In the post-war construction of the Armed Forces of the USSR, two periods are distinguished. The first period - from the end of the Great Patriotic War before the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Armed Forces (1953). At this time, the basis of the armament of the army and navy were conventional weapons that were used in the last war. The second period began in 1954 and lasted until 1990.

After the end of World War II Soviet Union directed the main efforts to restore the national economy. Consistently implementing Lenin's peace policy, the USSR carried out a significant reduction in its Armed Forces. However, the imperialist states led by the United States launched active activities in order to prevent the further strengthening of the world socialist system and strengthen their influence in the world. The United States of America has launched the production of nuclear weapons and means of delivering them to targets.

In this situation, the Communist Party and the Soviet government took appropriate measures to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces.

To preserve peace and strengthen socialism, the elimination of the US monopoly in the field of nuclear weapons was of particular importance. In August 1949, an experimental explosion of an atomic bomb was carried out in the USSR, and in August 1953 a hydrogen bomb was tested. At the same time, the development of means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target was underway. In 1947, the first launch of a controlled ballistic missile R-1, and three years later a more advanced R-2 rocket was tested.

The improvement of conventional means of armed warfare also continued. The combat and maneuver capabilities of artillery have increased significantly. A new 85 mm anti-tank gun, 122, 130, 152 mm guns, a 240 mm mortar, and BM-14, BM-24 and BMD-20 rocket launchers entered service. The new systems had increased fire power, greater firing range and armor penetration, better accuracy, and an increased degree of automation of loading and guidance. The new 100-mm and 57-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns included in the complexes ensured effective combat against air targets flying at sonic and supersonic speeds.

Armored vehicles have received great development. The medium tank T-54, heavy tanks IS-4, T-10, light amphibious tank PT-76, armored personnel carriers BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-50 were adopted. The improvement of tanks was characterized by an increase in firepower, armor protection, power reserve, turnaround time and improvement of other operational characteristics. The creation of domestic armored personnel carriers has significantly increased the capabilities of motorized infantry in joint actions with tanks.

Rifle units were armed with hand-held and mounted anti-tank grenade launchers, which ensured effective combat against tanks at ranges of up to 300 m (RPG-1, RPG-2 and SG-82). In 1949, a set of new small arms was adopted, which included a Simonov self-loading carbine, a Kalashnikov assault rifle and a Degtyarev light machine gun. The heavy machine guns in rifle companies were replaced by company RP-46 machine guns, which had significantly less weight. The Goryunov heavy machine gun was modernized.

The engineering troops were equipped with earth-moving machines. Trenchers KG-65 and PLT-60, excavators, bulldozers, graders made it possible to mechanize the excavation of trenches, trenches, shelters, and increased the capabilities of equipping roads and laying column tracks. Floating vehicles BAV, MAV, transporters K-61, self-propelled ferries GSP provided landing crossing of infantry, artillery, and tanks. The troops began to receive minelayers and new mine clearance equipment, which made it possible to mechanize the installation of minefields and speed up the making of passages in enemy obstacles.

Radical changes took place in Soviet military aviation, where piston aircraft were replaced by jet and turboprop aircraft. Immediately after the war, the MiG-9 and Yak-15 jet fighters entered the Air Force, then they were replaced by the MiG-15 and MiG-17, La-15, Yak-17, Yak-23 and other fighters, the speed of which reached the speed of sound and even exceeded her. In addition to rapid-fire cannons, rocket weapons were installed on the jet vehicles.

In 1949, serial production of the Il-28 front-line bomber began, which exceeded front-line piston bombers in speed and flight range by 2 times, and bomb load by 3 times. In long-range aviation, the Tu-4 piston bomber was replaced by the Tu-16 jet. Its maximum speed was close to 1000 km/h. Equipping aviation with radio-electronic systems ensured flights in all weather conditions, day and night. Military transport aviation had Il-12 and Il-14 aircraft. The introduction of Mi-1 and Mi-4 helicopters into the troops began.

In the early 50s, the country's Air Defense Forces received a new all-weather Yak-25 fighter-interceptor, anti-aircraft guided missile systems, and powerful detection and guidance radars with a range of hundreds of kilometers. which increased the ability to combat enemy air targets.

The Navy was replenished with new surface ships - cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and landing craft. The warships had high seaworthiness and maneuverability, powerful artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, mine-torpedo weapons, and advanced navigation and control instruments in battle. The construction of nuclear submarines began, marking the beginning of a new stage in the development of the fleet. The artillery, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons of previously built ships underwent technical improvement and strengthening. Naval aviation developed, which received long-range sea jet bombers - carriers of aircraft missiles.

Development of weapons and military equipment in the second period.

By the beginning of 1954, the Armed Forces received nuclear weapons. In September of the same year, the first major military exercise involving the actual explosion of an atomic bomb was held in the Soviet Union.

At first, the only carrier of nuclear weapons was bomber aircraft. However, subsequently missiles of various classes became the main carrier. The combination of nuclear weapons with missiles led to the emergence of a fundamentally new, nuclear missile weapon, which by the early 60s entered service with all branches of the Armed Forces.

Based on the combat purpose and the nature of the tasks being solved, strategic (intercontinental and medium-range), operational-tactical and tactical, as well as aviation, sea and anti-aircraft missiles were distinguished. They had nuclear charges of varying power: low - several kilotons, medium - several tens of kilotons and large - over 100 kilotons. Thermonuclear weapons of enormous power were also created. Intercontinental missiles could travel thousands of kilometers in a short time and hit a target anywhere on the globe. Medium-range missiles solved problems over shorter distances. Operational-tactical and tactical missiles made it possible to hit targets from tens to many hundreds of kilometers. Nuclear missile weapons have become the main means of defeating the enemy.

Combat capabilities have increased significantly conventional weapons. The T-54 medium tank and the T-10 heavy tank were improved. Medium tanks T-55, T-62, T-72 entered service. Subsequently, due to the equalization of the combat characteristics of the medium and heavy tank, the production of the latter was discontinued.

The units received amphibious armored personnel carriers BTR-50P, BTR-60P, and BRDM, which increased the maneuverability and combat capabilities of motorized rifle troops. Since the 60s, they began to be replaced by infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1, BMD-1). They were not only a transport vehicle, but also a combat vehicle for motorized rifle and airborne units, had anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons and could successfully conduct combat operations in any situation.

The artillery received a 100-mm anti-tank gun, a 122-mm howitzer, 122-mm and 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, BM-21 rocket launchers and other artillery systems.

Small arms have been updated. In the 60s, a new set of weapons was adopted, which included an AKM assault rifle, RPK, PK, PKS machine guns and an SVD sniper self-loading rifle, and in the 70s - a 5.45 mm assault rifle and a Kalashnikov light machine gun. Air defense systems of the Ground Forces have undergone rapid development. The engineering troops were equipped with high-performance tracklayers (BAT, PKT), and machines for clearing debris (MTU, KMM, TMM). New amphibious vehicles (PTS, GSP) ensured the crossing of tanks and artillery while overcoming water obstacles on the move.

Aviation units received advanced MiG-19, MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighters, a Su-7b fighter-bomber, new bomber and other supersonic combat aircraft that had powerful weapons, the basis of which were missiles. Combat aircraft with variable wing sweep and vertical takeoff and landing did not require complex runway equipment and increased flight duration in subsonic modes. The speed and carrying capacity of helicopters have increased. Combat helicopters were created, which became powerful, highly mobile fire weapons. Equipping aircraft and airfields with the latest automation, telemechanics, radar, and qualitatively new weapons allowed aviation to carry out combat missions at any time of the day and in various weather conditions.

The country's air defense troops received advanced anti-aircraft weapons missile systems, all-weather supersonic interceptor fighters. This significantly increased their effectiveness in the fight against enemy air attack weapons, especially in difficult weather conditions and at night.

Profound changes have occurred in Navy. The basis of its combat power began to be nuclear submarines and naval missile-carrying aircraft. Atomic power plants provided submarines with greater navigation autonomy and unlimited range. In 1955, the first ballistic missile was launched from a Soviet submarine.

In the second part of my article, I want to briefly consider the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery, including self-propelled mortars, self-propelled guns, and flamethrower systems.

The purpose of my article is to briefly highlight controversial military-technical decisions and mistakes made in the development of Soviet self-propelled artillery. Show that sometimes very dubious, illogical decisions were made, because of which until the 70s the USSR did not have normal self-propelled artillery.

Then, in just 7 years, perfect samples were created that are still actively used today. I tried to show what could have been changed in this industry if the USSR had taken into account the experience of both NATO designers and Socialist camp specialists. In addition, I will show that some design solutions were simply in plain sight, but for some reason the Soviet designers and/or the military did not appreciate or notice them.

To make things easier to understand, I’ll tell you briefly about the structure of Soviet post-war artillery. As part of the division of the 70-80s, artillery was available at 3 levels: the divisional level itself - an artillery regiment of 3 divisions of 152mm self-propelled guns or howitzers, an MLRS division, as well as an anti-aircraft missile or anti-aircraft artillery regiment, and an anti-tank fighter division. Regimental level - 122mm howitzer division, anti-aircraft division or battery, anti-tank battery, sometimes an MLRS battery was added.

Battalion level - a company of 120mm mortars, sometimes some of the mortars were represented by 82mm Vasilki.

Since the 80s, airborne divisions have had a Nona self-propelled gun division in each regiment, and at the divisional level an artillery regiment consisting of Nona self-propelled guns, D-30 howitzers, a MLRS battery and an anti-tank division.

It is clear that in different years the states differed significantly, there were too many divisions in the USSR. Let's say that the artillery of the post-war divisions was quite weak: 76-85mm divisional guns and 122mm howitzers, as well as a relatively small number of mortars and MLRS.

Anti-aircraft armament regiment of 24 37mm anti-aircraft guns. The tank division's strengths were different: for example, the artillery armament of one of the TDs for 1955: 4 57, 76, 85 mm guns, 37 122 mm howitzers, 4 120 mm and 13 160 mm mortars, 9 MLRS, 4 ZSU-37, 6 DShK machine guns, 6 ZPU-2, 3 ZPU-4, 2 25 mm, 29 37 mm, 6 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. Honestly, such states slightly shocked me; for me, the artillery weapons are very weak.

At the level of armies and districts there were separate artillery divisions and brigades, armed, as a rule, with corps guns, high-power guns, heavy MLRS and mortars.

The importance of artillery of various types is enormous; it is necessary to understand that real combat experience has shown that it is artillery, along with tanks, that is the main striking force of the ground forces, and even the main striking force in general.

The importance of anti-aircraft artillery has fallen, but ZSU and ZU confidently occupy their niche, becoming at the same time an important means of fire support for troops. Another advantage of artillery is its conservatism and slow obsolescence.

For example, mortars and many WWII artillery systems are quite combat-ready for local conflicts of our time, while armored vehicles, especially pre-war ones, are hopelessly outdated. The 120mm mortar model 1938 or the 122mm howitzer M-30 still look menacing, remaining in service with a number of countries, but tanks developed in 1938 have been preserved only in museums.

I also want to note that the purpose of the article is not digging through the trash, or savoring the mistakes of the Soviet military and designers, the author is a patriot of the USSR and a fan of Soviet weapons, but for me, separate criticism is still necessary.

For convenience, the problems of Soviet weapons are considered by type military equipment. I also consider some systems to be masterpieces of military-technical thought that have no analogues to this day, for example, 2S7 “Peony”, 2S4 “Tulpan”, 2S6 “Tunguska”, TOS-1.

1. Airborne self-propelled guns.

The first and most widespread airborne self-propelled gun was the ASU-57, adopted by the Airborne Forces in 1951 and produced until 1962. At first, the airborne division received a division of 35 self-propelled guns (essentially a battalion), then the self-propelled guns were transferred to the regimental level: each regiment had a battery of 10 self-propelled guns.

The car was compact and quite reliable and off-road. Its low weight made it possible to effectively land it with the advent of the An-8/12, as well as Mi-6 helicopters. It is clear that the vehicle had weak armor, protecting only from small fragments, as well as ordinary bullets, but this was the price to pay for the low weight. The only question for the self-propelled guns is how optimal was the choice of weapons?

The fact is that self-propelled guns had to solve a whole range of tasks, from fighting armored vehicles to destroying enemy firing points and destroying enemy infantry. In my opinion, the optimal weapon for solving such problems would be an automated control system with a 76mm gun. Moreover, it was developed simultaneously with the ASU-57, but they chose the system with a 57mm gun, guided by its better armor penetration: a 57mm gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 meters penetrated 115/105/95/85 mm of armor with a caliber projectile, and with a post-war sub-caliber projectile 155/140/125/100mm of armor.

For comparison, a 76mm cannon penetrated 95/80/70/60mm with a caliber projectile, and 125/110/90/75mm with a sabot projectile. It would seem that the advantage of the ASU-57 is obvious, and there is nothing to discuss, but at the same time you need to remember at least 3 factors: firstly, that the 57mm gun and the 76mm could not effectively fight the NATO medium tanks M-47/48, Centurion, and also the first MBT M-60.

If the first modifications of these tanks were still hit by BPS head-on from 500m, then the subsequent ones were invulnerable in the frontal projection. The sides were confidently hit by shells of both calibers.

