Corporate ownership is based on the functioning of capital, which is formed through the free sale of property titles - shares. Each owner of a share is the owner of the capital of an open joint stock company. In contrast to partnership ownership, if the latter operates in the form of closed joint stock companies, shares of open companies are freely bought and sold on the markets. In this regard, after certain periods of time, changes in the ownership of shares - fictitious capital - may occur, while the company will continue to exist until its liquidation or reorganization.
It should be emphasized that although corporate ownership represents fragmented, private shareholders (which is why it refers to private property), nevertheless, it can be considered a transitional form from private to public property. The fact is that share capital, despite its fragmentation between shareholders, functions and enters into economic relations as a single whole, as a social united capital. Relationships of disposal are not implemented separately, in relation to individual blocks of shares, but to the entire capital as a whole. The implementation of relations of disposal of share capital is carried out by those who own a controlling stake. The owners of a controlling stake manage the entire capital of the joint-stock company as a single property.
If we consider the implementation of corporate property through ownership relations, then it is obvious that they are carried out by separate
owners of shares in the form of assignment of dividends (income on shares). This is reflected in the ongoing economic, financial, organizational, managerial, and technological policy of the company, which is based on deductions from the profits of the joint-stock company to an accumulation fund intended for further capital accumulation, expansion and improvement of economic activities.
Within the framework of public property, collective, state and so-called public property should be distinguished.

Corporate finance study keyconcepts on which capital markets analysis is based and form the basisto make operational and strategiclogical financial decisions. In other words, they study methods, techniques, patterns and technologies for financial justification of strategic decisions in a corporation.Finance - this is a system economic relations related to the formation, distribution and use of monetary income and savings.Financial resources – cash income, receipts and savings at the disposal of organizations and the state, intended for the implementation of costs of simple and expanded reproduction, fulfillment of obligations to the financial and credit system.Finance functions: distribution and control.Features of corporate finance: 1) the dependence of financial decisions on the external environment (primarily financial markets and government regulation), 2) the value of the cash flow indicator. Cash flow- this is a set of receipts and payments of funds distributed over separate intervals of the time period under consideration, generated in the process of its operating, investment, financial activities, the movement of which is associated with factors of time, risk and liquidity.

Corporation(from the English “corporation” - joint-stock company) - a form of legal entity in the form of a joint-stock company or an association of shareholders, bears liability for obligations limited to the value of issued shares, has the right in its own name to produce goods and services, enter into contracts, receive and provide loans and perform any other civil actions.

The corporation has the following main features:

it is a separate legal entity;

the owners of this legal entity are equity investors - shareholders;

shareholders have limited liability (they are not liable for the corporation’s debts with their property);

current management functions are delegated to hired managers under the control of the board of directors;

The title of ownership of shareholders is a share that has the property of transferability, i.e. can be sold (transferred) by one person to another. Thus, the essence of a corporation is the shared ownership of its participants, and its goal is to maximize the capital of the owners (shareholders). The main goal economic activity and functioningcorporate finance is to maximize the welfare of its owners in the current and future periods, ensured bymaximizing its market value . Tasks:

Formation of a sufficient volume of financial resources to ensure the necessary pace economic development corporations.

Optimization of the distribution of generated financial resources by type of activity and areas of use.

Ensuring conditions for achieving maximum return on capital at the intended level financial risk.

Ensuring the minimization of financial risk associated with the use of financial resources at the envisaged level of their profitability.

Ensuring constant financial balance of the corporation in the process of its development

Ensuring a sufficient level of financial control over the corporation on the part of its founders.

Ensuring sufficient financial flexibility of the corporation.

Optimization of capital turnover.

Ensuring timely reinvestment of financial resources

The evolution of corporate finance theories. Agency costs, stakeholder theory, theory of maximizing the market value of a corporation.

