Maximum flight altitude Su 25. Russian Aviation. Flying tank armament

DATA FOR 2015 (standard update)

Su-25 "Rook" - FROGFOOT / RAM-J
Su-25SM

Stormtrooper. The development of the preliminary design of the aircraft for direct support of troops over the battlefield SPB ("Battlefield Aircraft") began on the initiative of the teacher of the Yu.A. Gagarin Air Force Academy I.V. Savchenko and employees of the P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau O.S. Samoilovich , D.N.Gorbachev, V.M.Lebedev, Yu.V.Ivashechkin and A.Monakhov in March 1968. In May 1968, the design of the aircraft began at the Sukhoi Design Bureau under the name T-8. The study of the aerodynamic design of the future attack aircraft began at TsAGI in 1968. The USSR Ministry of Defense, at the suggestion of the Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko, announced a competition for the project in March 1969 light attack aircraft in which the Sukhoi Design Bureau (T-8), Yakovlev (Yak-25LSh), Mikoyan and Gurevich () and Ilyushin (IL-42) participated. The Air Force requirements for the competition were formulated (see technical specifications).


The competition was won by T-8 and . Release of working drawings and preparation for the construction of a prototype aircraft - summer 1970. At the same time, the Air Force changed the requirements for maximum ground speed to 1200 km/h, which put the project at risk of complete rework. By the end of 1971, it was possible to agree on a change in the requirements for maximum speed to 1000 km/h (0.82 M). The design of the T-8 was resumed in January 1972 after P.O. Sukhoi approved the general design of the attack aircraft (01/06/1972) and signed an order to begin detailed design of the aircraft. M.P. Simonov was appointed project manager, Yu.V. Ivashechkin was appointed lead designer. Since August 1972 chief designer T-8 - O.S. Samoilovich, leading designer since December 25, 1972 - Yu.V. Ivashechkin (also chief designer since October 6, 1974). The prototype of the aircraft was accepted by the commission in September and construction of the prototype began at the end of 1972. The T-8-1 prototype made its first flight at the LII airfield in Zhukovsky on February 22, 1975 (pilot - V.S. Ilyushin). The second prototype aircraft with some changes in design (T-8-2) entered testing in December 1975.

In the summer of 1976, the engines on the experimental aircraft were replaced with more powerful R-95Sh, and some design elements were changed (1978) - the updated prototypes were named T-8-1D and T-8-2D. In July 1976, the T-8 received the name "Su-25" and preparations began for serial production at the aircraft plant in Tbilisi (originally it was planned to launch production in Poland). Tactical and technical requirements for the Su-25 attack aircraft with the R-95Sh engine, modified avionics - similar to the T-8-1D type - were approved by the USSR Ministry of Defense only on March 9, 1977 and discussed from May 11 to May 24, 1977 at the mock-up commission .

Information about the aircraft and the code name RAM-J appeared in the West in 1977 according to space reconnaissance data (RAM = Ramenskoye, railway station near the LII airfield). The first production vehicle (T-8-3) was produced in Tbilisi in 1978 and made its first flight on June 18, 1979 (pilot - Yu.A. Egorov). State tests of the aircraft took place (first stage) from March to May 30, 1980 (completed in December 1980). The production of two-seat Su-25UB/UT/UTG and a single-seat one was carried out at the aircraft plant in Ulan-Ude. In March 1981, an act on the completion of state tests of the aircraft was signed and it was recommended for adoption by the USSR Air Force. In April 1981, the aircraft began to enter combat units. Since June 1981, Su-25s have taken part in combat operations in Afghanistan. The Su-25 was officially put into service in 1987.

In total, until 2000, 1320 Su-25 and its modifications were produced. On October 8, 2009, the resumption of purchases of Su-25 aircraft (modification of the Su-25SM) for the Russian Air Force was announced.

The unofficial established name of the aircraft - "Rook" - was assigned to the aircraft after combat use in Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Engines:

Advance project 1968 - 2 x AI-25T with a thrust of 1750 kg.

Project T-8 (1970) - the possibility of installing a more powerful forced version of the AI-25T (R&D was carried out at the V.N. Lotarev Design Bureau), TR7-117, R53B-300 and AL-29 engines was considered.

T-8-1, T-8-2 - 2 x afterburning R-9-300 (modification RD-9B/R-9B) with a thrust of 2700 kg, in 1976 replaced by R-95Sh.

T-8-1D, T-8-2D, T-8-3, first series of Su-25 (until 1987) - 2 x R-95Sh turbofan engines (modernized afterburning R-13F-300) with a thrust of 4100 kg per emergency mode; the nozzle and air intake are unregulated, electric start.
Specific fuel consumption - 1.28 kg/kgf per hour


Su-25UTG is a carrier-based training aircraft (R&D and first flight - 1987, serial production in Ulan-Ude began in 1988, first landing on the aircraft carrier "Tbilisi" - 11/01/1989), the aircraft is equipped with a hook- anyway, until 1991 mass-produced;

Su-25UBK - export "commercial" modification of the Su-25UB (first mentioned in the press - 1988), mass-produced until 1991.

T-8-15 - in 1989, the aircraft was presented at the Le Bourget air show as the Su-25; the R-195 engines on the aircraft were replaced by the R-95Sh in connection with the “travel” abroad.

Su-25BM - target towing vehicle (start of production in Tbilisi - 1989, first mention in the press - 1993), as part of the 186th Fighter-Assault Aviation Regiment (Ishap) used in Tajikistan (typical load - 6 x OFAB- 250, 2 x PTB and 2 R-60 missiles). A total of 50 pieces were produced. Tows Comet targets, drops PM-6 diving targets and M-6 parachute targets.

Su-25SM - modernization of combat Su-25, carried out between 1997 and 2008. As of August 2008 (Georgian-Ossetian conflict), a certain number are in the Air Force and were used during combat operations. On October 8, 2009, the resumption of purchases of Su-25 aircraft (modification of the Su-25SM) for the Russian Air Force was announced. Production is carried out by a plant in Ulan-Ude. The aircraft's avionics have been updated, an HUD and a multifunctional LCD display have been added to the cockpit. Based on the results of an open auction on November 7, 2011, contract No. R/4/1/7-11-DOGOZ was concluded between the Russian Ministry of Defense and Aviaremont OJSC to carry out repair work with the modernization of Su-25 type aircraft into the Su-25SM variant quantity 36 units. According to the contract, it was planned to receive the first 8 Su-25SM by December 1, 2011 (!!), in 2012 - 16 Su-25SM and in 2013 - 12 Su-25SM. contract amount 4.6 billion rubles. Acts on the transfer of the first 8 Su-25SM were signed on November 30, 2011 - the aircraft were received by the air group of military unit 62231-7, Chernigovka airbase, Primorye ().


Su-25SM at the airbase in Kubinka, 03/22/2012 (photo - Vladimir Yazynin, Evgeny Volkov and Alexander Martynov, http://russianplanes.net).


- Su-25KM - a modernization option for the Su-25 of the Georgian Air Force. The modernization is carried out by Israel and includes the replacement of electronics and adaptation to NATO ammunition.

Su-25UBM is a modernized all-weather combat training aircraft, designed to train Su-25SM and . Designed on the basis of the Su-25UB. The Bars-2 on-board equipment complex with an information processing and display system, the Spear radar complex, a short-range navigation system, a satellite navigation system, a radio-technical reconnaissance station. Presumably the aircraft can be used as an airborne command post for a group of attack aircraft. The aircraft can be used as a deck-based aircraft. The first flight was made on December 6, 2008 at the Kubinka airfield near Moscow. In December 2009, the first stage of testing of the aircraft was completed. During 2010, it was planned to release an installation series and from 2011 it was planned to begin mass production. State tests were successfully completed by December 28, 2011 (the Act was signed), the aircraft was recommended for serial production. In 2012, testing of the combat capabilities of the sighting and navigation system, which includes information processing and display systems, GLONASS, short-range navigation, an electronic reconnaissance station and other systems, will continue at the State Flight Test Center (GLITs) named after V.P. Chkalova (Akhtubinsk, Astrakhan region)
Bombing accuracy - 10-15 m (from a horizontal flight altitude of 200-300 m)
Accuracy of determining aircraft coordinates:
- 200 m
- 10-15 m (using satellite navigation system)
Maximum speed - 950 km/h
Combat range - 300 km

Status: USSR / Russia - 23 aircraft were lost during the fighting in Afghanistan;
- March 1980 - USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov decided to send 2 aircraft (T-8-1D and T-8-3) for testing to Afghanistan (Operation "Rhombus", Shindand Air Force Base);

1980 April 16 - Operation Diamond begins, planes arrive at the Shindand base in Afghanistan.

1981 February 4 - the formation of the first combat unit with the Su-25 began - the 200th separate attack squadron of the 80th separate attack air regiment (OSHAP) in Sital-Chay (65 km from Baku);

April 1981 - The 80th OSHAP received the first 12 aircraft and on June 19, the 200th separate attack squadron of the regiment entered Afghanistan (Shindand airfield).

1981 June 18-19 - the 200th squadron was relocated to Afghanistan, the Su-25 began to take part in combat operations in Afghanistan.

1982 - production at the plant in Tbilisi reached the planned level.

1983 - at least 25 Su-25 aircraft in service;

1984 January 16 - in Afghanistan, for the first time, a Su-25 was shot down by a Strela-2M MANPADS (pilot - Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Rubin, near the village of Urgun).

1984 - by the end of the year, 5 Su-25s were shot down by MANPADS in Afghanistan. During the year, the number of Su-25s in Afghanistan was increased to an aviation regiment.

November 1986 - in Afghanistan, after the start of the use of Stinger MANPADS, 4 Su-25s were shot down in two weeks, 2 pilots were killed.

1986 - by the end of the year, 25 Su-25UBs had been produced at the plant in Ulan-Ude since the start of mass production (1984).

1988 August 4 - Su-25 of Colonel A. Rutsky was shot down by a Pakistani F-16 with an AIM-9L Sidewinder missile.

1989 January 23 - the last Su-25 before the withdrawal of troops was lost in Afghanistan (not confirmed). The total number of Su-25 military contingent in Afghanistan at the time of withdrawal was about 50 units, a total of 60,000 sorties were flown, total losses were 23 units. one each and 34 pieces according to other data (24 in the air and 10 on the ground).