Airborne self-propelled guns were not intended for open combat with enemy MBTs, but were supposed to operate from ambushes, where the main thing was to confidently penetrate the enemy tank into the side and have small dimensions for stealth. Secondly, a cumulative projectile was developed for the 76mm gun, which penetrated 180-200mm of armor. Thirdly, the mass of the OFS 57mm cannon is only 3.75 kg, and the 76mm 6.2 kg, i.e. more than one and a half times heavier, which is especially important for destroying infantry targets.

However, there was even more interesting option, proposed by designers in the mid-50s, the re-equipment of the ASU-57 with a 107mm recoilless rifle. By the way, a similar self-propelled gun was created in the USA, “Ontos”, armed with 6! 106mm recoilless rifles, it is clear that the Soviet Airborne Forces did not need such a perversion, but it is not clear why the military abandoned such rearmament?

The B-11 penetrated 380mm of armor (i.e., it hit any tank of the 50-60s), and its OFS weighed about 8 kg. Thus, such a self-propelled gun could effectively fight both armored vehicles and unarmored targets. But, for unknown reasons, ASU-107 was also rejected.

The second airborne self-propelled gun of the USSR was the ASU-85 (officially SAU-85 or Su-85). In fact, the Soviet “Hetzer”, armed with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, i.e. In terms of firepower, he caught up with the JagdPanther.

When creating the self-propelled guns, the PT-76 chassis was used. A battalion of 31 self-propelled guns was assigned to the Airborne Forces. What can you say about this system? It is quite well armed for its weight and is well armored: 90mm of frontal armor, 20mm of side armor. It had a self-propelled gun and an anti-aircraft machine gun, which increased its survivability.

However, the devil is in the details. Let's start with what is not clear: how was it planned to use the ACS-85 for its intended purpose? System weight 15.5 tons. Those. The An-8 and Mi-6 cannot physically lift it, just like the first modifications of the An-12. For more advanced modifications of the An-12, it is also too heavy, their maximum load capacity is 20 tons, but the weight of the monocargo is less.

So, in reality, the ASU-85 began to be transported by air 8 years after it was put into service, and such a rare aircraft as the An-22, then the Il-76 was able to lift it. So at the beginning of its service, the ASU-85 was unsuitable for landing forces due to its excessive weight.

Was there a way out? Apparently, it was necessary to abandon the creation of the landing Hetzer, and return to the roots. If the ASU-57/76 was preceded by the wartime development of the OSU-76, then the Su-85B (a development of the famous Su-76M) could be taken as the basis for the 85mm amphibious self-propelled gun.

It is clear that the landing version would be much lighter, due to the reduction of armor, to a bulletproof, denser layout. But the new self-propelled gun would weigh about 8 tons (like the BMD-2) and would be fully amphibious.

It is clear that armor penetration would have dropped: an 85mm cannon with post-war shells would penetrate at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000 m, respectively, 135/120/110/100 mm with an armor-piercing shell and 210/180/150 mm with a sub-caliber projectile. But, firstly, such a self-propelled gun could support our landing not in theory, but in reality.

Secondly, with the adoption of a cumulative projectile, armor penetration increased to 250mm, and the capabilities of the BKS do not depend on the length of the barrel, and thirdly, such a self-propelled gun should not have entered into open battles with enemy MBTs, but acted from ambushes. It could easily hit any NATO tank on the side from 2 km, and, for example, an M-48 could hit an M-48 in the turret from 1000m, in the lower frontal part of the hull from 1200 meters or more, and a well-armored forehead from 400m.

Finally, let me remind you that the artillery regiment of the Airborne Forces, until the mid-80s, was armed with SD-44, 85mm divisional guns, whose carriage was crossed with a motorcycle, and they became self-propelled. If such a system suited the Airborne Forces, then why would a similar gun, only as part of an armored self-propelled gun, be worse?
As for the original ASU-85, with a long-barreled 85mm cannon, it’s interesting enhanced version this machine for the ground forces. But more on that in the next chapter.

2. Turretless tanks (tank destroyers and assault guns).

Self-propelled guns of this type showed themselves very clearly during WWII. Thanks to their design features, they made it possible to install more powerful weapons on the chassis of the corresponding tank than the base model had; in addition, such self-propelled guns were cheaper and easier to produce tanks.

As the experience of WWII, especially German, showed, it was precisely such vehicles that were the most effective means of anti-tank defense and support for infantry, and even tanks. The advantages of a tank destroyer over an anti-tank self-propelled gun like the Su-76M or Marder are obvious; tank destroyers are better protected, although they are significantly heavier and more expensive.

Well, there’s no need to talk about towed anti-tank missiles. Of course, they are much cheaper and more compact, so they outnumbered self-propelled guns many times over, but they also suffered huge losses: for example, in 1944-45, the victorious Red Army lost -11,700 45 mm guns, 1,600 57 mm ZIS-2, 16,600 76 mm guns (though some of them are regiments) and about 100 BS-3. And in total, excluding regimental guns, up to 27,000 anti-tank guns and divisional guns.

Let's add to them another 8,000 light self-propelled guns, mainly Su-76. To compare medium and heavy self-propelled guns, 3,800 units were lost. What is the reason for such large losses of towed anti-tank missiles? The thing is that a competent enemy very rarely sent tanks into battle without strong artillery and/or air support, so that a significant part of the anti-tank tanks were destroyed or suppressed before they even had time to enter the battle.

And then, due to its low mobility on the battlefield and lack of protection, such a anti-tank missile system was very vulnerable to return fire from enemy tanks and self-propelled guns. To disable an anti-tank missile, a close rupture of the general explosive potential is sufficient, while a tank destroyer can only be disabled by a direct hit from a projectile, either a very powerful one, or in vulnerable places. It was the German Stugas and tank destroyers, as well as the Soviet Su-85/100 and heavy St. John's Worts that best cemented the defense.

Unfortunately, this direction of development of armored vehicles in the post-war USSR frankly stalled. Yes, separate samples were created, some, like the SU-122-54, were even produced small series, the ASU-85, which physically could not be airborne until the end of the 60s, fully met these criteria.

In reality, until the end of 1979, the basis of such equipment remained self-propelled guns of the Great Patriotic War - SU-100 and ISU-152. These systems were the best in the world for 1946, and remained adequate until the mid-60s. The thing is that until 1965, the Soviet army actively used the T-34-85, T-44, and IS-2/3 to provide support for which these self-propelled guns were needed. The produced T-54/55 and T-10 tanks were only enough to equip tank divisions, as well as MSDs of constant combat readiness. And the rear rifle and motorized rifle divisions were mainly armed with WWII equipment.

It is clear that the ASU-85 in its original form was not needed by the ground forces. In terms of armament, security, and mobility, it was inferior to the good old Su-100. Was it possible to create a tank destroyer worthy of the ground forces? I think so, here we could anticipate the Bundeswehr, for which they created the Jaguar tank destroyer, armed with a 90mm cannon.

To do this, instead of the ACS-85, it was necessary to create a vehicle weighing up to 20 tons with a reinforced chassis and a powerful V-105-V engine, thanks to which the new self-propelled gun could accelerate to 65 km/h, in addition, it had to be possible to install it in the self-propelled gun more powerful promising weapons.

But the main thing is to enhance security: the side armor should be strengthened to 25/30mm, the upper and lower armor plates, which correspond to 33/30mm of the given armor, allowing to protect the sides of the self-propelled guns from fragments and fire from 12.7mm heavy machine guns, and the forehead should be increased to 70mm of armor , which corresponds to 140mm of armor given.

Such a self-propelled gun would be somewhat inferior to the SU-100 in firepower (slightly, armor penetration is 10mm lower, and OFS power is lower, but it would have a faster rate of fire). At the same time, the Su-85 would be better protected in the frontal projection (140mm of armor versus 115mm) of the SU-100, at a lower altitude, although it would have weaker side protection; but it was superior to the Su-100 in maneuverability and efficiency.

But this is the first modification of the self-propelled guns, a trial one, and the main one could receive a 100mm T-19 “Rapier” smoothbore gun as its main armament, which would allow the self-propelled guns to confidently hit all enemy tanks of the 1st-2nd generation. For me, the 100mm tank destroyer is much more effective than the conventional Rapiers that were carried by the AT-P and MTLB armored tractors.

Its survivability is much higher than that of a towed anti-tank missile, and its mobility is higher than that of an MTLB with an attached gun. Like the German Jaguar, it is also possible to create an ATGM on a similar chassis for the Phalanx or Sturm-S ATGMs. Moreover, such an ATGM would be much better protected and carry more ammunition.

Medium self-propelled guns on the T-54 chassis were represented by the low-volume Su-122-54 self-propelled guns. The fact that this vehicle did not go into large production is quite understandable and fair: its armament is the D-49 cannon, a modernization of the ISovskaya D-25, which at distances of 500/1000/1500/2000 m penetrated 155/145/135/125mm, respectively armor.

That is, the self-propelled gun, created to support a medium tank, had less armor penetration than the main medium tank T-54 at a distance of 500-1000m, while before the adoption of the SU-122-54, a new 100mm armor-piercing projectile BR-412D appeared, which provided greater armor penetration than 122mm at all firing distances.

The D-25 simply did not penetrate the American M-47/48 tanks head-on. The need for a more powerful OFS is also controversial, because assault guns with 122mm guns were relevant when the main tanks were T-34-76 and T-34-85.

Their 21 kg shells were several times heavier than 76-85mm shells, but the gap between 100 and 122 mm shells was only 60%. Then, the self-propelled gun was worse protected, only about 160mm of frontal armor, versus 200mm for the T-54. So we are not talking about any quality enhancement.

Here it was necessary to decide what to get: a tank destroyer or an assault gun? If it’s an assault weapon, then the easiest way is to make a self-propelled gun based on the 152mm D-1 howitzer; 40 kg OFS was 2.5 times heavier than a 100mm projectile, and the presence of a concrete-piercing projectile in the ammunition made it possible to effectively break through enemy missile defenses.

Such a self-propelled gun in a modernized version (chassis to the level of the modernized T-55, reinforced armor and remote protection) would be quite relevant for both Afghanistan and Chechnya, a powerful 152mm projectile could sweep away militants holed up in any building, and enhanced protection would provide protection from fire anti-tank light weapons. In reality, we had to use the 2S3 Akatsiya, which is very poorly protected, for direct fire.

If the military needed a tank destroyer, then it would have to wait until 1957, when the new 122mm M-62 gun appeared. It weighed only 380 kg more than the D-25, but at the same time it penetrated 214 mm of armor at a distance of 2000 m. This armor penetration was enough for all American tanks until the advent of the M-60A1. She could only hit this tank from 1000m.

When the BKS and BPS were created for the M-62, it was able to effectively hit the M-60A1 head-on. So, a sub-caliber projectile, for example, penetrated 320mm armor at 2000m, i.e. It practically matched the armor penetration of a 125mm projectile, and was superior to 115mm projectiles of the late 60s. In the 70s, this self-propelled gun could have been re-equipped with a 125mm gun with an AZ, which would have made it possible to support Soviet T-54/55 and T-62 with fire.

By the way, it was possible to smoothly switch to the production of vehicles based on the T-55, and due to the powerful engine, increase the weight of the self-propelled guns and increase security. In some ways, such self-propelled guns would be similar to the Swedish turretless tank Strv 103; the SU-125-55 is more powerful in firepower, the Swede is better in protection, and the mobility is approximately equal.

Where is the place for such a self-propelled gun? Logically, IT looked good as part of self-propelled tank regiments, where one of the battalions was rearmed with self-propelled guns. Well, it would be better to concentrate assault guns as part of self-propelled breakthrough regiments, attaching them to armies.

Now let's talk about heavy tank destroyers and assault guns. There was no need for new assault guns; numerous ISU-152s were enough, into which even ISU-122s were converted.

But new tank destroyers could well be useful, the fact is that at the end of WWII the Germans created well-protected tanks and self-propelled guns: the Royal Tiger and the JagdTiger, which were low-vulnerable in the frontal projection.

After the war, the USA and Great Britain actually abandoned medium tanks, putting into mass production the actually heavy Pattons and Centurions, as well as the super-heavy M-103 and Conkerror tanks. It was extremely difficult to fight them with conventional Soviet tank guns.

It is interesting that at the end of the war the USSR created a new tank destroyer, the ISU-130, but did not put it into mass production.

This decision was played by the end of the war factor, the discontinuation of the IS-2, the enormous length of the tank barrel, and, finally, frankly stupid arguments that the 130mm caliber was foreign to the army, difficulties would arise with ammunition, etc. .

The last argument can be easily destroyed: isn’t the 100mm caliber a naval caliber?
Did the 85mm caliber appear so long ago? In reality, of course, the army needed a 130mm self-propelled gun; another question is that the self-propelled gun could be rearranged like Ferdinand, Su-101, i.e. place the gun cabin in the stern of the self-propelled gun, and make the vehicle itself on the IS-3 chassis.

Use the 130mm S-70 cannon developed for the IS-7 as a weapon. This gun at a distance of 500/1000/1500/2000m had armor penetration of 217/207/197/188mm, and its OFS were a third heavier than 122mm shells. In addition, one must understand that these data refer to shells from the 40s, while shells with better capabilities were adopted in the 50s.