Time value of money concept draws attention to the fact that identical amounts of money coming at the disposal of an economic entity at different points in time (for example, current and future) turn out to be unequal in terms of their purchasing power. The concept of transaction costs. The concept of transaction costs provides that in the real economy, any act of exchange (including transactions in the financial market) is associated with certain costs. Information is becoming one of the most important types of economic resources. Each economic agent has access to a limited amount of information; different participants in the transaction have different degrees of awareness about the product (goods, services). Based on such different information, exchange takes place in the market and prices are formed. Exchange costs are called transactional. Cost of Capital Concept shows that the capital raised by a company to finance its activities is not free. You have to pay for its use, and this payment depends on the form of capital attracted and the reliability of its recipient. Cash flow concept is the idea of ​​using a cash flow model to describe financial instruments, company performance, and other economic entities. The concept of the relationship between risk and return - any financial instrument (including a company) traded on the market provides the holder with some profitability through market prices. The considered concepts contributed to the emergence within the framework of financial theory of a direction that studies, using the methods of probability theory and mathematical statistics, the influence of uncertainty and risk on investment decision-making. raBot G. Markovich on the principles of portfolio formation, published in 1952.and laid the foundation for modern portfolio theory.

This period begins with the publication of the mentioned work by G. Markowitz and ends with the development of a model for valuing options by F. Black, M. Scholes and R. Merton. The most significant achievements in the development of neoclassical finance theory during this period are the theory of portfolio formation, developed by G. Markowitz in 1952; capital asset valuation model, better known in the literature by the abbreviation SARM, formed by W. Sharp, J. Litner and J. Maussin in 1964; the hypothesis of information efficiency of the capital market, put forward by Yu. Fama in 1965; the theory of capital structure and the theory of dividend irrelevance, proposed by F. Modigliani and M. Miller in 1958-1961; option pricing theory formed by F. Black, M. Scholes and R. Merton in 1973

Agency theory aims to resolve the problem of separation of ownership and control. It arose due to the fact that owners are extremely rarely able to independently manage their companies and are forced to delegate their management powers to hired specialist managers. Hired managers (or agents), whose competence includes making significant decisions on the management of an enterprise, have a large amount of information about the enterprise and do not always act in accordance with the goal of maximizing the welfare of the owners (or principals). As a result, so-called “agency conflicts” arise. Another source of this kind of conflict is the differentiation of interests of owners and creditors. They are devoted to the study of forms and methods of smoothing out such conflicts in the interests of owners. To resolve emerging conflicts, mechanisms are used: incentives, restrictions, punishments.

Incentives for managers can be incentive systems based on indicators of the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization's activities in the form of options to purchase shares of the enterprise or in the form of reward packages of shares. Development of neo-institutionalist theory towards the development of incentive mechanisms (mechanism design) was initiated by Nobel laureate L. Hurwitz in 1973.

Limitations may include direct intervention of shareholders in management by contacting the management of the enterprise or making proposals that must be put to vote at annual shareholder meetings. The punishment, first of all, is the threat of dismissal if its initiators gain the required number of shareholder votes, or the threat of buying up a controlling stake in the organization by a new investor, who, as a rule, replaces management.

The use of the listed mechanisms leads to the emergence agentski costs. These include:

costs of monitoring the activities of managers, for example the cost of audits;

creation costs organizational structure, limiting the possibility of undesirable behavior by managers, for example, the introduction of external investors to the board;

expenses for creating a system for stimulating the activities of managers.

Agency costs are justified as long as they are offset by profit growth.

The most important role in preventing and resolving such conflicts is played by corporate legislation and legislation on market activities valuable papers. 1

The Code of Corporate Conduct is a set of rules recommended for compliance by securities market participants and aimed at protecting the rights of investors, as well as improving other aspects of corporate governance. 2

3. Systems of corporate ownership and control. Peculiarities Russian market corporate ownership.

Systems of corporate ownership and control that exist in different countries, can be defined as insider and outsider. Insider system can be found in Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries. It is characterized by large shareholdings and widespread cross-shareholding. One of the characteristics of insider groups is that they are relatively small and their members know each other well. Insiders have the opportunity to clearly control the activities of corporate management; they can pursue corporate policies in their own interests without regard to the interests of small shareholders. In a number of countries (Germany, Japan), banks have the main influence among insiders. The most important means of control and the impact on managers on the part of investors is the exercise of their voting rights. In European countries with an insider system, the practice of limiting the rights of small shareholders is quite common (additional votes for certain categories of shareholders, issue of non-voting shares, ban on absentee voting, requirement of personal presence at the meeting).