Su-25 losses in Afghanistan (1981-1989, data from Markovsky and Bedretdinov):

№pp date Pilot Circumstances
01 12/14/1981 captain M. Dyakov, died Colliding with a mountain while exiting an attack
02 04/14/1983 ejected, pilot alive Crashed on takeoff
03 01/16/1984 Lieutenant Colonel P. Ruban, ejected and died MANPADS shot down in the Urgun area
04 September 20, 1984 the pilot is alive Crashed on landing during the flight to Bagram
05 12/10/1984 Senior Lieutenant V. Zazdravnov, died Shot down in the Panjshir Gorge area
06 07/22/1985 senior lieutenant S. Shumikhin, died DShK shot down in Panjshir Gorge
07 04/06/1986 Shot down by MANPADS and anti-aircraft fire in the Khost area
08 08/23/1986 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down near the Iranian border
09 02.11.1986 Senior Lieutenant A. Baranov, died Shot down in the dark
10 November 18, 1986 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down
11 November 20, 1986 Lieutenant I. Aleshin, died MANPADS shot down near Salanga
12-13 03.12.1986 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down in the Ryan area
14 01/21/1987 senior lieutenant K. Pavlyukov, ejected, died Shot down by MANPADS on takeoff from Bagram airfield
15 01/28/1987 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down near Khosta
16 02/05/1987 captain M. Burak, died Shot down by anti-aircraft fire during a night flight
in the Kandahar area
17 04/02/1987 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down
18 06/01/1987 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down near Kandahar airfield
19 06/20/1987 senior lieutenant V. Paltusov, died DShK shot down or crashed on return
20 September 13, 1987 Senior Lieutenant V.Zemlyakov, died Shot down by anti-aircraft fire or MANPADS in the Baraki area
21 12/26/1987 Major A. Plyusnin, died Shot down by a MANPADS during a night flight
22 03/17/1988 ejected, pilot alive MANPADS shot down or lost during a training launch near Bagram airfield
23 06/07/1988 the sentry died destroyed during shelling of Kandahar airfield
24-31 06/23/1988 destroyed during shelling of Kabul airfield
32 08/04/1988 Colonel A. Rutskoy, ejected, alive Shot down by Pakistan Air Force F-16
33 October 27, 1988 the pilot is alive The plane was damaged during landing and later destroyed when the airfield was shelled.
34 01/07/1989 senior lieutenant E. Gordienko, died Shot down over Janez Gorge

1989 - production of the Su-25BM began in Tbilisi, a total of 50 units were produced.

1990 - the Su-25, Su-25T and Su-25UB are officially in service with the USSR Air Force;

1991 - a total of about 500 pieces were produced by the industry over the entire period. Su-25 (including about 250 units for export), 350 units. Su-25UB/UT and 8 out of 10 ordered Su-25T; serial production of the Su-25 has been discontinued;

1994 - the Su-25T was put into service (the plant in Tbilisi transferred a batch of assembled aircraft to Russia), a total of 192 units in service with various modifications of the Su-25 - front-line attack aircraft; naval aviation attack aircraft - 55 pcs.

1997 - Su-39 offered for export. In total, more than 1000 pieces were produced by industry in the USSR and Russia. Su-25 (including 300 Su-25UB). According to unverified domestic data, there are 300 units in service with the Air Force, various modifications, and 100 units in the Navy aviation.

Damaged Russian Air Force Su-25 after a combat mission

(August 2008, Georgian-Ossetian conflict)

2009 October 8 - the resumption of purchases of Su-25 aircraft (modification of the Su-25SM) for the Russian Air Force was announced.

2011 - according to media reports, during 2011 the Russian Air Force (part of the attack aviation of the Eastern Military District) received 12 Su-25SM. An additional batch of the same Su-25SM is expected to arrive at the beginning of 2012.

2011 December 28 - an act on the successful completion of state tests of the Su-25UBM attack aircraft was signed.

2012 February 20 - with reference to the representative of the press service of the Ministry of Defense for the Air Force, Colonel Vladimir Drik, Interfax reports that it is planned to modernize 80 Su-25 attack aircraft to the Su-25SM level by 2020. Currently, Air Force units have about 30 aircraft modernized to the Su-25SM standard.

2013 September 23 - at 20-17 Moscow time, during a scheduled training flight, a mark on the radar control display equipment from the Su-25 aircraft of the Southern Military District disappeared. According to the report from the scene, the pilot took the car away from the nearest populated area and tried to land it on the ground. The plane exploded upon contact with the ground. The pilot died. The flight was carried out without ammunition from the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield Krasnodar region ().

2013 October 03 - The Ministry of Defense reports that by the end of the year the air bases of the Southern Military District (Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Rostov region) several Su-25SM aircraft will arrive.

Application of the Su-25SM during the air operation of the Russian Air Force in Syria (2015):

date Information from the Russian Ministry of Defense Information from other sources
30.09.2015 On the first day of the Russian Air Force air operation in Syria, all aircraft of the group performed 20 sorties. Strikes were carried out on 8 militant targets. Warehouses of ammunition, weapons, fuels and lubricants, and accumulations of military equipment were hit. Command posts for controlling militant formations in mountainous areas were completely destroyed (). The air group includes 12 Su-25SM attack aircraft. The aircraft were relocated to Latakia (Hmeimim airbase, Syria) in parallel with the military exercises "Center-2015" and the preceding surprise inspection of the Central Military District, which were held from September 11 to 20 ().
09/30/2015 (night) The air group continued to strike militant targets. 4 targets were attacked at night. In total, eight sorties were carried out by Su-24M front-line bombers and Su-25SM attack aircraft. The headquarters of terrorist groups and an ammunition depot near the city of Idlib, as well as a three-level fortified command post of militants near the village of Hama, were destroyed. It is reported that a factory for the production of explosives and ammunition north of the city of Homs, where suicide bombers' cars were loaded with explosive devices, has been completely destroyed.
01.10.2015
Strike aircraft continued to carry out targeted strikes on militant infrastructure. Su-24M and Su-25 carried out eight sorties against five targets. Objective control data obtained from various sources, including space reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles, confirm the complete destruction by Su-24M aircraft of the militants’ command post on the northern outskirts of Jisr al-Shugur in Idlib province ().

In addition, Su-25SM attack aircraft attacked a militant field camp in the Maaret al-Numan area, Idlib province. Bunkers were completely destroyed, as well as warehouses for weapons and fuels and lubricants ().


02.10.2015
Su-34, Su-24M and Su-25SM aircraft carried out 14 sorties, during which six strikes were carried out on militant targets. Thus, in the area of ​​the village of Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib province, the control point of the armed formations was destroyed by targeted strikes by Su-24M bombers and Su-25SM attack aircraft ().
03.10.2015 Su-34, Su-24M and Su-25SM aircraft made 20 sorties. 10 targets were struck. In particular, Su-25SM attack aircraft attacked a terrorist training camp in the Kesladjuk region, Idlib province. As a result of the strike, militants' hideouts and a workshop for the production of improvised explosive devices, including suicide belts, were destroyed.

Su-24M and Su-25SM aircraft carried out three consecutive strikes on a control center and an ammunition depot near the city of Maaret al-Numan. All targets are destroyed ().

04.10.2015 Aircraft carried out targeted strikes on nine targets in Syria. A total of 25 sorties were carried out by Su-34, Su-24M and Su-25SM. Su-25SM attack aircraft struck a training camp in the Jisr al-Shugur area (Idlib province). The buildings containing the terrorist ammunition warehouse were destroyed. When conducting aerial reconnaissance by unmanned aerial vehicles aircraft in the Jabal Koba area (Idlib province), a militant artillery firing position was discovered. The strike of Su-25SM attack aircraft on this target destroyed three artillery pieces and a field warehouse with ammunition. In a wooded area near the city of Idlib, a disguised terrorist base was discovered, which contained about 30 vehicles and armored vehicles, including T-55 tanks previously captured from the Syrian army. Six air strikes were carried out on the facility, as a result of which the militants’ equipment was completely destroyed ().
05.10.2015 During the day, 15 Su-34, Su-24M and Su-25SM sorties were carried out from the Khmeimim airbase. In the east of Homs province, near the city of Tadmor, a combat pair of Su-25SM attack aircraft, as well as a Su-24 bomber, attacked two areas where equipment was concentrated. In total, about twenty units of T-55 medium tanks, previously captured by militants from the Syrian army, were destroyed. As a result of the detonation of ammunition and fuel of combat vehicles, numerous fires arose.

At night, about 30 vehicles and armored vehicles, including tanks, were destroyed in a wooded area near the city of Idlib. “Despite the fact that the image provided by UAVs (drones) is understandable only to specialists, we have irrefutable intelligence data, including negotiations between militants in the area, about the destruction and disabling of terrorist combat vehicles.”

There, Su-25SM attack aircraft struck the area where the militants' engineering equipment was concentrated. As a result of this, engineering weapons and equipment previously captured from the Syrian army were destroyed. Also in the vicinity of Tadmor, Russian bomber aircraft attacked two terrorist ammunition warehouses, one of which was located on the territory of a salt plant. Both objects were hit by direct hits from controlled aerial bombs. Objective control data confirms the complete destruction of warehouses.

It is also reported that two pairs of Su-25SM attacked the control point and communications center of terrorists located in the Jebel Batra mountain range, and the headquarters of militants in the Jebel Mgar mountains of Damascus province - “as a result of direct hits from controlled air bombs, the objects were destroyed.” ().

06.10.2015 The aircraft of the air group made about 20 sorties. Su-34, Su-24M and Su-25SM attacked 12 rear infrastructure facilities, control posts, training camps and militant bases. Su-25SM attack aircraft attacked a militant stronghold at the heights of Telu-Dakua (Damascus province).
Also in the province of Idlib, a combat pair of Su-25SM attack aircraft attacked a field camp of the group’s terrorists. “As a result of the air strike, numerous destructions of buildings and structures were noted, which were used by terrorists for storing explosives, logistics and food supplies.”

In addition, in the Kafer Awaid area (Idlib province), a field camp was hit by two Russian Su-25 attack aircraft. "According to radio interceptions, negotiations were recorded on several occasions in the territory of this camp. foreign languages, which suggests that foreign fighters were trained at this base" ().

07.10.2015 At night, the Russian Air Force air group carried out 22 combat sorties and struck 27 targets. The planes attacked militant strongholds in Homs province and completely destroyed fortifications. Su-25SM and Su-34 bombers attacked eight militant strongholds in Homs province. As a result of the fire hitting the targets, the militants' fortifications were completely destroyed.

Su-25SM and Su-34 attacked 11 areas of militant training camps in the provinces of Hama and Raqa. As a result of the strikes, terrorist training infrastructure was destroyed. “Precise hits from concrete-piercing aerial bombs hit the underground shelters of militants, previously identified by space reconnaissance in the area of ​​​​the settlements of Arafit and Salma,”

Aerial reconnaissance also discovered a base camouflaged in a forest, which was subsequently destroyed by a pair of Su-25SM attack aircraft ().

08.10.2015 Aviation carried out 67 combat sorties from the Khmeimim airbase during the day. Su-34M, Su-25SM damaged 60 targets. The targets for the strikes were command posts and communications centers of militants, warehouses for weapons and fuel and lubricants, as well as militant training bases in the provinces of Raqqa, Latakia, Hama, Idlib and Aleppo. According to the General Staff, as a result of the strikes, six control points and communications centers, six ammunition and fuel depots, 17 camps and terrorist training bases, and three underground militant structures in the province of Latakia were destroyed. In addition, aviation destroyed 16 fortified areas and defensive positions with weapons and military equipment, 11 areas where bandit reserves are concentrated, an armored vehicle repair plant, 17 units of automobile and armored vehicles, as well as two installations of multiple launch rocket systems.

The headquarters of the Liwa al-Haq formation was destroyed by a direct hit from KAB 500-S precision bombs. According to radio intercepts, the strike killed two high-ranking field commanders and about 200 militants. In the Aleppo region, a militant base and an ammunition depot located in a former prison were attacked. “As a result, about 100 militants and an ammunition depot were destroyed” ().