So, for example, armor penetration increased to 250/240/225/210mm, even 180mm armor was hit at 3 km! But instead of this logical step, they tried to create a self-propelled gun - a monster on the IS-7 chassis, object 263. Why the army needed a tank and self-propelled guns with the same gun is not clear.

A similar 130mm self-propelled gun had to be created on the T-10 chassis, but then it was possible to produce an even more powerful self-propelled gun on the T-10M chassis. Ironically, such a self-propelled gun was created on the original T-10 chassis, object 268, armed with a powerful 152mm M-64 rifled cannon.

But for me, it was the T-10M chassis that was best suited, thanks to its powerful engine and perfect chassis, because the production of the initial modifications of the T-10 was ending, and if the self-propelled gun entered service, then in any case, it should have been produced on a new chassis.

Such a SU-152-10M would become the most powerful Soviet assault gun and tank destroyer. In terms of power, the new gun was significantly superior to the ML-20, which was armed with the ISU-152, the military argued that its power was insufficient against Western MBTs, but who prevented the creation of a BPS or BKS for this weapon, and that being hit by 43 kg OFS is dangerous for any tank , even without breaking through the armor.

The armor protection of the 268M object is also quite strong: frontal armor is 187-248mm, wheelhouse armor is about 200mm, side armor is about 110mm. For comparison, the ISU-152 had frontal armor of about 105mm, side armor of 80-90mm, which is just ridiculous for the level of anti-tank equipment of the late 50s. And the speed of the 268M object allowed it to move on equal terms with the T-54/55.

However, there was another option: creating a tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis with a completely new gun - the 152mm M-69 smoothbore gun was developed, which weighed only 200 kg more than the 130mm systems.

At the same time, its sub-caliber projectile had monstrous armor penetration for the late 50s: at a distance of 1000/2000/3000m it penetrated 370/340/310 mm of armor, respectively.

Thus, it could hit the M-60A1 from almost 5000m. And the most powerful OFS was dangerous to any MBT. For comparison, the first 125mm BPS penetrated 300mm armor from 2000m.

Accordingly, a 152mm sub-caliber projectile, which would have been put into service in the 70-80s, would have had significantly greater armor penetration, surpassing 125mm projectiles.

Unfortunately, they wanted to install this miracle gun on a weakly armored self-propelled gun - object 120. Object 120 was a typical anti-tank self-propelled gun, with thin anti-fragmentation armor, and would be very vulnerable to fire from NATO MBTs, 90-120mm cannons hit it from almost any firing distance, and 90-155mm OFS were very dangerous if hit directly.

So, unlike a tank destroyer on the T-10M chassis, object 120 was contraindicated from engaging in open battle with enemy tanks.

3. Classic self-propelled guns - self-propelled artillery systems.

Almost all modern self-propelled guns belong to this type - self-propelled artillery systems. This is, as a rule, an ordinary howitzer or cannon mounted on a lightly armored chassis and intended for fire support and escort of troops, firing from closed firing positions (with the exception of some anti-tank self-propelled guns).

Unlike turretless tanks, its armor is not capable of withstanding shell hits, but is bulletproof and anti-fragmentation in nature, so the self-propelled carriage should not engage in open combat with enemy armored vehicles.

The first such self-propelled guns were created back in WWII, when heavy guns began to be installed on the chassis of heavy tractors, which is why the USSR produced a small series of 122mm self-propelled howitzer SU-5, on the T-26 chassis. Wheeled self-propelled guns SU-12 were also created. But the Soviet military did not appreciate the enormous potential of such systems, and this stupidity continued until the end of the 60s.

The massive use of self-propelled artillery systems, or as the Germans also called them self-propelled carriages, or self-propelled guns, began during WWII by the Germans and Americans.

The Germans produced a fairly large series of 105mm Vespe howitzers, 150mm Hummel howitzers and 150mm Grille mortars. The Yankees created the following systems: 105mm self-propelled howitzer, 155mm self-propelled howitzers and guns, 203mm howitzers. This was the first generation of American escort self-propelled guns. As we see, the Germans essentially created self-propelled divisional artillery, and the Yankees, in addition, created corps artillery.

The idea of ​​​​creating such systems is quite logical, and was proposed by Guderian. It was he who proposed the thesis that tank forces only become such when, in addition to tanks, they include a combination of infantry, reconnaissance forces, artillery, air defense, sappers, and rear services with increased mobility, maneuverability, and preferably security.

The advantages of self-propelled guns over towed ones are obvious: they are significantly less vulnerable to enemy fire, thanks to the presence of armor, as well as the ability to quickly occupy and then leave firing positions.

It is clear that it is impossible to completely abandon towed guns, and it is not necessary, but, of course, it is self-propelled guns that dominate the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the Yankees realized this very quickly, and during 1943-1963 they replaced 3 generations of self-propelled artillery systems, and one of the 3rd generation self-propelled guns, the M-109, is the most popular self-propelled gun in the world, and is still in service with many countries. and, by the way, forms the basis of US artillery.

In the USSR, there were no such self-propelled guns until the 70s; the country had the most tanks in the world, but was quite far behind the enemy in saturating the troops with armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery. But in the 70s, a whole series of “flowers” ​​was created: “Carnation”, “Acacia”, “Hyacinth”, “Peony”, which was the best in the world at the time of its creation.

The first post-war self-propelled artillery systems were created in the USSR in 1949: SU-100P and SU-152T. SU-100P, in my opinion, is very interesting for two reasons.

Firstly: the military did not see its enormous potential, considering it as an anti-tank self-propelled gun; secondly: the suspension of the SU-100P was unique for its time; subsequently, on its basis, self-propelled guns “Akatsia”, “Gyacinth-S”, “Tulpan”, as well as a whole range of vehicles were developed.

Why didn’t the self-propelled gun go into production? I’ll quote Shirokorad: “Despite all the advantages of the SU-100P, one can say about it: “neither a candle to God nor a poker to the devil.” As an anti-tank weapon, it was not superior to the T-54 tank, it was not suitable for howitzers, and for a long-range gun it had a short firing range and a weak projectile.”

Is the master right? Yes and no. It is clear that the Soviet army did not need an anti-tank self-propelled gun; medium and heavy tanks and self-propelled guns were enough for these tasks, especially since it was inferior in protection to the SU-76M. The question is, what is the survivability of such an anti-tank self-propelled gun if its frontal armor did not exceed 30mm?

Yes, Sherman could hit her from the maximum distance, and right through. Our self-propelled gun was closest to the German Nashorn; it would have appeared in 1943-44, but it was very necessary for post-war tasks. But at the same time, this system could become very relevant.

To do this, it was necessary to stop looking at the SU-100P as a anti-tank gun, and make it a self-propelled divisional gun. To begin with, it was necessary to install the BS-3 instead of the D-10/50 tank gun, the whole point is that the tank gun had a maximum firing range of 15800m, while the BS-3, thanks to its large tilt angles, could fire at 20600m, which is longer than the Akatsiya. .

As for the weak projectile, let me remind you: in terms of performance characteristics, the BS-3 was superior to the German 105mm hull gun, with which the Germans fought the entire Second World War.

The SU-152G is even more promising, this is actually our “Hummel”, it is not clear why this modification of the SU-100P, armed with the 152mm D-1 howitzer, was not accepted into service?!

Logically, it was necessary to review the armament of tank and mechanized divisions of the SA, instead of a regiment of 36 towed 122mm howitzers, it was necessary to create a regiment of 24-122mm self-propelled guns, 12 SU-100P, 12 SU-152G. And in the 60s, make artillery regiments from 24 (36) SU-152G and 12 (18) SU-100P, making all the artillery of tanks and parts of motorized rifle divisions self-propelled. At the same time, 122mm self-propelled guns are transferred to the regimental artillery.

The question arises, where can I get a 122mm light self-propelled gun? Here, once again, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but by analogy with the German Vespe self-propelled gun, create a system on the SU-85B chassis, which is a development of the SU-76M.

I think that before the advent of the 122mm D-30 howitzer and the Gvozdika, such a system would have been very relevant. Then, as an intermediate option, it was possible to build a 122mm self-propelled gun with the D-30, on the BTR-50 chassis. By the way, the DPRK and China have created a whole range of self-propelled guns on the chassis of clones of this armored personnel carrier, including 122mm howitzers.

In the 50-60s, 152mm self-propelled guns were developed on the reinforced SU-100P chassis; I wrote about object 120 above; more interesting is the SU-152P, for which they created the M-53 gun, which was approximately equivalent in ballistics to the M-47.

In my opinion, it was necessary to go further and create a whole range of self-propelled guns on a reinforced chassis, the predecessors of the Akatsiya and Hyacinth, installing the Soviet D-20/74 and M-46/47 systems on the self-propelled guns. Such self-propelled guns could be used to strengthen tank armies, as well as Soviet troops in Europe and the Western districts.

But the T-54/55 chassis could well be used to create self-propelled guns of special power: 180mm cannon, this is the Grabin S-23. Firing range with a conventional projectile is 30.4 km, ARS – 43.8 km. This formidable system was developed to replace the 152mm high-power BR-2 cannon, but due to Khrushchev's lobbying for missile weapons, the re-equipment of the SA with new guns was greatly slowed down, and the heavy guns never went into production.

We resumed production of such systems in the early 70s for export, so that our allies would be able to resist the American 175mm self-propelled gun M-107. Our proposed self-propelled gun on the T-55 chassis would be structurally close to the North Korean M-1978 Kokusan, but superior to it in the quality of the artillery system and power, ours has a caliber of 180mm, versus 170mm for the Kokusan.

As for the M-107, the SU-180-55 would be superior to it with a projectile mass of 88 kg OFS and 84 kg of ARS, versus 66.8 kg for the American system, as well as in range, because The American system did not have ARS, but fired a conventional projectile at 32.7 km. In terms of the power of a conventional OFS, our system is superior to the American 203mm M110 self-propelled gun, which fired 90.7 kg of shells.

It makes no sense to make a 203mm self-propelled gun based on the famous B-4: its OFS is only 12 kg heavier than the 180mm, and in terms of range it is inferior by more than 1.5 times. In addition, logically, the self-propelled gun could also use naval 180mm shells weighing up to 97.5 kg.

So technically it was quite possible to create strong self-propelled artillery 15-20 years earlier. It would look like North Korean or Chinese self-propelled artillery from the 70s and 80s. Their systems are essentially our unborn self-propelled guns from the 50s and 60s.

Soviet self-propelled artillery of the 70-80s was generally optimal, for quite short term a whole series of excellent self-propelled guns were created, but the Msta-S became the crown of Soviet technical thought and at the time of its creation the best 6-inch self-propelled gun in the world. Was it possible to add anything to this self-propelled gun flower garden?

If we talk about vehicles on tracked chassis, then two systems are interesting. The first is the 2S15 “Norov”, a 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun, created on the basis of the chassis of the famous “Gvozdika”, in fact it is a self-propelled “Rapira-R”, equipped with a complex fire control system. Did such an anti-tank self-propelled gun have a right to exist?

With all my dislike for lightly armored anti-tank self-propelled guns, I must admit that there was a certain reason for creating such a self-propelled anti-tank gun.

Such a self-propelled gun had better fire accuracy than a conventional towed gun; The cross-country ability was also better than that of the towed version, simply attached to the MTLB; the crew was at least protected from shrapnel and bullets, which increased its survivability.

Finally, the self-propelled gun could quickly leave the firing position, avoiding enemy artillery fire. Unfortunately, work on the creation of this system began only in 1976, and the prototype was ready already in 1983, the machine was ready for production in 1985, but then the Rapier was already considered obsolete
system and its release was completed, so 9 years of work went into the archives...

What should have been done? To begin, immediately develop a duplex of two vehicles: a 122mm self-propelled howitzer and a 100mm anti-tank gun immediately after the creation of the 2S1, which would allow the 2S15 to be accepted for production 10 years earlier. If possible, the Rapier-S control system should be unified with the tanks of that time, for example the T-64B.

Since 1981, release a modification with a radar sight, which in reality was created this year. Regarding the obsolescence of the Rapier, let me remind you that 30 years have passed since its production ceased, but the 2A29 anti-tank gun is still in service and firmly included in the staff.

But I can’t resist criticizing the towed gun itself; the “Rapier” is known to be a modification of the PTO 2A19, which differed from it only in a new carriage, adapted for faster towing. The question arises, why couldn’t it be possible to install the anti-tank gun on the carriage of the legendary D-30A howitzer?

It’s interesting that such a PTO was developed by OKB No. 9, but the D-60 lost to the 2A29, so who stopped you from making a hybrid design, or is it even easier to give the command to unify the carriages of the two mass systems?!

The most annoying thing is that in the 80s, the Yugoslavs did just that, converting their anti-tank guns to the D-30 carriages (modification of the M87 TOPAZ). In addition to making operation easier, the D-30 carriage allows all-round fire, which is very useful for anti-tank guns. And the North Koreans created a self-propelled 100mm anti-tank self-propelled gun

The second alternative self-propelled gun is a 122 mm self-propelled gun, created together with the 2S3 Akatsiya, based on the towed D-74. This gun was developed in tandem with the 152mm howitzer-cannon D-20, the new guns were supposed to replace the veterans A-19 and ML-20, but in the 60-70s the main hull guns of the SA became 130mm M-47 and 152mm "Gyacinth- B", so the D-20 became the main divisional system of Soviet motorized rifle divisions.