Outsider system, or a system based on the regulation of corporate relations by the stock market, exists primarily in the USA, Great Britain, and other Anglo-Saxon countries and is characterized by the fact that the property of joint-stock companies belongs to wide group individual or institutional investors. In the outsider system, there are specific mechanisms for protecting the interests of small shareholders. In particular, the information disclosure system is better here, the market liquidity is higher (the number of market participants is not limited, transactions are made more often). Currently, investors and analysts prefer the outsider system, although supporters of the insider system point out that the latter allows for more successful long-term policy without regard to the short-term interests of shareholders. Consequently, owners have more control over managers.

The insider system worked successfully in the early stages of industrial development, but it does not adapt well to modern conditions of scientific and technological progress, is less flexible and responds less well to market signals. In our country, the existing system of corporate ownership can be unambiguously characterized as insider ownership. At the same time, significant changes have occurred in property relations to date. First of all, there is a decline in the share of insiders in general, with a partial concession to outside owners, and the concentration of share capital is increasing. According to a number of studies, the largest shareholder has a controlling stake in every fifth industrial organization. In this regard, the problem of liquidity in the Russian securities market is becoming more acute. Our existing market for large blocks of shares cannot be liquid initially, since large blocks are more difficult to sell and more difficult to buy. Access to the market is limited for small potential investors, whose savings represent the largest investment resource of society. Understanding the importance of this source of financing for the real sector of the economy, stock market regulators in Western European countries require strict compliance by issuers with the rule that at least 25% of shares from the proposed issue go on free sale (“free float”). Apparently, such a practice in Russian conditions would contribute to the development of the Russian securities market and increase its role in providing corporations with sources of financing. According to a number of analysts, the share of small shareholders is individuals it is necessary to increase it to 20-25%, and institutional investors representing the population - to 8-10%, and on this basis in the future to ensure the opportunity to raise capital on retail stock markets (most organizations have controlling shareholders with 55-70% shares ). In the United States, approximately half of all share capital is owned by individuals.

Currently, in economic theory there are many definitions of property as a category.

Corporate ownership is different from general concept property by its form and type. Therefore, it is logical to consider the concept of corporate property together with the definition of “property”.

Property is a system of economic relations between people expressed in the ownership, use and disposal of the means of production and the corresponding form of appropriation of the means and results of production.

Corporate ownership is usually considered from both an economic and legal point of view.

From an economic point of view, property can be represented as a system of relations between people in production and everyday life. Here there are the main features inherent to this system: the appropriation of the factor of production and products of labor; this is their economic use; it is the realization of economic benefits from them.

Legal aspects of property. Here property can be represented as property relations. The main points of these relations: ownership of the property, use of the property, disposal of the property.

As a legal category, property is a subjective interpretation of objectively established relations of appropriation. Here the right of ownership is established by the law of rules. And these rules determine what things this or that person can use, what he can dispose of, and the rules determine under what conditions such use and disposal is possible.

Theoretical analysis of property shows that it is a set of both economic and legal relations in society.

Property is the unity of the subjective and objective.

American economists Kodz and Alchian created new theory property. According to this theory, neither resources themselves are property. In society, there is a bundle or share of rights to use resources. Such a bundle consists of 11 rights: the right of ownership; right of use, right of management (i.e. who will use the benefits and how); right to income; the right to alienation, up to destruction (the right of the sovereign), the right to security, the right to inherit goods, the right to indefinite possession of goods, the prohibition on using goods to harm external environment, right to liability, right to residual nature.

In this theory, property rights are understood as sanctioned by society (state laws, traditions and customs, administrative orders). Property rights are represented as behavioral attitudes of people. In this theory, property is derived from the fact of limited economic resources. If there is no access to resources, i.e. they are not whose or do not belong to anyone or they belong to everyone - such resources are not objects of property.

