Light reconnaissance bomber Su-2 (Ivanov, ANT-51, BB-1).

Developer: Sukhoi Design Bureau
Country: USSR
First flight: 1939

The construction of the third Ivanov by the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau (according to order No. 452) ended in September 1938. The design of the vehicle was similar to the previous two prototypes, but the M-62 engine was replaced with a more powerful and high-altitude M-87. The capacity of the gas tanks was reduced from 930 to 700 liters, and the ammunition load of the wing machine guns was increased to 850 rounds each. According to pilot A.P. Chernavsky, who made the first flight on November 3, the new aircraft had a shorter takeoff run and a steeper glide path. Before submitting the SZ-3 (Stalin's task) for state testing, the military demanded that the M-87 be replaced with the more reliable M-87A, but the latter also failed after three flights on November 25.

The Ivanov aircraft was sent to state tests at the Air Force Research Institute with a cover letter stating that it “...is an extremely valuable object for the Red Army Air Force, it must complete flight tests as quickly as possible. The completed development and testing flights show that the aircraft, both from the point of view of reliability and from the point of view of the accessibility of the controls, can carry out flights according to the normal program ... "

From February 3 to April 6, 1939, in Yevpatoria, the vehicle was tested by a team consisting of military engineer 3rd rank A.V. Sinelnikov, pilot Major B.N. Pokrovsky and navigator Major A.M. Tretyakov. 78 sorties were carried out by military specialists, after which Major P.M. Stefanovsky made the flight. An experienced test pilot narrowly avoided a serious accident when the right landing gear did not fully extend during landing. Having successfully landed on one wheel, Pyotr Mikhailovich was still unable to keep the car on the run; with breakdowns in the landing gear assemblies, damage to the center section skin and pipes, it had to be sent for repairs.

But the flight accident did not spoil the impression of the new Ivanov. In his review, B.N. Pokrovsky emphasized that the aircraft “...represents an example of a well-thought-out cultural machine with high speeds, good rate of climb, good review, sensitivity to management. Flying on this aircraft leaves a pleasant impression of the car...” Other participants in the work also assessed the aircraft positively. It is not surprising that at the conclusion of the state test report, the head of the Air Force Research Institute A.I. Filin recommended that the vehicle be adopted by our aviation as a light bomber, with the possibility of use in attack aircraft and short-range reconnaissance variants. Filin asked the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry to build a military series of ten Ivanovs by November 1, 1939, which would differ from the experimental one in their mixed design (wooden fuselage and metal wings).

Events developed rapidly. Even before the end of the state tests, K.E. Voroshilov and M.M. Kaganovich reported Sukhoi’s successes to Stalin. At the end of March 1939, the Defense Committee decided to launch an aircraft called BB-1 (short-range bomber) into production at factories No. 135 in Kharkov and Sarkombine (this enterprise did not have a number at that time, and later became factory No. 292) in Saratov. The deadlines were set very strict - Pavel Osipovich was given no more than 20 days to process the drawings for a mixed design and transfer them to the factories. It was planned that the aircraft would be mass produced either with the M-88 engine (which was later going to replace the capricious M-87), or with the M-63 TK (with a turbocharger). In both cases, the maximum speed approached the 500 km/h mark desired by the aviation industry management.

But the decisions adopted at that time were not destined to be implemented for a long time. Firstly, the engines caused a lot of trouble for the plane. Numerous breakdowns of various engines (M-87, M-87A and M-87B) in 1938-1939 on the Ivanov and other aircraft only by chance did not lead to serious flight accidents, but caused long downtime. Shortly before the events described here, “for the sabotage delay in the introduction of M-87 engines,” the director of plant No. 29 named after. P.I.Baranova S.A.Alexandrov and some other prominent specialists. The same fate befell the chief designer of the plant, A.S. Nazarov. All of them completed an internship in France at the factories of the Gnome-Rhone company, managed to gain considerable experience, and their loss was very noticeable for the business.

Secondly, although Sukhoi immediately ordered to send a group of designers headed by D.A. Romeiko-Gurko to Kharkov, and to Saratov with N.P. Polenov, aircraft factories were not ready to introduce the new aircraft into series. At plant No. 135 (the head plant), work on the drawings of the BB-1 (the vehicle received the factory product designation “N”) began in June 1939. It quickly became clear that the technological profile of the enterprise would have to be radically changed, since the design and technology of the short-range bomber had nothing in common with the P-10 previously produced here.

To manage the process of introducing the aircraft into the series at the parent plant, by decision of the Defense Committee of July 29 and order of M.M. Kaganovich of August 7, 1939, P.O. Sukhoi was appointed chief designer of plant No. 135. The director was instructed to organize an experimental workshop, where he was ordered to move the team that formed during the work on Ivanov. In the pilot workshop it was planned to carry out work on modification and further improvement of the BB-1. Sukhoi was instructed to work out the installation of the M-63TK engine, design and build an armored attack bomber (SB), as a development of the BB-1. The design team at that time consisted of only 63 people. A great contribution to the deployment of serial production of the BB-1 was made by the closest assistants of the Chief: his deputy D.A. Romeiko-Gurko, the head of the general brigade N.A. Fomin, who also participated in the work on “RD” and “Rodina”, an experienced specialist in propulsion systems E.S. Felsner et al.

At the new location, Sukhoi’s team faced numerous difficulties. The director of the Kharkov aircraft plant, V. Neustadt, did not take any measures to create an experimental base for the design bureau for a very long time, and the city executive committee did not provide the employees with a single apartment - the relocated engineers and technicians lived in a hotel, separated from their families. Naturally, under these conditions, Muscovites were in no hurry to leave the capital. They also knew that the “Kharkov pioneers” were forced, in the absence of transport, to travel many kilometers on foot every day in the rain and frost to work and back. Pavel Osipovich feared the collapse of the design team - some specialists told him to leave, not wanting to go to Kharkov - and on February 11, 1940 he turned to the newly appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Experimental Aircraft Construction A.S. Yakovlev with a request “...to provide the team with one of the Moscow production bases, in which, in addition to two or three experimental facilities, it would be possible to organize the production of small series of 10-15 aircraft per year.”

A.S. Yakovlev agreed with this proposal and signed the corresponding order on March 16, 1940. Based on KB-29 in Podlipki (previously it was engaged in the development of pressurized cabins and artillery weapons for aircraft), a pilot plant was organized, which received the number 289, and in May the Sukhoi Design Bureau completely moved to a new “apartment”. Pavel Osipovich, who became the chief designer of the pilot plant, had to the shortest possible time equip the enterprise necessary equipment, create the backbone of the team. The first task was the construction by October 1940 of two modified BB-1s with powerful M-90 engines. At plant No. 135 they received the designation “MN” as backups for the “N” aircraft. Sukhoi's successor as chief designer of the Kharkov plant was P.D. Grushin.

Meanwhile, work continued on improving and fine-tuning the experimental SZ-3. At the beginning of 1938, Sukhoi sent E.S. Felsner to the new chief designer of the engine plant, S.K. Tumansky, to refine the VMG. Long attempts to improve the output and especially the performance characteristics of the M-87 engine did not lead to a positive result. Of particular concern were serious defects in the supercharger and the lack of perfection of the carburetor with automatic altitude corrector.

In April 1939, the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87B was tested at the Air Force Research Institute to test stability, maneuverability, range and engine reliability. The flights, in particular, showed that at an altitude of 1500 m the bomber made a turn in 25-26 s, and a combat turn in 17-18 s. Having good static and dynamic stability, the car needed to increase lateral stability. The basic flight performance data of the BB-1 M-87B remained the same as that of the aircraft with the M-87A engine.

As soon as Sukhoi became aware of Tumansky’s successful modernization of the engine, whose single-speed supercharger was replaced by a two-speed one, he decided immediately - even before state tests - to install the new M-88 on the SZ-3. The power of the power plant increased from 950 hp. at an altitude of 4700 m up to 1000 hp. at 6000 m, and this promised a noticeable increase in maximum speed. Since during the testing of the SZ-3 M-87A there was a requirement to provide the navigator with the opportunity to more freely leave the aircraft in emergency situations, the lower installation of the MV-2 was removed, leaving a wide hatch. The installation of the new engine on the BB-1 was completed on November 27, 1939, and after a short factory debugging, the car was handed over for state testing in January 1940. They were conducted by 3rd rank military engineer A.V. Sinelnikov, pilot Major B.N. Pokrovsky and navigator Captain S.Z. Akopyan.

This time the pilot turned out to be more restrained in his assessment of the machine - its flight characteristics did not improve. The conclusion of the test report stated:

“The BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine, which is necessary for arming the Red Army Air Force, cannot be allowed for normal operation in combat units due to the lack of development of the propeller-engine group... Slow work on the introduction of the aircraft... can lead to obsolescence of the aircraft in the process of its production and development " The act required urgent modification of the engine in terms of operational reliability.

At the end of the 30s, the Soviet aircraft industry was experiencing a serious crisis. In January 1940, A.I. Shakhurin replaced M.M. Kaganovich as People's Commissar. Analyzing the current situation, the new leader stated that among the four aircraft of new types (I-180, TB-7, BB-22 and BB-1), which were built in a military series, only the last aircraft successfully passed state tests, but its production was also underway unacceptably slow. Until the end of 1939, our aviation did not receive a single production BB-1 bomber. One of Shakhurin’s first orders, given on January 19, demanded that the management of plant No. 135 build 110 Sukhoi bombers by July 1940 “...in order from now on to switch to the production of the modernized BB-1(meaning a car with an M-88. — author’s note) at a speed of at least 500 km/h.”

NKAP Order No. 56 of February 15, 1940 began with the words: “Given the special importance of replenishing the air fleet with BB-1 aircraft designed by Comrade Sukhoi and in order to maximize the release of the latter...” The People's Commissar established a schedule according to which the production of BB-1 was now launched at three factories: the main plant No. 135, as well as No. 31 in Taganrog and No. 207 in Dolgoprudny. They were supposed to deliver 110, 20 and 5 cars in the first half of this year, respectively. All preparatory work at the Sarcombine was stopped.

In our opinion, the important and timely decisions of the government and the People’s Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, emphasizing the “special importance” of the deployment of the BB-1 program, did not correspond to the capabilities of the factories allocated for its production. Let us recall that in 1939, the four leading Soviet aircraft factories No. 1, 18, 21 and 22 not only provided 78% of the gross output of the aircraft industry, but were also recognized leaders in the development of serial technologies and equipment. They had the best machines and equipment, fairly well trained personnel. Back in May 1938, Sukhoi tried to convince Kaganovich that “...the equipment of plant No. 1 will be able to fully support the production of the Ivanov aircraft”. It is possible that if the production of BB-1 had been launched there or at one of the other three enterprises listed above, the fate of the vehicle would have turned out differently.

P.O. Sukhoi had great hopes for two experimental works: the modification of the SZ-1 for the M-63TK engine and the creation of the ShB (attack-bomber). The first “object” was lifted into the air at the end of March 1940 by factory pilot A.I. Kalyuzhnov. However, he did not have the necessary high-altitude training, so TsAGI pilot A.P. Chernavsky had to perform four flights to an altitude of 6000 m with the turbocharger turned on. During the tests, cracks appeared in the TC pipes, and the oil overheated due to the insufficient height of the oil pump. The management decided to further develop the capricious M-63TK on the I-153 fighter, and the modified SZ-1 was transferred to LII. The vehicle was not included in the experimental work plan for 1941 and was forgotten about when the war began.

It was originally planned that the ShB (otherwise called BB-2) would be a significant step in the development of the Ivanov aircraft, taking into account the accumulated experience. The project included the installation of not only the M-88 engine, but also one of the experimental engines of the new M-80 series (later the M-81 engine was released, and the M-82 was in mass production). The aircraft was built according to the tactical and technical requirements approved by the mock-up commission for the BB-1 in March 1939, so the SB turned out to be very similar to the “big brother” of the BB-1, distinguished by an all-wood fuselage, stronger armor, and improved aerodynamics. The landing gear was retracted back into the center section and covered with struts, while the wheels turned 90°.

Subsequently, Sukhoi repeatedly successfully used this landing gear retraction scheme on various types of aircraft. However, trouble happened on the ShB: in one of the first flights on June 4, 1940, due to an error in calculating the acting forces when extending the landing gear, a jamming occurred in the shock strut bushing. On the next flight, pilot V.T. Sakhranov was unable to control the plane - another accident on July 16 seriously delayed the tests of the ShB. Breakdowns continued to plague the vehicle, and at the end of autumn 1940, Sukhoi received instructions from Shakhurin to use the ShB to test the temperature conditions of the M-88. After the appearance of “real” attack aircraft Il-2 and Su-6, the car was considered unpromising. All work on the ShB was stopped at the end of April 1941.

Even earlier, work on the BB-1 project for the navy was interrupted. This topic was approved in August 1939 by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov and provided for the installation of a land reconnaissance aircraft on two floats. The authors have no information about further activities on this project, nor about Sukhoi’s work on a “pure” attack aircraft with an M-80 engine. It is only known that chief designer gave instructions to the OKB staff to begin preparing a preliminary design.

Combat and performance production BB-1 aircraft had to be tested during military tests. At the end of March 1940, a group of pilots and technicians from the 19th air brigade based in the Kharkov Military District arrived at the Kharkov aircraft plant. Seconded aviators, led by Captain A.I. Pushkin, got acquainted with the new machine right in the workshops. Based on their suggestions, some design improvements were also made here, in particular, the side windows of the BB-1 cabin were restored.

In May, the first 16 modified vehicles were accepted by the military and preparations for testing began. They decided to conduct them in the newly created regiment, which received No. 135 according to the number of the Kharkov plant. The aviators of the regiment, headed by Major Nevolin, had to determine some important characteristics of the BB-1 M-88, since during the state tests of the prototype there were many breakdowns, and they remained, in fact, unfinished. In particular, it was necessary to confirm the practical ceiling of the aircraft, estimate fuel consumption in different modes, and check the possibility of flying in difficult weather conditions and at night. It was also necessary to determine the possibility of using FAB-250 bombs from underwing holders. Hard work continued from May 10 to June 20. It was headed by the Air Force Research Institute - military engineer 2nd rank S.N. Chasovikov, pilots Captain S.M. Korobov and Art. Lieutenant Yu.N. Kruglikov, and from the 135th BAP - military engineer of the 3rd rank A.V. Telegin and assistant regiment commander Captain A.I. Pushkin.

The military tests were carried out satisfactorily, although there were some incidents. So, during a long-range flight along the route: Kharkov - Belgorod - Izyum - Kharkov, the control units on the plane froze at high altitude and a disaster almost occurred. In addition, high-altitude flights revealed poor-quality paint on the aircraft - the paint was peeling and falling off the leading edge of the wing and stabilizer. Among the main defects of the bomber were the unreliability of the engine, oiling of the sight and the navigator's lower hatch, and insufficient strength of the landing gear and pneumatics. The load on the rudders increased unevenly and turned out to be excessively large (compared to the experimental aircraft), backlash and friction appeared in the suspension units of the elevators and ailerons.

At the same time, the report noted that the aircraft is simple to operate, access to various individual units is convenient, and repair and replacement of parts does not present any difficulties. The vehicle took off freely from a dirt strip with a load of 700 kg of bombs. “Pilots who had below average qualifications, who came to the unit from Air Force flight schools, mastered the aircraft easily and after 20 - 25 export flights graduated independently on the BB-1.”, said the report on military tests. The pilots were pleased with the good forward visibility from the cockpit and the comfortable high control stick. The chief of the Air Force Main Directorate, P.V. Rychagov, and the piloting equipment inspector of one of the military districts, A.V. Belyakov, who arrived at the regiment, after a short ground inspection, safely completed an introductory flight on the BB-1.

Despite the favorable test results, on July 18, in a report addressed to Stalin and Voroshilov, Rychagov expressed the opinion that in 1941 it was necessary to demand from P.O. Sukhoi not only to eliminate the defects indicated in the military test report, but also to make significant changes to the design: install slats and increase the transverse V of the wing. After a joint meeting of pilots, navigators and designers in Moscow, where Major L.M. Maksimov made a report on the BB-1, and experienced Air Force inspectors Colonels I.I. Dushkin, I.P. Selivanov and I.A. took part in the discussion Titov, divisional commander P.A. Alekseev made a proposal to suspend the production of the Sukhoi aircraft until the main shortcomings were completely eliminated.

People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin did not agree with this. In his opinion, such a decision could cause production downtime. Flights by aviators of the 135th BAP showed that the aircraft was simple and safe to operate. In addition, the engines began to operate much more reliably, allowing the vehicle to continuously climb to an altitude of 7000 m (Previously, when climbing at the highest rate of climb, pilots had to cool the engine two or three times on horizontal platforms due to overheating of the oil.) The situation with the BB-1 looked like noticeably better compared to other new types of vehicles, for example, A.S. Yakovlev’s BB-22. Therefore, Shakhurin considered it expedient to accept the Sukhoi bomber into service, fully equip the 135th BAP with the machines and finally bring the vehicle directly to this unit in the second half of 1940.

Sukhoi did not make any fundamental changes to the serial design of the BB-1 during that period. Factories built aircraft in an effort to perfect the technology and eliminate production shortcomings. The greatest success in developing the BB-1 was achieved in Kharkov. There, by the summer of 1940, they introduced the plaza-template method, mastered the high-speed method of making stamps, and began to use the latest milling machines type "North American" and hydraulic presses for 500 tons. In the first five months of 1940, three more new workshops were built, increasing by 20%: the number of workers increased and the labor intensity of one machine decreased by 40%. Director Yu.N. Karpov and Chief Engineer I.M. Kuzin explained the failure to fulfill the plan to the management of the aviation industry due to interruptions in the supply of components and, above all, engines. Thus, engine plant No. 29 sent 132 M-87 and M-88 engines during this period instead of 185 planned, of which only 116 turned out to be serviceable.

In the history of Taganrog plant No. 31 named after. For Dimitrov, who specialized in creating aircraft for the Navy, 1940 remained one of the most difficult years. At the same time, machines that had little in common in design were under construction: MBR-2, KOR-1, GST, MDR-6 and BB-1. In addition, Taganrog residents manufactured parts and spare parts for the MBR-2, SSS and P-Z reconnaissance aircraft. Preparations for serial production of the R-5 began, but then this decision was canceled. “The plant was choked with a variety of technologically different types of machines, lost its production rhythm, actually stopped working in series and thus found itself on the sidelines from supplying the army with modern combat aircraft.”,” wrote director I.G. Zagainov in the report. When launching production of the BB-1, the "thirty-first" lacked, first of all, milling and planing machines, and the assistance promised by the People's Commissariat in equipment and personnel was not received.

Plant No. 207 was known in the late 30s as the “Dirigiblestroy”. For some time it seemed that airships had a great future in military aviation, but then views changed. Simultaneously with the decision to mass-produce the BB-1, there was an order from the government to mothball work on the huge airships of the B-1 series and the gondola for the DP-9. In addition, the plant stopped producing spare parts for the I-15bis. However, low qualifications of personnel, poor organization of production, disproportion between mechanical assembly and aggregate shops, and a large lack of milling machines slowed down the development of BB-1 and led to a high percentage of defects. Only after the reconstruction of the plant and the establishment of cooperation with other enterprises was it possible to launch two series of five machines each. Until December 1940, plant No. 207, like No. 31, did not build a single BB-1.

The 135th BAP played a special role in fine-tuning the vehicle. After the completion of military tests, the unit became a real training ground. From October 1940, when the regiment was headed by Colonel B.V. Jansen, until May 1941, instructors were trained there. 67 pilots and 71 navigators (they were also called observer pilots) mastered all the features of the new machine and before the war managed to retrain the leadership of nine other units.

Jansen's regiment also paid attention to the tactical training of aviators. Training bombing exercises showed that, due to the imperfection of the sights, the maximum height for dropping bombs should not exceed 3000 m, and the working altitude should not exceed 1000-1200 m. Close to the ground, attacks by enemy fighters from below seemed unlikely, as a result of which hatch installations were not installed on the aircraft. The military representatives did not oppose this, taking into account the opinion of P.O. Sukhoi that the hatch installation and the navigator’s armor would increase the weight of the vehicle and shift the centering back. Moreover, when in September 1940 the Defense Committee considered the issue of strengthening the machine gun and cannon armament of production aircraft, the BB-1 was the only machine that was “disarmed”: instead of four wing machine guns, two were left and the hatch ShKAS was eliminated. The war showed the fallacy of these measures.

In the fall of 1940, Sukhoi's attention was attracted by the new M-81 engine, developed under the leadership of A.D. Shvetsov. The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of October 23 stated that its development is “the most important and priority task of plant No. 19. The director of the engine plant, G.V. Kozhevnikov, was instructed to urgently send three experimental M-81 engines with an extended shaft to Kharkov for installation on a serial BB -1. By this time, Pavel Osipovich had managed to re-equip the second prototype of the MN machine “Dubler”, replacing the M-90 with the M-81. Despite the forced landing of the "Dubler" in the second test flight due to engine jamming, Sukhoi believed in the prospects of the work. However, at the end of November 1940, the leadership of the NKAP considered the M-81 engine a “dead-end development direction,” and its implementation and development was stopped.

At this time, the management's attitude towards Sukhoi's car changed greatly in a negative direction. The opinion began to be expressed that the BB-1 as a type would not find widespread use in a future war. The military was well aware of the defenselessness of the Polish light single-engine Karas bombers against attacks by German fighters. Later it became known that the British “Battles” (closest to the BB-1 in design and purpose), which were considered quite modern on the eve of the war, suffered extremely heavy losses in the May 1940 battles in France. Soviet intelligence reported that the largest Austin factories in Coventry had switched to the production of four-engine bombers, ceasing the construction of Battles.