09.10.2015
10.10.2015 From the Khmeimim airbase, 64 combat sorties were carried out by Su-34, Su-24M and Su-25SM aircraft against 63 targets in the provinces of Hama, Latakia, Idlib and Raqqa. In the area of ​​the village of Serakib (Idlib province), aerial reconnaissance discovered an artillery battery of militants, which was striking the surrounding settlements. This target was destroyed by a strike from Russian bombers.

In the vicinity of the city of Achan, Hama province, Su-25SM attack aircraft struck a terrorist stronghold identified by aerial reconnaissance. The terrorists' engineering structures and ammunition and logistics warehouses were destroyed in a targeted strike.

A militant training camp was discovered near the village of Kherbet al-Arous in Idlib province. Su-25SM attack aircraft struck this camp with high-explosive bombs, as a result of which the militants’ base was completely destroyed.

In just one day, the planes of the Russian air group destroyed: 53 fortified areas and defensive positions of terrorists with weapons and military equipment; one militant field command post; four terrorist training camps; seven ammunition depots; artillery and mortar battery ().

11.10.2015 In just one day, Russian fighters and bombers destroyed 25 fortified areas and defensive positions with weapons and military equipment. Destroyed: a terrorist stronghold near the village of Salma in the province of Latakia, seven militant command posts, six field terrorist training camps, six ammunition depots. One convoy of vehicles, three underground shelters in the province of Latakia, and one mobile mortar group () were also destroyed.

Su-24M bombers and Su-25SM attack aircraft destroyed a mortar position with targeted strikes within 24 hours, car convoy and a militant control center in the area of ​​the village of Suqeik, north of Hama. A Su-25SM attack aircraft destroyed a vehicle convoy delivering ammunition and fuel to militants occupying positions in the area. Three fuel tankers, a heavy-duty vehicle and two off-road vehicles with heavy machine guns installed on them, which provided security escort for the cargo, were destroyed.

In the area of ​​the village of Tell Suqeik, Hama province, a Su-25SM attack aircraft struck a mobile mortar position of militants discovered by unmanned reconnaissance equipment. As a result of the targeted strike, three off-road vehicles equipped with mortars and one truck with ammunition were destroyed ().

12.10.2015 A Su-34 bomber and a Su-25SM attack aircraft used targeted strikes to destroy a bunker with an ammunition depot and a convoy of militant military equipment. “In the El-Latamin area (Hama province), a bunker in which an ammunition depot was located was destroyed. As a result of a targeted strike by a Su-34 bomber, this underground structure was completely destroyed.”

A Su-25 attack aircraft in Aleppo province also attacked a militant convoy transporting fuel and weapons. "A fuel tanker was destroyed, three trucks with ammunition and two escort vehicles equipped with heavy machine guns" (),

13.10.2015 In the area of ​​the village of Khraitan, a Su-25SM attack aircraft struck an ammunition depot and a fuel and lubricants storage facility. The objects were completely destroyed by precise strikes from high-explosive bombs. Also in the province of Idlib, Su-25SM attack aircraft attacked a terrorist training center in a mountainous area. Objective monitoring means detected detonation of ammunition stored at the facility. Object destroyed ().

Export:
Azerbaijan - in service by 1997.

Angola:
- 1988 - first deliveries - 12 Su-25K and 2 Su-25UBK, aircraft were used in combat operations with UNITA rebels in the late 1980s - 1990s.
- 1993 - 10 units in service;

Armenia - in service by 1997.

Afghanistan - 1986-1990 - according to unconfirmed reports, 60 units were delivered (? perhaps we are talking about the redeployment of USSR Air Force aircraft);


Presumable camouflage of Afghan Su-25 (World Aviation. No. 104 / 2011).


Belarus:
- by 1997 it is in service.
- 2002 - 2 Su-25 and 2 Su-25UB were delivered to Cote d'Ivoire.
- 2008 - it is known for sure about the earlier delivery of 11 Su-25s from Belarus to Sudan.

Bulgaria:
- 1993 - 39 units in service. Su-25K;
- 2012 - 10 Su-25K attack aircraft in “as a source for repair” condition were delivered to Georgia ().

Hungary - 1991 - 50 units delivered over the entire period. (?);

Gambia:
- 2004 - in service with 1 Su-25 received from Georgia, based at Banjul airport. Probably later transferred to Guinea.

Guinea:
- 2010 - 1 Su-25 in service. Probably transmitted from Gambia.

1992 - in service (including at least 12 Su-25T units), serial production of the Su-25 may be underway at the Tbilisi aircraft plant;

2008 - in service, took part in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in August 2008.
- 2012 - 10 Su-25K attack aircraft in “as a source for repair” condition were received from Bulgaria ().

1985 - first delivery - from 30 to 45 Su-25K and Su-25UBK.
- 1985-1987 - in total, no more than 80 Su-25s were delivered during this period (two regiments, three squadrons); Every day the planes made about 1,200 sorties.


Su-25K Iraqi Air Force (World Aviation. No. 104 / 2011).


- 1986 - Su-25 aircraft take part in combat operations in the Iran-Iraq war.
- May 1989 - Iraqi Air Force Su-25 aircraft are shown in public for the first time.
- 1990 - 60 units in service;
- February 1991 - 2 aircraft were lost during Operation Desert Storm (F-15Cs were shot down while trying to fly to Iran), 7 aircraft flew to Iran and were interned;


One of the Su-25K of the Iraqi Air Force destroyed on the ground during Operation Desert Storm (World Aviation. No. 104 / 2011).


- 1995 - in service;
- 2003 August 01 - The media reported the discovery by American troops in the west of Baghdad in the Al-Takkadum area of ​​several dozen MiG-25s (including MiG-25RB) and Su-25s covered with sand.

Iran:
- 1991 - 7 Su-25K aircraft flew from Iraq during Desert Storm and were interned.
- 1997 - according to unconfirmed data (Ilyin V.E.) is in service. At approximately the same time, 3 Su-25UBKs were purchased from Georgia.

Kazakhstan - 1992 - in service;

1988 - already in service, only in 1988-1990. probably up to 40 aircraft were delivered;
- 1993 - 36 units in service;

1997 - in service.

Congo:
- 1999-2000 - 10 Su-25s were delivered from Georgia. The aircraft were used against rebels in the north of the country. Mostly hired Ukrainian pilots flew.

Ivory Coast:
- 2002 - 2 Su-25 and 2 Su-25UB were purchased from Belarus.
- November 2004 - aircraft were used against the French peacekeeping contingent. Two Su-25UBs were destroyed on the ground either by bombing or by a sabotage group.

Peru:
- 1996 - 10 Su-25 and 8 Su-25UB were delivered from Belarus.
- 2000 - in service.

Syria - 1991 - about 60 aircraft were delivered over the entire period (?);

Slovakia:
- 1993 - the Su-25K is in service, inherited after the collapse of Czechoslovakia;
- 1996 - all Su-25Ks were consolidated into the mixed 2nd Air Force Regiment (Malatsky-Kucina).
- 2003 - Su-25K aircraft were decommissioned from the Air Force.


Su-25K FROGFOOT of the 2nd mixed air regiment of the Slovak Air Force air show in Kosice, 1996-2003. (World Aviation. No. 104 / 2011).


Sudan:
- 2008 - 11 Su-25s purchased in Belarus were discovered for the first time. The aircraft were used against rebels in Darfur province.

Turkmenistan:
- 1997-2012 - is in service.
- March 2012 - at least 1 Su-25UB and 6 Su-25 of the Air Force of Turkmenistan are based at the Mary airfield.

Ukraine:
- 1992 - included in the Air Force;
- 2005 - possibly 2 Su-25 and Su-25UB were delivered to Equatorial Guinea.
- 2008 - 3 Su-25s were delivered (a total of 6 units were ordered) to Chad.

Chad:
- 2008 - 3 Su-25s were purchased (6 in total ordered) in Ukraine.
- May 2009 - aircraft are used against targets in Sudan.

Czechoslovakia (first importing country):

1982 - first deliveries of Su-25K;
- 1984-1985 - The 30th "Ostrava" attack air regiment received the Su-25K, based in Hradec-Karlov.
- 1989 - Su-25UBK is in service, a total of 2 Su-25UBK were delivered;
- 1991 - 50 units were delivered over the entire period;


Su-25K FROGFOOT of the 30th "Ostrava" attack air regiment of the Czechoslovak Air Force, Hradec-Karlov (World Aviation. No. 104 / 2011).


One of two Czechoslovakian Su-25UBK of the Czechoslovak Air Force (World Aviation. No. 104 / 2011).


Czech Republic - 1993 - in service;

Equatorial Guinea:
- 2005 - 2 Su-25 and Su-25UB were received. Probably from Ukraine.

Ethiopia:
- 1999-2000 - during this period, 2 Su-25 and 2 Su-25UB were not delivered new; the aircraft were used in the conflict with Eritrea.
- 2000 - the planes were written off for unknown reasons (according to media reports).

South Korea:

1992 - the possibility of purchasing the Su-25 or its modifications is discussed;

1997 - no delivery data.

Sources:

Aviation exhibition in Tushino. Moscow. 1989
Aviation and astronautics. NN 2, 3, 4, 5, 12 / 1989; 2, 6, 7, 9 / 1990
Aerospace engineering. N 2 / 1990

Bedretdinov Ildar, Sukhoi Design Bureau Su-25 attack aircraft. M., 1995

Burdin S., Su-25 Sturmovik. History, design, weapons, combat use. M. AST, Minsk, Harvest, 2001

Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia. Website http://ru.wikipedia.org, 2011
Voevoda S.S., archive, 1992
Military knowledge. NN 1, 8 / 1989; 4, 8 / 1990; 2-3 / 1992
Gordon E., Rigmant V., “The Violinist” played his part. Wings of the Motherland. N 5 / 1992
News. NN 04/08/1989; 03/28/1990; 26, 08/29/1990

Ilyin V.E. Attack aircraft and fighter-bombers. M., Victoria, AST, 1998
A red star. NN 4, 6, 05/18/1989; 07/08/1989; 08/04/1989
Wings of the Motherland. NN 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 / 1989; 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 / 1990; 1/1991; 4/1992
Lenta.ru. Website http://lenta.ru, 2003, 2011-2012
International life. N 3 / 1989
Russian Ministry of Defense. Website http://www.mil.ru, 2012
World aviation. No. 104 / 2011
Modeler-constructor. NN 7 / 1984; 8/1988
Museum of the USSR Armed Forces. Moscow. 1989
People's Tribune. 04/07/1990
New time. N 45 / 1988
Ponomarev A.N. Soviet aviation designers. M.: 1990
Is it true. NN 04/07/1989; September 19, 1989
Airplanes of the country of the Soviets. M.: 1974
I serve the Soviet Union. TV show. August 1988
Companion. September 1990
Soviet Russia. 05/14/1989
Soviet armed forces. Tomsk 1988
Soviet warrior. N 22 / 1988
Soviet patriot. N 7 / 1990
Soviet military review. NN 1985; 5/1986; 9/1987; 1, 9/1988; 3/1989
The balance of forces between NATO and the Department of Internal Affairs. ?????? (documentation for the contract)
Stukanov. archive, 1992
Equipment and weapons. NN 3 / 1989; 6/1990; 5-6/1992
Technology for youth. NN 11/1984; 11/1988
Tupolev A.N. The edges of daring creativity. M.: 1988