There are three types of ownership: general, private, mixed. Schematically, the types of relationships are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Types of property relations

The general type represents this form social production, in which a collective or union, a group of people owns the means of production, jointly uses them in the production of material goods and services, jointly distributes income, but everyone receives in accordance with their labor contribution.

The private type is a form of social production in which a certain collective or group of people owns the means of production, while others do not have them. The private type of property can be represented in the form of individual and corporate property.

With individual ownership, labor and means of production are combined. With corporate ownership, there is a separation of labor and the means of production.

Distribution, both with individual and corporate ownership, occurs by both labor and capital.

Mixed type. It is found in associations, cooperatives, joint stock companies, partnerships, leases, public corporations, and joint ventures.

Speaking about the variety of forms of ownership, it should be noted that it is classified based on criteria. Property can be classified as follows:

Classification by form of assignment. The object of property is considered individual property. These are: products, personal subsidiary farm, workforce, individual work activity, land, personal property and industrial, Natural resources, housing.

Collective property: securities, cooperatives, rental enterprises, knowledge (everyone's intellect), partnerships, joint stock companies etc.

Classification according to the form of ownership: There are private forms of ownership, ownership of individuals and legal entities, and cooperative.

State property: municipal, regional, state, national, lease, with the right to purchase. By the way, quite often the state nationalizes unprofitable enterprises to help them get out of a difficult financial situation, with possible subsequent privatization.

Joint ownership: joint stock, property of various partnerships, enterprises and organizations, property of public organizations.

Classification by subject of ownership: property of various foundations, church property, teams, groups of people, families.

It is clear that of all forms of ownership, the dominant role is played by private and state ownership. Private is everything that does not belong to the state. State - everything that is not private.

In summary, it should be noted that corporate property is an economic concept, systematized in its classification and typology, and, what is important, the relationships between subjects and objects are internally supported by law.

Partnership property

Single property

Types and forms of ownership

The classification of property involves the identification of the following two types: private and public property.

World practice shows that the defining type of property is private, which appears in three main forms: individual, partnership, corporate.

Single ownership is characterized by the fact that the individual or entity implements all property relations (appropriation, disposal, possession, use). We are talking about isolated simple commodity producers who are at the same time the owners of both the means of production and work force. True, the labor of family members can be used here (for example, family farms). In addition, individual property can be represented in the form of ownership of an individual private person, who can also use hired labor.

Partnership ownership involves the association in one form or another of property, capital of several legal entities or individuals for the purpose of implementing a common entrepreneurial activity. Here we are talking about the formation of an enterprise on the basis of shares (means of production, land, money, material assets, innovative ideas) founders. They can be created on the basis of full or limited liability.

With full liability, the founders of the company bear full responsibility to their creditors with all their property, including that which is not part of the partnership property of this enterprise. Moreover, this is also a mutual responsibility: insufficient funds from one of the partners when paying creditors are compensated by the property of the other partners.

In limited liability partnerships, the founders are liable to their creditors solely to the extent of the share of capital (share block) owned by each of them. Property liability does not apply to the property of its participants that are not related to the property of the partner enterprise. Shares of such enterprises are distributed only among their founders.

Corporate ownership is based on the functioning of capital, which is formed through the free sale of property titles - shares. Each owner of a share is the owner of the capital of an open joint stock company. In contrast to partnership ownership, if the latter operates in the form of closed joint stock companies, shares of open companies are freely bought and sold on the markets. In this regard, after certain periods of time, changes in the ownership of shares - fictitious capital - may occur, while the company will continue to exist until its liquidation or reorganization.

It should be emphasized that, although corporate ownership represents fragmented, private owners of shares (therefore it refers to private property), nevertheless it can be considered a transitional form from private to public ownership. The fact is that share capital, despite its fragmentation between shareholders, functions and enters into economic relations as a single whole, as a social united capital. Relationships of disposal are not implemented separately, in relation to individual blocks of shares, but to the entire capital as a whole. The implementation of relations of disposal of share capital is carried out by those who own a controlling stake. The owners of a controlling stake manage the entire capital of the joint-stock company as a single property.