Experts understood that the successes of the Ju-87 dive bomber could not be attributed solely to German propaganda. However, it was not this one that was purchased in Germany and studied in detail at the Air Force Research Institute, but another, the twin-engine dive bomber Ju-88, which had a great influence on the Soviet aviation industry and even on military doctrine. The country's leadership was not convinced that in the upcoming war it would be possible to immediately gain air superiority, and without it, the single-engine two-seat bomber was very vulnerable. According to the leadership of the Main Directorate of the Air Force and the NKAP, our country needed in mass production not a single-engine “horizontal” bomber, but a twin-engine dive bomber. As a result, the BB-1 aircraft was actually no longer considered as a new type of serial bomber. And before, the country’s leadership did not favor Sukhoi and his creation with their attention. One can cite the following fact: before the war, his aircraft did not participate in any parade or major display of new aircraft. Now, after Pavel Osipovich’s refusal to convert the plane into a dive bomber, interest in the BB-1 seemed to have completely disappeared.

In addition, in the fall of 1940, the aviation industry was unable to overcome the crisis in improving engines, especially those developed at the S.K. Tumansky Design Bureau. On M-88 engines, piston burnouts, VMG shaking, and increased oil consumption, which led to smoking, were constantly observed. If at the first speed of the supercharger the mixture was excessively lean, then at the second speed it was over-rich. We had to temporarily suspend their serial production. It was difficult to fine-tune the promising M-90 engine, on which the NKAP had high hopes. As a result, E.V. Urmin replaced Tumansky as chief designer of plant No. 29. Director S.A. Gromov was almost arrested - only Shakhurin’s intercession saved him from imminent execution.

On December 9, 1940, at a joint meeting of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the program for the production of aircraft and engines for 1941 was considered. This is extremely important document The aviation industry was ordered to stop building obsolete aircraft. For the short-range bomber BB-1, renamed after the chief designer in Su-2, an annual plan for all three factories was set at 1,150 aircraft (out of a total of 6,070 bombers). 600 Su-2s were to be built in 1941 in Kharkov.

Some change for the better in the production of Sukhoi bombers began in early December, despite the fact that Plant No. 31 was again reoriented until the end of the year - this time to produce LaGG-3 fighters. Work in progress, part of the equipment and 70 almost finished Su-2s were transferred from Taganrog to Dolgoprudny. The leadership of the NKAP had every reason to expect that Plant No. 207 would soon be able to contribute to the supply of aircraft for the Air Force.

After obtaining satisfactory test results of the M-88 engine, its serial construction was resumed under the designation M-88B. In Kharkov, shortly before the New Year of 1941, these engines were installed not only on newly built Su-2s, but also replaced substandard engines on already produced vehicles. In the last days of December 1940, it was not only possible for the first time to fulfill the plan and hand over 40 aircraft to military representatives, but also to provide the groundwork for the implementation of the next year’s program.

It is appropriate to say a few words about the serial numbers of bombers. Several Taganrog cars had a type (code) “26” and a six-digit number, which included the plant number. Thus, one of the aircraft of the 211th bap had number 263107. In Kharkov, the numbering of the Su-2 continued in the order adopted for the P-10. For example, vehicles No. 9/2 and 1/4 were transferred in January 1941 to the 135th BAP. Since the spring of this year, the bomber serial number of five digits has become standard. For example, aircraft No. 19017, 54093, 17106 were available in the summer of 1942 in the 209th BAP, and Su-2 No. 05056 was flown in the fall of 1941 by the crew of ml. Lieutenant I.A. Klevtsov and Art. Lieutenant M.A. Lashin from the 135th BAP.

And finally, as if specifically to confuse enemy spies, serial numbers were assigned in Dolgoprudny. It is known that the cars of factory No. 207 usually had five numbers and one letter, moving from series to series. The numbers “07” determined the type of aircraft, the letters indicated the encrypted series number, and the remaining numbers indicated the serial number of each aircraft in the series.

The establishment of mass production made it possible to calculate the cost of the aircraft. She turned out to be quite tall. Thus, Kharkov “drying” cost the country 430 thousand rubles, and Dolgoprudny ones are even more expensive - 700 thousand. For comparison, we note that SB-22 from plant No. 22 cost only 265 thousand rubles, and BB-22 from plant No. 1 - 400 thousand rubles . The main reasons for the high costs can be explained by the low mechanization of production even at plant No. 135 (compared to our leading enterprises), significant volumes of machining of a large number of parts and high metal consumption (845 kg of duralumin and 440 kg of steel for each aircraft).

The widespread introduction of the Su-2 into combat units began in January 1941. Following the 135th BAP, vehicles from Kharkov arrived at the 211th and 227th BAP. Meanwhile, the Dolgoprudnensky plant “took patronage” of the 97th BAP, and from Taganrog all the vehicles accepted by the military representatives were transferred to the 211th BAP. By the end of March, management and technical compositions four more air regiments - the 103rd, 209th, 210th and 226th. Until the spring of 1941, production aircraft arrived in the western districts in very limited quantities, which forced the command of the Red Army Air Force to extend the retraining period. Thus, for the 211th BAP of Major F.G. Rodyakin, a plan for the development of the Su-2 was approved, stretched over nine (!) months (from January to September 1941). Naturally, the outbreak of war compressed all the deadlines.

The military tests of the Su-2, which took place in the 135th BAP in the spring, revealed 28 serious defects in the vehicle. The military demanded that the propeller spinners be insulated for operation at high altitudes, that distortions in the moving part of the canopy be eliminated, and that leaks of the mixture in the landing gear shock struts and gasoline leaks from the drainage line during a dive be eliminated. The chief designer was asked to develop as soon as possible a system for filling gas tanks with neutral gases as fuel was used up and to cut a hatch in the engine hood to ensure the engine was warmed up from the APL-1 blowtorch.

Serious problems were caused by the unreliable operation of the propeller group. On most vehicles, shaking of the M-88 and M-88B engines was observed. If at the first speed of the supercharger it was accompanied by intermittent emissions, then at the second speed it was accompanied by a violation of uniform operation. There have been cases of motors cutting off in mid-air. Special tests carried out in the 135th BAP in March 1941 with the participation of P.O. Sukhoi showed that engine shaking disappeared with appropriate adjustment of the carburetor auto-corrector needle. Unexpectedly, it turned out that these parts are not interchangeable on the M-88 and M-88B engines.

Castor oil ejected from the engine prompter splashed the lower transparent part of the navigator's cabin and the OPB-1m sight, preventing the bomber from aiming at the target. In addition, the navigator's seat turned out to be very uncomfortable, making it difficult to quickly move from bombing to monitoring the air in the upper hemisphere and firing a defensive machine gun. In the meantime, one of the aircraft was equipped with an NV-5 sight for operations from low altitudes, the second with KD-2 underwing cassettes, the third with an RSR-1 radio station, but this equipment and weapons were not used in the series. An unsuccessful solution was the attempt to replace the plexiglass of the cockpit canopy with celluloid, since transparency was quickly lost and the crew's visibility deteriorated.

The wheels of the first production vehicles had insufficiently strong flanges, which collapsed after 15-20 landings. By the beginning of January 1941, 27 Su-2s in the 135th BAP could not take to the skies due to wheel failure. There was also a shortage of spare tires. Operational tests of the reinforced landing gear wheels showed that they began to correspond to the flight weight of the aircraft. By the beginning of April, the factory team had replaced several sets of landing gear shock struts, which had withstood three hundred landings.

What the flight crew liked most about the plane was the warm, closed cabin. “In winter, at least fly in a T-shirt, not like on the R-5, where the frost penetrates to the bones!” Junior Lieutenant N.Ya. Tuzov (who later became a general) from the 2nd separate aerial photo squadron, belonging to the 7th (cartographic) Main Directorate of the General Staff, made 25 combat missions on the Su-2 during the war. He recalled with regret that Sukhoi’s aircraft were not there in the winter of 1941, when their unit on P-5 and P-Z aircraft carried out intensive filming in Belarus.

“...Pilot training is underway. The teacher dictates a lot of numbers: wing span, MAR, aileron and trim angles. And then it went: compression ratio, valve clearances, piston stroke, order of operation of the cylinders... The pilots diligently wrote down all this in their notebooks.”, - this is how the beginning of studying the Su-2 in the spring of 1941 was remembered by the young pilot of the 227th BAP, foreman K.F. Belokon, later a Hero of the Soviet Union. Both in his and in neighboring units, the development of the machine proceeded at a slow pace, with an emphasis on theoretical studies. Due to the poor condition of airfields and interruptions in the supply of fuel, there were practically no flights in the spring.

However, work at the Air Force Research Institute did not stop either in winter or in spring. From December 1940 to March 1941, test pilot A.K. Dolgov conducted state tests of three Su-2s. One of the received vehicles (No. 1/6) was significantly different from the serial ones (No. 16/2 and 20/2). The purpose of the modification was to increase flight tactical data to the requirements of 1941. To do this, the oil cooler was moved to the center section, the hood profile and the shape of the suction pipe were changed. The very bulky rear turret of the MB-5 was replaced with a TSS-1 turret with a sliding cover. In general, the results of the work carried out were pleasing. The speed increased by 33-38 km/h compared to production aircraft, and the practical ceiling increased by 700 m. For the first time, at the second altitude limit, the Su-2 flew faster than 500 km/h.

Leading engineer A.V. Sinelnikov expressed concern - for the umpteenth time - about the unreliability of the engines. While it worked satisfactorily on the modified aircraft, four M-88Bs had to be replaced on the production aircraft, and three of them failed after three hours of operation due to scuffing and burnt-out pistons. Navigator Captain Gladintsev noted a number of advantages of the TSS-1, but did not ignore the disadvantages: small firing angles, difficulties in conducting aimed fire when working in air flow, difficulty in transferring the machine gun from the traveling position to the combat position.

According to the head of the Air Force Research Institute A.I. Filin, the changes made on the modified machine should have been introduced into the series after eliminating the defects noted during testing. But here the production workers showed haste and already in the spring began building the Su-2 with the TSS-1 turret. In the meantime, the turret was modified and improved, but its state tests still ended with unsatisfactory results. General I.F. Petrov, who replaced Filin at the Air Force Research Institute, considered the defense capability of the Su-2 to be unacceptably weakened, and after his intervention at the end of May 1941, the MB-5 turret was restored. In total, the factories produced 250 vehicles with the TSS-1 turret.

Shortly before the start of the war, Sukhoi determined his attitude towards new engines. He believed that already in the autumn of 1941, serial production of the Su-2 could be transferred to the M-89 engine, which was created under the leadership of S.K. Tumansky and then E.V. Urmin. But, according to Pavel Osipovich, the A.D. Shvetsov M-82 engine, a further development of the M-81, promised much more advantages in flight characteristics. The M-90 and AM-37 were considered as promising engines - the chief designer began designing and building experimental Su-4 (BB-3) vehicles for them in February 1941. Unlike the Su-2, they had to have not only a wooden fuselage, but also a wooden wing with metal spars. It was planned that Taubin heavy machine guns would replace the ShKAS guns in the wings and on the top turret.

The industry managed to fulfill the plan for the first half of 1941 for the production of Su-2 by 119% (on average for bombers - by 86%). On June 1, the factories reported 413 Su-2s, accepted by military representatives. Of this number, the location of 388 vehicles is known (382 had M-88 and 88B engines, and the rest - M-87). In the border military districts (MD), the Su-2 was distributed as follows: in the Western Special Military District - 64, in the Kiev Special Military District - 91 and in the Odessa Military District - 22. 124 bombers were in the Kharkov Military District, 85 - at factory airfields and 7 - in the training center. Several aircraft had to be written off as a result of flight accidents, while others had not yet arrived at their destination.

Shortly before the enemy invasion, many aircraft were prepared for operations in difficult weather conditions and at high altitudes. In Kharkov, Bobruisk, Kyiv and Vitebsk, the installation of RPK-2 radio half-compasses on 99 production Su-2s was completed by the beginning of June. At the same time, it was possible to eliminate the main defects of the oxygen equipment. This work began after an appeal to P.F. Zhigarev on May 5 by the commander of the Air Force of the Kharkov Military District, General S.K. Goryunov, who noted the facts of malfunction of the KPA-3 instruments and the unsuccessful installation of oxygen cylinders on dozens of Sukhoi bombers.

On June 16, flights began at the Air Force Research Institute of the serial Su-2, built at plant No. 207. The aircraft differed from those previously tested in that the MV-5 turret was replaced with a modified MV-5m, which provided the navigator with greater convenience, but somewhat reduced the possible angles of fire of the machine gun in anterior hemisphere. Nevertheless, the head of the institute’s department, military engineer 1st rank P.V. Rudintsev, recommended launching the MV-5m into series. The tests were successfully completed within a few days. The following conclusions seemed most important:
-The serial Su-2 M-88B aircraft produced by plant No. 207 is no different in production quality from the serial aircraft of plant No. 135.
-Most of the defects previously noted during state tests of serial Su-2s produced at plant No. 135 have been eliminated on the aircraft.
-The flight properties and characteristics of the aircraft produced by plant No. 207 are almost the same as those of the aircraft produced by plant No. 135.
-The propeller group on the plane worked normally.
-The temperature conditions of the oil when flying at rated engine power in horizontal flight and when climbing to 8000 m are normal and did not exceed 6O°C at the inlet and 108°C at the outlet...

The test results were encouraging and they were brought to the attention of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, as well as the commanders and headquarters of the active units. The last days of peace in the regiments passed in different ways. In the strictest secrecy, the Su-2 was mastered in Kotovsk, where the 211th BAP was stationed. Even the aviators of the 20th Air Division, which included the regiment, knew nothing about the new machine. During the intensive training work of the 227th BAP at the Borodyanka airfield in June, five accidents occurred. And the pilots of the 43rd BAP were unable to complete a single flight after June 7 due to lack of fuel.

By the beginning of the war, out of 82 short-range bomber air regiments of the Red Army Air Force, eight had mastered the Su-2 to one degree or another and two more had not yet received the vehicles from the factories, but planned to soon begin the retraining process. The 195 Sukhoi bombers located near the border (132 operational) were located south of the 55th parallel - approximately from the Vilnius-Vitebsk line to the Black Sea. There were no Su-2 aircraft in other types of aviation (Navy Air Force, NKVD air units).

Important events also took place far from the front line. From the first days of the war, the government made a number of decisions aimed at increasing production of the Su-2. According to one of the first military resolutions, Voronezh plant No. 450, from June 29, 1941, was freed from previously issued programs and completely switched to working in cooperation with plant No. 135, the lead plant for the production of the Su-2. The Kharkov plants "Sickle and Molot" and "Gidroprivod" received state orders only for the production, respectively, of fuselages and chassis for Sukhoi bombers. At the beginning of July, to improve economic relations, the branch of Voronezh plant No. 450 was transformed into a branch of the Kharkov aircraft plant.

A very important resolution of the State Defense Committee, which was adopted on July 4, required a significant increase in the production of aircraft and engines starting this month. Plant No. 135 was assigned the task of producing 368 Su-2s in the third quarter of 1941, and Plant No. 207 was tasked with producing 92 similar vehicles. If the planned tasks were successfully completed, already in July the Red Army Air Force should have received 155 Sukhoi bombers. Cadre workers were exempt from conscription into the army. At the same time, the entire management and engineering staff of the plants were transferred to barracks status.

No less attention was paid to improving the combat qualities of aircraft. The first step was an attempt to increase the reliability of weapons and firepower of the Su-2. Already in July, the quality of electric triggers on production vehicles was improved, they returned to the quartet of wing machine guns, and the lower turret of the MV-2 was restored. On August 7, the Air Force Research Institute completed comparative tests of the MV-2 and LU-100 hatch turrets. The design of the latter managed to eliminate a number of inconveniences for the navigator that were noted when working with the MV-2. First of all, the LU-100 allowed the navigator to freely leave the aircraft through the lower hatch, and also provided slightly larger firing angles. However, the military considered it inappropriate to disrupt mass production for the sake of these advantages and did not install LU-100 turrets on serial Su-2s.

But the MB-5m (modified) turret mount, which successfully passed field tests on July 23, 1941, replaced the old model of the upper shooting point. It allowed the navigator to quickly move from shooting to bombing and vice versa. Due to the inconvenience of replacing cartridge boxes and reloading the ShKAS machine gun, a continuous belt of increased length was used in the modified installation.

At the end of July, field tests were successfully completed and the KMB-Su-2 clusters of small bombs were introduced into the series, which replaced the KD-1. It was possible to significantly simplify and speed up the preparation of the bomber for departure, and to make more complete use of the bomb bays. Tests at NIPAV showed that with a normal load of AO-2.5 bombs, the Su-2 could carry about 400 kg of cargo, and with a maximum load - 600 kg. Cassettes on the Su-2 were introduced into the series much earlier than on the Il-2 attack aircraft. The industry quickly eliminated interruptions in the supply of modern electric ejectors (until July 7, outdated ESBR-2 along with ESBR-6 were installed on machines). The work of airfield personnel was designed to be facilitated by specially designed carts for cassettes.

The very first air battles revealed the insufficiency of the navigator's armor protection. More precisely, she was absent altogether. Without waiting for directive instructions, on July 10, 1941, the chief engineer of plant No. 135 P.G. Chepelev addressed a letter to the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin, the chief designer P.O. Sukhoi and the deputy head of the Air Force Main Directorate Ya.L. Bibikov: “When working on the front of the Su-2, the need was discovered to install side armor protection for the navigator on the aircraft. Plant No. 135 is urgently working on a prototype of the navigator's armor protection and upon receipt of the armor it will be installed on all aircraft. Due to additional armor, the weight will increase by 35 kg, due to the hatch installation - by another 30 kg. Based on this, I consider it advisable to reduce weight and shorten the production cycle to remove the RPK-2 radio compass, blinds for blind flights, and the metal navigator’s seat from the vehicle, while retaining the installation for the AFA-13 camera only on every fifth Su-2. In total, you can achieve a weight reduction of 42 kg.”

Chepelev did not know that immediately after the enemy invasion, Sukhoi instructed his pilot plant to develop a reinforced armor scheme. Already on June 26, the brigade chief N.A. Fomin presented, and the chief designer approved, a version of armor protection that differed from that proposed by the serial plant, increasing the armor from below, rather than from the side of the aircraft. The military, having examined the proposals, at first proposed to “give the green light” to both options, and then preferred Sukhoi’s scheme.

Meanwhile, from Brovary, where the 211th BAP was based on July 29, a telegram was received from regimental engineer Byaz with a request to urgently send 42 sets of armor protection for installation on the Su-2 in the field. The military engineer believed that it was better to place armor plates in the form of an apron on the movable ring of the turret. According to the regiment headquarters, combat losses by this time amounted to 2 pilots and 23 navigators. (According to other sources, during two months of the war, 4 pilots and 14 navigators were killed in the 211th BAP, not counting the aviators who did not return from a combat mission.)

By the beginning of August 1941, the Podolsk plant produced 100 sets of armor according to the chief designer’s design, and the plant in Mariupol produced 10 sets according to the Kharkov version; factory teams urgently went to the front to strengthen the protection of already produced aircraft. On August 9, the situation with the armor of the Su-2 crew was reviewed by the government. GKO Resolution No. 441, issued on that day, required that from August 15 all aircraft with navigator armor protection in the form of 8.5 mm sheets of cemented steel be produced. To maintain alignment and payload, the radio station and radio half-compass were removed from the vehicle. By the same decree, the State Defense Committee ordered the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry to immediately provide serial production of Su-2 aircraft with armor plates from the Mariupol plant named after. Ilyich.

Among the work carried out by pilot plant No. 289, the main place was occupied by the testing of new aircraft engines. Even before the start of the war, a propeller-mounted installation for the M-89 engine was designed. In July, the Su-2 M-89 aircraft was completed at plant No. 135.

The new engine differed in size from the M-88B only in the elongated gearbox shaft, but had 150 hp more. power, which promised an increase in speed and climb rate. After several test flights, during which the oil overheated greatly, it was possible to achieve normal oil temperatures in all flight modes by installing two standard 9-inch oil coolers in the center section toes.

From August 12 to 18, 1941, pilot A.P. Deev conducted factory tests of the new machine. Airplane No. 13016 differed from the serial Su-2 (in addition to the engine) by an easily removable Messerschmitt-type spinner without a ratchet and a lower LU installation that was completely retractable in the stowed position into the fuselage. Initially, the vehicle had a TSS-1 upper turret, but during testing it was replaced with the MV-5. According to the pilot, in terms of piloting technique the aircraft differed little from the serial ones, and its maximum speed was approximately 50 km/h higher at all altitudes. In one of the flights, Deev, emerging from a thundercloud, reached an indicated speed of 565 km/h during a dive - no vibrations or deformations were noticed in the structure.

Of course, the M-89 engine was still “raw” and unfinished. Due to insufficient fins, some cylinder heads often overheated. At the same time, its use promised great prospects. Immediately after the factory tests, Su-2 No. 13016 was transferred to factory No. 289 for development and testing of the M-89B engine with direct fuel injection on this machine. It was decided to carry out subsequent flights at the NKAP LII, but the evacuation prevented their completion.

At the end of July, under enemy pressure, the Zaporozhye engine plant No. 29 had to be evacuated to Molotov (Perm). In August, serial production of the Su-2 proceeded irregularly due to interruptions in the supply of cassettes, emergency electric ejectors, but most of all there was a shortage of engines. On August 25, plant No. 135 had 35 M-88B and 80 M-89 engines. The head of the Main Directorate for Armament Orders of the Air Force, General F.I. Zharov, decided to urgently transfer all M-88B engines to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, since the situation with the production of DB-3F bombers was simply threatening, but he allowed the backlog of engines to be used for the Su-2 program M-89. Indeed, until the “motor crisis” could not be overcome, several dozen modified vehicles were sent to the front, and others were equipped with M-88B with crankcases from the M-89.

Even greater prospects, according to P.O. Sukhoi, were promised by the installation of the M-82 engine on the Su-2. The aircraft was built by the beginning of July 1941, and pilot N.D. Fixon began flying at the airfield of plant No. 289. Already the first flights showed insufficient engine response due to the sticking of the metering needle, tight throttle movement and unsatisfactory carburetor operation in idle mode . Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry V.P. Kuznetsov, who personally supervised the progress of the tests, ordered the chief designer of plant No. 33 F.A. Korotkov to urgently finish the carburetors, and carry out further work on the Su-2 M-82 at the LII.

