world, most of the operating costs of AVs fall on wages crew. The crew of the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft consists of the ship's crew, which arrives during the voyage of the air group's personnel, and the marching staff. The ship's (permanent) crew itself consists of 170 officers, 1,130 midshipmen and sailors, the AG crew consists of 350 flight officers, 310 midshipmen and sailors, and up to 40 officers and midshipmen of the headquarters. The marching headquarters will be on any ship and should be excluded from comparison, as well as the personnel of the air group, since they receive salaries through naval aviation.

The crew of Project 12418 RKA, the construction of which is actively being exported, is five officers and 36 midshipmen and sailors, that is, 165 officers and 1260 midshipmen and sailors will serve on 35 such RKA. If we add to this that the salary of boat crews is also multiplied by a multiplying factor, the cost of the salary of the AB crew will be less by about 20%.

What about the new Project 11356.7 frigates for the Black Sea Fleet? There is no exact data on the number of crews, but there is data on the frigates of Project 11356, which were taken as the prototype of Project 11356.7: 35 officers, 188 midshipmen and sailors. Thus, 210 officers and 1,128 midshipmen and sailors will serve on six frigates. Again it turns out that six frigates are 10–15% more expensive in salary.

Some may ask about fuel costs. Well, you can calculate this too. So, for 8,000 miles at a speed of 18 knots, our AB spends 10,000 tons of fuel oil. But 35 RKA project 12418 at 1600 miles at a speed of 14 knots consume approximately 2500 tons of diesel fuel, and at 8000 miles - 12,500 tons, and at a speed of 18 knots (like AB) - 15,000 tons.

Well, how does it compare with six Black Sea frigates? For them, it turns out 3000 tons of diesel fuel for 2800 miles at a speed of 18 knots. Consequently, almost 9,000 tons of diesel fuel will be consumed for 8,000 miles. Fuel oil and diesel fuel cost the same only under Soviet rule, but now? So it turns out that by main consumables during operation, AV is approximately 10–30% cheaper, if not more. At the same time, we must not forget that our aircraft was supposed to be equipped with a nuclear power plant, and a conventional boiler-turbine turned out to be on it by the strong-willed decision of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov. Therefore, comparison of fuel costs is purely theoretical.

It should also be noted that per one member of the ship's crew on a domestic aircraft there is approximately 46 tons of displacement, and on US aircraft - 32 tons, per one aircraft on our aircraft there are 12–13 flight crew members, and on the US aircraft there are up to 40 flight crew members. This is explained by a different organizational and staffing structure, which in the US Army provides for the presence large quantity repair units and special workshops, reminiscent of small repair factories, which we do not have.

This leads to the fact that Russian aircraft cannot be away from the base for a long time (no more than four months), but US aircraft can. A large amount of regulatory and repair work on airplanes and helicopters, many of which are simply unacceptable on a Russian ship under existing rules. Therefore, even with the same number of AGs of ours and the American AB, the displacement of our AB and the cost of its construction will always be less than that of the American one.

This will happen, of course, only if it is not again “armed” with powerful missile weapons that are not typical for it (anti-ship missiles, various air defense systems and other “nonsense”), a luxurious two-tiered flagship command post (such a “meeting room” on the “Admiral Kuznetsov” "is practically not used, but "ate" together with the anti-ship missile cellar more than 30 meters of the hangar and, therefore, 6-10 aircraft in it). In the US Air Force, this flagship command post has only one tier, is smaller in area and is located on the gallery deck.

/Vladislav Nikolsky, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor;
Nikolay Novichkov, Candidate of Technical Sciences, vpk-news.ru/