Aerotyp. 1968. Berlin. DDR.
ArmeeRundschau. NN 9/1986; 1, 5, 7 / 1987; 7, 8, 12 / 1988; 1, 4, 6, 9, 12 / 1989. Berlin. DDR.
Beijing Revue. N 29 / 1988. China.
Congressional Record. NN 118, 129, 137, 143 / 1988; 38 / 1989. Washington. USA.
Encyclopaedia of modern world aircraft armament. Christopher Chant. 1988.
Flieger Jahrbuch. 1977-1986. Berlin. DDR.
Flieger Revue. NN 1/1977; 4, 8, 9 / 1980; 5, 7, 10 - 12 / 1981; 5/1982; 2, 4, 8, 12 / 1983; 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 / 1984; 11/1985; 9, 12 / 1986; 12/1987; 8, 11, 12 / 1988; 1 - 12 / 1989; 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 / 1990. Berlin. DDR.
Flugzeuge der NVA. 1971 gegenvart. 1989. Berlin. DDR.
Foreign Affairs. N 1/1989.
Interavia. NN 1/1984; 3, 5, 7, 9, 10 / 1988; 1, 9-11 / 1989.
Jane's weapon systems 1987-88.
Jonic publics. 1990-92.
Letectvi + Kosmonautika. NN 8 - 12, 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26 / 1989.
Maly modelarz. N 1-2 / 1990.
Newsweek. NN 27 / 1988; 1, 3 / 1989.
Seizing the initiative first. US National Security. 1985. Toronto. Canada.
US News & World Report. NN 33 / 1988; 12/1989.
World armament & disarmament 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981. SIPRI yearbook. Stocholm. 1978. Sweden.

The main data compilation is 11/09/1997.

Adjustments - 2009, 2011, 2012

The merits of Soviet attack aircraft in World War II were so great that it seemed that this type of aircraft should have been registered in the domestic armed forces for decades. However, interest in him disappeared almost immediately after the end of hostilities.

Short-term interest in attack aircraft arose again at the very beginning of the 1950s, under the impression of the successful use of the Il-10 by Chinese and North Korean pilots in Southeast Asia. In October 1950, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Marshal Zhigarev, even addressed Ilyushin with a letter in which he proposed to consider the issue of resuming serial production of the Il-10M attack aircraft as a combat aircraft for direct support of troops, “which has not yet lost its combat capabilities.” The request did not go unheeded - production was resumed, and during 1952−1954, plant No. 168 produced 136 copies of the Il-10M, which were decommissioned just two years later!

Despite the cool attitude of the military towards attack aircraft, Ilyushin himself remained faithful to them to the end, never stopping to develop new machines. For example, in 1950, his design bureau began developing the world's first jet twin-engine two-seat armored attack aircraft, the Il-40, with powerful artillery, missiles and bombs. The first Il-40 took off in March 1953. True, the further fate of this aircraft is sad.

In April 1956, Defense Minister Marshal Georgy Zhukov presented to the country's leadership a report prepared by the General Staff and the Air Force General Staff on the state and prospects for the development of attack aircraft. The report concluded that attack aircraft were low on the battlefield in modern warfare and actually proposed eliminating attack aircraft, ensuring the solution of combat missions for direct air support of ground forces in the offensive and defense by bomber and fighter aircraft. As a result, an order was issued by the Minister of Defense, according to which attack aircraft were abolished, and all existing Il-10 and Il-10M (no less than 1,700 aircraft!) were written off. In parallel with the dispersal of attack aircraft, serial production of the Il-40 armored jet attack aircraft was stopped and all experimental work on promising attack aircraft.

Why was this necessary? The fact is that with the advent of nuclear weapons, the concept of “remote” wars triumphed. It was believed that the future war could be won ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Moreover, options for the complete elimination of combat aviation were seriously considered.

Note that attack aircraft as a class disappeared not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. The Americans were the first to realize the mistake - Vietnam helped. The multi-role supersonic F-4 Phantom II and F-105 Thunderchief could not cope with the task of directly supporting ground troops, as did the light attack aircraft A-1, A-4 and A-6, whose low survivability did not allow them to operate at low altitudes. altitudes As a result, US Navy and Air Force specialists in the field themselves modified the aircraft as best they could, protecting them. The most interesting “home-made” was the legendary Vietnamese attack aircraft A-37 Dragonfly, converted from a Cessna T-37 training aircraft. The inside of the cabin was lined with Kevlar mats, soft polyurethane foam-filled fuel tanks and suspension units for weapons were installed under the wings. The most amazing thing is that the unit of these “homemade” attack aircraft, having completed several thousand sorties, did not lose a single aircraft!

In March 1967, the US Air Force sent out requirements for a promising aircraft for close support of troops on the battlefield to 21 aircraft manufacturers. Fairchild Republic's competition-winning A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft was one of the most amazing aircraft of the second half of the 20th century. Built around a specially created heavy-duty 30-mm seven-barrel GAU-8/A cannon, resembling a huge flying cross, with two barrels of turbojet engines on short pylons on the sides of the rear fuselage, with a bizarre spaced vertical tail, with rough, “chopped” shapes, the aircraft turned out to be extremely technologically advanced and ideal for its only task - direct support of troops over the battlefield. And since February 1975, the US Air Force began to receive serial attack aircraft, the likes of which no other country in the world had. On that moment.

The successes (or failures) of American aviation in Vietnam were closely monitored in the USSR. And if the leadership of the country's Air Force still continued to believe that every new aircraft should fly “faster, higher and further,” some aircraft designers had a different opinion. Having analyzed the experience of post-war conflicts, the deputy head of the brigade common types OKB Kulon (now Sukhoi OKB) Oleg Samoil O Vich, at his own peril and risk, began to develop a promising battlefield aircraft designed to destroy targets when they are visually detected. The development of the aerodynamic design and layout of the future aircraft was entrusted to the leading designer of the general design brigade, Yuri Ivashechkin.

It was decided to create a small aircraft (smaller dimensions - harder to hit) of a fairly simple design using non-scarce materials, easy to pilot, with the ability to be based on unpaved airfields and protect the crew from armor-piercing bullets up to 12.7 mm and rocket fragments up to 3 g. Fundamental The difference between the future Su-25 and the American A-10 was that the main weapon of the American attack aircraft was to be a unique cannon, and the Su-25 was designed with an emphasis on the use primarily of unguided weapons - bombs and missiles. The choice, by the way, is very logical: almost all the tanks destroyed by Il-2 attack aircraft during World War II were hit either by small cumulative bombs or rockets. Disabling German tanks from an aircraft cannon are isolated cases.

After numerous sketches, the design of a single-seat monoplane with a high wing of low sweep and high aspect ratio was chosen. The engines were placed in individual nacelles on the sides of the fuselage, which served as a fire and fragmentation barrier, which eliminated the possibility of their simultaneous destruction. The plane was designed to be as simple and easy to maintain as possible, a sort of flying Kalashnikov assault rifle, recalls Yuri Ivashechkin. The level of suspension of air bombs and missiles was exactly at the chest level of an average person, which made it possible, if necessary, to suspend weapons manually. The engine cowlings were easy to open from the ground, allowing instant access (try getting to the engines on the A-10!). There was even a built-in folding stepladder for the pilot to independently exit the cockpit - an unprecedented luxury in modern combat aviation.

The characteristic “humpbacked” profile of the aircraft was formed by a protruding cockpit - thanks to its location, the pilot received a view forward, down and to the side, the like of which was not found in any of the existing Soviet aircraft.

In May 1968, the project reached a certain degree of readiness and Samoilovich and Ivashechkin reported it to General Designer Pavel Sukhoi. Sukhoi liked the plane, and he gave the go-ahead to continue the development, which received the factory designation “T-8”. Application documents for the new aircraft were sent to the Ministry of Aviation Industry, the Air Force Civil Code, the Scientific and Technical Committee of the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and TsAGI. The designers began to wait for a reaction.

The General Staff Scientific and Technical Committee was the first to respond: the laconic answer fit on one page of typewritten text - we don’t need such an aircraft. The Air Force Research Institute sent a cautious conclusion, but the rest ignored the project. Nevertheless, Sukhoi, at his own peril and risk, gave instructions to continue the development of the T-8.

Hope was given by the results of large-scale "Dnepr" maneuvers in Belarus in the fall of 1967, when supersonic Su-7B and MiG-21 aircraft, with the support of ground forces, showed themselves to be significantly worse than the outdated transonic MiG-17, the only aircraft that managed to reach the ground on their first approach. target, recognize and destroy it.


Meanwhile, the analysis of the Vietnamese events, albeit belatedly, reached the military leadership of the USSR. At the beginning of 1969, the USSR Minister of Defense Andrei Grechko ordered the Minister of Aviation Industry to hold a competition for a light attack aircraft (LSH), and already in March four design bureaus - Ilyushin, Mikoyan, Sukhoi and Yakovlev - received requirements for a new aircraft. By the appointed time, Sukhoi Design Bureau had not only a preliminary design, but also a full-size mock-up of the aircraft, which immediately made the company a leader. The Mikoyan Design Bureau presented the MiG-21LSH project, created on the basis of the MiG-21, the Yakovlev Design Bureau - the Yak-28LSH, and the Ilyushin Design Bureau - the Il-42 based on the already existing experienced attack aircraft Il-40. The Air Force rejected the proposals of Yakovlev and Ilyushin, inviting Sukhoi and Mikoyan to build flying models.


Over time, the appetites of the military began to grow. By mid-1971, they demanded to increase the ground speed to 1,200 km/h (initially 800 km/h) and the combat load to 1.5 tons (was 1 ton). All this led to the complication of the aircraft and an increase in its size. Sukhoi especially resisted increasing the maximum speed - 1200 km/h still did not allow him to escape from fighters, but greatly complicated the design of the entire aircraft. As a result, a compromise of 1000 km/h was reached, and by November 1971 the Sukhoi Design Bureau was declared the winner.

Most American and Soviet aircraft that perform the same tasks are quite similar in appearance: F-15 and MiG-25, B-1 and Ty-160, etc. However, there is almost nothing in common between the A-10 and Su-25 . The thing is that they were created in complete isolation from each other - American and Soviet aircraft designers knew nothing about the work of their competitors. The first materials on the American A-10 became available to Sukhoi designers only in 1971. Immediately after this, Yuri Ivashechkin sketched out several layout options reminiscent of an American attack aircraft. He explained to us that they did not provide any fundamental advantages, and besides, it was too late to change anything. Having looked at the sketches, Samoilovich snapped: “It’s too late. Train has already left!"

Despite maintaining the original layout, the projected Su-25 was very different from the original T-8: the contours and layout were completely changed, the combat load (from 1000 to 1660 kg) and fuel capacity were increased. All this led to an increase in take-off weight (from 8340 to 10,530 kg) and physical dimensions of the aircraft (length from 12.54 to 13.7 m, wing area from 21 to 28 m²).