Despite all the efforts of Sukhoi, Shvetsov and Korotkov, the testing of the machine was greatly delayed. Before evacuation, three engines, six carburetors, and four R-7 regulators had to be replaced. Just to select the most suitable carburetor, factory pilots made 80 flights. It was not possible to complete flight tests of the prototype aircraft until the end of September; at the beginning of October 1941, the Su-2 M-82 was transported to Kazan, where VMG sketches were taken from it for use on the TB-7 bomber.

The story about the experimental work of plant No. 289 would be incomplete without mentioning the development of drawings for a wooden wing and a winter standard for a production vehicle. The Su-2 was also tested in reconnaissance and artillery spotter versions. According to the leadership of the Air Force Main Directorate, in the first role the most suitable aircraft were the Pe-2 and Pe-3, but in the second the Su-2 turned out to be simply irreplaceable. “Having a speed range from 220 to 450 km/h and sufficient armament, the aircraft can perform artillery missions,” the report noted. Comparative tests of the Su-2 and the two-seat Yak-7 trainer, carried out in August 1941 at the direction of the deputy commander of the Air Force, General I.F. Petrov, showed the indisputable advantage of the “sushki”.

On the Yak-7 it was impossible to increase the payload due to additional special equipment without a significant deterioration in flight data. The dimensions of the second cabin of the Yakovlev aircraft turned out to be insufficient, and the view from it did not meet the requirements for an artillery aircraft. In addition, the Yak-7 had a long run and range and needed good approaches to the airfield, and also did not have defensive weapons. The Su-2 was deprived of all these shortcomings. According to the leading test engineer, 2nd rank military engineer V.Ya. Magon, the vehicle satisfied “the main and main technical specifications required of a spotter without significant structural alterations”. The Air Force Research Institute recommended that the Sukhoi aircraft be adopted by corrective units and squadrons as soon as possible.

By the end of September 1941, 10 guides for PC-132 or RBS-132 missiles (armor-piercing missile) were mounted under the wing of aircraft No. 070403 in Podlipki. Field tests were successful, but at that time the People's Commissariat of Ammunition produced only standard RS-82 shells. Sukhoi received the task of remaking the car for them. It was planned that from mid-October all Su-2s would have RS attachment points, and every fourth production aircraft would have beams for them.

It remains to consider to what extent the aircraft factories have fulfilled the government’s very intense plans to increase serial production. Measures to include branches in plant No. 135 increased the number of employees at the enterprises to almost 10,000 people. Workers and employees switched to an 11-hour working day without days off. This made it possible to increase the production of aircraft in July to 94 against 62 in the previous month. The quality of Kharkov vehicles fully satisfied the requirements of the front. However, the operational schedule approved by A.I. Shakhurin could not be fulfilled in July: there was not enough equipment.

On August 3, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 384 “On the provision of aircraft to the Southern and Southwestern Fronts.” From now on, the director of the Kharkov aircraft plant, I.M. Kuzin, was supposed to transfer all assembled bombers to the military councils of these associations. By this decree, the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front S.M. Budyonny and member of the military council of the front N.S. Khrushchev pledged “to provide all possible assistance...in increasing production output”. According to the recollections of veterans, Marshal Budyonny actually arrived at the plant, where he met with workers, employees and the aviators who were there. In August, 117 Su-2s were transferred to active units - the largest number of vehicles in the entire history of serial production of the bomber.

Meanwhile, the Red Army continued to retreat, the front approached Kharkov, and clouds gathered over the aircraft plant. On the night of September 4, the enemy carried out the first raid on the city: from under the clouds, 11 bombers dropped fragmentation and incendiary bombs, including captured Soviet RRABs. About 30 factory workers were injured. During the second strike on the night of September 7, the enemy used large landmines. Wanting to make the task easier for the Luftwaffe crews, the Germans transmitted a provocative order to the searchlight batteries over the VNOS network to illuminate the aircraft factory, but the enemy’s plans were unraveled.

Despite the shelling and bombing, the daily production of Su-2s increased to four in early September, which corresponded to the adjusted government target. Kharkov pilots A.I. Kalyuzhnov, G.Ya. Korobko, P.I. Deev and others did not leave the cockpits all daylight hours. Right at the factory airfield after the flight, the vehicles were handed over to military crews. Fighters of the 146th IAP played a major role in covering the plant and the surrounding area. Since September 11, 22 MiG-3s have been on duty around the clock, not allowing the enemy to interfere with the work of Kharkov residents. The enemy failed to disrupt the planned evacuation of the enterprise. When Soviet troops were forced to leave Kharkov on October 25, the released Su-2 bombers promptly flew to rear airfields. The 146th IAP was late with the relocation and 112 people, led by battalion commissar Cherenkov, died and went missing.

Events in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Region, did not develop so dramatically. Here, with the beginning of the war, they carried out a minor modernization of the 4th series bombers and prepared a new standard, the Su-2. At the end of June 1941, aircraft No. 070T29 was tested at the Air Force Research Institute, on which most of the defects previously noted in the test materials were finally eliminated. The results of the work were encouraging.

But the management of the Dolgoprudny plant in the summer of 1941 was unable to establish rhythmic production and create the necessary backlog of parts. Moreover, the existing machine park was only half loaded. As a result, in July plant No. 207 delivered 12 vehicles to the military, and the next month - only eight Su-2s, i.e. The plan was only a third fulfilled.

Repeatedly, the senior military representative of the plant, military engineer of the 2nd rank A.M. Medvedkov, drew the attention of management to poor planning and lack of accounting, which led to frequent downtime. So, on August 7, about 100 people from one of the workshops were not provided with work, and the next day 52 workers were sent to field work at the airfield and 74 were sent on leave. On August 12, the head of the Main Directorate for Armament Orders of the Air Force, General Zharov, turned to Shakhurin with a request to remove director V.P. Gorin and chief engineer of the plant P.S. Kushpel from their posts.

N.V. Klimovitsky was appointed the new director of the 207th. The manager is tough and demanding; he managed to improve production and technological discipline in a short time. The plant increased production of Su-2s and was able to build 15 Su-2s in September, including five vehicles in the artillery spotter version and six long-range photo reconnaissance vehicles with an additional gas tank. It was possible to test the installation of rocket weapons, as well as modified photo installations AFA-1 and NAFA-19. No one could then imagine that very soon the work rhythm of the team would be disrupted. The unexpected breakthrough of the Germans to Moscow forced the Evacuation Council to give the order to relocate the Dolgoprudny plant along with other enterprises in Moscow and the Moscow region to the East. On October 8, it was decided to evacuate plant No. 207 to Perm, where it would be merged with plant No. 135.

The management of the aircraft plant tried to challenge this decision. Already on October 10, director N. Klimovitsky, chief engineer V. Tairov, who were supported by the party organizer of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) V. Egorov and senior military representative A. Medvedkov, turned to Stalin and Malenkov with a request to preserve the plant as an independent production unit. They proposed to evacuate the plant to Tashkent, to the base of a local repair plant, promising in this case as early as January. 1942 double the combat aircraft production program. But, as far as is known, there was no reaction to this appeal.

Evacuation of everyone industrial enterprises took place in difficult conditions. The factories producing the Su-2 were no exception. Thus, the first train from Kharkov to Molotov arrived on October 1, and the last one only on December 4, 1941. Incomplete loading of equipment under enemy fire and lack of Vehicle During unloading, the installation of equipment was delayed. And the management of Engine Plant No. 19, to whose area the production of Su-2 aircraft was relocated, turned out to be unprepared to receive a huge economy: the buildings of the workshops transferred to aircraft manufacturers were cleared and freed from the remains of motor equipment only after the intervention of the authorized NKAP.

It must be borne in mind that the enterprise was restored, as they said then, “based on a merger into a single production and economic unit”- plants No. 135, 207, a branch of plant No. 450, the fuselage shop of the Serp and Molot plant, as well as Gidroprivod, the production part of OKB-289 and the woodworking shop. By the beginning of November, a giant had emerged, numbering 1,763 pieces of equipment, of which 1,114 were metal-cutting machines (for comparison: in Kharkov by the fall of 1941 there were about 800 metal-cutting machines). At the same time, there were less than half of the required number of workers.

Having examined the state of affairs in Molotov and assessing the “bottlenecks,” People’s Commissar A.I. Shakhurin in early November ordered the production of 70 Su-2 M-82s by the end of 1941, and in December to produce three vehicles per day. The Germans were then a hundred kilometers from Moscow, and it was necessary to overcome the crisis associated with the evacuation as quickly as possible. The People's Commissar considered it possible by November 15 to install and put into operation in Perm all the equipment brought here.

In these difficult conditions, it turned out that somewhere along the way the VMG M-82 drawings for the Su-2 had disappeared and they had to be hastily restored. It was also necessary to introduce various substitutes for scarce materials, primarily aluminum and copper. Extensive correspondence took place between different departments on the question of who would produce skis for Sukhoi bombers. On November 18, Deputy Chief of the Air Force Main Directorate Ya.L. Bibikov approached Shakhurin with a proposal to produce every fifth aircraft in the reconnaissance and spotter version, “due to the fact that the Red Army Air Force does not have such aircraft, and the need for them for the front is very great.” . And suddenly…

On November 19, 1941, the State Defense Committee heard in Kuibyshev the director of plant No. 135, I.M. Kuzin, who reported on the difficulties associated with restoring aircraft production. It became clear that the front would not receive a single Su-2 by the end of the month. According to the secretary of the Molotov Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, N.I. Gusarov, it was not possible to create a single production team from the workers of various evacuated enterprises. After a heated discussion, the State Defense Committee adopted two resolutions. The first talks about the need to install and test the promising M-82 engine on the TB-7, “103”, Il-2 and DB-3F aircraft. There is not a word about the Su-2 in the document, although already in September the first two production Su-2 M-82 Su-2s were assembled at the plant in Kharkov, and in Molotov there was a good foundation for the production of these machines. The text of the second resolution turned out to be even more harsh for P.O. Sukhoi: plant No. 135 must immediately begin production of the Il-2 with the M-82 engine, while production of the Su-2 was stopped.

It is difficult to definitively answer the question of why management made this decision. Apparently, the main reason was associated with a decrease in the number of types of combat vehicles in production and the equipment necessary for them. There is no doubt that favorable reviews of the work at the front of the regiments on the Su-2 were late. At the same time, in November, aviation commanders and pilots rated extremely highly the efficiency, survivability, and unpretentiousness of Ilyushin’s attack aircraft. Many military experts then believed that it was difficult to imagine a better aircraft to support troops. Now, if only the IL-2 could be made double, so that the shooter would have a movable machine gun...

Contrary to popular belief, S.V. Ilyushin initially opposed converting the attack aircraft into a two-seater, but agreed to place the shooter in a vehicle with an M-82 engine. Such an aircraft was built, and testing began in early September 1941. A concept was developed for the interaction in battle of the two-seat leader Il-2 M-82 (they were often called Il-4 at that time) with several single-seat Il-2 AM-38.

In accordance with government instructions, the Perm plant received the IL-4 drawings on December 20, and preparations for a new production began the next day. Director Kuzin was allowed to complete the construction of the Su-2 only from the existing reserve. When it became clear that the restructuring of production in Perm was proceeding unacceptably slowly, and it would not be possible to assemble the Il-4 in the coming months, Shakhurin limited the production of the Su-2 only to vehicles located in the assembly shop. Many people perceived this decision with bewilderment, and the commander of the 135th BAP, Major G. Korzinnikov, even wrote a report to the head of the Air Force Main Directorate, where he substantiated the undesirability of stopping the construction of the aircraft, which had proven itself well at the front in recent months.

In the history of our aircraft manufacturing, there have been cases when an aircraft was taken out of production and then restored again. But in this case, having become convinced that it was impractical to build Ilyushin attack aircraft in Perm, the country’s leadership decided - an unprecedented step for the beginning of 1942 - to disband Plant No. 135. In January and February, aircraft factories No. 30 and 381 were strengthened using the personnel and equipment of this enterprise.

According to the recollections of the oldest employee of the OKB, M.I. Zuev, this decision was influenced by Stalin’s dislike for Pavel Osipovich. After the death of V.M. Petlyakov in a disaster on January 12, 1942, Sukhoi was summoned to the Kremlin and received an offer to lead the work on improving the Pe-2. Sukhoi did not refuse, but did not agree either. Stalin did not like Pavel Osipovich’s hesitation and on January 14, with his knowledge, A.I. Izakson was appointed to the position of chief designer of plant No. 22.

After another 10 days, an order was issued: to disband the aircraft plant in Molotov. Sukhoi was not allowed to return to Podlipki even when the Nazis were driven away from Moscow. It turned out that the BB-1 (Su-2) aircraft saw the light of day with the direct participation of the leader, and he also stopped its serial production.

But the history of the use of the Su-2 did not end there. During the cold and snowy winter of 1941-1942, combat activity was low. To ensure at least one flight, it was necessary to start the engines two or three times a night and begin preparing the plane for takeoff long before dawn. In the frost and cold, mechanics lit blowtorches, and then used them to heat up the oil coolers. The crew also experienced difficulties: the snow cover made it difficult for the pilot to calculate the landing, and for the navigator to navigate. The flights were mainly carried out by the most trained crews, since the Su-2 was difficult to fly in the clouds.

The navigators switched to bombing not “by the leader”, as was practiced in the summer, but with individual aiming. Often the planes went on the attack, repeatedly changing course, and five to seven kilometers before the target they unexpectedly turned sharply, making it difficult for the enemy to counter. In February, the 97th BAP installed ten RS-82 launch guides on several bombers and tested the jet weapons in battles on the Bryansk Front. After several successful flights, the pilots were twice thanked by the commander of the 3rd Army Air Force, Lieutenant General G.P. Kravchenko. He also demanded from the command of the 97th BAP and all flight technical personnel “to achieve maximum efforts in restoring the material part”. Indeed, the number of serviceable aircraft in the regiment was only a few. The aviators were most active on March 2, making 14 sorties with five aircraft. By the beginning of March, only four serviceable Su-2s were available in the 209th BAP, which was fighting somewhat to the south.

By the spring of 1942, aviators of the 103rd, 210th, 211th, 226th and 227th BAP finished combat operations on the Su-2. Most of the pilots underwent retraining on the Il-2 attack aircraft and positively perceived the transition “from plywood to cast iron.” In some attack regiments, Sukhoi aircraft were used as training aircraft to practice landing techniques on the Il-2 - after all, two-seat training attack aircraft were not yet produced at that time. The navigators subsequently served in training and combat regiments of daytime bomber aviation, most often on Pe-2 aircraft.

In the winter of 1942, another one was added to the “sushka” regiments operating at the front - in February, the 826th BAP of Major A.M. Bokun was trained in Molotov. The unit had 16 vehicles with M-88B engines and four brand new aircraft with M-82 engines. On the last Su-2s (production numbers 11114, 12116, 07117 and 35117), it was decided to conduct military tests of A.D. Shvetsov’s engines. The crews positively assessed the modified version of the Sukhoi aircraft and the M-82 engines in particular. But during training and during the flight to the front in the period from February 28 to March 9, one disaster, one accident and many forced landings due to engine fault occurred (in total in reserve regiments and training centers in 1941-1942, there were 6 accidents and 17 accidents with Su-2 aircraft - the numbers are unpleasant, but the flight time per serious flight accident was 25 - 30% more than for Pe-2 or Il-2 aircraft.)

Continuing to use the Su-2 in the role of short-range bombers, the command of the Red Army Air Force in March decided to begin forming correction units, and then squadrons. The Air Force Operations and Repair Directorate received an order to collect Su-2 aircraft from emergency landing sites, repair them and send them to the 10th reserve regiment, which was relocated to Kamenka-Belinskaya. The crews trained there received 23-24 hours of flight training and about 100 hours of ground training. Special requirements were imposed on spotter pilots: according to the instructions, each aviator had to have at least a hundred hours of flight time.

However, the situation at the front did not allow the retraining process to be delayed, and soon the first four adjustment flights with a dozen Su-2s left for the Western Front. By the summer of 1942, 77 crews were trained and sent to the active army, of which 52 flew Su-2, and the rest flew imported Curtiss O-52 reconnaissance aircraft. The constant shortage of serviceable Su-2s slowed down the work of the 10th ZAP. In addition, P.O. Sukhoi was ordered to stop all further work on improving the Su-2 spotter. Nevertheless, in April-May it was possible to prepare the first two fully staffed adjustment squadrons - the 12th KAE for the Leningrad and 13th KAE for the Kalinin fronts.

The state tests of the Su-2 M-82 were difficult and with great delays. It took a lot of time to develop the VMG. Only on April 22, 1942, a team of testers led by leading engineer A.V. Sinelnikov began drawing up a report. The pilot, Captain S.M. Korobov, performed 35 flights in the machine. He did most of them with a ski chassis. However, neither the skis nor the increased take-off weight, according to the Air Force Research Institute, affected the aircraft’s behavior in the air. Even without the use of afterburner, the Su-2 M-82 flew at low and medium altitudes much faster than with the M-88B. At the same time, the vehicle's range decreased and the landing angle became insufficient - 18.5°, with the required minimum of 26.5°, which made it dangerous to use the brakes on the run.

By April 22, almost all the pilots of the 826th BAP managed to fly the modified machine. The greatest experience was gained by Captain V. Galushchenko, who added another 11.5 hours of flight time on the Su-2 M-88 to 211 flight hours on the Su-2 M-82, and Lieutenant V. I. Dostalev (173.5 hours + 11.8 h). Both pilots, as well as the regiment commander, Major A.M. Bokun, managed to complete more than a hundred combat missions on “dryers” by May 1942.

In the first days of the Soviet offensive on Kharkov, ground troops were supported by 374 bombers different types, part of the Air Force of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts. Of the 92 bombers suitable for daytime operations, there were 42 Su-2s in the 13th Guards, 52nd, 135th, 288th and 826th BAP. At the beginning of the operation, the crews flew out two or three times to bomb enemy troops, ensuring a breakthrough for tanks and cavalry. However, a timely relocation of aviation following the advancing units was not organized. Every day the interaction with fighters and ground troops became worse. The number of flights dropped sharply, for several reasons. Thus, Colonel I.P. Gorokhov, who replaced V.I. Artamonov in command of the 288th BAP, ordered the pilots not to take off without fighter cover after a pair of Messerschmitts burned three “dryers” on takeoff from the Aleksandrovka airfield. The 40th IAP, which was assigned to the bombers at the beginning of the operation, was based at a great distance and could not cover them, since the range of the I-16 fighters was not enough, and the 762nd IAP, located in Aleksandrovka on the LaGG-3, did not receive the task of escorting the Su-2.

The 97th BAP, which fought on the Bryansk Front, lost almost all of its Su-2s during a bombing at the Yelets airfield in May. The remaining vehicles and personnel were reinforced by the 209th BAP. This unit, together with other regiments of the front air force, had to repel the German summer offensive that began on June 28 in incredibly difficult conditions. In the battles on the outskirts of Voronezh, strong and active Luftwaffe fighter aircraft inflicted heavy losses on many of our regiments, but the 209th BAP retained its combat effectiveness.

The assault regiments that fought side by side with the Su-2 either suffered heavy losses (503rd ShAP) or had many faulty aircraft (218th and 874th ShAP). But the aviators of the 209th BAP also had a hard time in the conditions of retreat. Suffice it to say that the regiment began fighting as part of the 208th Night Regiment, then it was promptly subordinated to the 205th Air Division, and in mid-July 1942 it was added to the 223rd Regiment. By September, 20 Su-2s remained in the unit. All crews flew from 55 to 170 combat missions on this type; 83 people were awarded orders and medals.

An even more intense battle unfolded in July-August 1942 on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Dwelling on the specifics of the combat use of Su-2 aircraft, we will say that some crews of the 826th BAP began to “put on board” a third person - the lower gunner. In one of the battles, an anti-aircraft shell jammed the left aileron, and Messerschmitts attacked the damaged vehicle of Petty Officer Savelyev. The fighters tried to approach from below, but unexpected fire from Sergeant Major Grekov allowed the crew to repulse the attacks. The pilot managed to land the damaged bomber in a field.

On some flights, it was necessary to organize the interaction of the Su-2 M-88, which had undergone two or three major overhauls, with the brand new Su-2 M-82. The difference in their maximum speeds at low and medium altitudes reached 100 km/h. The speeds of the aircraft were almost equalized after VAPs (aircraft pouring devices) were suspended under the wings of the Molotov aircraft. In the summer of 1942, ampoules with a mixture of KS were widely used - they effectively hit enemy manpower and equipment.

The Su-2 crews solved another problem throughout the war. We are talking about dropping leaflets in Russian and German languages over enemy-occupied territory. The intensity of such work increased in July. Up to 45 thousand leaflets were scattered from airplanes over cities occupied by the Nazis in just one month. They spoke about the enormous losses of fascist German troops on the Soviet-German front, reported on the powerful Allied air raids on German cities that had begun, and also cited the text of the Anglo-Soviet cooperation agreement. At the height of summer, German “hunter” fighters began active flights in our near rear. The best Luftwaffe aces from squadrons JG/3, /52, /53, /77 caused enormous damage to our aviation with unexpected attacks. In conditions of treeless, sun-scorched steppe, it was not easy for Soviet pilots to escape the pursuit of the Messerschmitts. At the beginning of July, several Su-2s were shot down by the enemy during takeoffs and landings, and several more were destroyed on the ground. In order to somehow secure their airfields in the face of a shortage of anti-aircraft weapons, regiment commanders ordered the organization of shooter-bomber duty at the MV-5 turrets at a time when the unit was not carrying out combat sorties.