Unfortunately, the D-74 was produced in small quantities and mostly went for export, and most of it was produced by the Chinese. It is clear that the need for such a hull gun has disappeared, but who prevented the D-74 from being made into a divisional gun? By analogy with D-1 and BS-3, the stereotyped thinking of our generals deprived the divisional artillery of an excellent system.

The main advantage of the D-74 is its enormous range by the standards of the 60-70s - 23900m; it shoots 6.5 km further than the D-20/2S3 and 3.3 km longer than the Grad. Even the 152 mm Msta-B howitzer, which appeared 30 years later, shoots only 800 meters further than the D-74, despite the fact that it weighs 1.5 tons more.

So very current system and the creation of a self-propelled gun for it similar to the Acacia. It’s sad that such a system was created, but again our brothers in the socialist camp - in the DPRK, both visually and in characteristics it resembles the 2S3, but is armed with the D-74. This is the M-1991 system.

As for the 2S18 Pat-S self-propelled gun on the BMP-3 chassis, I consider the abandonment of this self-propelled gun quite reasonable. The only good thing about this self-propelled gun is the excellent chassis, but the artillery part is surprising, the new 152mm howitzer has worse ballistics than the outdated D-20/Acacia, the range does not exceed the D-30/Gvozdika, the only advantage is the powerful 152mm projectile.

But in the realities of the late 80s, the Msta became the main divisional howitzer, and numerous Acacias were transferred to the regiments, for example, they armed the “ceremonial” divisions near Moscow.

Now let's talk about wheeled self-propelled guns. For the 50s, the most relevant thing was to install a 107mm recoilless rifle on the BTR-40 chassis. I wrote about the advantages of this weapon above; all that remained was to combine it with a fairly successful and cheap armored personnel carrier.

In the next period, the 2S14 “Sting-S” system, a light anti-tank self-propelled gun on the BTR-70 chassis, armed with a unique 85mm 2A62 smoothbore system, is very interesting.

Apparently, it was planned to adopt both a self-propelled and a towed system, which was supposed to solve the tasks of anti-tank weapons at the battalion level in motorized rifle troops and marines, and the towed version was intended for air assault brigades. It is believed that the “Sting-S” did not go into production due to insufficient armor penetration, which was 1.5 times inferior to a 125mm tank gun.

What can I say? The armor penetration of Soviet 125mm shells of the 60-70s was in the range of 300-420mm at a distance of 2000m, so an 85mm shell of the mid-70s could penetrate up to 280mm at the same distance. Thus, he confidently hit all NATO tanks head-on at a long distance except the latest modifications of the Chieftain.

However, the Soviet military was afraid of 3rd generation tanks: Abrams, Leopard 2, Challenger. Nevertheless, there are still many reasons to defend the 2S14: firstly, 85mm shells would be improved, reaching 360-400mm, while the rate of fire of the self-propelled guns was 2 times higher than that of the MBT.

Secondly, for some reason the military likes to take extreme situations, it’s just like seeing hordes of “Abrams” or “Leo-2” going to the poor “Sting-S”, in fact, even in 1990. The arsenal of NATO countries was dominated by 1st-2nd generation tanks, and the PLA was represented mainly by T-54/55 clones and light tanks.

Then, why would a light self-propelled gun conduct open battles with modern MBTs? Its destiny is to operate from ambushes, hitting NATO carcasses on the side and stern. Thirdly, for the Zhalo-S there were many tempting targets besides tanks - infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armored vehicles.

Personally, the only thing that confuses me about this system is the need to adopt new types of ammunition and weapons. Can this be avoided? Yes, of course: the self-propelled guns had to be armed with the good old Rapier.

Is it possible? Previously, I considered such a move an adventure, but again the decisions were suggested by the brothers in the Socialist Camp, now Cubans. The Cubans created self-propelled guns on the BTR-60 chassis, installing on them... 100mm guns from the T-54/55, of course, modernizing them.

If the Cuban “Kulibins” succeeded in this, then what prevented our most powerful military-industrial complex from installing the lighter 100mm smoothbore “Rapier” on the more powerful BTR-70/80 chassis?

I think it's just a lack of imagination. What place does such a self-propelled gun or cannon armored car have? Logically, this is a strengthening of motorized rifle battalions by including platoons of such vehicles; in addition, the reconnaissance battalions could also include a Zhalo-S company; there is also a reason to transfer some anti-tank units from motorized rifle brigades to these self-propelled guns, as well as strengthen Marine Corps.

Now let's look at wheeled self-propelled guns on automobile chassis. The first self-propelled gun, which actually could become the base one, is the famous Czech “Dana”; it was tested in the USSR and adopted to a limited extent by the TsGV.

Moreover, the GRAU opposed the adoption of this system, not seeing the advantages of the Dana over the Akatsiya. For me, the advantages of “Dana” for the European theater of operations are obvious:

- “Dana” had greater speed and range than “Acacia”, therefore, it was much more mobile, which is important for a rapid breakthrough to the English Channel. The worst cross-country ability is not critical, the roads of the Central and Western Europe by Soviet standards they are simply incomparable.

And in the shroud of Africa such a self-propelled gun is preferable. Then, for some reason, no one discusses the maneuverability of Soviet MLRS, they are all wheeled, but at the same time they served in all climate zones and are now serving successfully.

- “Dana” has a significantly higher rate of fire than “Acacia”, 8 rpm, compared to 3 rpm for our self-propelled gun.

- "Dana" is significantly cheaper and more economical to operate. Per 100 km it consumes 65 liters of fuel, and Akatsiya 165 liters. Finally, the chassis life of wheeled vehicles is significantly higher than that of tracked vehicles.

There were, of course, advantages of our “Acacia”: its chassis is stronger, it can withstand heavy loads more easily, its maneuverability is higher, its ability to fire shells fired from the ground is not unimportant, and the Tatra chassis is still alien to our army.

For me, it was necessary to organize a barter with the Czechs in order to supply large quantity Self-propelled guns for units of Soviet troops in Europe in exchange for the supply of air defense systems and tanks, and "Acacia"
preserve it for troops on the territory of the USSR and seriously approach the creation of self-propelled guns on Soviet chassis.

IN real story one brigade of 120 “Dan” was formed as part of the Central Military Command. But for me this is a wrong decision: individual artillery formations were armed with more powerful systems, and the Dana is still a divisional self-propelled gun.

The Soviet automobile self-propelled guns began to be created in the mid-80s, based on the Msta-B howitzer and the KrAZ-6130 or KamAZ-5320 chassis. Officially, this work was carried out for 2 years (1985-87), but in fact they began back in 1983

Why was all work stopped in 1987? Here is the reluctance of the Ministry of Automotive Industry to deal with new chassis, making changes to existing designs, and the indifference of the military to this topic.

For me, the retrograde behavior of our military and officials was clearly evident here; having the example of the successful “Dana,” they did not bother to create its Soviet analogues. Work should have begun back in 1980, with the maximum use of Czech design solutions, subject to due persistence of military customers, by 1987 our Msta-K variants should be ready for serial production, which would be a serious addition to the towed and tracked option.

The advantages over tracked ones are the same as those of the Dana over the Acacia. Cheap chassis, with many times more mileage before major repairs; greater mobility - speed of 85 km/h and range of 1000 km, versus 60 km/h and 500 km for the Msta-S, and finally, efficiency - fuel consumption of 45 liters per 100 km versus...260 liters for the tracked version.

The most annoying thing is that subsequently many countries created their own wheeled self-propelled guns: G6 - South Africa, Nora-B Yugoslavia, Caesar France, Archer Sweden, SH1 China. Fortunately, there is great hope that a wheeled “Coalition” will be created.

At the end of this topic, I want to say that it made sense to create a 122mm wheeled self-propelled gun on the Ural-4320 chassis. Such a self-propelled gun would occupy an intermediate niche between a towed howitzer and a tracked self-propelled gun. Already in our time, such a system was created jointly by Israel and Kazakhstan, however, on the KAMAZ-63502 chassis.

You can ask, maybe it’s easier to tow the D-30? The advantage of such an installation is the ability to quickly open fire on the enemy and quickly leave the position before return fire.

A towed howitzer takes about 3 minutes to deploy and return to its stowed position. Then the self-propelled guns can automate some processes, which would increase the rate of fire and accuracy of fire.

4. Self-propelled mortars and combined guns.

Mortars are the cheapest, lightest with the same caliber, easy to use and at the same time very effective artillery pieces.

Thanks to their cheapness, lightness and simplicity, they have penetrated many military levels: from company armament to equipping RGK units.

The USSR was the leader in the creation of mortars: during the Second World War its 120mm was so good that the Germans simply copied it, but the 160mm mortars simply had no analogues (except for the German 150mm infantry gun, but these are different systems, the German mortar gun), after the war there were a new type of 160mm mortar and a heavy-duty 240mm mortar have been created.

Unfortunately, because of Khrushchev, the development of mortars was abandoned. In the 70-80s, the situation somehow improved, the automatic 82mm mortar “Cornflower” and the first self-propelled mortar “Tulip” appeared, but at the same time there was complete stagnation with conventional mortars, the army used 120mm mortars from the Second World War, 160mm were gradually withdrawn from service, and 82mm wartime mortars were replaced with “Vasilki” and automatic grenade launchers.

Only when the “cock pecked”, or rather Afghanistan began, new 82mm and 120mm mortars appeared. Unfortunately, apart from the Tulip, the Soviet Army did not receive self-propelled mortars, although its NATO opponents used 81 and 106mm, and then 120 self-propelled mortars, on armored personnel carrier chassis. Moreover, self-propelled mortars appeared during WWII in Germany and the USA, on the chassis of half-track mortars.

What kind of self-propelled mortars could be created in the USSR? In the post-war years, the most urgent thing was the creation of a whole range of mortars.

For an 82mm mortar, the BTR-40 chassis is most convenient, while a 160mm mortar is wiser to install on a chassis from the SU-85B; for a 240mm mortar, the installation from the SU-100P is suitable (especially since in 20 years the “Tulip” will be created on these chassis). The Airborne Forces were armed with a 107mm mountain mortar, the ASU-57 chassis would be suitable for it, the most effective remains the 120mm mortar, the BTR-50 chassis would be guaranteed to be suitable for it, but the main question was, of course, installing this mortar on the BTR-152 chassis.

Outwardly, it may seem that this mortar is too heavy for the BTR-152, since only 81mm mortars were installed on half-tracks; on the other hand, much heavier ZPU-2, and even ZPU-4, were installed on the BTR-152. Well, the Cubans have created a modification of the 120mm mortar on the chassis of the much lighter BRDM-2, so by strengthening the chassis of this armored personnel carrier, you can get a completely perfect 120mm self-propelled mortar.

In the 60s, it was possible and necessary to create 120mm self-propelled mortars on the BTR-60 and MTLB chassis. By the way, in Bulgaria in 1981 they created and put into mass production a 120mm self-propelled mortar on the Tundzha MTLB chassis, which turned out to be very successful; for unknown reasons, this mortar did not enter service with the Soviet army, although its modification with the 120mm Sani mortar was created. .

Obviously, they planned to arm the Soviet army with combined self-propelled guns, so such a cheap and simple self-propelled mortar was not needed. But such self-propelled guns began to enter service with motorized rifle units only recently, the 2S34 Khosta self-propelled guns, and our motorized riflemen did not receive a 120mm self-propelled mortar for several decades.

I think there is no need to prove that when receiving the task, our designers created a similar mortar 10 years earlier than the Bulgarians, and the mortar on the BTR-60 chassis back in the 60s. In the 2000s in Russia, for some reason, they created an 82mm self-propelled mortar 2K32 “Deva”.

To me, it looks like a mockery of common sense; it is stupid to install such a weak mortar on an MTLB chassis. The brothers created a similar mortar 30 years earlier, only it fires pound mines, although it has a slightly smaller ammunition load of 60 minutes, instead of 84 for the “Virgin”, but also a smaller crew - 5 people, instead of 6.

In the 70s in the USSR they tried to create a 120mm mortar on the BMP-1 chassis, and in 2 versions - the usual one - muzzle-loading, and breech-loading, with installation in the turret. But for some reason the first, simple option did not go into production, although it is directly requested to be used in the arsenal of a mortar company of a motorized rifle battalion on an infantry fighting vehicle, and a combined gun was preferred to a breech-loading mortar.

And here the question arises: why weren’t self-propelled mortars based on the Vasilka created? Usually, ersatz self-propelled guns were created on the MTLB or BTR-D chassis, where the Cornflower stood openly on the roof of the vehicle.

Logically, it would be necessary to create a self-propelled company mortar, respectively, on the BMP-1, BTR-70, BRDM-2 and BMD-1 chassis, with a “Vasilka” installation in the turret. It turns out to be a mini-Nona, but such a mortar is not its replacement, but an addition; 2 self-propelled automatic mortars per motorized rifle company would greatly increase its combat capabilities, especially in the fight against entrenched enemy personnel. Such a machine is very relevant today.

Now let's move on to our unique combination weapons. I believe that the 120mm Nona was a masterpiece of design, and only the inertia of the military did not allow us to correctly assess its universal capabilities.