If we consider the implementation of corporate property through ownership relations, then it is obvious that they are carried out by separate

owners of shares in the form of assignment of dividends (income on shares). This is reflected in the ongoing economic, financial, organizational, managerial, and technological policy of the company, which is based on deductions from the profits of the joint-stock company to an accumulation fund intended for further capital accumulation, expansion and improvement of economic activities.

Within the framework of public property, collective, state and so-called public property should be distinguished.

Corporate ownership in a transformational economy

V.G. Naimushin, Doctor of Economics, First Deputy general director- Director for Economics of JSC VESNII, A.N. Kozlov, graduate student of the Department of Political Economy and economic policy, Rostov State University

The article examines the specific historical features of the formation of the corporate sector in modern Russia. The authors analyze the features of the post-privatization functioning of the institution of joint-stock ownership.

IT IS KNOWN that the economy is most developed countries world represents a constantly improving interaction of various forms of ownership and management, an optimal combination of state, corporate and private principles. In theory, such systems are called “mixed”. To a decisive extent successful development countries with mixed economies are the result dramatic changes in property relations, in the structure of which the joint-stock form of appropriation occupies a central place.

The “openness” and elasticity of shareholder ownership provides corporations with the opportunity to constantly expand the circle of investors, take advantage of mass production technology and the specialization of the total employee, and ensure high flexibility, dynamism and production efficiency. It was these properties of corporations that determined the significant advantages of the joint-stock form of ownership and its right to become the leading link in a mixed economy.

However, in our conditions, the mass corporatization of enterprises has not yet made significant changes in achieving the main goals of society. The initial stage of the market transformation of the administrative-command economy revealed a deep discrepancy between the initial plans of the reformers and the actual results achieved, which gave rise to disappointment and irritation among the vast majority of the population. Over the past decade, the country has lost from half to two-thirds of its production, scientific and technical potential. And although joint-stock companies (JSC) and partnerships make up more than half of the total number of enterprises and organizations, the results of privatization do not give grounds to assert that the key problem of the reform is the formation effective structure property - close to a successful solution.

Comprehensive study of theoretical and practical aspects the formation and development of joint-stock ownership in a transformational economy is one of the most important areas scientific research. It is becoming increasingly obvious that society needs not only to change the organizational and legal form of enterprises, but also to develop effective mechanisms for realizing the economic potential of corporations.

The specific historical features of the formation of the corporate sector in modern Russia are due to the fact that the basis of this process is the denationalization of the economy, and not the proactive unification of disparate capitals in order to realize the advantages of large-scale production. Mass privatization of state and municipal enterprises, accompanied by the fragmentation of existing production and economic complexes, formed a special type of corporate behavior aimed at extracting current income to the detriment of goals strategic development corporations. Such practices of corporate behavior do not correspond to the nature and characteristics of joint stock ownership and impede the effective implementation of its capabilities.

The economic potential of corporate ownership, as experience shows, does not arise overnight due to a change in the organizational and legal form of enterprises. This potential is formed gradually as a set of market opportunities, competitive advantages, means and sources of development of joint stock companies.

The formation of corporate entrepreneurship involves the formation of the foundations of shareholder democracy, the development by enterprises of various models of self-financing, taking into account and coordinating the interests of various categories of shareholders, and the establishment of partnerships in the economy. The potential of joint-stock enterprises is formed as a result of the implementation of a set of interrelated organizational and economic transformations carried out by the “techno-structure” with the active support of the state. The potential of corporations itself represents a systemic unity of six functional blocks: 1) the production and technical base of the enterprise; 2) investment resources; 3) organizational and management structure of the JSC; 4) personnel composition; 5) Information Support; b) a portfolio of innovative projects.

In a transition economy, the implementation of the competitive advantages of joint stock companies is ensured by:

Improving privatization and corporate legislation as legal basis development of partnerships between enterprises, as well as enterprises and the state;

Development and implementation of the program state support privatized enterprises in order to adapt them to market conditions, forming anti-crisis teams in corporations;

Overcoming the dependence of enterprises on administrative structures (ministries, central administrations, etc.) and establishing shareholder democracy as the most rational form of corporate self-government;

Creation of a modern market infrastructure capable of ensuring the rationalization of economic relations of enterprises of all forms of ownership;

Development investment projects and a rational combination of “insider” and “outsider” models of their financing;

Coordination of interests and constructive interaction all categories of shareholders.