During the summer battles on the Don, the 52nd BAP became one of the best aviation units on the Stalingrad Front. In May, the regiment received the last 22 Su-2 M-82s manufactured in Molotov. The vehicles were originally intended for the women's 587th BAP, which was formed by M.M. Raskova, but she preferred the more modern Pe-2. Having quickly mastered the modified machines, the aviators of the 52nd were grateful to fate that they again had to fight in the creation of P.O. Sukhoi. Almost all veterans of the regiment spoke of the Su-2 with exceptional warmth. According to them, it was an unpretentious, reliable soldier aircraft. Many times, vehicles arrived with bullet holes, or even with parts of stabilizers and rudders cut off, but were repaired by technical personnel and a few days later went into battle again.

The documents noted that well-trained crews detected small, well-camouflaged targets, such as, for example, pontoon crossings submerged several tens of centimeters under water, delivered well-aimed blows and evaded pursuit of enemy fighters at low level. In other cases, on the contrary, single bombers climbed to a height of up to 8000 m. An entry in the combat log of the 270th BAD stated that “at these altitudes, German fighters did not catch up with the Su-2 aircraft and attacked only on oncoming and intersecting courses”. This fact can be explained by the rich experience of the crews, their ability to camouflage themselves with clouds, as well as the insignificant activity of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft at high altitudes in the summer of 1942 - after all, the maximum speed of the Bf-109F and Bf-l09G was still at least 100 km/h more than the Su-2 M-82.

Over the entire 1942, German fighters and anti-aircraft guns shot down 64 Su-2s, of which eight were irretrievable losses of the 8th Air Army during the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad. On average, in the 270th BAD, each Su-2 managed to complete 80 sorties before being written off in July-August, and Pe-2 - only 20. Of course, it would be an exaggeration to say that Sukhoi aircraft are several times better than “pawns” " or "Bostons". We must not forget that among the flight personnel of the 52nd and other regiments on the Su-2 there were many aviators who had excellent training and flight experience from pre-war times. But combat vehicles have now realized everything that the designer put into them.

By the fall of 1942, the number of Su-2 air regiments fighting at the front was reduced to two. In addition to the 288th BAP operating on the Southern Front, the 52nd Regiment continued fighting at Stalingrad. At the beginning of July 1942, the remaining vehicles from the 13th Guards were transferred to the last unit. and the 826th BAP, and in early September - from the 135th BAP. Despite this, the 52nd BAP had no more than 16 Su-2s in September, of which approximately half were combat-ready. Each aircraft was now assigned two or three crews. Not only old-type cars with M-88B, with serial numbers No. 22095, 55092, 1910, but also with M-82 engines, such as No. 44117, 45118 and 47118, have reached a 100-hour resource. Consequently, it was possible to gain invaluable experience in the long-term operation of A.D. Shvetsov’s engines at the front. It is not surprising that in September in Verkhnyaya Akhtuba, bomber pilots helped pilots of the 287th Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Danilov in mastering the first production La-5s - as is known, the M-82 engine was also installed on S.M. Lavochkin’s fighters.

It would seem, what could several Sukhoi bombers mean on the scale of the front at the end of 1942? Meanwhile, in inclement weather, some crews managed to cause significant damage to the enemy. During the counteroffensive of our troops near Stalingrad, which began at the end of November, single Su-2s were successfully camouflaged in the clouds and almost always flew without fighter cover. The “hunter” crews bombed enemy locomotives, vehicles, and airfields with virtually no losses. In one of the flights, the “drying plane” was mistakenly attacked by red star fighters, but they were unable to shoot down the plane. The Su-2 crews brought very valuable information about the German-Romanian troops from raids behind enemy lines to a depth of 200 - 250 km.

Five to seven serviceable Su-2s were available at the end of autumn in the 288th BAP, headed by Major I.I. Bautin. It must be borne in mind that the strength of the entire bomber aviation of the 5th Air Army rarely exceeded fifty aircraft and every serviceable aircraft counted. According to the report of the senior engineer of the 288th BAP, most often Su-2s were idle due to the lack of wheel tubes. Mechanics even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to adapt car tires to the bomber. We were looking forward to the repaired cars from the Grozny workshops...

It is interesting to note that at the end of 1942 Sukhoi aircraft practically ceased to be written off from service. Much more quickly than, say, a year ago, the removal of damaged aircraft from emergency landing sites, their transportation to repair facilities, as well as the dismantling of damaged aircraft and engines into their component parts, sorting into good and bad, and dispatch to their destination were organized. If in the first year of the war 48 Su-2s went through current and restoration repairs, then in the second year - no less than 568 Sukhoi aircraft. Some “dryers” ended up in workshops and repair centers more than 20 times!

In mid-November, 41 spotters of this type were already operating on different fronts, of which 34 were combat-ready. Most of the Su-2s - 13 units - were in the 34th and 45th separate AEs that fought at Stalingrad. The latter, led by Captain N.N. Korolev, made 26 sorties in January 1943 without losses, of which 8 were associated with artillery fire adjustments, 14 with visual reconnaissance, 2 with photographic reconnaissance, and 2 sorties had to be interrupted due to bad weather. Sometimes the aviators were able to adjust the fire of the 1st artillery division of the RGK General V.N. Mazur on seven targets simultaneously. After the victory on the Volga, the squadron received the honorary title of 1st Guards.

During the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad, the personnel of the 12th separate CAE distinguished themselves, ensuring the work of the artillery corps of the breakthrough of the reserve of the Supreme High Command of General Zhdanov. The command believed that the artillerymen could not so effectively suppress long-term enemy firing points without the “prompt” of the pilots. The patched and patched Su-2s accelerated no faster than 275 km/h (measured), but stayed in the air perfectly.

Among the shortcomings in the organization of combat operations, the gunners took a long time to prepare data for firing - the Su-2 crews had to stay above the front line for more than an hour. Often the escort fighters returned home after using up all their fuel, and the spotters had to face an unequal battle with the Messers and Fokkers. So, on June 23, 1943, near the city of Kholm, the crew of the 1st GvKAE died: pilot Art. Lieutenant A.L. Dmitrienko (93 sorties) and navigator Senior Lieutenant N.I. Kukushkin (101 sorties). From archival documents it follows that at the beginning of the war, Dmitrienko acted uncertainly and once even dropped bombs on his troops by mistake. Subsequently, having mastered the Su-2 perfectly and learned to fight on it, he became one of the most trained pilots of the 97th, then the 209th BAP, and subsequently the 45th AE.

The Germans quickly realized the threat that slow-moving vehicles posed. Just as Soviet fighters sought to shoot down FW-189 spotters, their German opponents hunted for our artillery aircraft. According to the pilot of the 54th GvIAP Ya.L. Mikhailik, the FW-190s tried to primarily shoot down the Su-2 with surprise dive attacks. It turned out to be very difficult for the escort fighters to protect them from powerful fire. For example, on June 28, 1943, four Yak-1s managed to save the spotter, although the Yakovlev from the 55th GvIAP burned out from enemy fire. On the eve of the battles on the Kursk Bulge, a lot of work was done by the crews of the 16th and 47th Air Forces (in the Arkhangelskoye-Kamenka and Kamenka-Saburovo areas, respectively), which were part of the 16th Air Army. They regularly reported to the command of the ground forces about the activities carried out by the enemy on the front line.

Even after the withdrawal of the 52nd BAP from the front at the end of 1942 to Petrovsk-Saratovsky (15th ZAP) and the transfer of the remaining nine Su-2s to the correction squadrons, there were constantly not enough aircraft for the latter. But the aviators of the 52nd BAP significantly strengthened the 14th and 15th KAE; by this time, 14 pilots had flown from 93 to 244 (!) combat sorties on the Su-2. 21 navigators and 65 technicians had no less experience.

The lack of new Su-2s forced the Air Force command to begin forming correction squadrons on Il-2 aircraft in the spring of 1943. Despite the fact that S.V. Ilyushin modified the communication equipment of the attack aircraft, he was unable to eliminate a number of defects of the vehicle, and above all the cramped rear cabin. According to the letnabs, the Ilas did not provide them with the necessary convenience of work, but by the summer of 1943, adjustment squadrons were sent to the front only with them. Meanwhile, until the end of 1943, the 53rd and 54th KAE, led by senior lieutenants I.I. Kasatkin and A.I. Shvetsov (both veterans of the 52nd BAP), successfully fought on the Su-2. Major Shvetsov subsequently formed and headed the 187th separate correctional reconnaissance regiment, with which he reached Victory. But not a single Su-2 remained in service in the regiment by 1944. According to documents from the 42nd KEA, on November 27, 1943, one of the last Su-2s in service, No. 263105, was shot down by a sudden attack from behind the clouds by a German ace.

At the beginning of March 1943, the 288th BAP was withdrawn from the front to Mozdok for additional staffing and training for crews in combat operations at night. All vehicles were equipped with RSB-Zbis radios, RPK-10 radio semi-compasses, and NAFA-19 night photo installations. However, retraining dragged on and was marred by disaster. On the night of June 3, 1943, during a training flight in the light of searchlights, the crew of Hero of the Soviet Union G.G. Nikolaev (navigator A.N. Petrov) crashed. The regiment leadership had to make great efforts to overcome “photophobia.” After several combat missions at the end of the summer of this year, the command of the 4th Air Army, which included the regiment, decided to disband the 288th BAP and transfer the personnel to the 650th night BAP.

Led by Major A.S. Kutsenko, the 650th BAP became the thirteenth and last regiment that fought on Sukhoi aircraft (in addition, at least 12 reconnaissance and spotting squadrons and 18 flights operated on the Su-2; individual aircraft were used by 90- 1st RAE, 8th ORAP, 205th IAD, headquarters of the 6th VA and other units). For effective and selfless sorties during the battles in the Kuban, the unit was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in August 1943, after which two squadrons were re-equipped with the Su-2, and the third continued to fight with the P-10. In the battle over the Blue Line in September-October, the Su-2 crews of pilots N.N. Malega and G.P. Lepaev especially distinguished themselves, successfully using their vehicles at night. From the Slavyanskaya airfield, the regiment supported our sailors during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, causing noticeable damage transport transportation enemy in Crimea.

But the time of the Su-2 was running out. In January 1944, the 650th BAP handed over the few remaining vehicles and two months later completed re-equipment with the Pe-2. It is symbolic that the regiment became part of the 188th BAD of Colonel A.I. Pushkin, who made a significant contribution to the development and successful use of Sukhoi aircraft. Let's say a few words about other heroes who fought on the Su-2.

M.P. Odintsov will forever remember the eighth combat mission. After striking an enemy crossing on July 3, 1941, enemy fighters “they didn’t leave a single living place on the plane”. The pilot and navigator were seriously injured. The plane somehow stayed in the air and Odintsov was able to land it safely at his airfield. Mikhail Petrovich remembered that it took 11 bandages to bandage him. After two strikes by the squadron of the 210th BAP headed by Lieutenant I.L. Karabut on the enemy’s front line on September 29, 1941, the commander of the 96th Infantry Division defending here assessed the actions of our aviators on the Su-2 as “beyond all praise.”

Navigator M.A. Lashin demonstrated enviable skill in many missions. So, on March 23, 1942, his crew flew out to reconnaissance enemy troops. Meanwhile, a group of He-111s, covered by Bf-109s, approached the Korocha airfield, where the 135th Regiment was then based. Noticing a lone Soviet plane, the leading Messerschmitt chased after it, but was hit by a well-aimed burst from Lashin and made an emergency landing at the location of the airfield service battalion.

The commander of 9/JG52, Lieutenant K. Schade, who had considerable experience in training and combat work, was captured. Hitler's ace managed to shoot down 27 Soviet aircraft, and the lone Soviet aircraft that he attacked so unsuccessfully was identified by German aviators as an “armored Il-2.” By the way, on August 27, 1942, the commander of another detachment, 8/JG52, Lieutenant O. Decker, was also shot down after he unsuccessfully pursued a Su-2. Our pilot dodged the Messer's bursts at low level, firing back from a machine gun, until, finally, one of the soldiers in the trenches managed to hit the oil cooler of a German fighter with a rifle. It was possible to capture not only the German commander, but also the newest Bf-109G No. 13529, which became a valuable trophy of the Red Army Air Force.

The Soviet command considered the raid of the five Su-2s, led by Art. Lieutenant V.A. Verkholantsev, to the Kursk railway station on May 1, 1942. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, our bombers accurately hit the target. The enemy warehouse caught fire and the fire raged for three days. “Operating on the Stalingrad Front from August 1, 1942 to January 5, 1943, Art. Lieutenant I.N. Martynenko carried out the most important tasks of the command, such as detecting airfields and reconnaissance of defensive lines", - noted in the award material. The pilot made 37 such flights.

On the night of July 25, 1943, Captain K.Ya. Franchuk, with the help of SABs, was able to detect a cluster of vehicles on the Taman Peninsula, and then accurately dropped bombs on them. No less successful were the night raids on the Novorossiysk pier late in the evening of August 15 and ships in the port of Cordon on the night of November 6, 1943. In each of these cases, the crews recorded numerous explosions and fires at the enemy's location.

Busy with other work, Sukhoi did not leave his attention to the Su-2 aircraft even after its serial production ceased. On his initiative, in July 1942, new M-82FN engines with direct fuel injection into the cylinders were installed on two vehicles (Nos. 25095 and 26096). Despite the crash of the second aircraft on August 5, 1942, Pavel Osipovich ensured that testing continued. After fine-tuning the VMG, it became clear that the new engine holds great promise. The work turned out to be very useful for our aviation. Let us remember that it was only in the summer of 1943 that success came to the La-5FN with the same engine.

In December 1942, Pavel Osipovich proposed to subject the Su-2 to serious alterations, installing an M-71F engine with a take-off power of 2200 hp on a well-developed airframe. With. In the project, designated BB, the fuselage design was redesigned, the armor was strengthened and the wing area was increased, changing its planform. This work, as well as the Su-2 project in the attack aircraft version, was not approved by Deputy People's Commissar for Experimental Aircraft Construction A.S. Yakovlev.

Designed in 1935-1936 and created in prototypes at the Ivanov competition in 1937, P.O. Sukhoi’s short-range bomber was built in a large series from 1940 to 1942. The factories produced 893 vehicles, of which approximately 30 had M-87A or B engines (before the war, most of them were re-equipped with more powerful M-88B engines), 58 had M-82 engines, and the rest - M-88 and M-88B . We emphasize that Pavel Osipovich installed on prototypes of his vehicles not only the engines listed above, but also Shvetsov M-62, M-63, M-63TK, M-81, M-82FN, Urmin M-87, M-89 - many of which at that time did not go beyond the scope of experimental work.

The crews especially noted such advantages of the Su-2 as a spacious, comfortable cabin, warm in any cold weather, and good visibility for the pilot and navigator for single-engine aircraft. The ability to control the aircraft from the navigator's cabin simplified the process of retraining the flight crew and turned out to be an invaluable advantage in the event of a pilot being injured or killed. The aircraft were widely used at the front in the first year of the war in the role of short-range bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and attack aircraft. True, the Su-2 turned out to be poorly prepared for the latter role and the Sushok regiments suffered heavy losses. The surviving aircraft were used at the front until the beginning of 1944, mainly in the role of reconnaissance aircraft and spotters. They turned out to be very useful in conditions of air supremacy of Soviet aviation.

To sum up, we can say that the Su-2 aircraft was not Sukhoi’s most successful design. It was followed by the excellent Su-6 attack aircraft, for which the designer was awarded the 1st degree Stalin Prize, Su-9 and Su-11 fighters, Su-7B fighter-bombers and many other machines that left a much greater mark on the history of our aviation. For a number of reasons, the Su-2 bomber did not become a mass-produced aircraft. The real “Ivanov” of the Soviet Air Force was the Il-2 attack aircraft, which entered service in ever-increasing quantities. It replaced the Su-2 in many roles and was widely used in the vast majority of World War II operations.

Design of the BB-1 production aircraft with the M-88 (M-88B) engine.

The design of the aircraft is mixed: the fuselage and fin are wooden, all other components remain metal.

A distinctive feature of the design was the transition from steel welded components and parts to similar ones made of high-strength aluminum alloys, allowing serial production their production by cold and hot stamping (from AK-1 material) and casting (from 195T4 and AK material) with minor mechanical finishing.

Welding followed by heat treatment was used only in the design of the chassis, crutch, engine mount, as well as in weapon elements.

The design provided for modular assembly with the installation of controls and equipment before final assembly, which made it possible to use the in-line assembly method with access to the conveyor.

The mechanization of the manufacture of parts and drilling of holes along the jigs ensured the interchangeability of parts without any additional adjustment. The use of open profiles not only simplified the assembly of elements and entire units, but also made it possible to mechanize the riveting process. Thanks to extruded profiles, the skin of the wing and tail began to work not only in shear, but also in compression. The increased role of cladding forced us to pay special attention to the edging of various cutouts and hatches caused by the needs of assembly and operation. For this reason, a number of hatches were made not with locks, but with bolts and anchor nuts

The fuselage was a monocoque type with a load-bearing skin, made entirely of wood, and consisted of 20 frames connected to each other by four spars and several stringers, covered with plywood sheathing - a shell.

The first 19 frames are all-wood, 20th mixed construction. It consisted of two parts: the upper one, made of plywood, and the lower one made of duralumin. After installing the stabilizer, both parts were connected by two duralumin profiles, on which two elevator brackets and two stabilizer suspension brackets were attached. On frame No. 20 the tail wheel was mounted.

The four fuselage spars were made in the form of beams made of slats of variable cross-section, tapering towards the tail section. There were two plateaus at the top of the fuselage. The front plateau of box-section served to connect the upper spars and to attach the rear screen turret. Next was the rear plateau, above which the rear folding fairing was located. When using the turret, the fairing could be lowered. The pilot's duralumin floor consisted of two horizontal and one inclined slabs.

To view the lower hemisphere in the navigator's cabin, one window was installed on each side of the fuselage. There were also footrests on the sides of the fuselage to support the navigator's legs. In the rear part of the fuselage there was a hatch designed for emergency escape from the aircraft and installation of a hatch installation.

The fuselage skin was made of birch veneer 0.5 mm thick, glued onto a special blank shaped like the fuselage. The veneer was glued at an angle of 45° to the axis of the aircraft. The thickness of the fuselage skin was variable. After gluing the shell onto the frame and removing any irregularities, the fuselage was covered with a harsh awning and painted.

The pilot's cockpit was covered with a convex, streamlined plexiglass canopy and a high sliding canopy, providing excellent visibility in all directions. The sliding part had a window on the left side that moved back on guides. Fully moving the canopy back ensured the pilot's free exit from the cockpit.

Behind the oblique rear section of the pilot's cockpit canopy was attached the navigator's turret fairing, which consisted of a fixed and folding part. The folding visor could be tilted all the way forward and locked - in this position the navigator could get into the cockpit.

Both cabins were heated. Heating of the air in them was provided by a special pipeline laid on the right side of the aircraft. Air entered the pipeline from the flame pipe of the exhaust manifold. At the request of the crew, fresh air could be pumped into the cabin through the same pipelines.

The wing differed from the wing of the SZ-2 aircraft in the way the fairing was attached between the center section and the fuselage. The center section frame consisted of two spars, six ribs and two longitudinal walls. In the toe behind the second spar at the top and bottom there were stringers in the form of angular profiles.

Along the rear edge of the center section, from below, there were landing flaps (two sections), which were attached to the rear wall of the center section and had a constant chord. Sheathing - duralumin, hard-worked, 0.6 mm thick. The shields under the fuselage had windows for viewing down from the navigator's cabin.

The frame of each wing console consisted of two spars, 17 ribs, a rear wall, stringers and additional beams in the machine gun compartment. All frame elements, with the exception of a few nodes, were made of duralumin.

To mount the tank, a large hatch was made on the lower surface of the wing, which was closed with a lid in the form of a panel. The panel was attached to the ribs and spars using screws and self-locking nuts.

The detachable part of the wing, as well as the center section, was sheathed with smooth cold-worked duralumin sheets. Sheathing thickness is from 1.0 to 0.6 mm. The riveting of the skin along the toe to the first spar and along the upper surface from the first to the second spar is secret; the rest of the skin was riveted with rivets with lenticular heads.

The frame of each aileron consisted of a tubular duralumin spar, stamped sheet ribs, a nose stringer and a tail profile. The toe of the aileron was sheathed with a thin duralumin sheet to give rigidity. The entire aileron was covered with canvas. A tube with lead was placed in the toe of the aileron, which served as weight compensation. The wing ailerons deviated 25° up and down. The left aileron had a controlled trim tab.

The design of the flaps, located on the consoles from the aileron to the connector, is similar to the center section ones.

The longitudinal tail assembly consisted of four channel-section walls, extruded profiles and corners; transverse - from split sheets of ribs. The casing and the entire stringer set are duralumin.

Six cast brackets necessary for hanging the elevator were attached to the rear wall of the stabilizer. The stabilizer was installed motionless at an angle of -5° and bolted to the corners bordering the cutout in the fuselage for the stabilizer. The connection was closed with a seal. In addition, the stabilizer was bolted to the rear fuselage frame using two middle brackets.

The elevator had weight compensation. Both halves of it were interchangeable and connected by a pipe passing through the tail fairing of the fuselage. The elevator frame consisted of a pipe-spar with tail ribs strung on it. The nose of the steering wheel was sheathed with duralumin, and the entire surface was covered with canvas. At the tail end of each half of the rudder, a trimmer was suspended from a ramrod.

The all-metal keel consisted of two box-section spars, stringers and ribs; its covering was plywood. On the rear spar there were two brackets for hanging the steering wheel.

The rudder trimmer, like the elevator trimmer, consisted of a channel section profile, to which a casing reinforced with several ribs, a loop and an eyelet for the trimmer control rod were riveted.

Aircraft control is dual, mixed. The elevator, ailerons and flaps had rigid control wiring, and the elevator, trim tabs and crutch had cable control. From the second cabin it was possible to turn off the elevator control.

The shields were controlled by a hydraulic cylinder through a system of rods and rockers. They deviated at an angle of 55° upon landing.

The mechanism for retracting and releasing the landing gear is electro-hydraulic. The main pillars are the same as on SZ-2.

The crutch installation had an automatic stop in the neutral position after the tail of the aircraft separated from the ground. It automatically retracted at the same time as the main pillars. The crutch wheel could rotate on the ground 42° in each direction.