This self-propelled gun is at the same time a light howitzer, and its OFS have a very strong high-explosive effect due to a powerful explosive charge of -4.9 kg, surpassing a 122mm howitzer projectile; the Nona ammunition also included cluster, volumetric detonating and other projectiles. At the same time, “Nona” is also a mortar capable of using all 120mm mines.

And, finally, it can play the role of a anti-tank missile, having cumulative shells in its ammunition load. The Nona has all these capabilities at a low weight; its towed version weighs 1200 kg, 2.5 times less than the D-30, which makes it easier to install on different chassis.

In 1981, the Nona-S on the BTR-D chassis entered service with the Airborne Forces and went into mass production, becoming the basis of the airborne artillery; the Airborne Forces required 72 new self-propelled guns.

The ground forces and marines quickly appreciated the new system, enthusiasts proposed starting a wide range of R&D to saturate motorized rifle battalions with Nona batteries, at the rate of 6 self-propelled guns, instead of 8-120mm towed mortars.

Work began on the “Nons” on the 2S1 “Gvozdika” chassis, BRM-1K and BTR-70, the so-called. 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV. But, unfortunately, the first two cars were not even created in metal, the second was ready for serial production by 1984, but it was decided to develop a new Nona-SVK system on the chassis of the new BTR-80. Why didn't these excellent systems go into series? The principle “The best is the enemy of the good” worked.

It was decided to create a new generation combined weapon, with improved ballistics and automated. This system was to be created on a chassis from the future BMP-3 and BMD-3 systems.

As a result, all work dragged on for a long time; new systems were created by 1995 and 1990, respectively! The system for the Airborne Forces “Obzhimka” remained in a single copy; the 2S31 “Vena” took a long time to be perfected, but has not really entered service with the army until now. Instead, a simplified 2S34 “Hosta” system based on the 2S1 was recently developed.

Logic dictates that the GRAU, on the contrary, should have given the task of creating new combined self-propelled guns as soon as the process of adopting the Nona-S into service reached the finish line, i.e. since 1980, and in 3 versions at once, to equip motorized rifle battalions armed with the appropriate type of armored vehicles.

Already in 1984, it was possible to launch mass production of 2S17, 2S17-2 and Nona-SV, and they could be produced until the collapse of the USSR, regularly modernizing, the only thing being that the production of “Nona-SV” would smoothly transition into the production of “ Nony-SVK", already in 1987.

Soviet and then Russian motorized riflemen and marines would have found these self-propelled guns very useful in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and in the 2000s the army would have received various modifications of the Vienna.

5. Flamethrower systems.

By flamethrower systems we mean flamethrower tanks and flamethrower MLRS. It should be noted that it was the USSR that was the leader in the creation of flamethrower tanks; before the war, the Red Army had more than 1000 flamethrower tanks on the T-26 and T-37 chassis.

During the Second World War, medium flamethrower tanks OT-34 and OT-34-85, as well as heavy KV-8, appeared, and 1640 Soviet flamethrower tanks were produced, more than any other country.

Soviet flamethrower tanks differed favorably from their German and American counterparts by retaining the main cannon armament. In the post-war years, for obvious reasons, the importance of flamethrower armored vehicles began to decline, although it was sometimes used very actively in local conflicts.

The strengthening of anti-tank weapons of the infantry had an impact here: if the flamethrowing range remained within 200 m, then the saturation of the infantry with RPGs and recoilless rifles made the use of flamethrower tanks quite difficult, however, for counter-guerrilla operations, flamethrower tanks were very effective, but again the appearance and massive use of napalm , sent them to second roles.

In the USA, after the war, they created the M-67 (based on the M-48) and M-132 (based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier) flamethrower tanks, which were built in small series; they performed well in Vietnam, but very few of them were produced, and The massive appearance of the RPG-7 made it difficult to use, so after this war they quickly disappeared from the scene.

The USSR created flamethrower tanks OT-54 and TO-55. And this is where the mysteries begin: very few of these cars were produced. As I wrote above, the main difference between Soviet flamethrower tanks and American tanks was the presence of standard cannon armament, which was placed instead of a coaxial machine gun.

So our vehicles were universal and could fight like regular tanks, which is especially important when breaking through enemy defense lines or fighting in populated areas, and they could fight enemy tanks on equal terms. Therefore, nothing prevented the creation of strong flamethrower units in every tank and motorized rifle unit.

Logically, it was possible to have a company of 10-13 flamethrower tanks in each tank or motorized rifle division, and form breakthrough tank flamethrower regiments as part of the armies. Such units could effectively interact together with heavy tanks and self-propelled guns when breaking through the enemy front. Well, light flamethrower companies could have flamethrower armored personnel carriers based on the BTR-152 and BTR-60, armed with a TPO-50 flamethrower.

This would be a very versatile weapon, equally good in the event of a rush to the English Channel, grinding down hordes of Chinese infantry, or destroying dushmans. However, only 110 OT-54s were produced, which means that for the entire army, taking into account the OT-34-85, there were about 300-400 flamethrower tanks left, despite the fact that an order of magnitude more was needed. Much more TO-55s were produced, but also not enough, only 830 vehicles.

Although it was necessary and possible to release 2-3 times more. At the same time, taking into account the increased engine power compared to the original T-54 tank, as well as the fact that the flamethrower tank is a weapon for a methodical breakthrough, it was necessary to increase the mass of the tank to 40 tons, adding 3.5 tons of armor.

This would make it possible to increase the frontal protection to 300mm, which would make the tank invulnerable to the use of RPG-2 and 82mm recoilless rifles, and even the first modifications of the RPG-7 would penetrate the TO-55M to the limit.

Vulnerability to fire from tank guns, especially 90mm, would also be reduced. The first combat test of the OT-54 could have been carried out in Budapest-56, greatly demoralizing the local Salashists; of course, our OT-54 and TO-55M tanks could have shown themselves effectively in Damansky and in Afghanistan, and in other local conflicts.

They would also be useful in Chechnya (of course, with reinforced engines and emergency protection), by the way, ordinary T-55 and T-62 fought on our side in the Second Chechen Company, and it was these tanks that stormed Grozny in 2000. It seems that additional flamethrower weapons would not hurt them. But in reality, our OT-54 and TO-55 were withdrawn from service in 1993.

However, all this is a saying. In the 70s, the USSR began to develop a new flamethrower weapon: the heavy flamethrower system. Essentially, this is an armored MLRS on a T-72 chassis that fires missiles with incendiary or thermobaric filling at short distances.

The predecessor of this system can, to some extent, be considered the Sturmtiger, whose 380mm gun was a rocket launcher that fired 350 kg rocket bombs filled with 125 kg of TNT. It is clear that in street battles this monster could sweep away entire neighborhoods.

The Germans were let down by excessive armor, the self-propelled gun was overloaded and often broke down, and it was a couple of years late.

In our country, we took a different path and created a 30-round MLRS on the chassis of a mass-produced tank. Surprisingly, already in 1980, TOS-1 successfully completed military tests and was recommended for mass production. And silence…

The unique combat model was forgotten at the training ground for several years! They got around to releasing the first experimental batch only in 1987, and one vehicle was sent for combat testing in Afghanistan the following year, 1988.

To be honest, these facts shocked me: by 1981 the USSR already had an ideal weapon for counterinsurgency warfare, but they forgot about it for 7 years and threw it into battle at the end of the war, then, despite successful tests, it was not put into mass production . Why?

Here, in my opinion, two factors played a role: creating new weapons for war, with some spooks they considered it unnecessary, ordinary equipment should have been enough; For the war with NATO and the PLA, these weapons were considered unnecessary; it was planned to break through their defenses with strikes from tactical nuclear weapons, masses of T-64/72/80. Why else, some kind of TOS?

The Soviet army had little interest in local wars and could not overcome stereotypes. Then, the range of TOS-1 is only 3500m, in order to suppress enemy positions, it had to approach 2000-3000m, which made it vulnerable to enemy ATGM and MBT fire, but it did not take into account that the terrain often does not allow a direct shot further than 1500-2000m, while TOS-1 is capable of firing from closed positions.

And in urban areas, especially with ATGMs, you can’t shoot at extreme ranges, but to support an assault on a populated area, TOS is ideal. In Afghanistan, the TOS-1 had simply unique capabilities: the dushmans practically did not use ATGMs, from 2000-2500 m RPGs and recoilless rifles are practically not dangerous, armor at the level of the T-72 made it generally invulnerable, but a volley of 30 AP or incendiary rockets demolished any village with militants.

It is clear that TOS had to be used en masse, one battery for each regiment or brigade. Due to the late adoption of TOSs, they did not get into the First Chechnya, and only in the Second Chechnya did they finally deserve recognition.

But they could be mass produced and used since 1981, and even exported. I think that TOS-1 would have played big role in the Iran-Iraq War, Eritrea, Angola. By the way, for export it was possible to create a lightweight system on the T-55 chassis. But it’s just a shame that this car was stolen from the army for almost 20 years.

6. Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns.

The ZSU is a fairly massive and effective air defense weapon, and unlike the air defense system, it is universal, since it can be effectively used to support infantry and tanks, combat enemy personnel, firing points and armored vehicles. Anti-aircraft self-propelled guns are especially effective during operations in mountainous areas, as well as during an assault on a populated area.

During the war, the USSR had only anti-aircraft guns and machine guns mounted on trucks or armored trains. Real ZSUs were in service with the Reich, the USA and Great Britain, both on the chassis of tanks and armored personnel carriers, half-track tractors.

Lend-Lease anti-aircraft self-propelled guns based on half-tracks were very popular in the Red Army.

In the first post-war years, for reasons that are difficult for me to explain, the Soviet army did not receive a sufficient number of self-propelled guns on tank chassis. Only 75 were produced! ZSU-37 on the SU-76M chassis.

It’s not clear what prevented us from releasing 10 times more of them? The SU-76 was well studied by the troops, and there should be no problems with operation, the 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft gun also fully justified itself, moreover, in the post-war years it accounted for hundreds of shots down American aircraft in Korea and Vietnam. So why was this symbiosis not put into mass production?

It can be assumed that it was decided to curtail chassis production; the army was downsized and received mainly medium and heavy tanks. But then what prevented us from making a large number of ZSUs on the T-34-85 chassis, or even simpler, converting part of the large number of remaining T-34-76, produced in 1943-44, into self-propelled guns, which were anyway outdated and were mainly used for tractors or remelting?!

In the 60s, the PRC, and from China to the DPRK and Vietnam, received the “63” type ZSU, which was a conversion of the serial T-34, with the installation of a twin 37mm V-11 cannon. These systems showed themselves well in the Vietnam War, I think that nothing prevented them from being created in the USSR 15 years earlier and tested in Korea and Budapest. But, unfortunately, until 1955, there was no mass-produced tracked anti-aircraft self-propelled gun in the USSR, despite the fact that it was extremely necessary.

In 1955, the ZSU-57-2 on the T-54 chassis was finally put into relatively mass production; about 830 of them were produced, which was enough to create regimental air defense for tank divisions with 4 vehicles for each tank and motorized rifle regiment, as well as arm part of the tank regiments of motorized rifle divisions.

Ideally, of course, there would be all MSD tank regiments, and, if possible, motorized rifle regiments, and also think through the issues of modernizing the ZSU-57-2. The question of its effectiveness is debatable; the accuracy of fire jet planes it was small, there was no radar, on the other hand, for 1955 it was a completely perfect anti-aircraft gun.

You need to understand that in addition to its division, there were many anti-aircraft weapons covering it: an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, anti-aircraft guns on an armored personnel carrier chassis (more on them below) and, finally, heavy machine guns on armored vehicles, and small-arms fire from infantry at low altitudes is very dangerous. Then, you need to take into account the power of Soviet fighter aircraft.

However, the ZSU-57-2 was considered insufficiently effective, its production was stopped in 1960, before the Shilka was put into production, although it was possible to continue production on the T-55 chassis for another 3 years, having carried out modernization according to Project 520.

The modernization consisted of installing 57-mm SV-68 "Berezina" cannons and small-sized radio-optical instrument systems for autonomous fire control "Desna". "Desna" combined optical sighting of the target - and a radar system for measuring the range and flight parameters of the aircraft, with automatic corrections to the position of the gunner's sights.

It is clear that the firing accuracy of such a vehicle is many times higher than its predecessor, and it could dramatically increase the capabilities of divisional air defense. And there, as an option, giving the ZSU-57-2 battery a mobile radar.

Such machines could already be produced for quite a long time, right up to the 80s, both for the SA and for export. With the advent of the Shilka, the ZSU-57-2M had to be transferred to anti-aircraft artillery regiments to replace the towed S-60s; in any case, their accuracy and security were higher. But, unfortunately, such modernization was not carried out and most of these vehicles were transferred to allies in the Socialist Camp and countries of socialist orientation. By the way, the firing range of the 57mm ZSU is 6000m, which allowed them to hit helicopters of the 70s equipped with ATGMs, the only question is target designation.

Now let's talk about wheeled ZSUs of the 50s. There are no questions about the BTR-40A, it is a successful anti-aircraft gun, the main armament is a 2x14.5mm ZPTU-2 machine gun, it’s a pity that few of them were produced, but questions arise about its older brother BTR-152A.