Post-privatization practice has revealed a paradoxical contradiction of interests of different categories of shareholders: large owners strive to increase current profits, often neglecting strategic goals corporations; "technostructure", on the contrary, relying on the support labor collectives, shows interest in the stable and dynamic development of enterprises. As a result, the positions of large investors and managers in resolving strategic issues often diverge: large investors act as operational management personnel, and administrators act as responsible owners.

In the last decade, the redistribution of shareholder property has acquired a permanent and acutely conflicting nature, which negatively affects the financial and economic activities and investment attractiveness of domestic corporations. This is explained, in our opinion, by a transitional, unformed structure of share capital. Over the past decade, the concentration of controlling stakes has been and continues to be used to redistribute property rights and power, while the investment opportunities of joint-stock companies remain virtually unclaimed.

In the process of corporatization in our country, an atypical “insider” structure of share capital was established, characterized by the predominance of small blocks of shares of minority owners, and a bureaucratic procedure for managing state blocks of shares emerged - all this negatively affects the realization of the potential of the corporate sector of the economy. Overcoming the deformations of accelerated corporatization of enterprises is associated with the fastest completion of the process of initial capital accumulation, stabilization of the financial and economic activities of corporations and increasing their attractiveness for domestic and foreign investors.

The “insider” type of corporate ownership predetermined the imbalance of its internal architectonics and the disinterest of “outsiders” in long-term investments. The policy of “dissipation” of share capital objectively contradicts the nature of large-scale corporate entrepreneurship and hinders the formation of the institution of an “effective owner.” Attracting investment capital for the implementation of large-scale projects is being replaced by the struggle of oligarchic groups for new sources of short-term income. The solution to this urgent socio-economic and political problem cannot be successful without establishing and maintaining a balance of interests of the main participants of the joint-stock company: managers, employees, investors and the state.

The subject-object structure of corporate ownership makes it possible to establish its internal contradiction, the investment and profitable forms of realizing the economic potential of a joint-stock company, to specify the interests of various groups of shareholders, and to justify the institution of shareholder democracy as a mechanism for coordinating their interests. Contradictions between the economic and political interests of various groups of shareholders pose the corporate community with a dilemma: to use the corporation’s potential primarily to solve current problems - replenishment working capital, bonuses for staff and payment of dividends - or direct efforts and funds to achieve strategic goals related to the implementation of large-scale projects? The internal inconsistency of shareholder ownership is externally manifested in permanent intra-company conflicts, reflecting the struggle of various groups of shareholders for the redistribution of property and power.

Modern restructuring of the shareholders of domestic joint stock companies is characterized by several trends:

Promotion specific gravity"outside shareholders" and, accordingly, a decrease in the share of "insider shareholders" employed in this enterprise;

The transition of priority positions among “insider shareholders” to the “technostructure”, which objectively bears the greatest responsibility for preserving and sustainable development corporate business;

Gradual outgrowth of formal corporate ownership, focused on internal sources of financing and stability staffing, into a real-corporate one, characterized by high activity in the markets of labor, capital and business services;

The weakening of direct targeted support for privatized enterprises from the state and the growing desire of joint-stock companies for independent economic activity;

Increasing responsibility of the state for improving the regulatory framework of the corporate sector and regulating the activities of joint-stock companies mainly through economic and institutional methods of influence.

It is worth highlighting a group of factors that hinder the normal development of corporate-type enterprises: non-compliance with the rights of shareholders on the part of the state and the “technostructure”; difficulty accessing information about financial condition JSC, violation established order disclosure of information by issuing enterprises; low activity in the securities market due to the preference of economic partners for informal business contacts; “tying up” a significant amount of shares, low degree of transformation of savings into investment capital.