To ensure winter operation, all production aircraft were equipped with a set of skis produced by factories No. 135 and 207, as well as the Moscow factory No. 2 of the People's Commissariat for Forestry. During flight, the skis of the main struts were retracted and adjacent to the lower center section skin. These skis consisted of a skid (plywood glued to ash or oak planks), three box spars, nine frames, two side ribs, four stringers, plywood skins, and sheet aluminum edging. The ski had dimensions of 2700×650 mm.

During flight, the crutch ski was adjacent to the lower surface of the fuselage. To attach the shock absorber to the fork on the ski, there was a boar with a bushing into which the fork axle was inserted. Two shock absorber cords were attached to the top of the ski, front and rear. The crutch ski consisted of two solid pine spars and two side ribs. The ski runner consisted of ash planks. The entire ski was edged with sheet aluminum. The dimensions of the tail ski are 615×290 mm.

When installing the skis, the wheels along with the axles were removed, and the skis were secured in the lower part of the shock absorber using a traverse. Instead of summer shields, winter ones were installed.

The propeller-engine group consisted of a two-row star-shaped 14-cylinder engine M-88 (M-88B) with a rated ground power of 950 hp. With. The engine was equipped with a three-bladed VISH-23 variable-pitch propeller with a diameter of 3.25 m. The propeller fairing consisted of front and rear parts connected to each other by screws and anchor nuts. The fairings were made of sheet duralumin. A heat-treated steel ratchet was riveted to its front part to start the engine from an autostarter.

The engine hood had internal and external parts, as well as a skirt. The outer hood was made in the form of three removable covers, inserted into the groove of V-shaped profiles and secured only to the engine using front and rear units.

The hood skirt was divided into three sectors - two side and bottom. The side sectors had six doors. They were connected by hinges and guide sheets made of stainless steel. When the skirt was fully opened, the flaps retained the shape of the hood, bridging the gaps between the flaps. In the right side sector there was a cutout in two flaps for the engine exhaust pipe.

On top of the hood, between the side members, a removable panel was attached to access the fuselage fuel tank.

A tunnel for the carburetor suction pipe was attached to the lower part of the hood, and behind it, in the area of ​​the skirt, an oil cooler with a tunnel for air intake was installed. The incoming air was regulated using a damper.

Small arms included three ShKAS machine guns, two of which were stationary in detachable wing consoles outside the rotor rotation zone. To access the machine guns, there were hatches in the upper surface of the wing. The firing of the wing machine guns was controlled using triggers located on the aircraft control stick.

The upper turret of the MV-5 remained unchanged, as on the SZ-2 aircraft, and the hatch installation was removed from the aircraft.

Bombs with a caliber of 8 - 100 kg were suspended on cassette holders in the fuselage bomb bay, under the cockpit. The normal bomb load was 400 kg, and the maximum was 600 kg. The internal suspension did not exceed 400 kg. Bombs of 100 and 250 kg could be suspended on external bomb racks under the wing.

Equipment. External communication of the aircraft was carried out using a radio station of the RSB “Dvina” type, which was installed in the second cabin in front of the navigator. All units of the radio station were easily removed and mounted on the frame shelf, using rubber shock absorbers of the “Lord” type.

The radio station was equipped with a rigid single-beam T-shaped antenna stretched from the bow rod to the keel. As a rule, radio stations were filmed on bombers. They were left on planes performing reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment tasks.

The AFA-13 camera was installed on the starboard side of the navigator's cabin. In the stowed position it could be secured to the side with a latch.

The Su-2, or BB-1 as it is also called, is a light bomber that was widely used during the Second World War. This machine had significant differences from machines of a similar design at that time. The Su-2 aircraft has greater visibility from the pilot's seat, which allows him to use the aircraft more efficiently and skillfully. Due to its visibility, this device was often used as a spotter for our artillery. An innovation was the idea of ​​the chief designer P. Sukhoi to move all the bombs into the middle of the hull, which would increase the flight speed of the vehicle. During development, the designers planned to make the car entirely from metal. Unfortunately, this could not be done because there was little metal.

History of the creation of the Su-2 bomber

The development of a new high-speed attack aircraft, which was supposed to fly over long distances, began in the winter of 1936. This car in the documents was called “Ivanov”. In 1937, P.O. started this project. Sukhoi, who made his own adjustments. The main changes affected the power plant, since the designer equipped this device with a more reliable air-cooled engine of the M-62 type.

As for the time spent on design and production, it was very short. The first prototype was ready six months after the start of project development. The Su-2 prototype was first flown in the summer of 1937. Quite a lot of time was spent on refining the engine, which constantly broke down. It was because of this engine that the car was not allowed to undergo state testing.

After modifications, the aircraft was tested in 1938 and arrived at the plant for an engine replacement. But a new engine of the same type malfunctioned on the third flight, and the plane crashed. After this incident, Su-2 aircraft began to be equipped with new, more reliable M-87 engines. The new power plant made it possible to achieve high flight performance and pass state tests in 1939. The military was interested in this machine and decided on its mass production in Kharkov, and Pavel Sukhoi was appointed chief designer.

The first cars had both iron and wooden parts in their construction, since there was a catastrophic shortage of metal. The latest cars were equipped with more advanced engines. The production of these aircraft proceeded at a very large scale, since from 1940 to 1942 more than 910 units of this aircraft were produced.

In addition, throughout the entire production period, designers constantly worked on improving and modernizing this machine. During World War II, the Su-2 aircraft was widely used in military operations and proved to be a high-quality combat vehicle. 27 pilots who flew this aircraft were awarded the highest award - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Design features of the Su-2 aircraft

The aircraft is manufactured according to the design of a cantilever glider with one engine. The body is made of metal and plywood, which allowed saving metal and lightening the overall weight of the structure. The cockpit was covered with a fairing, which was equipped with a canopy. The fairing is made of plexiglass and provides excellent visibility to pilots. The plane is controlled by two pilots, who are located in two heated cabins.

The wings are made of duralumin. Each wing is equipped with fuel tanks, which can be serviced using hatches in the wing. The keel of the aircraft is made of duralumin, as is the steering wing. The vehicle's controls are paired, allowing each pilot to control the vehicle. The chassis in the Su-2 was retracted into internal niches using an electric drive. The landing gear of this aircraft consists of three supports.

The power plant of the machine is represented by a 14-cylinder engine of the M-88 model, which is cooled by air. Engine power is 950 horsepower. The engine drives a three-blade propeller, which has a diameter of 3.35 meters.

As for the hood that covers the engine, it consists of two parts and is equipped with a skirt. The right side of the hood has a hole for the exhaust pipe. On top of the hood there is a panel with which you can get to the fuel tank located in the fuselage of the car.

As for weapons, the aircraft has three 7.62 mm machine guns, one of which is controlled by the co-pilot. Some modifications of the Su-2 had a hatch in the bottom, which was located in the navigator's cabin. With its help it was possible to protect the bottom of the device. As for the bombs that the plane carried, they were located in the bomb bay and on external bomb racks. The pilots' means of communication was a Dvina-type radio station, which was located in the co-pilot's cockpit.

Su-2 characteristics:

In 1936, a competition began in the USSR for the development of a new “military aircraft” under the code “Ivanov”, designed to replace the mass-produced R-5 biplane. The new vehicle was supposed to perform the functions of an attack aircraft, a light bomber, a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft and even an escort fighter.

All leading design teams took part in the competition, including Design Bureau P.O. Sukhoi, which proposed an all-metal two-seat low-wing aircraft with retractable landing gear. The armament consisted of four 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns in the wing and one on the turret. A bomb load weighing up to 600 kg was placed in the fuselage bomb bay; only for 250 kg bombs was an external sling provided. Initially, the competition requirements included the use of an AM-34 liquid-cooled engine, but during the design process the designer opted for a 9-cylinder air-cooled M-62 engine. The first two prototypes were equipped with such engines - SZ-1, tested from August 25, 1937, and SZ-2, flown in December 1937. The third machine - SZ-3 - received a 14-cylinder M-87 engine, the installation of which made it possible to improve takeoff and landing characteristics. Also on this vehicle, the fuel supply and machine gun ammunition capacity were increased, and some other changes were made. The SZ-3 became the model for the series, but the production vehicles were not all-metal, but of a mixed design - a metal wing and a wooden fuselage.

Production aircraft were designated BB-1, and from December 1940 - Su-2. Total production was 893 units. 785 of them in 1940-1942. manufactured by Kharkov plant No. 135, and several dozen of them were assembled after the evacuation to Molotov (Perm). 92 aircraft were built by plant No. 207 near Moscow (3 in 1940 and 89 in 1941) and 16 by Taganrog enterprise No. 31 (16 in 1940 and 4 in 1941).

Technical characteristics of Su-2 aircraft

• Modification: Su-2 M-88 B
• Engine: M-88B
• power, hp: 1100
• Wingspan, m: 14.30
• Aircraft length, m: 10.25
• Aircraft height, m: 3.94
• Wing area, sq. m.: 29.0
• Weight, kg:
• empty aircraft: 2790
• takeoff: 4375
• Maximum speed, km/h: 455
• Climb time 5000 m, min: 12.6
• Practical ceiling, m.: 8900
• Flight range, km: 890

Main modifications of the Su-2

• Su-2 with the M-87B engine (950 hp) - the first option, which was, in fact, pre-production. Small arms - 5 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns (4 in the wing, 1 on the top turret). Bomb load weight - 400 kg (maximum - 600 kg). Crew - 2 people. The exact number built is unknown, but at least 6.
• Su-2 with an M-88 or M-88B engine (1100 hp) - the main modification. Small arms and bomb armament correspond to the M-87B variant. From August 1941, enhanced armor was installed. More than 800 units were produced.
• Su-2 with an M-82 engine (1400 hp). Basically similar to the version with M-88B, but a lower hatch rifle installation with 1 ShKAS machine gun has been introduced. 58 aircraft were built.

Combat use of the Su-2

The first unit to receive Su-2 bombers was the 135th Bomber Aviation Regiment (BAP), formed in 1940 in Kharkov. By the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union, 8 regiments had been fully or partially equipped with new aircraft. The first to debut were the Air Force regiments of the Odessa Military District - the 210th and 211th BAP. Already on the evening of June 22, 8 Su-2s bombed crossings across the river. Rod. The 97th and 43rd BAP operating on the Western Front (the latter not completely rearmed) entered the battle on June 24 and by July 7, 1941, had lost all their aircraft and were withdrawn for rearmament. At the end of June, the 103rd and 135th BAPs, armed with Su-2s, arrived on the Western Front from near Kharkov. They supported the ground forces during the hastily organized counter-offensive near Zhlobin, and also suffered serious losses in the first half of July. On the Southwestern Front there were 2 regiments armed with Su-2 - the 226th and 227th BAP, stationed near Kiev. In the first days of the war, they continued training missions, since the crews had not yet fully mastered the new aircraft, and only entered combat on June 28. The Su-2 crews, along with other bombers, attacked the advancing columns of the 1st Tank Group, trying to hold back the enemy's advance. Flying without fighter cover, in conditions of good visibility at low and medium altitudes, the bombers suffered heavy losses.

By August 1941, the Soviet Air Force was significantly reduced due to losses suffered. But the combat effectiveness of the regiments armed with the Su-2 had even increased by that time - the crews had gained combat experience and began to act more confidently. Many crews began flying missions in difficult weather conditions and at night, and learned to camouflage themselves with clouds. A successful operation was carried out on the morning of August 30 by the 227th BAP. 14 of his Su-2s struck the Belaya Tserkov airfield, destroying a repair base and destroying 10. In August, the armed Su-2 of the 289th BAP arrived on the Southwestern Front. His first task was the bombing of crossings across the Dnieper near Kremenchug. At the same time, some regiments flying other types of aircraft received Su-2 aircraft as compensation for losses. So, on August 10, the 13th BAP, equipped with twin-engine SBs and operating from the first days of the war on the Western Front, received 7 Su-2s.

In September 1941, 6 regiments armed with Su-2 fought on the Southwestern Front. As of October 4, the front air force had 474 aircraft, of which 116 were Su-2. Never before or subsequently have bombers of this type played such an important role and were the most popular aircraft of frontline aviation. Su-2 tactics in the fall of 1941 were based on operations in small groups - 6-8 aircraft covered by 2-3 fighters. Due to low clouds, planes often bombed from extremely low altitudes. As of November 25, the Air Force of the Southwestern Front still had 93 Su-2s, but the number of serviceable aircraft decreased from 77 to 37 compared to the beginning of October.

In total, the Su-2 carried out about 5,000 combat missions in 1941. Due to various reasons, more than 400 Su-2s had to be written off, of which 222 were combat losses.

By the spring of 1942, most of the regiments that fought on the Su-2 were re-equipped - mainly with . In February 1942, the 826th BAP was formed, which received 16 Su-2 M-88B and 4 Su-2 M-82. In this regiment, aircraft with M-82 engines underwent military tests. In general, the crews rated the modified Su-2 quite well. But the “raw” M-82 engine constantly let us down. Probably the last operation in which a significant number of regiments armed with Su-2 were involved was the Kharkov operation in May 1942. Aviation from the Southern and Southwestern Fronts took part in it. In total, five regiments with Su-2 operated on these fronts: 13th Guards, 52nd, 135th, 288th and 826th. But their composition was far from complete: they numbered only about 40 bombers. Trying to compensate for the insufficient numbers by the intensity of combat work, the crews carried out two or three sorties a day, ensuring a breakthrough for tanks and cavalry. Subsequently, 3 regiments (52nd, 135th, 826th) became part of the 270th BAD, which actively participated in the defensive phase of the Battle of Stalingrad.

By the fall of 1942, the number of Su-2 regiments fighting at the front had been reduced to two. In addition to the 288th BAP operating on the Southern Front, the 52nd BAP fought at Stalingrad, which at times had only 3-4 combat-ready aircraft. As of October 1, there were 9 Su-2s with M-82 engines and 4 with M-88B engines in service. Each aircraft was now assigned 2-3 crews. In the conditions of inclement weather that established itself at the end of 1942, single Su-2s flew “free hunting”. Operating without fighter cover, skillfully camouflaging in the clouds, the planes bombed trains with virtually no losses, car columns, convoys, airfields.

The last unit to fight with the Su-2 was the 650th Night Bomber Regiment (NBAP), which received such aircraft in August 1943. In September-October, the regiment successfully operated in the battle over the Blue Line. Then the regiment took part in supporting the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, and it delivered the last few Su-2s in January 1944.

Experience in combat use showed that the Su-2 had a number of undoubted advantages. The crews liked the spacious, comfortable cabin, protected from the cold, and good visibility for the pilot and navigator compared to other single-engine aircraft. The presence of a second set of aircraft controls in the navigator's cabin simplified the process of retraining the flight crew, and was also invaluable in the event of a pilot being injured or killed in combat. The aircraft were widely used at the front in the first year of the war in the role of short-range bombers and attack aircraft. True, the Su-2 turned out to be poorly suited for the latter role, and the regiments suffered heavy losses. The period of large-scale use of the Su-2 in battles turned out to be relatively short - due to the evacuation of the Kharkov plant No. 135, which was practically the monopoly producer of the Su-2, and the subsequent cessation of production of aircraft of this type, the regiments that fought on the Su-2 were gradually rearmed with other types of aircraft or even disbanded. However, the surviving Su-2s, having undergone repeated repairs, served as spotters until the beginning of 1944.

Production of Su-2 aircraft (1940 - 1942)

Su-2 - Soviet light bomber during the Second World War. In the second half of 1936, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of Aviation Industry (GUAP), the design teams of N.N. Polikarpova, I.G. Nemana, S.V. Ilyushina, S.A. Kogerigina, D.P. Grigorovich and P.O. Sukhoi conducted preliminary research on the designs of attack reconnaissance aircraft with an AM-34FRN piston engine.

The SUAI Commission reviewed the projects and came to the conclusion that they “... differ very little from each other in their geometric dimensions, weight and flight performance data,” and considered it expedient to build the aircraft in three design options: duralumin, based on American technologies, wooden and mixed. For each of the options, chief designers were appointed: P.O. Sukhoi (plant No. 156, Moscow), I.G. Neman (plant No. 135, Kharkov) and N.N. Polikarpov (plant No. 21, Gorky).

The commission’s proposal received approval from the country’s leadership, and on December 27, 1936, a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) was issued “On the construction of a high-speed long-range attack reconnaissance aircraft,” later mentioned in correspondence under the code “Ivanov.”

Continuing work on the topic, at the beginning of 1937 P.O. Sukhoi reworked the project for the M-62 air-cooled engine, as it was more reliable in combat conditions. In the design of the new aircraft, extruded profiles, stamped and cast power units made of aluminum alloys, and flexible textolite were widely used, and the use of the plasma-template method made it possible to simplify the manufacture of the aircraft and ensured the possibility of its mass production. The project received the internal designation SZ (“Stalin’s task”).

The development and construction of the prototype was carried out in record time - 6 months. August 25, 1937 M.M. Gromov took off the first copy of the SZ-1 aircraft. Factory tests, with interruptions caused by engine failures, continued until the end of 1938. The aircraft was not transferred to state tests due to the ban on the operation of M-62 engines.

In December 1937, the construction of the “backup” (SZ-2) was completed, and the aircraft made its first flight on January 29. By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry, in January 1938, SZ-2 was transferred to joint tests with the Air Force, which were carried out in Yevpatoria, from the Air Force Research Institute Yu.A. participated in them. Makarov and K.A. Kalilets. The tests were completed on March 26, the aircraft turned out to be successful and was recommended for serial production.

For various reasons, “Ivanov” I.G. Neman was not completed, and the plane N.N. Polikarpov took off only at the end of 1938. This meant that “Ivanov” P.O. Sukhoi turned out to be the winner of an unannounced competition. After completing state tests, the SZ-2 arrived at plant No. 156 to replace the engine, which had exhausted its service life. Only a few flights were carried out with the new engine, and on August 3 the plane crashed due to the destruction of the M-62 engine.

The third copy of the SZ-3 aircraft with the M-87 engine was flown on November 17, 1938 by test pilot A.P. Chernavsky. After factory tests and fine-tuning, the SZ-3 was transferred to state tests, which ended in early April 1939. In terms of its flight characteristics, the aircraft completely satisfied the Air Force, the machine’s high technical culture and good flight characteristics were noted. In March 1939, even before the completion of state tests, the People's Commissars of Defense and Aviation Industry turned to the Defense Committee (DC) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with a request to accept the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A engine into service with the Red Army and organize its mass production. The decision to select a serial plant was greatly delayed; only at the end of July 1939, after the NKAP approved the experimental aircraft construction plan for 1939-40, the plant in Kharkov began preparing serial production of the aircraft under the designation BB-1 ( short-range bomber - first). At the same time P.O. Sukhoi was appointed Chief Designer of Plant No. 135.

Unlike the prototypes, the production aircraft had a mixed design (the fuselage was a wooden monocoque with plywood sheathing, the wing and stabilizer were metal). The latter was explained in detail by the fact that the USSR still did not have enough metal for a large series of all-metal aircraft.

In 1940, the BB-1 (since December 1940 - Su-2), having undergone a number of modifications, began to be produced with the M-88, M-88B engines, and the last production aircraft, about 60 copies, had the M-82 engine.

In addition, in 1940, plants No. 31 in Taganrog and No. 207 in Dolgoprudny were connected to the production of the aircraft. In total, until the spring of 1942, 910 Su-2 aircraft were produced.

During the period 1939-41 in parallel with serial production at the design bureau P.O. Sukhoi, work was underway to modify the aircraft. A number of aircraft projects were developed with improved flight-tactical characteristics, which included improving its aerodynamics, equipping it with new engines (M-63TK, M-81, M-89, M-90), etc.

Su-2 began to enter service with the Air Force units of the spacecraft in the second half of 1940. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941, the fleet of Su-2 aircraft in the Air Force numbered 213 units (Western Front - 75; Southwestern Front - 114; 9th separate army (Odessa military district) - 24). In combat operations before 1944, (according to various sources) from 14 to 17 short-range bomber air regiments, more than 12 reconnaissance and spotting squadrons and 18 flights armed with Su-2 aircraft took part.

At different times, during the Great Patriotic War, 27 pilots who were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union fought on Su-2 aircraft, including M.P. Odintsov and G.F. Sivkov were awarded this title twice.

Flight characteristics of the Su-2 aircraft

Video about the Su-2 aircraft

Vladimir PROKLOV

PLANES OF THE DRY PERIOD OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The birth of the Sukhoi Design Bureau practically coincided with the beginning of World War II.

Having received the status of an independent design bureau in July 1939, the team continued planned work on modifying the short-range bomber BB-1 (Su-2, Su-4), designing and building the I-135 fighter (Su-1, Su-3), and also began to the design of the armored attack aircraft OBS (Su-6), and then the DDBSh (Su-8).

Along with the planned tasks, the OKB carried out research on some initiative projects of fighters and bombers.

In September 1935, Brigade No. 3 KOSOS TsAGI, headed by P.O. Sukhim, began research on the project of high-speed reconnaissance aircraft No. 51 (ANT-51) with the M-34FRN engine.

By preliminary calculation the aircraft had to have the following basic data:

Aircraft length, mm 9390

Wingspan, mm 13000

Wing area, m2 28.16

Aircraft weight, kg:

- empty 2076

- flight 3210

Maximum speed at N 4000 m, km/h 455

Landing speed, km/h 109

Climb time, min:

- 11 3000 m 5.2

- 11 /000 m 18.6

Practical ceiling, m 9800

Flight range (H=6000 m; V=290 km/h), km 1500

Until the end of 1935, aerodynamic and alignment calculations were carried out. Four experimental wing sections were put into production for testing.

In March - April 1936, military engineer 2nd rank Kulikov (Red Army Air Force Research Institute) prepared tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for an attack reconnaissance aircraft with the AM-34FRN.