Why is the armament of an armored personnel carrier twice as heavy as that of its light counterpart? After all, a version of this vehicle with ZPTU-4 was being developed, but for unknown reasons it did not go into production. Was it even possible to double the mass of weapons on our anti-aircraft armored personnel carrier?

We look at the Czech neighbors, they created their Prague-53/59 ZSU on a chassis close to our ZIS-151/ZIL-157, only the armament of the Czech vehicle is a 30mm twin cannon, whose towed version weighed the same as our quad anti-aircraft gun . Well, the Arabs and Vietnamese installed without any problems a quad installation based on the DShK, which is not much lighter. So, the BTR-152A should be armed with a 4x14.5mm mount.

Other weapon options are also possible: for example, a 2x25mm anti-aircraft gun, based on the 2M-3 ship system, but the quad ZPU is still more interesting due to its higher rate of fire, the mass of a second salvo of the ZPU-4 is only 10% less than the 2M-3, armor-piercing almost the same. But the probability of being hit by 40 bullets per second is higher than that of 10 shells.

By the way, similar systems were developed on the BTR-50 chassis, for example the BTR-50P4, armed with ZPU-4. The division's air defense option looks like this: a tank division has in each regiment 4 ZSU-37-2 or ZSU-57-2, as well as 4 BTR-152A-4 or BTR-50A-4, and the anti-aircraft regiment is armed with 32 57mm S- anti-aircraft guns 60. In the MSD, only the tank regiment is so armed, and 3 MRR have 4 BTR-152A-4 and 4 BTR-40A, and the division's anti-aircraft regiment is equipped with 32 37mm 61-K anti-aircraft guns. The airborne division has an anti-aircraft division of 18 BTR-40A.

The next interesting ZSUs are “Shilka” and “Yenisei”. If “Shilka” is well known, then “Yenisei” is worth telling about. This is a twin 37mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun, created on the SU-100P chassis. In terms of firepower, “Yenisei is more powerful than the best Western ZSU “Gepard”.

It was planned that the Yenisei would become the basis of air defense for tank divisions, and the Shilka for motorized rifle divisions, and the ZSU-37-2 variant should cover the Krug air defense system, covering them dead zones. The Shilka has advantages in shooting at targets flying at low altitude, up to 1000m, as well as lower weight and cost. The Yenisei has better range and height reach, 4 times heavier projectiles, and is 10 km/h faster.

For me, the abandonment of the Yenisei was far-fetched; both ZSUs had the right to exist and complemented each other. But there was also a more reasonable, compromise option, the creation of a ZSU based on the Shilka, but with the artillery part of the excellent naval installation AK-230.

Its 30mm projectile weighed 390g. versus 190g. for 23mm Shilka assault rifles, the firing range was not much inferior to the capabilities of the Yenisei, and the AK-230 could be immediately installed on the ZSU-23-4 chassis, which, by the way, was done in the DPRK. The mass of a second salvo is the largest for the AK-230 (13 kg), why is the Yenisei (12.8 kg), for the Shilka 10.8 kg. I think that such a ZSU would deserve fame and respect even more than the original Shilka.

However, the 23mm caliber would not be forgotten either: the whole point is that in 1960 the USSR created the even more legendary ZU-23-2 system. This system, with a mass of about 1 ton, had a rate of fire of 2000 v/m, i.e. her second salvo is 6.3 kg! For comparison, the ZPU-4 installation, twice as heavy, had a second salvo of 2.56 kg.

Almost Soviet anti-aircraft guns of those years lost to the ZU-23. At the same time, the system turned out to be quite reliable and easy to manufacture. The ZU-23 was actively exported, but in the Soviet army it played a small role, being essentially a standard anti-aircraft gun only for the Airborne Forces, as well as providing cover for anti-aircraft missile units.

Glory came to the ZUshka in Afghanistan, it quickly became clear that Soviet armored vehicles were not very suitable for war in the mountains; the angles of inclination of the guns and machine guns of the BMP-1, BMD-1, BTR-60, BRDM-2 did not allow them to effectively hit targets on mountain peaks , due to the small elevation angle.

In several better situation there were only BTR-60s and T-62s, which had anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, the constant task of defense arose car columns. So we had to use the Shilka and ZU-23 for these tasks. Anti-aircraft guns mounted on trucks of all types turned out to be a necessary weapon, moreover, ZU-23s were actively installed on MT-LB, BTR-D, BTR-60P, in fact, the army received hundreds of ersatz ZSUs. In modern wars, this anti-aircraft gun is used massively, often on both front lines.

It turned out to be a very versatile weapon; even in the non-modernized version, the ZU-23 shot down a lot aircraft, they are especially dangerous for helicopters and medium UAVs. But at the same time, the 23mm anti-aircraft gun has become the most important means of combating enemy manpower and light armored vehicles, being a de facto battalion weapon.

Almost all self-propelled guns based on it have a serious drawback: the calculations and the installation itself are poorly protected, or are generally located openly. Logic dictates that from its very creation, the ZU-23 could and should have been installed on the BTR-152A/BTR-40A instead of the ZPU-2.

I already wrote in the first part of the article that, in my opinion, the production of these armored personnel carriers, as well as vehicles based on them, was stopped prematurely. The SA lost a large number of cheap and very capacious armored personnel carriers, and therefore the self-propelled guns on their chassis.

For me, such vehicles are better than ordinary unarmored trucks with anti-aircraft guns in the back. As an option, this is the release of simple anti-aircraft self-propelled guns on the BTR-60/70, MTLB and BTR-D chassis, equipped with ZU-23-2, but this is a specialized ZSU, with the installation of an anti-aircraft gun in the body of an armored vehicle, with a crew and ammunition covered by armor, with additional equipment for air defense tasks.

This could be a tablet for illuminating the air situation, like the MANPADS crews, and a radio direction finder, like the Strela-10. The classic installation of the ZU-23-2 on a truck is also possible. The only question is the number of ZU-23s used and their place in military air defense. In my opinion, ideally it was necessary to have an anti-aircraft platoon of 4 ZSU-23-2s as part of each motorized rifle battalion, as well as the engineering and reconnaissance battalions of the division.

In addition, a battery (8 ZU-23) should be assigned to the division's anti-aircraft regiment and an automobile supply battalion. The MSD in this version receives 64 ZSU/ZU-23-2, and the tank division receives 48 anti-aircraft guns. The Airborne Forces should receive a battery of 6 ZSU-23-2 on the BTR-D chassis for each airborne regiment and a division of 18 similar self-propelled guns per division.

Moreover, the air defense missiles of motorized rifle battalions must be placed on armored chassis. This will strengthen the division's air defense (they write that the probability of hitting a target is 0.023% in one flight, with a target speed of up to 50 m/s), I think there is an error in the text, the target speed is 250 m/s, not 50 m/s , the accuracy of fire on helicopters is many times higher.

Then, the barrage fire of dozens of ZU/ZSU-23-2 is capable of disrupting enemy raids at low and ultra-low altitudes, forcing enemy aircraft to rise above 2-2.5 km, which will reduce the accuracy of strikes and increase losses from the use of air defense systems. In addition, the massive use of these installations was equally dangerous for the motorized armies of NATO, for the masses of PLA infantry, and for militants like dushmans.

The only drawback of the ZU-23 is its rather weak armor penetration: at a distance of 500/1000m it is only 25/20mm. But here is a question for the military-industrial complex, which was supposed to give our army powerful armor-piercing shells for 23mm guns.

Even before the collapse of the USSR, such shells were created first in Finland, they hit 40mm armor from 500m, then Bulgaria, whose shells penetrated 40mm from 1000m. It is clear that with such shells, the 23mm cannon became a dangerous adversary for any NATO or PLA light armored vehicles.

So the mass of the ZSU-23-2 would become an important help for Soviet motorized riflemen, paratroopers, and marines. By the way, in the Bundeswehr divisions there were from 50 to 144 20-mm twin anti-aircraft guns, and the illogical ZU-23 (Rh202 system). I think that a similar approach would not hurt the Soviet army.

Conclusions.

It should be objectively recognized that Soviet post-war self-propelled artillery has reached a very high level, first anti-aircraft, then the rest, being the best in the world in a number of parameters.

Even 24 years after the collapse of the USSR, Soviet self-propelled artillery serves and fights in many countries around the world, remaining very widespread. Well, TOSs are experiencing a real flourishing.

It is clear that there were shortcomings that were both objective and subjective. Objective shortcomings include the SA’s focus on waging a global war with the massive use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction; therefore, the army was not prepared for local conflicts, the fight against partisans or rebels.

Another drawback was the bias in favor of the production of tanks; until the 70s, the rest of the armored vehicles were produced on a residual basis, which slowed down the equipping of the SA with self-propelled artillery and armored vehicles.

Subjective factors include the decision of Khrushchev and his circle to stop the development of self-propelled artillery, which slowed down its development for many years. Although even earlier, the Soviet military did not bother to correctly evaluate the experience of the Wehrmacht and its allies in creating self-propelled artillery systems and self-propelled guns.

It is very difficult to explain the refusal to adopt the Object 268 heavy assault gun to replace the ISU-152, or the inability to expand the production of combined guns on different chassis, in the hope that a new generation combined weapon will be created.

As a result, only in the 2010s did our army receive what it could have had already in the 80s. Similarly, only subjective factors can explain the neglect of light ZSU or the refusal to modernize the ZSU-57-2.

And finally, there is no justification for the delay in adopting the TOS-1, which was already ready for production at the very beginning of the Afghan war.

All that remains is to throw up our hands and be sad that our army did not receive so many interesting examples of self-propelled artillery, or received it very late, or these weapons were created by more backward allies of the USSR, and the superpower used primitive or weaker models.

Many samples of military equipment and weapons used during the Great Patriotic War passed it from start to finish, which indicates the success of their design and the most complete compliance with tactical and technical requirements (TTT). However, a number of products of the Soviet defense industry, with which the Red Army entered into confrontation with the German troops, did not live to see its completion due to either obsolescence or inconsistency with these same notorious TTT. But some combat vehicles created during the war, including the T-60 light tank, shared the same fate.

Counteroffer

In May 1941, Moscow plant No. 37 received the task of mastering the serial production of the new generation light tank T-50, which shocked the management of the enterprise, modest production capabilities which clearly did not correspond to the new object. Suffice it to say that the T-50 had a complex eight-speed planetary gearbox, and gear cutting production has always been at this plant weak point. At the same time, workers at plant No. 37 came to the conclusion that it was possible to create new lightweight tank for direct support of infantry. In this case, it was assumed that the used engine-transmission unit and chassis of the T-40 amphibious tank would be used. The hull should have had a more rational shape, reduced dimensions and enhanced armor.

Having convinced yourself of the feasibility and advantages of such a solution, chief designer N.A. Astrov, together with the senior military representative of the enterprise, Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Okunev, wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin, in which he substantiated the impossibility of producing the T-50 tank and, on the other hand, the reality of quickly mastering the production of a new tank. Letter to the in the prescribed manner They put it in the mailbox at the Nikolsky Gate of the Kremlin in the evening, Stalin read it at night, and in the morning the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, V. A. Malyshev, arrived at the plant and was assigned to work on the new machine. He examined the model of the tank with interest, approved it, discussed technical and production problems with the designers and advised replacing the DShK machine gun with a much more powerful 20-mm ShVAK automatic cannon, well-used in aviation.

Already on the evening of July 17, 1941, Resolution No. 179 of the State Defense Committee “On the production of T-60 light tanks at Plant No. 37 of Narkomsredmash” was signed. It should be noted that this resolution was not talking about the classic “sixty”, but about the T-60 (030) tank, externally identical to the T-40 with the exception of the rear hull plate and better known under the unofficial designation T-30.

For the T-60 (already in version 060), designer A.V. Bogachev designed a fundamentally new, more durable all-welded hull with a significantly smaller armored volume than the T-40 and a low silhouette - only 1360 millimeters high, with large frontal angles and stern sheets made of rolled homogeneous armor. The smaller dimensions of the hull made it possible to increase the thickness of all frontal sheets to 15-20 millimeters, and then with the help of shielding to 20-35, side plates - up to 15 millimeters (later up to 25), aft - up to 13 millimeters (then in some places up to 25). The driver was located in the middle in a forward-protruding wheelhouse with a frontal shield and an upper landing hatch that folded down in a non-combat situation. The driver's viewing device - a quick-change mirror glass block "triplex" with a thickness of 36 millimeters was located in the frontal shield (initially and on the sides of the wheelhouse) behind a narrow gap covered by an armored flap. The bottom, six to ten millimeters thick, had an emergency hatch.

The new tower, 375 millimeters high, designed by Yu. P. Yudovich, had a conical octagonal shape. It was welded from flat armor plates 25 millimeters thick, located at large angles of inclination, which significantly increased its resistance to fire. The thickness of the front zygomatic armor plates and weapon mantlet subsequently reached 35 millimeters. The roof had a large commander's hatch with a round lid. In the side faces of the tower to the right and left of the shooter there were narrow slits equipped with two triplex-type viewing devices. The tower was shifted to the left side.