Particular problems arose with the booking. The contours of the head part were formed by straight planes, so most of the cabin armor plates could be made flat, which simplified the production technology. The armor was initially planned to be a “sandwich” of plates of KVK-37D steel alloys, which held up well against the high-explosive effect of a warhead, but poorly against bullets and fragments, and a layer of ABO-70 alloy, resistant to bullets and fragments, but not to high explosives. A rubber shock-absorbing layer was provided between the plates. However, such a “sandwich” could not be welded, and bolted assembly significantly made the cabin structure heavier and larger. The solution was to use a special titanium alloy ABVT-20, specially developed for the Su-25. In addition to the possibility of creating a monolithic welded cabin, titanium armor made it possible to reduce the overall weight of the armor protection. By the way, as it turned out later, American designers of the A-10 also came to titanium armor.

In general, the plane turned out to be very technologically advanced. Minister of Aviation Industry Pyotr Dementyev, who visited the pilot production in 1972, assessed the technological simplicity of the almost finished machine on the slipway: “If something happens, ten of these ‘hunchbacked horses’ can be riveted!”


The T-8−1, the future Su-25, took off for the first time on February 22, 1975. It was piloted by the chief pilot of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, Hero. Soviet Union Vladimir Ilyushin, son of the legendary aircraft designer. The whole year was spent refining the aircraft. Like the Americans, the designers were faced with the problem of engine surge when firing large-caliber unguided rockets and simultaneously firing from the built-in cannon and four SPPU-22 outboard cannon containers. Like the Americans, they dealt with the problems.

In November 1975, the aircraft was shown to Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, who for the first time directly asked the question: “Will the Su-25 be able to hit the new American M1A1 Abrams tank?” - to which I received an honest answer: “Maybe, but very low probability" To accomplish this task, a specialized set of powerful guided weapons was required. After analyzing the problem, a decision was made to create a specialized aircraft to combat tanks, which subsequently led to the appearance of the Su-25T, armed with supersonic Whirlwind missiles.

Another problem for the future Su-25 was serial production plants. Nobody wanted to take a low-prestige attack aircraft into production. Here are strategic bombers or, at worst, strike fighters - yes! And an attack aircraft is a lot of hassle, but not enough money. And only in 1977 it was possible to “register” the aircraft at the Tbilisi Aviation Plant named after. Dimitrova. Moreover, there was a chance to lose this aircraft altogether: at the same time, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Poland, Edward Gierek, approached Brezhnev about transferring a license to produce the aircraft at the Polish aircraft plant in the city of Mielec.

Little by little, the Tbilisi plant began to master the production of the Su-25, producing a pair per year. The aircraft entered lengthy state tests. In March 1980, on the personal instructions of the Minister of Defense Dmitry Ustinov, a decision was made to conduct tests in " special conditions" - in the zone of real combat operations in the Republic of Afghanistan. For this business trip, the Sukhoi Design Bureau promised to count all the remaining tests. Along with two T-8s (future Su-25s), six Yak-38M vertical take-off and landing aircraft were sent to Afghanistan, which were supposed to test the concept of creating airmobile troops. The test program was called "Rhombus". Post-war history has never seen anything like this before.

The Shindand airfield was chosen as the base for testing, where the aircraft were relocated in April 1980. At first, shooting and bombing were carried out at an improvised training ground 9 km from the airfield. But at the very beginning of May, the 9th Motorized Rifle Division began the Farah operation, during which it came across a fortified area in a narrow mountain gorge. Even at the entrance to the gorge, two infantry fighting vehicles were blown up by mines, and the infantry was met with heavy fire. At each bend in the gorge there were powerful pillboxes armed with large-caliber machine guns, which made the use of attack helicopters almost impossible. It was decided to use a pair of Su-25s, which worked in the gorge for three days, making 3-4 sorties a day, using unguided missiles, high-explosive and concrete-piercing shells. But the main weapons were “sotochki” - hundred-kilogram AB-100 bombs; 32 “hundreds” were located on eight underwing hardpoints. The planes entered the gorge from the rear, “dive” from the top of the mountain and moved towards our units, not giving the Mujahideen time to deploy large-caliber machine guns. After the attack aircraft finished their work, the infantry entered the gorge without a single shot or casualties.


A Su-25 shot down in Afghanistan by a Stinger MANPADS and landing on its belly

As Ivashechkin recalled, after the operation the gunsmiths decided to simulate the operation of the AB-100 by detonating an equivalent explosive charge in the gorge. After the explosion, the test participants could not come to their senses for three days - the acoustic impact alone was shocking. No one could imagine what the dushmans felt in the gorge, on whom these bombs continuously fell for three days, causing, among other things, heavy landslides. After the Farah operation, Su-25s began to be actively used for other combat operations. They soon earned the affectionate nickname “scallops” from the infantry. At the beginning of June 1980, Operation Diamond was successfully completed, the test program was completed and the Su-25 pair returned safely to the Union. And in May 1981, the first batch of 12 production Su-25s entered service with the 200th separate assault aviation squadron(200th OSHAE). Exactly a quarter of a century later, attack aviation was revived in Russia.

Almost immediately after receiving the new aircraft, the 200th OSHAE was urgently relocated to Afghanistan to the already familiar Shindand airfield - the military really liked the resulting aircraft. On July 19, 1981, the first Su-25 landed at the airfield, and already on July 25, the attack squadron began to take an active part in a large-scale operation in the Luarcoch mountain range. After working the mountain range with “combs” for many days, the enemy completely abandoned the area, suffering heavy losses. A little later, Su-25s appeared in the Herat region, and by the fall - in the south of Afghanistan in the area of ​​the country's second largest city - Kandahar. By this time, the attack aircraft also had a second nickname - “rooks”.

In just one year, the 200th Squadron completed more than 2,000 combat missions without losing a single vehicle. The most effective weapon was the 80-mm S-8 rocket, especially the S-8D variant with a volumetric detonating warhead. Cluster bombs and incendiary tanks were also used. The most powerful effect was exerted by the ODAB-500 volumetric detonating bombs, which had terrifying power. They were used for serious purposes.

By 1983, the tactics for using new aircraft had also developed. As a rule, the Su-25s began their fire attack, making the first approach to the target, after which the Mi-24s appeared, point-by-point clearing out the remaining pockets of resistance. The Su-25 learned to work at night - the first attack aircraft dropped luminous SAB aerial bombs, in the light of which, as in a football stadium, the next link of “rooks” began its terrible work. They mastered the Su-25 and the profession of miners, carrying out mining of caravan trails from a height of 300-500 m at a speed of 700 km/h from KMG containers; in 1984-1985 they carried out 80% of all mine laying. Thanks to its efficiency and versatility, the Su-25 quickly became the most popular aircraft in Afghanistan; its pilots had the most flying hours compared to pilots of other types of aircraft. Not a single operation could be completed without attack aircraft, and the geography of deployment was continuously expanding: Bagram, Kandahar, Kabul, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif.

By the fall of 1985, dushmans began to actively use portable anti-aircraft systems, and the number of aircraft losses began to rise. The greatest damage was caused by American Red Eye MANPADS. To counter them, the number of infrared traps fired by aircraft was sharply increased, bringing their shooting to a combat trigger. Now, after leaving the attack, the traps were automatically fired from the aircraft within 16 seconds - this was enough to go to a safe 5 km.

At the end of 1986, the dushmans acquired more advanced Stinger MANPADS with a dual-band homing head, from which the Su-25 suffered the greatest losses. They were never able to find an effective “antidote” against the Stingers, but losses were reduced by radically improving the fire extinguishing system - after the hit, a significant number of aircraft began to reach airfields.

In 1989, Su-25s were the last to leave Afghanistan, covering the withdrawal of Soviet troops. During the entire Afghan war, 23 attack aircraft were lost in the air. On average, there was one lost aircraft per 2,600 combat sorties. These are very good indicators.

Subsequently, Su-25s took part in almost all conflicts involving Soviet weapons: in the Iran-Iraq war of 1987-1989, where they carried out up to 1100 (!) combat sorties per day, in Angola, in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Karabakh conflict, in the Georgian-Abkhaz war, in Tajikistan and, of course, in Chechnya. And everywhere these planes earned only excellent reviews.


Damage received after being hit by an Osa-AKM MANPADS missile during the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in 2008 / From here: http://govorim-vsem.ru/viewtopic.php?t=27886

Existed (and exists) great amount modifications legendary aircraft. Let's focus only on the most important ones. Since 1986, the plant in Ulan-Ude began producing the “sparky” Su-25UB, a two-seater combat training aircraft. Apart from the addition of a second pilot seat, the aircraft is almost completely identical to a classic attack aircraft and can be used for both training and combat operations. The most modern modification of the serial attack aircraft Su-25SM differs from the “original” in a more modern complex of onboard radio-electronic equipment. The project of a carrier-based attack aircraft with ejection take-off Su-25K never went beyond the project stage (due to the lack Russian aircraft carriers with catapults), but several carrier-based training aircraft Su-25UTG were produced, intended for deployment on board the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov" with a ski-jump take-off. The aircraft turned out to be so successful that it serves as the main training aircraft for training carrier-based aviation pilots.

But the most interesting and complex modification is the Su-25T anti-tank aircraft, the decision to create which was made back in 1975. The main problem in the development of this aircraft was the creation of avionics (avionics) for detecting, tracking and guiding missiles at armored targets. The aircraft was based on the glider of the two-seat training aircraft Su-25UB; all the space allocated for the co-pilot was occupied by a new avionics. We also had to move the gun into the cockpit compartment, expand and lengthen bow, where the Shkval daytime optical sighting system was located to control the firing of Whirlwind supersonic missiles. Despite the significant increase in internal volume, there was no room for a thermal imaging system in the new car. Therefore, the Mercury night vision system was mounted in a suspended container under the fuselage at the sixth suspension point (by the way, the problem was solved in a similar way with the A-10). The anti-tank attack aircraft failed to win the laurels of its older brother, the Su-25 - it did not participate in anti-tank battles in Russia, and was not exported. Nevertheless, the originality of the aircraft was emphasized by the name Su-34 (in honor of the legendary T-34 tank), which the aircraft bore for some time. It was later given to another aircraft.

The most advanced modification of the Su-25 is now called Su-25TM (sometimes called Su-39, under this name the aircraft can be exported). It is distinguished by advanced on-board electronics, which allows it to effectively hit point targets in any weather.

As Yuri Ivashechkin told us in parting, the Su-25 can remain in service for a long time - it is far from becoming obsolete. The only thing that needs to be periodically replaced is the on-board electronics: the equipment is rapidly becoming obsolete, since technical progress in this area it is developing by leaps and bounds. Let us note on our own that, despite its unprepossessing appearance and small size, the Su-25 is truly the greatest modern Russian combat aircraft. And this will be confirmed to you by everyone who fought and who had the opportunity to see this hard worker at work, and not just on the demonstration fields of aviation exhibitions.