In mid-1936, the design teams of P.O. Sukhoi, S.A. Kocherigin, I.G. Neman, N.N. Polikarpov, S.V. Ilyushin and D.P. Grigorovich received from Glavaviaprom the task of preliminary preliminary design and calculations for a mass reconnaissance attack aircraft with an AM-34FRN engine.

The need to create such a vehicle was caused not only by the lack of a modern long-range reconnaissance attack aircraft in service with the Red Army Air Force, but also by the need to create a vehicle for the domestic AM-34 engine, which has great prospects for mass production.

By December, preliminary designs were submitted to the Main Directorate of Aviation Industry (GUAP).

Reconnaissance attack aircraft AM-34FRN (drawings by B.M.Kondorsky)

General form reconnaissance attack aircraft with AM-34FRN

Layout diagram of a reconnaissance attack aircraft with AM-34FRN

In the memorandum “On long-range and speed attack reconnaissance aircraft” sent to the government by the head of the GUAP M.M. Kaganovich, it was noted that: “... All presented aircraft projects in their geometric dimensions, weight and flight-tactical data differ little from each other friend and technically fit within very narrow limits.

Having discussed these projects together with the designers, we came to the following conclusion:

It is not possible to design and build an aircraft in a short period of time (8-9 months) to meet the specifications specified above by the efforts of one design bureau.

The design and construction of this aircraft in a short time is possible only with collective development of the project by creating a cross-cutting team from all design bureaus and scientific institutes VIAM, CIAM, TsAGI, with the involvement of specialists in individual disciplines, such as: motor engineering, materials, production technology, aircraft equipment, etc.

In this way, all the best experience accumulated by the Union Design Bureau will be concentrated in this machine, and the creation of the machine will be ensured, taking into account its mass production ... "

However, M.M. Kaganovich’s idea of ​​​​creating a cross-cutting team composed of designers from six design bureaus remained on paper, since it was not supported by any organizational measures. The issue of the production base of such a brigade was not resolved either.

“... 1. Approve the proposal of the GU-AP on the construction of a long-range attack aircraft with the following flight-tactical data:

a) maximum speed at an altitude of 4-5000 meters - 420-430 km/h;

b) maximum speed near the ground - 350-400 km/h;

c) landing speed - 90-95 km/h;

d) practical ceiling - 9000-10000 m;

e) range at normal load at an altitude of 5000 m - 2000 km;

f) range with overload at an altitude of 5000 m - 4000 km;

g) cruising speed - 300-350 km/h...

…3. The aircraft's armament should include the installation of 3-5 machine guns, the bomb load in the normal version is 200 kg for an attack aircraft and 500 kg for a bomber due to overload.

The aircraft must be capable of installing a bomb rack with a total capacity of 1000 kg. ...

…6. Oblige SUAI to develop the aircraft in 3 variants:

1 - duralumin based on American design and technology, 2 - wooden structure and 3 - mixed design.

7. Approve by the designers responsible for the design and construction of approved aircraft on time: for duralumin aircraft, etc. Sukhoi, wooden - T. Neman and mixed - T. Polikarpov.”

The TTT for the attack reconnaissance aircraft was approved in February 1937.

During the design process, the aircraft received the code "Ivanov". To increase combat survivability, in March they decided to replace the AM-34FRN engine (1200 hp) with an M-25 or M-62 engine.

Aircraft SZ-2 M-62

In May 1937, the model of the “Ivanov” or “Stalin’s Task” (SZ) aircraft, built at plant No. 156, was approved.

On July 25, 1937, the Defense Committee (DC) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a plan for experimental aircraft construction for 1937-1938. Among other tasks, the teams of P.O. Sukhoi (plant No. 156), N.N. Polikarpov (plant No. 21) and I.G. Neman (plant No. 135) were assigned to design and build Ivanov aircraft with an M-25 engine (775 hp). Each of the designers was required to create four variants of the aircraft (reconnaissance aircraft, attack aircraft, bomber and escort). The vehicles were released for state testing in September 1937.

On August 25, 1937, test pilot M.M. Gromov made the first flight on a Sukhoi SZ-1 aircraft with an M-62 engine (1000 hp).

By this time, in the design bureau of N.N. Polikarpov, due to the heavy workload of other work, there was a significant backlog on the Ivanov aircraft, and the team of I.G. Neman received a five-month delay associated with the construction of the KhAI-5 (R-10) aircraft ).

The first flights revealed good stability and controllability of the SZ-1 aircraft. The car turned out to be simple and easy to pilot.

On September 18, while performing a task to determine horizontal speeds at altitudes, the landing gear retraction and extension system failed. Test pilot M.Yu. Alekseev landed on the right extended support, as a result the plane crashed. The following were damaged: the propeller, the engine and the rear center section spar.

Flights resumed on November 22, 1937. From December 1937 to January 1938, the aircraft's equipment was modified and installed on a ski chassis.

At the end of January, factory flight tests were stopped due to a breakdown of the M-62 engine. The new engine was installed only in November 1938.

On November 25, during a test flight, the engine failed again; test pilot of plant No. 156 V.T. Sakhranov managed to land the plane without damage. After replacing the engine, preparations began for the SZ-1 aircraft for state tests, but a ban on flights with the M-62 followed.

In December 1937, construction of the SZ-2 aircraft with the M-62 engine was completed. At the beginning of January 1938, the car was transported by rail to Yevpatoriya for joint state tests.

On January 29, 1938, test pilot of the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force, military engineer 2nd rank K.A. Kalilets, took the SZ-2 aircraft into the air. Then, to prepare the vehicle for state tests, flights were carried out for three weeks to select a propeller and fine-tune the propeller-motor group (VMG).

During state tests from February 21 to March 26, 1938, flight characteristics were taken, the tactical properties of the aircraft were revealed, and weapons and equipment were tested.

At the conclusion of the report on state tests of the SZ-2 aircraft, it was noted that:

"1. The Ivanov aircraft designed by engineer P.O. Sukhoi, produced by plant No. 156, satisfies the basic 111 of 1937 with the exception of the maximum speed at the design altitude (403 km/h instead of 420-430 km/h) and the ceiling (7700 m instead of 9000 m).

2. In terms of maximum speeds, firepower, visibility and defense capability, the Ivanov aircraft has advantages over the R-10 and BSh-1 aircraft accepted for supply to the Red Army Air Force.

3. By fine-tuning the VMG with the same motor, the maximum speed should be brought to the value specified by III.

4. By modifying the aircraft by installing a more powerful engine without significant modifications to the design, the maximum speed can be increased from the M-87 to 450 km/h, from the M-88 to 475-500 km/h at the design altitude.

5. Based on the above, the aircraft can be recommended for serial production to replace the Valti aircraft, taking into account the similarity of the technological process for manufacturing parts..."

After completing state tests, the SZ-2 aircraft was sent to plant No. 156 to replace the M-62 engine, which had exhausted its service life.

The new motor was installed only at the end of July. On August 3, 1938, the SZ-2 plane crashed due to the failure of the M-62 engine.

At the beginning of July 1938, employees of the design bureau P.O. Sukhoi: D.A. Romeiko-Gurko, S.N. Strogachev and I.Z. Zaslavsky sent a letter to I.V. Stalin with the following content: “... We, the employees of the design bureau of the head. No. 156, working under the leadership of engineer P. O. Sukhoi, decided to contact you on the issue of a completely intolerable situation with the Ivanov machine designed by Sukhoi.

Having received the Government's order for this machine in January 1937, the bureau staff, at that moment, dispersed through the efforts of Tupolev and

Petlyakov, was reborn around this task. The unity of the designers, and subsequently the plant staff, was greatly facilitated by the naming of this machine “Stalin’s task” - “SZ”, since everyone accepted this task as yours personally.

Despite a number of organizational and technical difficulties and obstacles, the machine was designed and built by August 1937. The bureau team, working with great enthusiasm, tried to put into it all the modern achievements of metal aircraft construction, in order to obtain a simple, cheap mass-produced machine that meets the technical requirements. Due to circumstances beyond the team's control (an emergency landing with a broken engine and the lack of a new one to replace it), the release of the vehicle for state testing was delayed until January 1938. By this time, the second copy of the machine, “SZ-2,” was built, which was submitted for state tests. In order to speed up testing on a wheeled chassis, on the direct instructions of the People's Commissariat Comrade. M.M. Kaganovich, with a great expenditure of effort and money, organized a joint expedition of the Air Force Research Institute and Plant No. 156 to Evpatoria. Due to the exhaustion of engine resources, an incomplete test of the aircraft was carried out, which, however, allowed the Air Force Research Institute to give a positive review in its report on the aircraft from tactical, technical, flight and production points of view and recommend it for serial construction to replace the Vulti.

Based on the positive assessment of the machine, in anticipation of the Government's decision, the design bureau prepared complete drawings for production, having worked on a number of technological aspects. At the same time, by May 1938, drawings of a new, improved version of the machine, the SZ-3, were put into production "with a different engine, taking into account the shortcomings that emerged during testing of the first machines. The development of the latter also continued in terms of improving the propeller-motor group in order to obtain the missing 4-6% of speed.

Continuation of the State. Testing of the SZ-2 machine with an improved propeller-engine group was supposed to take place in May-June after the old engine had been rebuilt or a new one had been received. The launch of the new SZ-3 vehicle at the airfield was scheduled for July 1938

As a result of hard work, the design bureau promptly submitted the drawings to production and took care of receiving the engine and equipment, thereby ensuring the release of the vehicle on time appointed by the Government. Completion of work on all three aircraft on schedule ensured that the full face of the aircraft with various engines would be revealed during the 1938 flying season.

But, unfortunately, created for Lately The situation at the factory does not allow meeting the scheduled deadlines and deprives the car of any prospects in the near future. The SZ-1 machine is waiting for a gear motor, the dispatch of which by plant No. 19 was very late, despite a number of promises. The SZ-2 car has just received an engine that was rebuilt after the first stage of the state inspection. tests, but work on it is being carried out at a snail's pace. The SZ-3 machine, which did not make enough progress in May-June, is now completely suspended, without any indication of its completion date.

The complete cessation of work on SZ machines was preceded by a number of alarm signals:

1. At a meeting of shop managers, director Usachev stated that the production of the SZ-3 machine is a secondary task and all efforts should be devoted to building the first copy of the Ivanov machine designed by Polikarpov.

2. Under the priority order, the procurement of parts for “SZ-3” was completely suspended.

3. In the twentieth of June, the plant was visited by the People's Commissar M.M. Kaganovich, who ordered to speed up the production of Polikarpov's machine in order to complete it by July 25. Interpreting this order of the People's Commissar in a peculiar way, the director on the same day at a general meeting of plant workers said that the only work of national importance is the work of Polikarpov's bureau, which created the impression that all the work of the Sukhoi design bureau and the plant workshops on the SZ-3 machine was of no use to anyone. need not.

After the suspension of work on the machine. “SZ-3”, in order to ensure the release date of Polikarpov’s “Ivanov” machine, which was very tense due to the untimely deployment of work on the machine, the installation of parts manufactured for “SZ-3” began on the aircraft. It got to the point that, in order to use the metal slipway of the SZ-3 wing to assemble Polikarpov’s Ivanov wing, the director gave the order to remove the unfinished SZ-3 wing from the slipway. Only the categorical refusal of the leading engineer Rybko to carry out this absurd order saved the frame prepared for sheathing from being rendered unusable as a result of this operation.

All these facts have an extremely painful impact on our team. We are confident that our year and a half work was needed by the country and our vehicle is a good contribution to the defense of our Motherland. We have no doubt that this machine is truly adapted for mass production and even surpasses the Vulti machine in its flight-tactical characteristics and production simplicity, which makes it possible to extremely quickly introduce the machine into series. Therefore, we cannot come to terms with the attitude of the plant management towards our machine and the fate of our team, which is closely connected with it. Plant No. 156, which simultaneously built several heavy and medium-tonnage machines, now suddenly found itself capable of carrying out work on only one medium-tonnage machine, to the detriment of all the others. The Sukhoi Design Bureau is actually deprived of the production base at the plant and is even limited in the construction of prototypes of the machines planned for design. Not only the production, but also the everyday interests of the team are infringed, the main personnel of which work at the plant for 8-12 years. So, when allocating apartments in new buildings, the director did not provide and does not intend to provide a single place for employees of Sukhoi’s bureau who are in dire need of living space.

Objectively, there is every possibility of friendly, joint work of several design teams on the basis of one powerful pilot plant to equip our air fleet with new material. In the interests of the common cause, Sukhoi's bureau shares its experience with Polikarpov's team and provided it with drawings of a number of units of the SZ machine, which were fully used. But in the person of chief designer Polikarpov, the Sukhoi Bureau does not meet reciprocity. Despite the lack of reasons on the part of engineer P. O. Sukhoi, an extremely modest person who does not claim an exclusive position at the plant, recent practice and the policy of clamping down does not leave hope for the normal work of the two teams within the plant and even casts doubt on the possibility of testing the machine "SZ-3" until the end of the summer season.

Aircraft SZ-3 M-87A

A way out of this situation could be the transfer of Sukhoi's bureau to another plant. We think that if the Government resolves favorably the issue of introducing the SZ machine into the series, for the further development of both this and new designs of our bureau and their rapid introduction into the series, it would be advisable to transfer the Sukhoi bureau to a serial plant adapted for mechanized production and having a good experienced workshop. It is clear that such a transition does not relieve plant No. 156 of the obligation to quickly complete the projects started by our bureau and, at first, to carry out a whole series of experimental work on new bureau designs.

Seeing no opportunity within the plant and even the First Directorate of NKOP to find a solution to the issues that deeply concern us, we ask you, dear Joseph Vissarionovich, to say your weighty, wise word about the fate of our machine and our team, always ready to devote all their strength, knowledge and experience to the implementation any of your tasks..."

A special sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) forwarded the letter to the CO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The acting chief inspector under the Council of People's Commissars, G.P. Leshukov, was sent to plant No. 156.

A memorandum by G.P. Leshukov, with the conclusion: “At plant No. 156, a clearly unhealthy situation has been created that requires the intervention of the Defense Committee” and with the resolution of the Chairman of the Defense Committee V.M. Molotov: “t. Kaganovich. I ask you to look into the affairs of plant No. 156 and report on the measures taken,” was sent to the NKOP USSR. As one would expect, everything was limited only to a change in the management of plant No. 156.

On November 3, 1938, test pilot A.P. Chernavsky made the first flight on an SZ-3 aircraft with an M-87 engine (950 hp).

Factory flight tests have begun. According to the conclusion of A.P. Chernavsky: “The general impression of the aircraft is good. Compared to SZ-1, the take-off run has been reduced. The glide path has been increased, the ailerons have been lightened, and the speed has been increased.”

Before submitting for state testing, at the request of the Air Force, the M-87 engine was replaced with the M-87A.

On November 25, during the next test flight (with an operating time of 3 hours), the M-87A engine failed.

On December 28, 1938, after a test flight with a new engine, the SZ-3 aircraft was transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for state tests. In January 1939, the disassembled car was transported by rail to Yevpatoria. Testing began on February 3, 1939.

On March 28, 1939, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov and People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry M.M. Kaganovich sent a letter to V.M. Molotov. It noted that:

“The single-engine two-seater Ivanov aircraft, designed by engineer Sukhoi, is an attack reconnaissance aircraft and a light bomber. In March 1938, it passed state tests with the M-62 engine.

Currently undergoing state tests with the M-87 engine in Evpatoria...

The design of the aircraft being tested is all-metal. Production aircraft will be produced with a wooden fuselage, with a subsequent transition in series to a wooden wing with a steel spar...

The Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A, in terms of its flight performance and firepower, is significantly superior to the same type of aircraft in our service (R-zet M-34RN and R-10 M-25V).

Considering the good performance of the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A, we ask for permission to accept it into service with the Red Army and organize serial production of these aircraft at the Sarcombine plant.

Measures to set up production and release aircraft from the Sarcombine plant will be presented within 20 days.”

“The People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry should organize the production and production of the Ivanov aircraft designed by Comrade Sukhoi at the Sarcombine and 135 (Kharkov) factories.

Submit to the KO within 10 days a detailed action plan ensuring the serial production of aircraft and the size of the order for 1939.”

At the beginning of April 1939, due to a landing gear failure, state tests of the SZ-3 aircraft were interrupted at the final stage. The car was sent to Moscow for repairs. Based on the test results, a report was drawn up, in the conclusion of which it was noted that:

"1. The Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A engine passed state tests satisfactorily.

Aircraft BB-1 M-87B

2. Recommend that the Ivanov aircraft be adopted by the Red Army Air Force as a light bomber, with the possibility of using it as an attack aircraft and short-range reconnaissance aircraft in a mixed design (wooden fuselage and metal wings) with M-87A and M-88 engines.

3. To propose to the PGU NKAP by 1.1 J.39 to produce the first series of aircraft in the amount of 10 copies for military testing, which will be completed by 1.01.40.

4. By 1.06.39, plant No. 156 should present the Ivanov aircraft with M-88 to the Air Force Research Institute for testing.”

In May 1939, a draft pilot construction plan for 1939-40 was ready. Due to the fact that the approval of the plan was delayed, the PSU NKAP sent unapproved tasks to production organizations. By this time, serial production of the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A was planned to be launched only at plant No. 135, and at Sarkombine (SZK) it was planned to produce the Sh aircraft by S.A. Kocherigin.

To provide technical assistance to the serial plant, the plan provided for the appointment of P.O. Sukhoi (part-time) as temporary acting chief designer of plant No. 135, while retaining his design bureau and production base at plant No. 156. And it was planned to send D.A. Romeiko-Gurko to plant No. 135 as deputy chief designer.

On July 29, 1939, government decrees approved a plan for experimental aircraft construction for 1939-40.

The resolution “On the creation of modified and new experimental bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft in 1939” and the order of the NKAP dated August 4, 1939 prescribed:

“... 7. To the Head of the First Main Directorate of the NKAP, Comrade Lukin, Director of Plant No. 135, Comrade. Neustadt and the chief designer comrade. Sukhoi installed the M-88 engine on the second prototype of the BB-1 aircraft, presenting it for state tests in August of this year.

2. Install the M-63TK engine on the BB-1 aircraft and submit it for state tests in September 1939.

3. Design and build the BB-2 attack bomber with the M-88 and submit it for state tests in September 1939...”

Resolution "On the introduction into mass production of modified bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft in 1939-40" and by order of the NKAP dated August 4, 1939, the management of the NKAP PGU and the director of plant No. 135 were instructed to:

"1. ...to introduce into production the BB-1 aircraft with a wooden fuselage and a metal wing with an M-87A designed by Comrade. Sukhoi (short-range bomber)

Provide for the possibility of installing four wing-mounted ShK AS machine guns to use this aircraft in an assault version.

2. Rebuild the plant's production to produce BB-1 aircraft with the M-87A engine and launch production according to design drawings, without waiting for the end of state tests of an aircraft with a wooden fuselage in such a way as to produce 10 aircraft in 1939, and completely switch over in 1940 for the production of these aircraft, ensuring preparation of production for the production of 500 aircraft in 1940.

All further modifications of the BB-1 aircraft should be carried out in the experimental workshop of plant No. 135.

3. Chief designer comrade. Sukhoi, with the entire team of his design bureau, will be transferred to plant No. 135 in the city within a month and a half. Kharkov, placing at his disposal the entire experimental base of plant No. 135 and appointing him as chief designer of plant No. 135...”

In August 1939, the BB-1 (SZ-3) aircraft with the M-87A successfully passed joint state spin tests.

In mid-September, the M-87B engine was installed on it and on September 19 the plane made a flight along the Chkalovskaya - Kharkov route.

At Plant No. 135, test pilots from the Air Force Research Institute from September 29 to October 3, 1939 conducted state tests of the aircraft for stability, range and maneuverability in bomber, attack aircraft and reconnaissance variants. At the conclusion of the test report it was noted:

"1. The aircraft...in the operational center of gravity range of 22 - 24% of the CV has good static and dynamic longitudinal stability and insufficient lateral stability.

2. Large margins of longitudinal static stability in the presence of dynamic longitudinal stability distinguish the Ivanov aircraft designed by Sukhoi in better side compared to other domestic aircraft.

3. To increase the lateral stability of the aircraft, it is necessary to increase the transverse V of the wing...”

October 4, 1939, i.e. two months after the approval of the experimental work plan for 1939-40, the head of the Red Army Air Force, commander of the 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov, in a letter addressed to the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry, reported:

"1. ...Due to the failure to provide apartments in Kharkov, Comrade Sukhoi’s design bureau is still located in Moscow.

The current situation leads to the collapse of the team of Comrade Sukhoi’s design bureau, because KB employees receive offers to move to work in other places and stay in Moscow. As a consequence of this situation, work on Comrade Sukhoi’s prototype aircraft is being carried out extremely poorly.

2. ...the BB-2 aircraft with the M-88 was to be presented by plant No. 135 for state tests in September 1939.

The aircraft is currently at plant No. 156. No work is being done on it. The overall readiness of the aircraft is 45-50%. Due to the current circumstances, it is advisable to complete the construction of the BB-2 aircraft with the M-88 at plant No. 156; this event will speed up the production time of the aircraft.

3. ...the Sukhoi BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 was supposed to be presented by plant No. 135 for state tests in August this year. d. The government's decision has not been implemented, because The motor was received only in September.

4. ...the BB-1 aircraft with the M-63TK should be presented by plant No. 135 for state tests in September of this year. The deadline was missed due to a turbocharger failure. ...

The Military Council of the Red Army Air Force asks you to accept necessary measures for the listed objects."

In his response letter, M.M. Kaganovich confirmed that the facts indicated in the letter were true and listed the measures being taken. But, unfortunately, this situation with the implementation of the pilot construction plan by the end of the year has not changed.

In January 1940, the leadership of the NKAP was updated. The reason for this was the serious omissions he made in his work.

Apparently, a change in the leadership of the industry and the hope for help from him prompted P.O. Sukhoi to write a letter to Deputy People's Commissar A.S. Yakovlev. The message noted that the conditions in which the team’s work takes place create a threat of failure to fulfill the plan and lead to the collapse of the design bureau.