The main reasons for the low emission activity of joint-stock enterprises of the Southern Federal District are as follows:

The existing structure of joint stock companies, among which closed companies dominate (almost 70%);

The underdevelopment of the securities market infrastructure and the lack of trust and experience among enterprises in interacting with financial institutions in this area;

The difficult geopolitical situation in the Southern Federal District, which became the reason for the practical stop of emission processes in the republics of the North Caucasus; to a share Rostov region And Krasnodar region accounts for about 70% of the total volume of securities issues in the region;

The lack of interest of investors in long-term financing of corporations, combined with

Corporate ownership in a transformational economy by the “aggressive” policy of potential investors;

Outflow of investment resources from regions to Finance center countries.

Most of the privatized enterprises remained within the framework of the primary issue. Faced with “aggressive” actions of potential investors, joint-stock companies in our region were faced with an alternative: either to cede control over their assets for next to nothing, or not to participate in the securities market at all. The choice was made in favor of the second option, which negatively affected the activities of young corporations.

This is confirmed by data on the dynamics of securities issue volumes. The unpreparedness of the majority of enterprises in the region to attract direct investment is also indicated by the structure of issues grouped by placement method. For example, in 1999, the share of public subscription to shares accounted for only 1.3% of the total issue volume.

Conflict situations in joint-stock companies, violent methods of overcoming them are evidence of the alienation of new owners, and above all labor collectives, from the institution of joint-stock democracy that is emerging in Russia. This is explained by the weakness of federal and local legislation, the ineffectiveness of the supervisory and judicial systems, the insufficiently strong positions of enterprise administrations that have failed to overcome dependence on government structures at various levels and shadow capital, and the use of mechanisms of shareholder democracy for the purpose of deliberate bankruptcy enterprises or their adaptation to serve the interests of the managerial elite.

We can propose a typology of corporate conflicts, including the following main areas of conflict of interests:

1) control over the expression of will of shareholders - employees of the enterprise;

2) guaranteed promotion of proxies to the management bodies of the joint-stock company, and first of all to the position of general director;

3) comprehensive weakening of the positions of competing groups of JSC owners and the formation of a blocking or controlling stake;

4) reorientation of business to serve the interests of controlling shareholders.

Conducted analysis and personal practical experience allow us to conclude that in modern conditions the ideology of solidary cooperation between JSC participants should be accepted as the leading direction of state and corporate policy. In this regard, it is appropriate to cite the statement of former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt: “Where competition ends, cooperation must arise...” It seems that this idea has not lost its relevance today. Our young corporations need to consolidate the interests of all social forces involved in corporate self-government.

In our opinion, a “techno-structure” is intended to become a conductor of the idea of ​​corporate solidarity and responsibility, integrating in its activities the functions of the owner, employee, entrepreneur and manager. The main condition for overcoming the wait-and-see attitude of the “technostructure” is to strengthen its economic and political positions and master generally accepted standards of corporate behavior. We believe that the change in the mentality of domestic managers will occur gradually, as their share in the capital of corporations increases, the formation of a sustainable interest in the development of joint-stock companies, and the improvement regulatory framework, development market type thinking and behavior.

Elimination of corporatization deformations state enterprises and post-privatization practice of JSC work involves strengthening and developing the institution of shareholder democracy as a balanced system of corporate self-government at all levels. Antimonopoly policy pursued by the state at the macro level must be complemented by effective measures to create a system of “checks and balances” at the micro level. The result of this transformation process is a natural transition from the original “six-link” management configuration, bearing the imprint of the previous administrative-command system, to a more stable and effective “three-link” configuration, expressing the partnership interaction of large investors (the “capital” factor), shareholders and employees (factor “labor”) and “technostructure” (factor “entrepreneurship”).

This transition is a progressive process of redistribution of property rights in the corporate sector. At the same time, a solution to a triune task is ensured: firstly, the institution of an effective owner focused on long-term investments is formed; secondly, economic and legal guarantees are being developed to protect the interests of employees - holders of small blocks of shares; thirdly, the priority of positive (and not protective, as now) goals of the “technostructure” activities related to strengthening the innovation strategy in the activities of the joint-stock company is ensured.