On the second prototype of the T-60 (060), instead of the DShK, a fast-firing 20-mm ShVAK-tank gun with a barrel length of 82.4 calibers, created on the basis of the wing and turret versions of the ShVAK-20 air gun, was installed. Refinement of the gun, including based on the results of front-line use, continued in parallel with the development of its production. Therefore, it was officially accepted into service only on December 1, and on January 1, 1942 it received the designation TNSh-1 (Tank Nudelman-Shpitalny) or TNSh-20, as it was called later.

For ease of aiming, the gun was placed in the turret with a significant offset from its axis to the right, which forced adjustments to be made to the readings of the TMFP-1 telescopic sight. The table range of a direct shot reached 2500 meters, the sighting range was 7000, the rate of fire was up to 750 rounds/min, the mass of a second salvo of armor-piercing shells was 1,208 kilograms. The gun had a belt feed with a capacity of 754 shells (13 boxes). The ammunition consisted of fragmentation tracer and fragmentation incendiary projectiles and armor-piercing incendiary projectiles with a tungsten carbide core and a high initial speed Vo = 815 m/s, which made it possible to effectively hit light and medium armored targets, as well as machine gun emplacements and anti-tank guns and enemy manpower. The subsequent introduction of a sub-caliber armor-piercing incendiary projectile increased armor penetration to 35 millimeters. As a result, the T-60 could fight at short distances with early German Pz.III and Pz.IV medium tanks when firing at the side, and at distances of up to 1000 meters - with armored personnel carriers and light self-propelled guns.

To the left of the gun, in the same mount paired with it, there was a DT machine gun with 1008 rounds of ammunition (16 discs, later 15).

Manufacturers

On September 15, 1941, Moscow plant No. 37 produced the first production T-60, but due to the evacuation that soon followed, production was stopped on October 26. In total, 245 T-60 tanks were made in Moscow. Instead of Tashkent, which was initially planned, the enterprise was sent to Sverdlovsk, where a new tank plant No. 37 soon became operational. Assembled there on December 15, 1941, mainly from parts brought from Moscow, the first two dozen T-30s and T-60s were produced on January 1, 1942 along the streets of Sverdlovsk. In total, until September 1942, 1144 T-60s were built in the Urals, after which plant No. 37 was repurposed for the production of components and assemblies for the T-34, as well as ammunition.

The workshops of the Kolomna Machine-Building Plant named after Kuibyshev were involved in the production of armored hulls of the T-60 tank. In October 1941, some of them, including those that produced T-60 tank hulls for plant No. 37, were evacuated to Kirov, to the site of the May 1st NKPS machine-building plant there. Was created here new plant No. 38 and already in January 1942 the first T-60s came out of its gates. Since February, the 38th began their planned production, while simultaneously supplying other enterprises with cast track tracks, which were previously made only by STZ. During the first quarter, 241 cars were produced, and until June – another 535 units.

T-30

T-40

T-70

Plant No. 264 (Krasnoarmeysky) was also involved in the production of the T-60 shipyard in the city of Sarepta near Stalingrad, which previously produced river armored boats). He received the technical documentation for the tank in a timely manner, but subsequently drove the vehicle on his own, without resorting to the help of the parent company, but without attempting to modernize it. On September 16, 1941, workers from the evacuated KhTZ, who were familiar with tank building, joined the factory team and began mastering the production of the T-60 while still in Kharkov. They arrived at the 264th with a backlog of tools, patterns, stamps and tank blanks already prepared, so the first armored hull was welded by September 29th. The transmission and chassis units were to be supplied by STZ (plant No. 76). Loaded with the production of T-34 and V-2 diesel engines, moreover, at the end of 1941 they found themselves the only manufacturer, the Stalingrad enterprise and Plant No. 264, which supplied it with armored hulls and welded turrets for the T-34s, could not pay as much attention to the light T-60. Nevertheless, in December we managed to assemble the first 52 cars. In total, by June 1942, 830 T-60s were produced here. A significant part of them took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, especially in its initial phase.

GAZ became the main and largest plant for the production of T-60, where on October 16, 1941, permanent job N.A. Astrov arrived with a small group of Moscow colleagues to provide design support for production. Soon he was appointed deputy chief designer of the tank building enterprise, and at the beginning of 1942 he received the Stalin Prize for the creation of the T-40 and T-60.

In a short time, GAZ completed the production of non-standard technological equipment and on October 26 began mass production of T-60 tanks. Armored hulls for them began to be supplied in increasing quantities by the Vyksa Crushing and Grinding Equipment Plant (DRO) No. 177, and later by the Murom Locomotive Repair Plant named after. Dzerzhinsky No. 176 with its powerful boiler production, technologically similar to a tank corps, and, finally, the oldest armored plant No. 178 in the city of Kulebaki. Then they were joined by part of the Podolsk plant No. 180, evacuated to Saratov to the territory of the local steam locomotive repair plant. And yet there was a chronic shortage of armored hulls, which hindered the expansion of mass production of the T-60. Therefore, soon their welding was additionally organized at GAZ. In September, only three T-60 tanks were manufactured in Gorky. But already in October - 215, in November - 471. By the end of 1941, 1,323 vehicles were produced here.

In 1942, despite the creation and adoption of the more combat-ready light tank T-70, parallel production of the T-60 continued at GAZ until April (in total for 1942 - 1639 vehicles), at Sverdlovsk plant No. 37 - until August , at plant No. 38 – until July. In 1942, all factories produced 4,164 tanks. Plant No. 37 delivered the last 55 vehicles at the beginning of 1943 (until February). In total, since 1941, 5839 T-60s have been produced, the army has accepted 5796 vehicles.

Baptism of fire

The first mass use of the T-60 dates back to the Battle of Moscow. They were available in almost all tank brigades and individual tank battalions defending the capital. On November 7, 1941, 48 T-60s from the 33rd Tank Brigade took part in the parade on Red Square. These were Moscow-made tanks; Gorky's T-60s first entered battle near Moscow only on December 13th.

T-60s began arriving on the Leningrad Front in the spring of 1942, when 60 vehicles with crews were allocated to form the 61st Tank Brigade. The story of their delivery to the besieged city is not without interest. They decided to transport the tanks on barges with coal. It was good from a camouflage point of view. The barges carried fuel to Leningrad, became familiar to the enemy, and not every time they were actively hunted. In addition, coal as ballast provided river vessels with the necessary stability.

Combat vehicles were loaded from the pier above the Volkhov hydroelectric power station. Log decks were laid on top of the coal, tanks were placed on them, and the barges set sail from the shore. Enemy aircraft were never able to detect the movement of our military unit.

The baptism of fire of the 61st Tank Brigade occurred on January 12, 1943 - the first day of the operation to break the siege of Leningrad. Moreover, the brigade, like the 86th and 118th tank battalions, which were also armed with light tanks, operated in the first echelon of the 67th Army and crossed the Neva across the ice. Units equipped with medium and heavy tanks were brought into battle only on the second day of the offensive, after a bridgehead two to three kilometers deep had been captured and sappers had strengthened the ice.

T-60s also fought on the Southern Front, especially actively in the spring of 1942 in the Crimea, and participated in the Kharkov operation and in the defense of Stalingrad. T-60s made up a significant part of the combat vehicles of the 1st Tank Corps (commanded by Major General M.E. Katukov), together with other formations of the Bryansk Front, which repelled the German offensive in the Voronezh direction in the summer of 1942.

By the start of the counter-offensive of the Stalingrad, Don and Southwestern fronts on November 19, 1942, quite a few combat vehicles of this type remained in the tank brigades. Insufficiently armored and poorly armed, the T-60 had very low stability on the battlefield, becoming easy prey for enemy medium and heavy tanks. In fairness, it must be admitted that the tankers were not particularly fond of these lightly armored and lightly armed vehicles with fire-hazardous gasoline engines, calling them BM-2 - a mass grave for two.

The last major operation in which T-60s were used was the lifting of the siege of Leningrad in January 1944. Thus, among the 88 vehicles of the 1st Tank Brigade of the Leningrad Front there were 21 T-60s, in the 220th Tank Brigade there were 18, and in the 124th Tank Regiment of the Volkhov Front, by the start of the operation on January 16, 1944, only 10 were available combat vehicles: two T-34, two T-70, five T-60 and even one T-40.

On the basis of the T-60, the BM-8-24 rocket launcher was produced (1941), and prototypes of a tank with a 37 mm ZIS-19 gun, a 37 mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun (1942), and a 76.2 mm a self-propelled artillery mount, a T-60-3 anti-aircraft tank with two twin 12.7-mm DShK machine guns (1942) and an OSU-76 self-propelled artillery mount (1944). All these vehicles turned out to be not very successful, since the T-60 tank was clearly not suitable for use as a base for self-propelled guns.

Why were these cars produced?

The T-60 is usually compared to its “colleague” in armament – ​​the German Pz.II light tank. This is all the more interesting because these vehicles were encountered in real combat. Analyzing the data of these tanks, we can say that Soviet tank builders managed to achieve almost the same level of protection as the German tank, which, with a smaller weight and dimensions, significantly increased the invulnerability of the T-60. The dynamic characteristics of both cars are almost similar. Despite the high specific power, the Pz.II was not faster than the sixty. Formally, the weapon parameters were also the same: both tanks were equipped with 20-mm cannons with similar ballistic characteristics. The initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile of the Pz.II cannon was 780 m/s, the T-60 was 815 m/s, which theoretically allowed them to hit the same targets.

In fact, everything was not so simple: the Soviet TNSh-20 cannon could not fire single shots, but the German KwK 30, as well as the KwK 38, could, which significantly increased the accuracy of fire. Even when firing in short bursts, the T-60 cannon was pulled to the side by the recoil, which did not allow it to effectively fire at infantry or group targets (a cluster of vehicles, for example). “Dvoyka” turned out to be more effective on the battlefield due to the size of the crew, which consisted of three people and also had much more best review from a tank than the T-60 crew. An important advantage was the presence of a radio station. As a result, the Pz.II was significantly superior to the Sixty as a front-line vehicle. This advantage was felt even more when using tanks for reconnaissance, where the stealth, but “blind” and “mute” T-60 was practically useless. The situation was no better when using the T-60 as an infantry escort tank: the too weak armor of the “sixty” was easily hit by almost all anti-tank weapons and heavy weapons of the Wehrmacht infantry.

As a result, we can conclude that the T-60 tank was completely unnecessary for the Red Army, since it did not correspond to any technical specifications (if they were developed for it at all). These vehicles, which rarely survive one attack, are often called suicide tanks. Almost six thousand T-60s literally burned out in the crucible of war. Moreover, they burned almost without a trace: relatively little remained front-line photographs of these machines, little is stored in archives and documents about them combat use. Literally a few tanks of this type have survived to this day.

The question naturally arises: why were they released at all? The motivation of plant No. 37 is clear, but why did the Supreme Command Headquarters agree with this motivation? The latter circumstance can be explained by the desire to make up for the huge losses in tanks, on the one hand, and a greatly overestimated estimate of the size of the German tank fleet, on the other. To imagine that the Germans, having five times fewer tanks than the Red Army, achieve success thanks to a well-thought-out organizational structure of tank formations, well-established interaction with other branches of the military, good controllability and advanced tactical techniques for their use, is apparently simply not possible at Headquarters. could. Alas, at that time we could not oppose anything other than quantitative superiority to this.

Well, if not the T-60, then what? Yes, what the Red Army sorely lacked throughout the war - armored personnel carriers! Let's imagine something reminiscent of the T-60 chassis, but without a turret, and let's say, with a pivot or turret (which is better) installation of a DT or DShK machine gun and an anti-tank rifle to boot, capable of transporting at least four or five infantrymen. This is exactly how the Lend-Lease “Universal” tracked armored personnel carriers were equipped, which were valued by soldiers as worth their weight in gold. But we received only two thousand of them. If instead of the T-60, as well as the T-70 that followed them, the troops had received 14 thousand tracked armored personnel carriers, then really, they would have been much more useful.

But history has no subjunctive mood. What happened, happened, and nothing can be fixed. And not to resurrect the crews of mass graves for two. Eternal memory to them, eternal glory to them!

Many samples of military equipment and weapons used during the Great Patriotic War passed it from start to finish, which indicates the success of their design and the most complete compliance with tactical and technical requirements (TTT). However, a number of products of the Soviet defense industry, with which the Red Army entered into confrontation with the German troops, did not live to see its completion due to either obsolescence or inconsistency with these same notorious TTT. But some combat vehicles created during the war, including the T-60 light tank, shared the same fate.

Counteroffer

In May 1941, Moscow plant No. 37 received the task of mastering the serial production of the new generation light tank T-50, which shocked the management of the enterprise, whose modest production capabilities clearly did not correspond to the new facility. Suffice it to say that the T-50 had a complex eight-speed planetary gearbox, and gear cutting production has always been a weak point at this plant. At the same time, workers at Plant No. 37 came to the conclusion that it was possible to create a new light tank for direct infantry support. In this case, it was assumed that the used engine-transmission unit and chassis of the T-40 amphibious tank would be used. The hull should have had a more rational shape, reduced dimensions and enhanced armor.

Convinced of the feasibility and advantages of such a decision, chief designer N.A. Astrov, together with the senior military representative of the enterprise, Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Okunev, wrote a letter to I.V. Stalin, in which he substantiated the impossibility of producing the T-50 tank and, on the other hand, the reality of a rapid mastering the production of a new tank. The letter, in accordance with the established procedure, was dropped in the evening into the mailbox at the Nikolsky Gate of the Kremlin, at night Stalin read it, and in the morning the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, V. A. Malyshev, arrived at the plant and was assigned to work on the new machine. He examined the model of the tank with interest, approved it, discussed technical and production problems with the designers and advised replacing the DShK machine gun with a much more powerful 20-mm ShVAK automatic cannon, well-used in aviation.