The Su-25 is equipped with 10 external hardpoints located under the wing. The two closest to the wing tips are designed for air-to-air guided missiles, and on the remaining eight nodes, with a load of 500 kg each, various offensive weapons can be mounted: bomber (8 bombs for various purposes, calibers 500, 250, 100 kg, or 32 bombs of 100 kg caliber on beam holders MBD2-67U, or 8 KMGU-2 containers for mining, or 8 bomb cassettes RBK-250, RBK-500); unguided missile (256 unguided aircraft missiles (UAR) S-5 caliber 57 mm, or 160 UAR type S-8 80 mm caliber, or 40 UAR type S-13 caliber 122 mm, or 8 UAR type S-25 266 mm caliber, or 8 NAR type S-24 caliber 240 mm); guided missile (2 air-to-air missiles R-60, R-60M on external pylons, 4 air-to-surface missiles Kh-25ML, S-25L, or 2 Kh-29L missiles with semi-active laser heads guidance, or 4 Kh-25MTP missiles with a thermal homing head)

In preparing the article, I actively used the book by Ildar Bedretdinov “Su-25 attack aircraft and its modifications”, M., 2002

Few armies in the world can afford the luxury of an attack aircraft.
For example, of the NATO allies, Germany, England and Belgium wanted to buy Thunderbolt-2, the Japanese, Koreans and Australians also licked their lips at it... But in the end, considering that it was too expensive, they refused, limiting themselves to fighter-bombers and multirole fighters.
There are significantly more owners of the Su-25, but if you remove from the list all the freeloaders from the former allies and republics of the Soviet Union, who received the aircraft for next to nothing from the USSR... then, in principle, the picture is the same. The exception is Congo, which bought the “drying” in 1999, and today’s Iraq.
In general, even for rich countries, a specialized attack aircraft, as it turned out, is an expensive pleasure. Neither the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, accustomed to squandering money on military toys, nor even China, which is rapidly growing in power, have such aircraft. Well, with China it’s a separate question - there the role of ersatz attack aircraft can be played by numerous clones of MiGs of the seventeenth (J-5), nineteenth (J-6) and others like them, and human resources are almost limitless... the excess male population has to be put somewhere.
In general, there are now two serious armies in the world that can afford attack aircraft - the American one and ours. And the opposing sides are represented accordingly A-10 Thunderbolt II(which I'm talking about) and Su-25.
Many people have a natural question -
“Which of them is cooler?

Western apologists will immediately say that the A-10 is cooler, because it has a monochrome screen in the cockpit, takes more and flies further.
Patriots will say that the Su-25 is faster and more durable. Let's try to consider the advantages of each aircraft separately and take a closer look.
But first, a little history - how both cars came to be.

. Timeline of creation

USA

1966 opening of the Air Force programs A-X (Attack eXperimental - drum experimental)
March 1967 - a competition was announced for the design of a relatively inexpensive armored attack aircraft. 21 aircraft manufacturing companies are participating
May 1970 - two prototypes were flown(YA-9A and YA-10A are competition finalists)
October 1972 - start of comparative tests
January 1973 - victory in the YA-10A competition from Fairchild Republic. A contract ($159 million) was signed for the production of 10 pre-production aircraft.
February 1975 - flight of the first pre-production aircraft
September 1975 - first flight with the GAU-8/A cannon
October 1975 - flight of the first production A-10A
March 1976 - aircraft began to enter service with the troops(to Davis-Monthan airbase)
1977 - achievement of combat readiness and adoption by the US Air Force

USSR

May 1968 - the beginning of initiative design at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, taking on the appearance by general designer P.O. Sukhim. At that time the plane was still called the “battlefield aircraft” (SPB).
The end of 1968 - the beginning of purging at TsAGI
March 1969 - competition for a light attack aircraft. Participated: T-8 (with two 2 x AI-25T), Yak-25LSH, Il-42, MiG-21LSH
End of 1969 - victory of the T-8, military requirement of 1200 km/h
Summer 1970 - development of the project, creation of documentation
End of 1971 - finalization of the appearance, agreed with the military on a maximum speed of 1000 km/h
January 1972 - finalization of the appearance of the T-8, start of mock-up work
September 1972 - approval of the layout and set of documentation from the customer, start of construction of the prototype aircraft
February 1975 - flight of the first prototype (T-8-1)
Summer 1976 - updated prototypes (T-8-1D and T-8-2D) with R-95Sh engines
July 1976 - receiving the name "Su-25" and beginning of preparations for serial production
June 1979 - flight of the first production vehicle (T-8-3)
March 1981 - GSI was completed and the aircraft was recommended for adoption
April 1981 - the aircraft began to enter combat units
June 1981 - start of use of the Su-25 in Afghanistan
1987 - official adoption


Project SPB (Battlefield Aircraft) Sukhoi Design Bureau

. Comparison on paper


The tactical and technical characteristics of the aircraft had to be collected long and hard, because they were not available in any source.
The performance characteristics of the A-10 in RuNet (with a maximum speed of 834 km/h) is generally something that has its origins in an old Soviet brochure from 1976. In short, like with that one GAU-8 cannon and the mass of its shells, everywhere in RuNet(except for my post about her in svbr) published incorrectly. And I calculated this by counting the variants of the combat load - there was nothing wrong with the existing mass.
Therefore, I had to surf the websites of the adversaries, during which I even found a 500-page manual for the A-10.

In short, the result of all this was a post about the A-10 and this sign:

Advantages of "Warthog"

And indeed, A-10 "takes" more

The maximum combat load of the A-10 is 7260 kg, plus the cannon ammunition (1350 rounds) is 933.4 kg.
The maximum combat load of the Su-25 is 4400 kg, gun ammunition (250 shells) is 340 kg.

Thunderbolt-2 has a longer range - from 460 km with a normal load (in "close support" missions) to 800 km lightly (in "aerial reconnaissance" missions).
Hrach has a combat radius of 250-300 km.

Largely due to the fact that Thunderbolt engines are more economical.
The bench consumption of TF34-GE-100 is 0.37 kg/kgf·h, for R-95Sh - 0.86 kg/kgf·h.
Here, lovers of American technology throw their caps into the air and rejoice: “The rook is two and a half times more gluttonous.”

Why is that?
Firstly, the Thunderbolt engines are double-circuit (on Grach they are single-circuit), and secondly, the Su-25 engine is more unpretentious and omnivorous (for example, it can eat... diesel fuel instead of aviation kerosene), which of course does not benefit fuel efficiency , but expands the application possibilities of the aircraft.
And it should also be remembered that hourly fuel consumption is not the same as kilometer consumption (because aircraft speeds differ, and at cruising speed the same Su-25 flies 190 km more per hour).

An additional advantage of the A-10 is presence of an in-flight refueling system, which further expands its possible range of action.

Refueling from a KC-135 air tanker

Separate engine nacelle

It gives advantages when modernizing an aircraft - the new power plant does not depend on the size of the engine nacelle, you can plug in what you need. It is also likely that this arrangement of the engine makes it possible to quickly replace it if damaged.

Good visibility from the cabin

The shape of the warthog's nose and canopy provide the pilot with good review , which gives better situational awareness.
But it does not solve problems with finding targets with the naked eye, the same as those experienced by the Su-25 pilot.
More about this below.

The superiority of "Rook"

Speed ​​and agility

Here the Su-25 comes forward.
The cruising speed of the Warthog (560 km/h) is almost one and a half times less than the speed of the Rook (750 km/h).
The maximum, respectively, is 722 km/h versus 950 km/h.
In terms of vertical maneuverability, thrust-to-weight ratio (0.47 versus 0.37) and rate of climb (60 m/s versus 30 m/s), the Su-25 is also superior to the American.
At the same time, the American should be better in horizontal maneuverability - due to its larger wing area and lower speed when turning. Although, for example, the pilots of the “Heavenly Hussars” aerobatic team who piloted the A-10A said that a turn with a bank of more than 45 degrees for the A-10A comes with a loss of speed, which cannot be said about the Su-25.
Test pilot, Hero of Russia Magomed Tolboev, who flew the A-10, confirms their words:

“The Su-25 is more maneuverable, it does not have restrictions like the A-10. For example, our aircraft can fully perform complex aerobatics, but the “American” cannot, it has limited pitch angles and roll angles, fit into the A-10 canyon can’t, but the Su-25 can..."

Vitality

It is generally accepted that their survivability is approximately equal. But still, “Rook” is more tenacious.
And in Afghanistan, attack aircraft had to work in very harsh conditions. In addition to the well-known American Stinger MANPADS supplied to terrorists... in the mountains of Afghanistan, Su-25s encountered intense fire. Strelkovka, heavy machine guns, MZA... and the "Rooks" were often simultaneously fired not only from below, but also from the side, from behind and even... from above!
I would like to see the A-10 in such scrapes (with its large canopy with “excellent visibility”), and not in the conditions of the predominantly flat Iraq.

Both are armored, but structurally... the armored cabin of the A-10A is made of titanium panels fastened with bolts (which themselves become secondary elements of destruction in the event of a direct hit), the Su-25 has a welded titanium “bath”; The control rods on the A-10A are cable, on the Su-25 they are titanium (in the rear fuselage made of heat-resistant steel), which can withstand hits from large-caliber bullets. The engines are also spaced apart for both, but on the Su-25 there is a fuselage and an armored panel between the engines, on the A-10 there is air.

At the same time, the Su-25 is geometrically smaller, which somewhat reduces the likelihood of it being hit by a rifle or MZA.

Location flexibility

Rook is less demanding on the airfield.
Take-off run length of the Su-25: on a concrete runway - 550/400 m (on the ground - 900/650 m). If necessary, it can take off and land from unpaved runways (whereas the A-10 stated only planting on grass).
Take-off/run length A-10: 1220/610 m.

The Rook does not need a special complex to reload the gun, unlike the A-10.


Special complex ALS (Ammunition Loading System) for reloading GAU-8

And the most interesting thing.
Su-25 pilots do not need a refrigerator with Coca-Cola! Just kidding. The Rook R-95 engine, which is criticized for its “gluttony” (stand consumption 0.88 kg/hour versus 0.37 kg/hour for the American)... is much more unpretentious and omnivorous. The fact is that The Su-25 engine can be fueled... with diesel fuel!
This was done so that the Su-25s operating together with the advancing units (or from “skid-up airfields”, prepared sites) could, if necessary, refuel from the same tankers.

Price

The price of one A-10 is $4.1 million in 1977 prices, or $16.25 million in 2014 prices (this is the domestic price for the Americans, since the A-10 was not exported).
It is difficult to establish the cost of the Su-25 (because it has been out of production for a long time)... It is generally accepted (I have seen this figure in most sources) that the cost of one Su-25 is $3 million (in 2000s prices).
I also came across an assessment that the Su-25 was four times cheaper A-10 (which roughly agrees with the above figures). I suggest you accept it.

. View from the trench


If we move from paper to specific ravines, i.e. from comparing numbers to combat realities, the picture turns out to be more interesting.

Now I’m going to say a seditious thing for many, but don’t rush to shoot tomatoes - read to the end.
The solid combat load of the A-10 is, in general, meaningless. For the job of a stormtrooper is “ appeared - combed the enemy - dumped”, until he came to his senses and organized air defense.
The attack aircraft must hit its target on the first, or maximum on the second, approach. On the third and other approaches, the effect of surprise has already been lost, the unhit “targets” will hide, and those that do not want to hide will prepare MANPADS, heavy machine guns and other things that are unpleasant for any aircraft. And enemy fighters called for help may also arrive.
And for these one or two (well, three) runs, seven tons of the A-10’s combat load is excessive; it won’t have time to dump everything specifically on the targets.