In this situation, P.O. Sukhoi asked for assistance in providing housing and retaining a number of design bureau employees who announced their resignation.

A month later, in his next message to the Deputy People's Commissar, Pavel Osipovich said that in the design bureau's plan there are a number of objects, the production of which on time and with the proper quality at the KB-135 pilot production is not possible. And the work on introducing the BB-1 aircraft into mass production, which requires the presence of the entire team at plant No. 135, has already been completed. Considering these circumstances, P.O. Sukhoi asked to provide his team with one of the Moscow production bases.

On March 4, 1940, the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ordered the People's Commissariat for Aviation Industry to organize an experimental aircraft manufacturing plant on the basis of KB-29 NKAP (Kaliningrad, Moscow region), based on the production of two experimental aircraft and 10-15 zero-series aircraft per year. Transfer the entire composition of the P.O. Sukhoi design bureau from plant No. 135 to the experimental aircraft manufacturing plant, appointing Pavel Osipovich as the chief designer of this plant and assign it to the specified plant No. 289.

In September 1939, after receiving the M-88 engine, they began installing it on the BB-1 (SZ-3) aircraft, while some changes were made to the design of the machine: they removed the hatch machine-gun installation, changed the configuration of the suction pipe, changed the location of the oil cooler and carried out a number of other works.

For joint state testing of the aircraft, by order of the Air Force Research Institute dated November 20, 1939, a working group was appointed. From plant No. 135 - chief designer P.O. Sukhoi, design engineer D.A. Romeiko-Gurko, leading engineer Vechura, motor equipment engineer E.S. Felsner, aerodynamic engineer I.E. Baslavsky, from the Air Force Research Institute - leading engineer 3rd rank military engineer A.V. Sinelnikov, leading pilot Major B.N. Pokrovsky, senior military engineer 1st rank Pavlov.

During testing from November 1939 to April 30, 1940, 44 flights were completed with a flight time of 1 6 hours 45 minutes. Due to failure, three M-88 engines were replaced. The tests were completed on the fourth engine, in the oil filter of which chips were discovered after the last flight.

The conclusion of the test report noted:

"1. The BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine, which is necessary for arming the Air Force, cannot be approved for normal operation in combat units of the Air Force due to the lack of development of the propeller-engine group.

Slow work on introducing the BB-1 into combat units... could lead to the aircraft becoming obsolete in the process of its production and development...

3. The maximum speeds of the BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine, 375 km/h at the ground and 476 km/h at the second altitude limit, remained almost the same as on the BB-1 aircraft with the M-87 engine...”

To eliminate these shortcomings it was proposed:

Plant No. 135 should bring the VMG up to speed in the shortest possible time and submit it for control tests, and, in addition, bring the aircraft speed to the design speed (495 km/h);

Plant No. 29 should ensure normal operation of the M-88 engine with a service life of at least 100 hours;

Combine 150 together with plant No. 135 will carry out work on the selection propeller for an airplane.

After finishing work on the VMG, it was planned to carry out control tests on the production aircraft to measure flight characteristics.

At the end of May 1940, the BB-1 M-88 (SZ-3) aircraft flew from Kharkov to the Ramenskoye airfield, where until the end of the year, plant No. 289 carried out fine-tuning of the VMG and a number of other systems.

In parallel with the SZ-3, the SZ-1 aircraft was also tested. At the beginning of March 1940, a new M-63TK engine was installed on it, and test pilot A.I. Kalyuzhny began factory tests. Development of the VMG continued until June 1940, and then the aircraft was transferred to plant No. 289 and was used as a flying laboratory for testing various units. The aircraft was not included in the experimental aircraft production plan for 1941.

The delay in serial production of the BB-1 M-87 (M-88) aircraft, to which I.V. Stalin attached special importance, forced the government to connect factories No. 31 (Taganrog) and No. 207 (Dolgoprudny, Moscow) to its production. region), as well as speed up the start of production at plant No. 135. This decision was legitimized by resolutions of the CO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated February 19, 1940 and May 4, 1940.

In March 1940, Plant No. 135 began serial production of BB-1 aircraft with M-87 and M-88 engines.

In May, military tests of six BB-1 aircraft with M-88 zero and first series began at the Kharkov airfield. The flight technical personnel of the 135th aviation regiment of the Air Force and the combat use regiment of the Research Institute of GUAS KA, combined into a separate test group, took part in the tests. Tests were carried out from May 17 to June 20, 1940. A total of 616 flights were performed with a total flight time of 157 hours.

Aircraft BB-1 M-88B

In the summer of 1940, the following people arrived in Kharkov for an inspection: Deputy Chief of the Air Force, Aviation Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, and Head of the Research Institute of GUAS (GU Air Force) of the Air Force, Major General of Aviation A.I. Filin. The purpose of the inspection was to examine “the state of construction at plant No. 135 and operation in combat units of the Kharkov Military District of BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine.” Based on the results of the survey, a memorandum was drawn up addressed to the People's Commissar of Defense. It noted that:

“... During the inspection, control flights were carried out by Lieutenant General of Aviation Comrade Rychagov, Major General of Aviation Comrade Filin and test pilot Major Comrade Stefanovsky; In addition, pilots of the 135th Air Regiment carried out flights with bomb loads of 400 and 700 kg. The takeoff of the BB-1 aircraft with a load of 700 kg occurred normally.

The examination confirmed the presence of a number of significant positive aspects of the aircraft, previously noted by state and military tests of BB-1 aircraft:

1. Relatively simple qualities of the aircraft in terms of piloting technique.

2. Powerful bomb armament - in the normal version the aircraft takes up to 500 kg of bombs of caliber from 1 kg to 250 kg and in the overload version, tested in military tests, up to 700 kg.

3. Good firepower of the aircraft in the attack aircraft version:

a) 4 wing-mounted ShKAS 7.62 mm machine guns with a reserve of 850 cartridges per machine gun;

b) 1 turret machine gun with a reserve of 1000 cartridges;

c) 144 bombs of caliber from 7 to 2.5 kg or 30 bombs of caliber from 8 to 20 kg.

Instead of bombs, it is possible to install chemical weapons - two VAP-200.

4. Maximum horizontal speed of the aircraft

at the ground - 375 km/h

at an altitude of 6600 m - 467 km/h...

...The military tests confirmed the inadequacy of the propeller-engine group of the BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine and revealed insufficient strength of the landing gear, wheels and pneumatics, which does not allow the normal operation of the aircraft in combat units.

Currently, flights in units on BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine have been stopped due to the fragility of the landing gear and pneumatics.

Plant No. 135 has brought the oil temperature to a satisfactory state, which will be finally verified by additional tests at the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft.

To ensure normal operation of the BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine in combat units of the Red Army Air Force, it is necessary to require the NKAP to carry out the following measures:

1. Strengthen the shock absorber strut and upper landing gear strut and install them on all previously produced aircraft.

2. Strengthen the wheels and pneumatics.

3. Ensure completely reliable operation of the M-88 engine.

4. Eliminate oil from the sight and the navigator’s lower hatch.

5. Oblige the chief designer Comrade Sukhoi to personally supervise the development of the BB-1 aircraft and the elimination of defects at plant No. 135.

For 1941, it is necessary to demand from the chief designer of the BB-1 aircraft, T. Sukhoi and plant No. 135:

1. Installation of slats on the BB-1 aircraft.

2. Increase in transverse V.

3. Installation of the tail wheel according to the type of Messerschmidt 109 aircraft and installation of the crutch stopper.

4. Increasing the release time of the shields to 6-8 seconds.

5. Working out the normal increase in overloads on the rudders by setting “aerodynamic” play in the elevator and friction in the ailerons.

6. Work out the installation for hanging one 500 kg bomb.

7. Bring the aircraft speeds to the design speeds.

8. Work on the issue of using the BB-1 aircraft for dive bombing.”

In December 1940, in accordance with government decree, fifteen samples of new combat aircraft received the designations: Ar-2, Er-2, Il-2, LaGG-1, LaGG-3, MiG-1, MiG-3, Pe-2 , Yak-1, Yak-2, Yak-3, Yak-4, Yak-5, Yak-7, and the BB-1 M-88 aircraft became known as the Su-2.

By the end of 1940, Plant No. 135 produced 110 Su-2 aircraft, against the plan of 275; plant No. 31 - 12, with a plan of 100; Plant No. 207 - 3, with a plan of 25. The shortage of aircraft disrupted the plan for the formation and training of combat units of the Air Force.

The main reasons for failure to fulfill the supply plan were:

Unsatisfactory supply of factories with equipment, materials and finished products;

The hood of the production aircraft Su-2 M-88B

Cowl of a modified Su-2 M-88B aircraft

Modified Su-2 M-88B aircraft with TSS-1

Slowness in preparing production and mastering new technologies;

Unsatisfactory state of production cooperation between factories.

At the end of 1940, in connection with the transition to mass production of LaGG-3 fighters, plant No. 31 stopped producing Su-2 aircraft. In January-February 1941, parts, assemblies and equipment for the Su-2 aircraft were transferred to plant No. 207.

In December 1940, Plant No. 135 presented two production Su-2 M-88B aircraft (Nos. 16/2 and 20/2) to the Air Force Research Institute for state testing. During testing from December 2, 1940 to March 17, 1941, 4 M-88B engines were replaced on aircraft No. 16/2.

In the conclusion of the Act based on the test results, it was noted that:

“1. The temperature regimes of the VMG on the serial Su-2 M-88B after its conversion by plant No. 135 still remain unfinished. ...

4. By 05/01/41, carry out control tests at plant No. 135 to measure the flight characteristics of the Su-2 M-88B.”

In the period from February 13 to March 1, 1941, the Research Institute of the Air Force KA conducted state tests of the modified Su-2 M-88B aircraft (No. 1/6) produced by plant No. 135.

Unlike the serial Su-2 M-88B, on plane No. 1/6 the profile of the engine cowling, the shape of the suction pipe and propeller spinner were changed, and the oil cooler was moved to the wing center section. To create a “reactive effect,” the shape of the exhaust pipe was changed. The rear MV-5 gun mount was replaced with a TSS-1 mount. We installed an L-shaped antenna with a shortened mast. In order to select a propeller, tests were carried out with VISH-23 and VISH-23-7 propellers.

On March 18, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Aviation Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, approved the Act based on the results of state tests. His conclusion noted that:

"1. The modified Su-2 M-88 B... state tests passed satisfactorily, showing fairly good flight-tactical data.

2. A preliminary positive conclusion on the modified aircraft was already given on February 28, 1941. It is necessary to accelerate the introduction of this aircraft with a VISH-23-7 propeller with blade angles of 22-42 °, with the obligatory elimination of defects in the VMG, TSS-1 installation and radio equipment .

3. Consider the M-88 and M-88B engines to be undeveloped for reliable operation in Air Force combat units. Require plant No. 29 to ensure reliable operation of the engine in operation on an aircraft with a service life of at least 100 hours.

4. Oblige the chief designer and plant No. 135 to present a modified Su-2 M-88B No. 1/6 aircraft with eliminated defects specified in the conclusions of this act for control state tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force KA by March 25, 1941.”

Su-2 as an artillery spotter

On March 29, aircraft No. 1/6 was presented for state control tests, which continued intermittently until the end of June 1941. According to their results, TSS-1 did not pass the test and was removed from mass production. The development of the VMG did not provide normal temperature conditions either.

Considering the M-89 engine (1300 hp) as an alternative to the M-88 engine, the government, by a decree of January 20, 1941, obliged the director of plant No. 135, Yu.N. Karpov and chief designer P.O. Sukhoi “... to work out the VMG and conduct an air test of engine 89 on a Su-2 aircraft by April 15, 1941...”.

During the period from May 5 to June 28, 1941, test pilot A.P. Deev completed a factory test program on the Su-2 M-89 production aircraft (No. 13016).

After these tests were completed, the aircraft was transferred to plant No. 289 for installation of the M-89B engine (with direct injection), and then factory tests began at the LII NKAP airfield. They were not completed due to the evacuation of plant No. 289. At the beginning of 1942, aircraft No. 13016 was converted into an artillery spotter and transferred to the Air Force.

It is appropriate to note that in November 1941, an M-89F engine was mounted on one of the production Su-2s and transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for joint state tests.

At the beginning of July 1941, P.O. Sukhoi, in a letter addressed to Deputy People's Commissar P.V. Dementyev, said that: “The Su-2 M-89 aircraft in factory tests showed a speed at the ground of 415 km/h and at an altitude of 6800 m -514 km/h; respectively, the speeds of the Su-2 M-88 aircraft are 407 km/h and 512 km/h.

The expected speed of the Su-2 M-89 at altitude is 525 km/h. The reasons for the lack of speed are clarified by repeated flights; in addition, Comb. No. 150 sends a new propeller for the aircraft.

But regardless of the results of refinement of factory tests, I consider it necessary to report that at present, in my opinion, it is inappropriate to disrupt the production cycle of plants No. 135 and 29 by switching to the M-89, since the increase in speed is not justified by the delay in production.

Taking into account signals from squadrons operating at the front, it is necessary to increase the production of M-88 to ensure timely replacement of engines in units, because There are indications of a decrease in engine power after 40 hours of operation. Obviously, the M-89, being more powerful, will be no better in this regard than the M-88. At the same time, there is reason to expect that the M-82 will be more reliable in operation.

Taking into account the above, I believe that at the moment it is necessary to delay the transition of the Su-2 series of aircraft to M-89 engines and resolve the issue after the completion of tests of the Su-2 M-82.”

People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin agreed with these arguments and in August 1941 turned to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR I.V. Stalin for permission to delay the introduction of the Su-2 M-89 aircraft into the series.

In August 1941, Deputy People's Commissar P.V. Voronin gave instructions to the heads of factories No. 135 and 289: “In connection with the cessation in the third quarter of this year. production of M-88 engines, I propose to use the 96 M-89 engines available at the plant to ensure serial production of the Su-2 at plant No. 135, before switching to the M-82 installation.

Urgently carry out the necessary measures to ensure the installation of these engines on the aircraft.”

Back on May 13, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry issued an order to install the M-82 engine on the I-185, Yak-1 (Yak-3), Su-2, MiG-3, DIS-200 and “103” aircraft. The Su-2 M-82 aircraft was released for flight testing on July 1, 1941.

Design and production work were completed on time. The aircraft was tested in July at the airfield of plant No. 289, and in August-October, on a special assignment from the deputy. People's Commissar V.P. Kuznetsov - in the LII of the NKAP.

Due to unreliable operation and the difficulty of adjusting the carburetor, the tests were delayed. About 80 flights were performed just to select the carburetor. During testing, three engines, six carburetors and a number of other units were replaced. Flight characteristics were measured with two types of propellers.

Ahead of events, I would like to note that this aircraft (Su-2 M-82) was evacuated to Kazan, where it was used to take sketches of the VMG, which was later used on the TB-7 (Pe-8) aircraft.

In accordance with the order of the NKAP dated August 10, 1941, to ensure the production of Su-2 M-82 aircraft, it was prescribed:

"1. The chief designer of plant No. 289, T. Sukhoi, to work out and conduct all flight tests of the Su-2 aircraft with the M-82 engine by August 20, 1941 and transfer the drawings of the necessary alterations for installing the M-82 engine on the Su-2 aircraft to plants No. 135 and 207 to August 12, 1941

2. The director of plant No. 135, T. Kuzin, must ensure the production of five Su-2 aircraft with M-82 by September 1, 1941.

3. The director of plant No. 135, T. Kuzin, and the director of plant No. 207, T. Gorin, should begin preparing the serial production of the Su-2 with the M-82, ensuring their serial production from September 10, 1941...”

Su-2 M-82 aircraft

Su-2 M-82 on a ski chassis

Su-2 at front-line airfields

The M-82 engine was adopted by the KA Air Force at the end of September 1941.

Meanwhile, serial production of the Su-2 M-88 aircraft continued. Plant No. 135 successfully coped with the task, exceeding the plan almost every month. Plant No. 207, having received from Plant No. 31 at the beginning of 1941 a backlog of 33 almost finished aircraft and 80 sets of parts for aircraft, carried out production plan 100% But since May, the percentage of completion of the production program began to gradually decline and by July reached 39%. This situation with the implementation of the plan at plant No. 207, according to the head of orders and armaments of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, was “as a result of the lack of day-to-day organizational and technical leadership on the part of the plant management...”

On June 22, 1941, the day of Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, there were 213 Su-2 aircraft at front-line airfields. Of these: 75 - on the Western Front, 11 4 - on the Southwestern Front and 24 - in the 9th Separate Army (ODVO).

The experience of the first days of the war revealed the need for additional protection for the navigator. On August 11, 1941, the NKAP ordered the head of the NKAP PGU and the directors of plants No. 135 and 207 to:

“...and from August 15, 1941, to produce all Su-2 aircraft with armor protection for the navigator, consisting of sheets of cemented steel 8.5 mm thick;

b) to maintain the alignment and payload of the aircraft, from August 15, 1941, produce all aircraft without a walkie-talkie and radio semi-compasses...”

In July and September 1941 at the scientific testing site aviation weapons The Air Force (NIP AV VVS KA) has tested the production Su-2 aircraft (No. 070403), armed with ten RS-132 and RS-82 missiles. According to the conclusion of the NIP AV VVS KA, the missile launcher for the RS-82 with the possibility of transferring to the RS-132 on the Su-2 aircraft has passed field tests.

Fairing of the Su-2 gargrot in the raised position

Fairing of the Su-2 gargrot in the lowered position

In October 1941, the head of the South State Air Forces of the Spacecraft, brigengenger Ya.L. Bibikov, addressing P.A. Voronin, asked: “...to give instructions:

1. To the chief designer of plant No. 289, comrade. Sukhoi to transfer to plant No. 135 the drawings for a rocket launcher for the RS-82 with changes made to them based on the results of field tests.

2. Director of plant No. 135 comrade. Cousin from November 1st. d. introduce a missile launcher for the RS-82 into series and produce all Su-2 aircraft equipped with these launchers..."

In order to identify the possibility of using the Su-2 aircraft as a reconnaissance-spotter of artillery fire, in the period from August 15 to 19, 1941, tests of the serial Su-2 M-88B aircraft produced by plant No. 207 were carried out at the airfield of the Research Institute of the Air Force KA. The conclusions from the test results noted that:

"1. The Su-2 aircraft, being a short-range bomber, despite some inconveniences in observation (front hemisphere), can be used in artillery aviation for the purposes of enemy reconnaissance, aerial photography and artillery fire correction.

2. The speed range of 220-450 km/h and sufficient armament (6 machine guns) allow the Su-2 aircraft to carry out artillery missions, both from its own location and by flying into the enemy’s location.

3. To create greater convenience in the operation of the flight laboratory and the possibility of installing aerial photographic equipment on the aircraft (except AFA-13), it is necessary to make changes:

Install the OPB optical sight;

Place a flare gun with colored flares and a tablet device for adjusting the artillery fire of the PUAOS.

In addition, replace the suspended seat of the letnab with a rigid reclining seat with height adjustment.

Disadvantages: the right side gets splashed with oil during long-term operation...”

In September, by order of P.A. Voronin, plant No. 207 began supplying the troops with Su-2 aircraft equipped as a reconnaissance and artillery fire spotter. Before the evacuation began, plant No. 207 handed over 18 vehicles to the unit.

At the beginning of October, due to the approach of the front to Moscow, the evacuation of the capital's enterprises and institutions began. Plant No. 289 was evacuated to Molotov (Perm) and merged with the evacuated plant. No. 135, which included evacuated factories No. 207, 450, 472, 480.

On November 19, 1941, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution according to which plant No. 135 was to begin serial production of the Il-2 M-82 armored attack aircraft from February 15, 1942. At the same time, Plant No. 135 was allowed to produce a certain number of Su-2 aircraft, limited by the available reserve. As a result, the plant produced 15 Su-2 aircraft in December 1941, and 40 in January-February 1942. Of these, 36 were with the M-82 engine, 2 were M-88, 2 were M-89.

In total, in 1941, Plant No. 135 produced 625 Su-2 aircraft, against the plan of 1068; plant No. 207 - 89, with a plan of 115; Plant No. 31 - 4 aircraft.

According to the Air Force Main Directorate, from June 22 to December 23, 1941, the losses of Su-2 aircraft amounted to 205 units. Of these: shot down in air battles - 50; shot down by anti-aircraft artillery -14; destroyed at airfields - 9;

did not return from a combat mission -103; non-combat losses - 29.

By decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of January 21, 1942, plant No. 135 was disbanded, and specialists and equipment were distributed to plants No. 23, 30, 381.

By decision of the NKAP, plant No. 289 began to be restored as an independent economic unit.

On February 25, 1942, the production Su-2 M-82 aircraft No. 15116 was presented for state testing.

Until April 24, test pilot of the Air Force Research Institute Captain S.M. Korobov performed 35 flights on the aircraft, 23 of them with ski landing gear. The total flight time was 22 hours 15 minutes.

The conclusions of the report on state tests noted that: “The installation of the M-82 engine with a rated ground power of 1400 hp on the Su-2 aircraft, instead of the previously installed M-88B engine with a rated ground power of 950 hp, significantly increased flight performance aircraft data..."

At the same time, a number of shortcomings were identified both in the aircraft and in the power plant.

In March-June 1942, Su-2 aircraft with M-82 engines were tested in combat conditions. According to the flight crew: “The Su-2 M-82 aircraft is significantly superior in its flight performance to the same aircraft with the M-88 both in speed, maneuverability and bomb load.

... The M-82 engine tolerates depletion of lubricant in its rubbing parts quite reliably. In case of damage to the oil system, flying for 2-3 minutes without pressure does not entail destruction of the engine ... "

The production aircraft Su-2 M-88 (M-82) was a two-seat monoplane of mixed design with a low wing.

The fuselage is a wooden monocoque, made without technological connectors. The power frame consisted of 20 frames, four spars, stringers and skin laminated from birch veneer. A welded truss frame was attached to the front frame, on which the piston engine was located.