Already on the evening of July 17, 1941, Resolution No. 179 of the State Defense Committee “On the production of T-60 light tanks at Plant No. 37 of Narkomsredmash” was signed. It should be noted that this resolution was not talking about the classic “sixty”, but about the T-60 (030) tank, externally identical to the T-40 with the exception of the rear hull plate and better known under the unofficial designation T-30.

For the T-60 (already in version 060), designer A.V. Bogachev designed a fundamentally new, more durable all-welded hull with a significantly smaller armored volume than the T-40 and a low silhouette - only 1360 millimeters high, with large frontal angles and stern sheets made of rolled homogeneous armor. The smaller dimensions of the hull made it possible to increase the thickness of all frontal sheets to 15-20 millimeters, and then with the help of shielding to 20-35, side plates - up to 15 millimeters (later up to 25), aft - up to 13 millimeters (then in some places up to 25). The driver was located in the middle in a forward-protruding wheelhouse with a frontal shield and an upper landing hatch that folded down in a non-combat situation. The driver's viewing device - a quick-change mirror glass block "triplex" with a thickness of 36 millimeters was located in the frontal shield (initially and on the sides of the wheelhouse) behind a narrow gap covered by an armored flap. The bottom, six to ten millimeters thick, had an emergency hatch.

The new tower, 375 millimeters high, designed by Yu. P. Yudovich, had a conical octagonal shape. It was welded from flat armor plates 25 millimeters thick, located at large angles of inclination, which significantly increased its resistance to fire. The thickness of the front zygomatic armor plates and weapon mantlet subsequently reached 35 millimeters. The roof had a large commander's hatch with a round lid. In the side faces of the tower to the right and left of the shooter there were narrow slits equipped with two triplex-type viewing devices. The tower was shifted to the left side.

On the second prototype of the T-60 (060), instead of the DShK, a fast-firing 20-mm ShVAK-tank gun with a barrel length of 82.4 calibers, created on the basis of the wing and turret versions of the ShVAK-20 air gun, was installed. Refinement of the gun, including based on the results of front-line use, continued in parallel with the development of its production. Therefore, it was officially accepted into service only on December 1, and on January 1, 1942 it received the designation TNSh-1 (Tank Nudelman-Shpitalny) or TNSh-20, as it was called later.

To the left of the gun, in the same mount paired with it, there was a DT machine gun with 1008 rounds of ammunition (16 discs, later 15).

Manufacturers

On September 15, 1941, Moscow plant No. 37 produced the first production T-60, but due to the evacuation that soon followed, production was stopped on October 26. In total, 245 T-60 tanks were made in Moscow. Instead of Tashkent, which was initially planned, the enterprise was sent to Sverdlovsk, where a new tank plant No. 37 soon became operational. Assembled there on December 15, 1941, mainly from parts brought from Moscow, the first two dozen T-30s and T-60s were produced on January 1, 1942 along the streets of Sverdlovsk. In total, until September 1942, 1144 T-60s were built in the Urals, after which plant No. 37 was repurposed for the production of components and assemblies for the T-34, as well as ammunition.

The workshops of the Kolomna Machine-Building Plant named after Kuibyshev were involved in the production of armored hulls of the T-60 tank. In October 1941, some of them, including those that produced T-60 tank hulls for plant No. 37, were evacuated to Kirov, to the site of the May 1st NKPS machine-building plant there. A new plant No. 38 was created here, and already in January 1942 the first T-60s came out of its gates. Since February, the 38th began their planned production, while simultaneously supplying other enterprises with cast track tracks, which were previously made only by STZ. During the first quarter, 241 cars were produced, and until June – another 535 units.

Plant No. 264 (Krasnoarmeysky Shipyard in the city of Sarepta near Stalingrad, which previously produced river armored boats) was also involved in the production of the T-60. He received the technical documentation for the tank in a timely manner, but subsequently drove the vehicle on his own, without resorting to the help of the parent company, but without attempting to modernize it. On September 16, 1941, workers from the evacuated KhTZ, who were familiar with tank building, joined the factory team and began mastering the production of the T-60 while still in Kharkov. They arrived at the 264th with a backlog of tools, patterns, stamps and tank blanks already prepared, so the first armored hull was welded by September 29th. The transmission and chassis units were to be supplied by STZ (plant No. 76). Loaded with the production of T-34 and V-2 diesel engines, and, moreover, at the end of 1941, it turned out to be their only manufacturer, the Stalingrad enterprise and Plant No. 264, which supplied it with armored hulls and welded turrets for the “thirty-four”, could not devote as much to the light T-60 attention. Nevertheless, in December we managed to assemble the first 52 cars. In total, by June 1942, 830 T-60s were produced here. A significant part of them took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, especially in its initial phase.

The main and largest plant for the production of the T-60 was GAZ, where on October 16, 1941 N.A. Astrov arrived for permanent work with a small group of Moscow colleagues to provide design support for production. Soon he was appointed deputy chief designer of the tank building enterprise, and at the beginning of 1942 he received the Stalin Prize for the creation of the T-40 and T-60.

In a short time, GAZ completed the production of non-standard technological equipment and on October 26 began mass production of T-60 tanks. Armored hulls for them began to be supplied in increasing quantities by the Vyksa Crushing and Grinding Equipment Plant (DRO) No. 177, and later by the Murom Locomotive Repair Plant named after. Dzerzhinsky No. 176 with its powerful boiler production, technologically similar to a tank corps, and, finally, the oldest armored plant No. 178 in the city of Kulebaki. Then they were joined by part of the Podolsk plant No. 180, evacuated to Saratov to the territory of the local steam locomotive repair plant. And yet there was a chronic shortage of armored hulls, which hindered the expansion of mass production of the T-60. Therefore, soon their welding was additionally organized at GAZ. In September, only three T-60 tanks were manufactured in Gorky. But already in October - 215, in November - 471. By the end of 1941, 1,323 vehicles were produced here.

In 1942, despite the creation and adoption of the more combat-ready light tank T-70, parallel production of the T-60 continued at GAZ until April (in total for 1942 - 1639 vehicles), at Sverdlovsk plant No. 37 - until August , at plant No. 38 – until July. In 1942, all factories produced 4,164 tanks. Plant No. 37 delivered the last 55 vehicles at the beginning of 1943 (until February). In total, since 1941, 5839 T-60s have been produced, the army has accepted 5796 vehicles.

Baptism of fire

The first mass use of the T-60 dates back to the Battle of Moscow. They were available in almost all tank brigades and individual tank battalions defending the capital. On November 7, 1941, 48 T-60s from the 33rd Tank Brigade took part in the parade on Red Square. These were Moscow-made tanks; Gorky's T-60s first entered battle near Moscow only on December 13th.

T-60s began arriving on the Leningrad Front in the spring of 1942, when 60 vehicles with crews were allocated to form the 61st Tank Brigade. Their delivery to the besieged city is not without interest. They decided to transport the tanks on barges with coal. It was good from a camouflage point of view. The barges carried fuel to Leningrad, became familiar to the enemy, and not every time they were actively hunted. In addition, coal as ballast provided river vessels with the necessary stability.

Combat vehicles were loaded from the pier above the Volkhov hydroelectric power station. Log decks were laid on top of the coal, tanks were placed on them, and the barges set sail from the shore. Enemy aircraft were never able to detect the movement of our military unit.

The baptism of fire of the 61st Tank Brigade occurred on January 12, 1943 - the first day of the operation to break the siege of Leningrad. Moreover, the brigade, like the 86th and 118th tank battalions, which were also armed with light tanks, operated in the first echelon of the 67th Army and crossed the Neva across the ice. Units equipped with medium and heavy tanks were brought into battle only on the second day of the offensive, after a bridgehead two to three kilometers deep had been captured and sappers had strengthened the ice.

T-60s also fought on the Southern Front, especially actively in the spring of 1942 in the Crimea, and participated in the Kharkov operation and in the defense of Stalingrad. T-60s made up a significant part of the combat vehicles of the 1st Tank Corps (commanded by Major General M.E. Katukov), together with other formations of the Bryansk Front, which repelled the German offensive in the Voronezh direction in the summer of 1942.

By the start of the counter-offensive of the Stalingrad, Don and Southwestern fronts on November 19, 1942, quite a few combat vehicles of this type remained in the tank brigades. Insufficiently armored and poorly armed, the T-60 had very low stability on the battlefield, becoming easy prey for enemy medium and heavy tanks. In fairness, it must be admitted that the tankers were not particularly fond of these lightly armored and lightly armed vehicles with fire-hazardous gasoline engines, calling them BM-2 - a mass grave for two.

The last major operation in which T-60s were used was the lifting of the siege of Leningrad in January 1944. Thus, among the 88 vehicles of the 1st Tank Brigade of the Leningrad Front there were 21 T-60s, in the 220th Tank Brigade there were 18, and in the 124th Tank Regiment of the Volkhov Front, by the start of the operation on January 16, 1944, only 10 were available combat vehicles: two T-34, two T-70, five T-60 and even one T-40.

On the basis of the T-60, the BM-8-24 rocket launcher was produced (1941), and prototypes of a tank with a 37 mm ZIS-19 gun, a 37 mm anti-aircraft self-propelled gun (1942), and a 76.2 mm a self-propelled artillery mount, a T-60-3 anti-aircraft tank with two twin 12.7-mm DShK machine guns (1942) and an OSU-76 self-propelled artillery mount (1944). All these vehicles turned out to be not very successful, since the T-60 tank was clearly not suitable for use as a base for self-propelled guns.

Why were these cars produced?

The T-60 is usually compared to its “colleague” in armament – ​​the German Pz.II light tank. This is all the more interesting because these vehicles were encountered in real combat. Analyzing the data of these tanks, we can say that Soviet tank builders managed to achieve almost the same level of protection as the German tank, which, with a smaller weight and dimensions, significantly increased the invulnerability of the T-60. The dynamic characteristics of both cars are almost similar. Despite the high specific power, the Pz.II was not faster than the sixty. Formally, the weapon parameters were also the same: both tanks were equipped with 20-mm cannons with similar ballistic characteristics. The initial speed of the armor-piercing projectile of the Pz.II cannon was 780 m/s, the T-60 was 815 m/s, which theoretically allowed them to hit the same targets.

In fact, everything was not so simple: the Soviet TNSh-20 cannon could not fire single shots, but the German KwK 30, as well as the KwK 38, could, which significantly increased the accuracy of fire. Even when firing in short bursts, the T-60 cannon was pulled to the side by the recoil, which did not allow it to effectively fire at infantry or group targets (a cluster of vehicles, for example). The “Deuce” turned out to be more effective on the battlefield due to the size of the crew, which consisted of three people and also had a much better view from the tank than the T-60 crew. An important advantage was the presence of a radio station. As a result, the Pz.II was significantly superior to the Sixty as a front-line vehicle. This advantage was felt even more when using tanks for reconnaissance, where the stealth, but “blind” and “mute” T-60 was practically useless. The situation was no better when using the T-60 as an infantry escort tank: the too weak armor of the “sixty” was easily hit by almost all anti-tank weapons and heavy infantry of the Wehrmacht.

As a result, we can conclude that the T-60 tank was completely unnecessary for the Red Army, since it did not correspond to any technical specifications (if they were developed for it at all). These vehicles, which rarely survive one attack, are often called suicide tanks. Almost six thousand T-60s literally burned out in the crucible of war. Moreover, they burned almost without a trace: relatively few front-line photographs of these vehicles remain, and few documents about their combat use are stored in archives. Literally a few tanks of this type have survived to this day.

The question naturally arises: why were they released at all? The motivation of plant No. 37 is clear, but why did the Supreme Command Headquarters agree with this motivation? The latter circumstance can be explained by the desire to make up for the huge losses in tanks, on the one hand, and a greatly overestimated estimate of the size of the German tank fleet, on the other. To imagine that the Germans, having five times fewer tanks than the Red Army, achieve success thanks to a well-thought-out organizational structure of tank formations, well-established interaction with other branches of the military, good controllability and advanced tactical techniques for their use, is apparently simply not possible at Headquarters. could. Alas, at that time we could not oppose anything other than quantitative superiority to this.

Well, if not the T-60, then what? Yes, what the Red Army sorely lacked throughout the war - armored personnel carriers! Let's imagine something reminiscent of the T-60 chassis, but without a turret, and let's say, with a pivot or turret (which is better) installation of a DT or DShK machine gun and an anti-tank rifle to boot, capable of transporting at least four or five infantrymen. This is exactly how the Lend-Lease “Universal” tracked armored personnel carriers were equipped, which were valued by soldiers as worth their weight in gold. But we received only two thousand of them. If instead of the T-60, as well as the T-70 that followed them, the troops had received 14 thousand tracked armored personnel carriers, then really, they would have been much more useful.

But history has no subjunctive mood. What happened, happened, and nothing can be fixed. And not to resurrect the crews of mass graves for two. Eternal memory to them, eternal glory to them!