The situation is similar with a cannon, which has a huge rate of fire on paper, but allows you to fire only short bursts lasting one second (maximum two). In one run, the Warthog can allow himself one burst, and then a minute of cooling of the trunks.
The second burst of the GAU-8 is 65 shells. For two passes the maximum consumption of ammunition is 130 pieces, for three passes - 195 pieces. As a result, out of an ammunition load of 1350 shells, 1155 unused shells remain. Even if you shoot in two-second bursts (consumption of 130 pieces/sec), then after three passes there are 960 shells left. Even in this case, 71% (actually 83%) of the gun’s ammunition is essentially unnecessary and redundant. Which, by the way, is confirmed by the same “Desert Storm”, the actual consumption of shells was 121 pieces. for departure.
Well, oh well, he doesn’t have enough reserves - let’s leave it to him so that he can shoot down helicopters along the way; we need to dispose of the depleted uranium 238 that the Americans don’t need somewhere.

Well, you say, we can not take the full combat load (we’ll take the same amount as Grach), but fill in more fuel and even grab a couple more PTBs (outboard fuel tanks), seriously increasing the range and time spent in the air. But the large combat radius of the A-10 hides another problem.
B O a longer range has an unpleasant downside for a subsonic aircraft. The higher the flight range, the farther the airfield is from the battle site, and accordingly, you will have to fly to the aid of your troops. O more. Okay, if the attack aircraft is patrolling in the “front line” area at this time... what if this is an emergency flight from the ground?
It’s one thing to fly 300 kilometers at a speed of 750 km/h (Su-25 departure), and completely different to fly 1000 km (and about that much and even a little further you can drag an A-10 with 4 tons of combat load, full tanks and a pair of anti-tank tanks ) at a speed of 560 km/h. In the first case, a ground unit, pinned down by fire, will wait 24 minutes for an attack aircraft, and in the second, 1 hour 47 minutes. What is called - feel the difference (c).
And the military comrades will “cut” the zone of responsibility for the attack aircraft on the map according to the radius of action. And woe to those American infantrymen whose units will be located at the edges of the radius.

But we forgot that an American attack aircraft with a lot of fuel (and the ability to refuel in the air) can “hang” over the front line for a long time, ready to work when called from the ground. Here, however, the problem of calling from the other end of a large area of ​​​​responsibility still remains... But maybe you’ll get lucky and the guys attacked somewhere nearby will call.
Fuel and engine life will indeed have to be wasted, but this is not the worst thing. There is another serious BUT. This scenario is poorly suited for a war with a peer enemy that has front-line fighters, AWACS aircraft, long-range air defense systems and over-the-horizon radars in the combat zone. With such an enemy, hanging over the front line “waiting for a call” will not work.
So it turns out that the seemingly serious paper advantage is practically nullified real life. The A-10's range and combat load capabilities seem excessive. It’s like driving a nail (destroying an important point target on the front line) with a microscope... You can take a regular hammer (Su-25), or you can take a sledgehammer (A-10). The result is the same, but the labor costs are higher.

At the same time, everyone should remember that the Su-25 is much cheaper. For the price of one A-10 you can buy 4 Su-25s, which can cover the same (if not larger) area of ​​responsibility with much more high speed response.

Now, let's think about what is most important for a stormtrooper.

The attack aircraft must a) accurately and quickly hit the target, b) get out of the fire alive.

On the first point, both aircraft have problems (and even their current modifications, the A-10S and Su-25SM). Without preliminary high-quality target designation from the ground or a drone, it is often impossible to detect and hit a target on the first approach.
And for the A-10A and Su-25 we are comparing, this is even worse, since there was no normal sighting system (about this and the problems encountered in Iraq - here).
The attack aircraft carried neither an optical-electronic sight (for TV-guided missiles, the A-10 pilot searched for the target on a monochrome screen of poor resolution through the missile's homing head with a narrow field of view), nor a radar. True, the "Rook" at the same time had its own laser rangefinder-target designator "Klen-PS", with the help of which it could use air-to-surface guided missiles with laser seekers (S-25L, Kh-25ML, Kh-29L). "Warthog" could use laser-guided bombs only with external lighting laser targets.


Launch of a Kh-25ML guided missile from a Su-25 attack aircraft

On the second point (“getting out of the fire alive”) the Su-25 clearly has an advantage. Firstly, due to higher survivability. And secondly, due to a much higher maximum speed and better acceleration characteristics.
And now, for example, we also install .

. Different approach


While writing this article, I remembered one episode from the movie "Snatch".

In this case, I strongly associate the healthier and heavier A-10A (with a fatal blow™) with the luxurious George, and the small and wiry Gypsy Mickey with the Su-25.

It seems that the planes are of the same class, but you start to understand and realize that in fact the cars are very different. And their differences are due to different approaches and concepts of application.

"Thunderbolt" is more of a protected flying "tank destroyer", designed for a long time in the air and free hunting. Powerful and heavily loaded, carrying a ton of ammunition for all occasions. Its weapons complex (the heavy-duty GAU-8/A cannon and the AGM-65 Maverick guided missiles) was primarily “tailored” to attack tanks, to level out the Soviet tank advantage on the ground (which began in the late 60s and took shape in the 70s). 1940s), and only then - for direct support of troops.

"Rook" was created as a workhorse for the furnace. As a hardy, cheap and unpretentious aircraft for war, which was supposed to solve the problem of supporting ground forces “cheaply and cheerfully”, coming as close as possible to the enemy and treating him with bombs, NURS and a cannon... And in some cases, using missiles with a laser seeker to destroy point targets goals.

As we see today, the idea of ​​a “plane around a gun” did not justify itself (especially considering that the vast majority of the A-10A’s targets were destroyed by Maverick missiles), and in the next modification the A-10C went to altitude, receiving sighting containers as “eyes” and precision weapons as a “long arm” and retaining atavisms in the form of a gun and armor.
And the concept of remote warfare and loss reduction actually pushed it out of the “attack aircraft” into the niche of fighter-bombers, which, in my opinion, largely determines its current problems. Although sometimes the Warthog “takes to the old ways” and irons ground targets (preferably more defenseless) ... but still, it seems that the Americans seriously intend to bury the attack aircraft as a class again.

Ours do not intend to abandon the Su-25. Not so long ago, the Hornet design and development work was opened for a new promising attack aircraft, and then they started talking about the PAK SHA program. True, in the end, having studied the capabilities of the modernized Su-25SM3, the military seemed to have decided for now to abandon the new platform and squeeze the potential of the old Su-25 to dry, modernizing all the remaining aircraft in the Air Force under the SM3 program. Maybe even the production of the Su-25 would have been launched again if the plant for their production had not remained in Georgia after the collapse of the USSR, and the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant (which at one time produced the Su-25UB, Su-25UTG and plans to produce the Su-25TM) production of the Su-25 has already been curtailed.
Despite periodically sounding crazy thoughts about replacing the Su-25 with a light attack aircraft based on the Yak-130, our military is not going to give up attack aircraft. And God willing, soon we will see a replacement for the good old Rook.

No matter how hard military visionaries try to rid the battlefield of the ordinary soldier... the onset of these times is not yet in sight. No, in some cases you can fight with robots, but this solution is very “niche” and not for a serious war.
In a large-scale war with a comparable enemy, all of today’s expensive fake whistles will quickly become a thing of the past. Because anyone who will strike with high-precision missiles/bombs costing $100,000 or more on bunkers with a cost of 50,000 rubles and 60 man-hours of work is doomed. Therefore, all this talk about high-precision weapons, replacing attack aircraft with drones, 6th, 7th and 8th generation aircraft, “network-centric warfare” and other joys will quickly cease in the event of a serious and large-scale mess. And the attack aircraft will have to return to the battlefield again, the seats in the cockpits of which will have to be taken by Ivans and Johns...

The T-8M product of the Sukhoi design bureau is better known as the Su-25T. This vehicle is designed specifically to destroy armored vehicles, ships, bridges, manpower, as well as any enemy air targets. This combat vehicle has the ability to operate under any weather conditions and at any time of the day. Combat missions can be carried out at altitudes from 30 to 5 thousand meters. Optimally, the aircraft conducts fire work at a depth of 450 kilometers behind the front line.

The first Su-25T aircraft took off from the ground in the summer of 1984, and serial production of the vehicle began in 1990. These devices were manufactured at an aircraft factory in Tbilisi. The Su-25T was first presented to the public in the winter of 1991 in Dubai. As for tests at the state level, they continued until 1993. After testing, the aircraft entered service with the Russian Air Force.

Design features of the Su-25T attack aircraft

This aircraft is made in a single-seat version and differs from the standard original aircraft in that instead of a co-pilot there is a fuel tank and a compartment in which radio equipment is located. This type of aircraft was equipped new system sight called "Shkval". Since it was located in the forward part of the fuselage, it had to be enlarged. The changes also affected the location of the guns: they were moved under the fuel tanks.

The middle part of the fuselage of the vehicle is made in the same way as in the previous version. This department includes the engines and air intakes of the car. The tail section of the vehicle is equipped with a soft fuel tank and a full range of control systems and radio equipment. The nacelles to which the power plant is attached were redesigned for new engines of the R-95Sh type. As for the wing, it remained the same and was not improved, only the brake flaps were changed. On the wings of the Su-25T there were five special holders that could carry weapons weighing 1 ton.

There are two types of aircraft tail: horizontal and vertical. As for the stabilizer of the device, it can be located in three positions depending on the task, namely: flight, maneuver or takeoff and landing mode. The position of the stabilizer is changed using a hydraulic cylinder.

The Su-25T model aircraft has a landing gear with three legs, which are retracted into special niches. The front support is slightly offset to the left, this was done to position the guns. The front pillar has one steerable wheel, which has a protective shield against dirt. As for the supports under the middle part of the device, they are exactly the same as in the previous version of the aircraft, and the wheels are equipped with braking systems. The release and lifting of the chassis is controlled by a hydraulic system. For more effective braking, the aircraft has an additional parachute system, which is located in the rear of the aircraft. This system is represented by a double-dome parachute.

The cockpit is completely sealed and has an excess pressure in the middle of 0.25 kg/cm 2 . This allows the pilot to feel more comfortable and fly the plane to an altitude of 10 thousand meters. The cockpit is all-welded and equipped with titanium armor, which allows the pilot to be protected even from a direct hit from a 12-mm projectile.

All machine controls are automatic, but the main work in flight is performed by the elevators and controls, as well as the ailerons. For easier and more comfortable control, all systems are equipped with hydraulic boosters. As for the control wiring, it is made according to a rigid circuit, which increases its survivability. But the most important thing in control is that the aircraft has a system that allows automatic flight. This SAU-8 type system ensures stabilization of the vehicle at angles and roll; in addition, it is capable of stabilizing flight. The plane can automatically move both horizontally and vertically. This equipment capable of landing approaches up to a height of 50 meters.

The hydraulics of the machine differ only in the presence of a booster, which is located in the longitudinal channel along with the control system.