The crew cabin was located in the middle part of the fuselage. The pilot's cockpit was covered with a sliding transparent canopy, behind which was attached the navigator's turret fairing with a folding visor. Under the floor of the pilot's cabin there was a bomb bay. The hatch in the rear fuselage was intended for emergency escape of the aircraft by the navigator, as well as for the installation of a hatch gun installation.

The cantilever all-metal wing consisted of a center section and two detachable consoles.

The power frame of the center section included two spars, six ribs, two longitudinal walls, stringers and skin. The frame of each wing console consisted of two spars, seventeen ribs, a rear wall, stringers, additional beams in the machine gun compartment and skin. The wing installation angle was 1°30". The transverse V angle of the wing was 6.

The ailerons had a duralumin frame with fabric covering. For weight compensation, a pipe filled with lead was attached to the toe of each aileron. The left aileron had a trimmer. Aileron deflection angles ±25°.

The all-metal landing flaps had four sections, two on the center section and two on detachable wing consoles. The cleaning and release of the shields was carried out using a hydromechanical system. Deflection angles of the shields: - 52°.

The tail included a fin with a rudder and a stabilizer with an elevator.

The removable keel of the all-wood structure consisted of two spars, stringers and ribs, and plywood sheathing. On the rear spar of the keel, a rudder was suspended on two nodes, consisting of a channel section profile to which a skin reinforced with several ribs was riveted. Steering angles ±25е

The cantilever all-metal stabilizer consisted of four channel-section walls, extruded profiles and angles, split ribs and plating. Two halves of the elevator were suspended from the rear of the stabilizer on six nodes. Both halves were connected by a pipe passing through the tail fairing of the fuselage. The elevator frame consisted of a pipe-spar with ribs strung on it. The nose of the steering wheel was sheathed with duralumin, and the rest of the surface was covered with canvas. Elevator deflection angles: ±25°.

The rudder and elevator had trim tabs.

The landing gear is tricycle with a tail wheel. The main supports with brake wheels 750x250 were retracted into the center section and closed with flaps. The 300x125 tail wheel was partially retracted into the fuselage.

The hydraulic system, designed for retracting and releasing the main landing gear and flaps (flaps), included: two landing gear power cylinders; shield power cylinder; chassis and flap cranes; pressure reducing valve (25-28kg/cm2); hydraulic pump with electric drive; hydraulic tank and pressure gauges. Hydromixture - 50% alcohol and 50% glycerin. The emergency release of the main supports was performed by the navigator using a winch with a cable transmission. The tail support is retracted and released using a cable transmission connected to the right main landing gear.

Braking of the main wheels was provided by a self-starting pneumatic system, consisting of: a self-starting air cylinder; self-starting manual compressor; shut-off valve; two pressure reducing valves PU-ZK (on the pilot’s pedals); wheel brakes and pressure gauges.

Aircraft control is dual, mixed. The elevator and ailerons had rigid wiring, while the rudder, tail wheel and trim tabs had cable wiring.

Attack bomber BB-2 (ShB)

The power plant consisted of a two-row, star-shaped 14-cylinder air-cooled piston engine M-88, with a maximum power of 1100 hp. and a three-blade propeller VISH-23. The temperature of the cylinder heads was adjusted using the engine hood “skirt” flaps. The oil cooler was placed under the front of the fuselage in a special tunnel with an adjustable damper. Oil tank capacity 55.5 l (50 kg).

The fuel was placed in three tanks. The capacity of the fuselage is 405 l (300 kg), the wing capacity is 175.5 l (130 kg).

Small arms included three ShKAS machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber, two of them were fixedly mounted in detachable wing consoles outside the rotor rotation zone. Ammunition capacity is 900 rounds per machine gun. To protect the rear hemisphere, the navigator mounted a ShKAS machine gun with 1,500 rounds of ammunition on a rotating shielded turret MV-5. Bombs with a caliber of 8-100 kg were suspended on cassette holders in the fuselage bomb bay. The normal bomb load was 400 kg, and the maximum was 600 kg. The internal suspension did not exceed 400 kg. Bombs of 100 and 250 kg could be suspended on external bomb racks.

The main source of direct current electricity was the GS-1000 generator, and the emergency source was the 1 2A30 battery.

Radio equipment - radio station RSB-1 and aircraft intercom (SPU-2).

Instrumentation and aeronautical equipment is a standard set that provides flights in simple and adverse weather conditions.

Photographic equipment - AFA-13 camera.

Flights at high altitude were provided by a set of oxygen equipment.

The main differences between the Su-2 M-82 aircraft and the Su-2 M-88 aircraft:

Installed M-82 engine (1700hp);

VISH-21 propeller installed;

Navigator armor installed;

Machine guns installed: 4 wing ShKAS, 1 turret ShKAS and one hatch ShKAS;

Removed: RSB, RPK-2 and AFA-13.

Basic data of the production aircraft Su-2 M-88B (M-82):

Aircraft length, mm 10250

Wingspan, mm 14300

Wing area, m2 29.0

Aircraft weight, kg:

- empty 2995 (3213)

- flight normal. 4345 (4700)

Maximum speed, km/h:

- near the ground 378 (430)

- at altitude, m 455/4400 (474/3200)

Climb time 5000m, min 12.6 (9.8)

Practical ceiling, m 8900 (8400)

Flight range, km 820 (790)

Run length, m 610 (450)

(Data in brackets refer to the Su-2 M-82 aircraft)

In addition to serial modifications of the Su-2 aircraft, the Sukhoi Design Bureau designed and built modifications of this aircraft, which for one reason or another were not brought to serial production.

On May 5, 1938, the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a plan for experimental and experimental work on aircraft construction for 1938-39.

One of the points of this plan provided for the creation of a high-speed attack bomber (SB) with an M-88 or M-63 engine in triplicate with delivery dates in June, July and August, respectively.

The work was entrusted to the design department of P.O. Sukhoi. The machine was designed on the basis of the Ivanov (SZ) aircraft built and tested.

Until August 1938, the design of an all-metal aircraft was underway. However, the decision of NKOP to save metal forced the switch to a wooden structure for the fuselage, and later for the entire aircraft.

Was ready by the end of the year preliminary design, the construction of the model has been completed, 60% of the detailed design has been completed.

It was planned to install an M-88 engine on the first copy of the aircraft, an M-80 on the second, and on the basis of the third, P.O. Sukhoi intended to design a single-seat attack aircraft with an M-80 engine.

At the end of 1938, the customer removed the second copy of the aircraft from the M-80 from the 1939 plan, and by mid-1939, the third copy.

On February 22, 1939, the commission approved the model of the ShB aircraft with the M-88. By April, plant No. 156 had produced 50% of the fuselage parts and 40% of the center section, but the lack of wood materials at the plant slowed down the production of the wing. We should also not forget that at plant No. 156, in addition to the team of P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau was located: N.N. Polikarpov, I.F. Nezvalya, A.P. Golubkova, V.N. Belyaev, Design Bureau of propeller-driven vehicles, torpedo boats and licensed aircraft. Each team had its own projects, the implementation of which was carried out at the pilot production of plant No. 156. All this affected the pace of construction of the ShB aircraft.

ShB at the emergency landing site 06/04/40

ShB at the emergency landing site on November 28, 1940.

The next impetus to speed up work on the ShB M-88 project, designated BB-2, was supposed to be the government-approved experimental aircraft construction plan for 1939-40. But he did not speed up the pace of work on the now only copy of the aircraft. In this situation, the NKAP was forced to file a petition with the Defense Committee to postpone the transfer of the aircraft for state tests from September to the end of 1939. But by the beginning of December 1939, the percentage of readiness of the BB-2 M-88 aircraft was only 45%.

In April 1940, the aircraft was assembled and transferred to the airfield in preparation for factory testing.

On May 25, 1940, test pilot of Plant No. 156, Captain V.T. Sakhranov, took the BB-2 M-88 aircraft into the air for the first time.

On June 4, after completing the flight mission, the landing gear did not extend. Having tried all the release options (main and emergency), captain V.T. Sakhranov landed at the airfield with half-extended struts. The plane received minor damage.

The emergency commission considered the actions of the crew to be correct, and the cause of the accident, in its opinion, was a flaw in the design of the chassis. Deputy Chief Designer D.A. Romeiko-Gurko did not agree with this conclusion of the commission. According to his version, the failure to release the landing gear occurred due to the crew’s poor knowledge of the landing gear operating instructions.

After repairs, testing of the aircraft continued.

On July 16, 1940, while taxiing after landing, captain V.T. Sahranov, inadvertently, removed the landing gear instead of flaps. By order of People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin, test pilot V.T. Sakhranov was removed from further factory flight tests, and test pilot of the 8th department of TsAGI A.I. Emelyanov was involved in the tests. After the next repair, factory tests continued.

At the beginning of October 1940, plant No. 156 transferred the BB-2 M-88 aircraft to plant No. 289 according to an act.

On October 29, Pavel Osipovich reported to the deputy head of the 7th Main Directorate of the NKAP S.N. Shishkin that: “The BB-2 M-88 aircraft completed factory tests according to the program approved by the 7th Main Directorate.

Due to the discrepancy between the maximum speeds calculated and the flight data, I consider it necessary to continue testing to remove the polarizer and test new propellers and exhaust.

To conduct these flights, a pilot from plant No. 289, T. N.D. Fixon, was assigned.”

On November 27, 1940, the crew consisting of test pilot N.D. Fixon and observer - leading engineer of the 8th department of TsAGI M.D. Sokolov made an emergency landing at the Lipitsa summer airfield, located ten kilometers east of Serpukhov. The reason for the landing was overheating and release of oil with a simultaneous drop in its pressure.

On November 28, the commission of the 8th department of TsAGI examined the aircraft and the engine, and after testing it in all modes, gave permission for the BB-2 aircraft to fly to the Ramenskoye airfield.

An hour after takeoff from the emergency landing site, the M-88 engine began to malfunction, then stopped. The crew made an emergency landing on arable land near the airfield of the SPB-134 military unit (Podolsk region). During landing, the pilot received a facial injury and was sent to the hospital, and the landing gear on the plane was broken, the propeller was bent, the wing consoles, the suction pipe and the oil radiator tunnel were damaged.

The investigation established that the engine stopped due to the complete exhaustion of fuel from the fuselage tank, with a remainder of about 220 liters in the wing tanks. The culprit of the accident is N.D. Fixon.

Apparently, the aircraft was not restored, and by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated April 16, 1941, work on it was stopped.

The design of the BB-2 (ShB) aircraft was somewhat different from the production Su-2 (BB-1) aircraft.

When designing the BB-2, the task was to obtain a design that was simple in mass production, with minimal use of aluminum alloys, replaced by steel and wood.

The fuselage and keel were made entirely of wood.

In the cantilever parts of the wing mixed design, metal was used only in the spars, in the second rib and in the tip. The wing center section also had a mixed design.

The BB-2 aircraft was distinguished by the kinematics of retracting and releasing the main landing gear, which retracted back into the wing center section with the wheels turning at 90 degrees. Subsequently, a similar scheme was used on Su-1, Su-6 aircraft and in a number of other projects.

On March 4, 1940, the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution “On the modification of the single-engine short-range bomber BB-1 designed by comrade. Sukhoi" obliged the NKAP and the management of plant No. 135:

“...a) Install an M-90 engine with a power of 1500 hp on a single-engine short-range bomber (BB-1). at an altitude of 6000 m. Flight technical data should be as follows:

The maximum speed at an altitude of 7000m is 560 km/h.

Landing speed - 120 km/h.

Range but 0.9 max, speed - 800 km.

Ceiling - 10000 m.

Crew - 2 people.

Armament: 4 7.62mm machine guns forward, 1 7.62mm machine gun on the turret.

Bomb load standard/overload - 400/600 kg.

b) The aircraft should be built in two copies and submitted for state tests within the following time frame: The first copy - by September 1, 1940

While working on the BB-1 M-90 modification project, it received the designation BB-3 M-90 or “MN”. By June 1940, the model of the aircraft was approved, 90% of the working drawings were completed, and readiness for the production of units and parts was approximately determined at 50%. The main delay in the production of drawings and parts was the lack of an M-90 engine.

The lengthy development of the M-90 engine forced the NKAP management to allow the installation of the M-81 engine on the second copy of the BB-3.

In early November, the BB-3 M-81 was transported to the factory airfield, and the design of the BB-3 M-90 was stopped.

On November 29, 1940, test pilot A.P. Deev took the BB-3 M-81 into the air. The next day, during the second flight, the engine failed. The plane was mothballed because... By decision of the government, the M-81 was removed from production.

Apparently, Pavel Osipovich foresaw such a situation, therefore, at the beginning of October 1940, the design bureau completed the development of a preliminary design of the BB-3 aircraft with an AM-37 engine. The explanatory note to the project noted that:

“The BB-3 aircraft is a modification of the BB-1 M-81 aircraft. The changes concern only the propeller-engine group and a small part of the fuselage. Boning up the AM-37 engine somewhat improves the pilot’s visibility compared to the M-81 engine...

The AM-37 engine requires the use of, in addition to normal radiators for water and oil, a radiator to cool the air entering the carburetor. It is possible to install a water radiator with an area of ​​28 dm2, an air radiator with an area of ​​12 dm2 and an oil radiator with an area of ​​9 dm2.

Due to the conditions of minimal modifications of the BB-1 aircraft and the impossibility of placing radiators in the wing, all radiators are installed under the engine in a common tunnel; The tunnel has a common entrance and exits, separately adjustable for each radiator.

This installation of the engine and radiators allows, with minimal modifications to the design and accessories of the serial plant, to produce an aircraft with any of the AM-37, M-81 and M-90 engines, depending on customer requirements and industry capabilities. The only changes to the airframe when switching from the AM-37 to air engines will be the installation of a fairing in the front lower part of the fuselage and the displacement of the fin in the opposite direction, since the rotation of the AM-37 and M-81 and M-90 engine propellers is opposite.

The capacity of the gas tanks is 850 liters, which provides a flight range in the overload version of 1200 km.

Normal filling of gasoline is 525 kg (710 l - author's note), providing a range of 1000 km.

The fuselage of the production BB-1 aircraft changes in the lower front part, where the radiator tunnel extends.

Automatic slats are installed on the aircraft's wing to improve lateral control.

The equipment is retained for the BB-1 aircraft; RPK-2 and armored gunner's back are added to protect against gunfire from behind.

The armament is retained for the BB-1 aircraft with the addition of a hatch installation.

Basic aircraft data

Take-off power of the AM-37 and power at an altitude of 6000m is 1400 hp.

Aircraft flight weight - 4620 kg Climbing time to 6000m - 10.5 min

Service ceiling - 9500 m

Maximum ground speed - 450 km/h

Maximum speed at an altitude of 6000 m - 550 km/h

Landing speed - 116 km/h

Takeoff length - 350 m..."

In the conclusion on the preliminary design approved by P.V. Rychagov on December 9, 1940, it was noted:

“... 1. The preliminary design of the BB-3 AM-37 aircraft... - to approve with the additions specified in these conclusions and to recommend the construction of the aircraft according to the project, including it in the experimental aircraft construction plan for 1941.

2. Due to the lack of a used copy of the AM-37 engine, it is considered acceptable to install the AM-35 engine on the first copy of the aircraft...”

On January 25, 1941, the government approved the experimental aircraft production plan for 1941. The resolution “On the single-engine bomber Su-4” and the order of the NKAP dated February 3, 1941 obliged: “... the director and chief designer of plant No. 289, comrade. Sukhoi P.O. to design and build a single-engine Su-4 bomber: the first copy with a 37 engine and the second copy with a 90 engine; both examples have a wooden fuselage and a wooden wing with metal spars.

Submit the Su-4 aircraft for state tests: the first copy with engine 37 by August 1, 1941 and the second copy with engine 90 by September 1, 1941, with the following flight tactical data:

Motor 37 90

Maximum speed at an altitude of 6000 m, km/h 550 560

Landing speed, km/h 120 120

Ascent time to a height of 5000 m, min 9 8

Ceiling, m 9500 9500

Range at 0.8 maximum speed, km 1000 1000

Small arms:

a) Airplane with engine 37

2 ShKAS machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber with a reserve of 750 cartridges per machine gun, with machine guns installed in the wings;

1 Taubin machine gun of 12.7 mm caliber on a turret with limited fire, with a reserve of 250 cartridges;

MV-2 hatch installation with 1 ShKAS 7.62 mm machine gun with an ammunition box for 450 rounds.

b) Airplane with 90 engine

2 Taubin machine guns of 12.7 caliber in the wings with a reserve of 250 cartridges per machine gun;

The turret and hatch machine gun installations are the same as on the aircraft with the 37 engine.

Bomb weapons:

4 bombs of 100 kg inside and, in addition, in overload on the external sling, 2 bombs of 100 kg or two bombs of 250 kg. ..."

On March 4, 1941, People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin, in addition to and development of the order of February 3, 1941, issued another order, which prescribed: “...To the director of plant No. 135, comrade. Karpov Yu.N. and the Chief Designer of the aircraft, Comrade. Sukhoi P.O.:

a) Assemble one prototype of the prototype Su-4 aircraft with engine 37 and submit it for factory testing on 1.VII - 1941.

b) The Su-4 aircraft, manufactured for the M-81 engine, should be transferred to plant No. 289 by 1.IV -41, without wings, propeller unit, fully equipped, completed and equipped for release for factory flight tests with the M-90 engine 15.VI - this year

...To the Director and Chief Designer of Plant No. 289, Comrade. Sukhoi P.O.:

a) Transfer to plant No. 135 the drawings of the Su-4 airframe with M-37 (without wings) with full equipment by 15.III - 41.

b) Manufacture and transfer to plant No. 135 one set of wooden wings of the Su-4 aircraft with M-37 by 1.VI - 41...”

In mid-March 1941, P.O. Sukhoi presented a memorandum to the leadership of the NKAP, in which he stated:

“Analysis of the M-90 engine data obtained in connection with its installation on the Su-4 aircraft leads me to the following conclusions:

1. Overweighting the engine compared to the original data by 150-200 kg and shifting the center of gravity forward worsens the flight characteristics of the aircraft and causes great difficulties in alignment, because it is necessary to shorten the front part of the fuselage and, as a result, reduce the volume of the gasoline tank located in this compartment.

2. The high specific fuel consumption, which exceeds the consumption of all our engines of similar power, requires a corresponding increase in the volume of gas tanks, which also leads to overweight and deterioration of the aircraft data.

3. High heat transfer into the oil with relatively low pumping entails a sharp increase in the oil cooler.

Based on the above, I am forced to insist on improving the data of the M-90 engine by:

1) reducing the weight of the motor to at least 900-950 kg;

2) reducing fuel consumption to 300-320 g/hp. h at the second speed of the supercharger;

3) increasing oil pumping to 32-36 kg/min.

I believe that without these improvements the M-90 engine will not find use, since it is inferior to the M-71 in all basic data.

Layout diagram of BB M-71F

I ask for your instructions to plant No. 29 to take urgent measures to improve the M-90 engine.”

Fulfilling the departmental order of March 4, 1941, plant No. 289 produced a wing and a set of drawings for the Su-4 AM-37 aircraft and transferred them to plant No. 135.

In July 1941, by order of the NKAP, all work on the aircraft was entrusted to plant No. 289.

In October 1941, unfinished Su-4 M-90 and Su-4 AM-37 aircraft were evacuated to Molotov.

By order of the NKAP, in the summer of 1942, a fully completed Su-4 M-90 aircraft was transferred to plant No. 29, evacuated to Omsk, for flight testing of the M-90. According to reports from the Air Force Research Institute, by April 15, 1943, the aircraft had completed 9 flights with a flight time of 4 hours and 30 minutes.

No work was carried out on the Su-4 AM-37 aircraft during evacuation, and due to the termination of serial production of the Su-2 aircraft, a petition was filed with the People's Commissar to remove this task from the plant plan.

It is interesting to note that the process of improving the Su-2 short-range bomber was not limited to the above modifications. There were also a number of unrealized projects.

One of the points of the government decree dated July 29, 1939 on the issue “On the creation of modified and new experimental bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft in 1939” ordered P.O. Sukhoi “...to develop a preliminary design of a single-engine two-seat short-range bomber as a further development of the BB-1 and presented to the NGO in July 1939...”

In the fall of 1939, a preliminary design of the BB-2 aircraft with the M-106 TK engine (1200 hp) was presented to the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force.

Basic calculated flight technical data of the BB-2 M-106 TK aircraft:

Maximum speed, km/h:

near the ground 480 (according to TTT - 500)

at 11-6000 m 540

at 11 10000 m 580-590 (according to TTT - 600)

Climbing time Н=10000 m, min 23.0

Practical ceiling, m 12000

Flight range (H=8000m, V=510 km/h), km 1000

Empty weight of the aircraft, kg 2554

Aircraft flight weight, kg 3630

In the conclusion of the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force it was noted:

"1. The presented preliminary design of the BB-2 with the M-106 engine with the technical design of Comrade Sukhoi cannot be approved due to the fact that the aircraft does not satisfy the specifications in terms of:

a) visibility from the cockpit of the pilot and navigator;

b) shelling the rear shooting point;

c) the general layout of the aircraft;

d) flight characteristics.

2. Propose to the designer, rework the preliminary design in accordance with the technical specifications, and then submit it to the Air Force Research Institute.”

It is known that the design bureau did not rework this project.

In December 1942, specialists from P.O. Sukhoi’s design bureau completed their initiative work - a preliminary design of the “BB” aircraft with the M-71F engine (2200 hp)

Basic design data for the BB M-71F aircraft:

Aircraft length, mm 10700

Wingspan, mm 15000

Wing area, m2 32.0

Aircraft weight, kg:

- empty 3900

- flight 5650

Maximum speed, km/h:

- near the ground 490

- at an altitude of 4600 m 560

Climb time

5000m, min 7.0

Practical ceiling, m 10000

Range of flight

(normal), km 1000

Run length, m 325

This preliminary design was not submitted to higher organizations for consideration.