Concerning power plant, then it consists of two new turbojet engines of the R-195 type. The engines themselves do not have an afterburner system and are not equipped with nozzle adjustment. The drive box is located under the power plant and is equipped with an electric start that operates from an autonomous system. These engines produce a towing capacity of 4300 kg. In addition, they have a low level of IR radiation. The machine's nozzles are equipped with a central body, which promotes better cooling by blowing cold air through it, which comes from the air intakes. On the Su-25T aircraft, it is possible to replace the engines with others of the R-95Sh type.

The fuel system, through pumps, ensures the supply of fuel to the power plant regardless of the aircraft's position in flight. The vehicle's fuel is located in four fuel tanks in the fuselage and one more in the wings of the vehicle. The total capacity of the tanks is almost five tons of fuel. For greater survivability in combat conditions, each engine has its own autonomous tank, and the looped system provides the power plant with fuel from any tank. To prevent the tanks from exploding, they are filled with 70 percent polyurethane foam. For transporting the vehicle, it is possible to install additional outboard tanks with a capacity of 4 tons of fuel.

To rescue a pilot in an emergency, a Su-25T aircraft is equipped with an ejection system that operates effectively in any flight mode and at any altitude.

Power supply is provided by generators installed on the engines. The peculiarity is that the aircraft has a system of direct and alternating current, which is used for different systems. The current voltage is 115 volts and the frequency is 400 Hz. As for the lighting equipment, it is similar to the previous version.

Characteristics of the Su-25T:

    Crew: 1 person

    Length: 15.33 m (with LDPE)

    Wingspan: 14.36 m

    Height: 5.2 m

    Wing area: 30.1 m²

    Empty weight: 9,500 kg

    Normal take-off weight: 16,500 kg

    Maximum take-off weight: 19,500 kg

    Fuel weight: 4890 kg

    Engines: 2x TRD R-195

    Thrust: 2x 40 kN (4,500 kgf)

Armament of the Tu-25T:

Small arms and cannon: double-barreled 30-mm GSh-30 cannon with 200 rounds of ammunition (built-in)

Guided missiles:

  • air-to-air missiles: 2 x R-60M; 2 x R-73
  • air-to-surface missiles: 16 x ATGM “Vikhr”; 6 x X-25ML (MT, MR, MP, MPU); 8 x S-25L; 2 x Kh-29L (T, ML, TE, TM, TD); 2 x X-58E (U).

Unguided rockets:

  • NAR blocks - 8 x B-5 blocks with S-5 NAR (256 NAR);
  • 8 x NAR B-8 blocks; x NAR S-8 (160 NAR);
  • 8 x NAR B-13L units; x NAR S-13 (40 NAR);
  • 8 x NAR S-24 B; x NAR S-24 OFM;
  • 8 x NAR S-25; x NAR S-25 OFM.

Bombs: free-falling and adjustable for various purposes, cluster bombs

  • 2 x KAB-500Kp;
  • 10 x AB-100; 32 x AB-100 together with MBD-2-67U
  • 10 x AB-250;
  • 8 x AB-500;
  • 8 x RBK-250;
  • 8 x RBK-500;
  • 8 x KMGU-2;
  • 8 x ZB-500;

Su-25UTG

In connection with the completion of work on the heavy aircraft carrier-cruiser TAKR project 1143.5 called “Tbilisi” (the first of the series), it was decided to create a ship-based fighter Su-28. But for negative reasons, the aircraft project was stopped. It was replaced by the base model, the Su-25UB. Engineers from the Sukhoi Design Bureau made this decision after flight tests in the summer of 1984. Tests were carried out for the Su-27 - take-off from a ski-jump at the Nitka base complex. At the same time, the Su-25 (T8-4) was tested. He showed himself quite well. It was based on the results that the engineers from the design bureau decided to use it as a basis for creating a carrier-based training aircraft - the T8-UTG, or Su-25UTG.

To develop the new aircraft, one production Su-25UB was allocated, and N.P. was appointed lead flight test engineer. Petrukhina. The aircraft was assembled immediately, taking into account future improvements to strengthen the structure. Mass production it was planned to be carried out at the aircraft plant in Ulan-Ude, starting in 1988. In March, the fighter was sent under its own power to the LIS OKB. There they installed a hook and KZA calibration on it. Tester I.V. took the modernized model into the sky. Votintsev.

In October, the aircraft was transported to the city of Saki to conduct a test program of landing with a hook on the arresting arrester cable. All test flights were carried out by V.G. Pugachev, I.V. Votintsev, S.N. Melnikov, E.I. Frolov, A.V. Krutov (LII tester), A.B. Lavrikov and A.I. Fokin (military testers). For the first time, T8-UTG1, piloted by test pilots Kruglov and Votintsev, landed on the deck of the aircraft carrier Tbilisi. The entire ship-based test program was carried out from 1991 to 1992. The ship was relocated to Severomorsk.

In Ulan-Ude in 1990, 12 copies of a small production batch of Su-25UTG were created and produced. They were transported to Severomorsk for transfer to the Northern Fleet aviation as part of the training program for Su-27K pilots. In the period from 1991 to 1995, another batch of five Su-25UTG was assembled at the plant. This game was the second and last.

Technical description of Su-25UTG

The aircraft was created for pilots to carry out landing and takeoff on a ground complex with a short take-off mechanism - an inclined ramp-springboard, practicing landing - an arresting arrester and monitoring pilots and cadets of combat units and flight schools.

The flight performance characteristics of the Su-25UTG are practically no different from the characteristics of the training Su-25UB. Thanks to the flight and navigation equipment installed on the aircraft, it is possible to practice take-off and landing of the aircraft under any weather conditions for training flights.

The Su-25UTG is very similar to the production Su-25UB in terms of aerodynamic layout, power plant and its systems, overall weight characteristics, equipment, aircraft systems and airframe design with landing gear structure.

The process of training flights of the Su-25UTG consists of fulfilling the assigned flight training tasks:

    Taking off from a springboard.

    Landing on an aerofinisher using a catch hook.

    Development of piloting techniques at any time of the day and under any weather conditions.

    Performing instrument flights and conducting “blind flights”.

    Training in the principle of action in the event of an emergency or with a simulated failure of navigation and flight equipment.

    Aircraft navigation (day and night).

    Initial training in flight centers and schools.

The Su-25UTG combat production aircraft has a number of differences from the basic training model. The differences mainly relate to the elements and systems of construction. The Su-25UTG lacks units of sighting equipment and weapons control systems, installations with guns, beam holders and pylons, armored engine shields, radio communication stations, blocks and elements of the defense system. But at the same time, a landing hook was installed in the rear of the fuselage, which is a braking hook with side stabilizers and a lifting damper. A modified fuselage tail boom was attached, capable of absorbing the loads from the landing hook.

Since the parachute-brake unit was removed, the end of the tail boom had to be shortened. The niche intended for the cannon installation was sewn up (located in the head part). A forward viewing periscope (POP-1) was installed in the second cabin, and armored hatches in the central part were replaced with aluminum alloy slabs. Instead of the removed combat consoles, blanks and rangefinder windows were installed.

When the aircraft was relocated, they decided to retain the option of installing four fuel drop tanks. Each of them could hold 800 liters. PTB-800 were placed two under each wing; taking into account a possible emergency situation, they can be dropped.

When an airplane takes off from a ski-jump, it is brought to flight angle of attack values ​​taking into account the curvature of the ski-jump. Thanks to this, the take-off run length is significantly reduced. Before takeoff, the pilot taxis and puts the plane on the delay, then turns on the maximum engine operating mode and lowers the stabilizer to the takeoff position. After the command, the aircraft is released from the arrestor and accelerates along the runway towards the springboard. The angle of attack is brought to the take-off position after leaving the springboard, and after three seconds it accelerates to flight speed.

The GLOS (ground-based optical landing system) is responsible for the process of entering the aircraft into the landing zone. Once in the beam of the optical system, the pilot, using instruments, switches the machine to altitude reduction mode along a given glide path. The flight along it is carried out at a calculated angle of attack while maintaining maximum speed. The process occurs until the landing gear wheels touch the runway.

During landing, the brake hook slides along the top of the runway and catches on the arrester cable. After hooking the cable, the plane travels a distance of 90 meters with the highest G-value during braking (4-5 units).

Application in the Air Force

Previously, the aircraft was in service with the USSR and Ukraine. The aircraft served in the Soviets until its collapse, after which five Su-25UTGs went to Ukraine. In 1993 they were transferred to the 299th naval assault aviation regiment. In 1994, 3 copies were exchanged for Russian Su-25UB, and two were sold to China and the USA.

At the moment, the remaining Su-25UTG are in service with the Russian Air Force.

Su-25K after takeoff from the deck, drawing

Development and production

Operation history

General design data

Engine

Flight-tactical characteristics

Armament

suspended

  • air-to-air missiles: 2 x R-60
  • air-to-ground missiles: 4 x Kh-27PS, 2 x Kh-31, 2 x Kh-29L
  • unguided missiles, bombs (up to 1265 kg)

built-in

  • 1 x 30 mm gun GSh-30-2

Power point

The aircraft is equipped with two R-95Sh afterburning turbojet engines with a non-adjustable nozzle. Air enters the engines through two cylindrical channels with oval subsonic unregulated air intakes.

At the bottom of the engines there are boxes of aircraft units that take away part of the power of the turbines to rotate the electric generators that power the aircraft’s on-board network. These same generators serve as starters that spin up the compressor when starting.

Weapons and equipment

Sighting equipment The carrier-based attack aircraft was supposed to include an ASP-17BMTs aviation rifle-bomber sight and a Klen-PS laser illumination and ranging station, which ensured the destruction of targets when they were visually visible. The weapon control system ensured the use of both similar and mixed types of weapons in one attack.

Armament The aircraft included a powerful 30-mm double-barreled GSh-30-2 cannon in the fuselage; if necessary, it could be supplemented with SPPU-22 suspended containers with 23-mm GSh-23L cannons. A wide range of bomb and missile weapons were also mounted on an external sling. There were eight pylons under the wing in total, but with the suspension of multi-lock beam holders on them, the number of suspension points could be increased.

The attack aircraft could carry both unguided bombs and missiles, and laser-guided ones (target illumination was provided by the Klen-PS onboard laser station); If a container with a Vyuga control system was suspended on one of the pylons, the aircraft could also use anti-radar missiles of the Kh-31 and Kh-27PS types. For self-defense, a suspension of R-60 air-to-air missiles with heat guidance was provided.

Modifications

Variants of the Su-25K carrier-based attack aircraft, equipped with on-board radar

In addition to the main, single-seat version, the project also worked on a combat training two-seat version of the attack aircraft ( Su-25UBK). Preliminary design This aircraft was supposed to be used by deck pilots for training in piloting techniques during takeoffs and landings on an aircraft carrier, as well as in aircraft navigation in conditions open sea And combat use. Unlike the one actually built educational Su-25UTG, which cannot carry a combat load when taking off from a springboard, combat training The Su-25UBK was designed to take off from a catapult, so it had to retain some of the attack aircraft’s weapons and a full-fledged sighting and navigation system.

At the level of preliminary design, improved modifications of the single-seat attack aircraft were also developed - Su-25K-1 And Su-25K-2. They were supposed to carry a more advanced sighting and navigation system, including an on-board radar.

  • A selection of materials about projects of domestic aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft on the website paralay.com

Notes

Image gallery