The sphere of technology has always been the engine of progress and development of society. In this article we will look at the system of the military-industrial complex, its impact on the Russian economy, structure and other important points.

First of all, new technologies appear in the military industry. Modern computers, advanced instruments and other equipment have been fully funded by the state for many years. Subsequently, the development companies were able to diversify their technologies for civil society. The Russian Federation is no exception in this matter, just like its predecessor the USSR. A well-known fact: cigarettes in the USSR were the same diameter as gun cartridges. This trend led to an increase in the size of purchases in the military-industrial complex, after which enterprises were able to significantly expand the scope of their activities.

The development of the peaceful atom in general is the merit of the technology race in creating the atomic bomb. Defense technologies are still at the forefront of science.

What is OPK?

The defense industrial complex is a collection of enterprises and institutions that specialize in the production and development of equipment and military equipment.

Structure of the defense industry:

• research centers whose main task is theoretical research;
• design bureaus - create mock-ups and test samples based on the submitted documentation of the above-described institutions;
• laboratories and testing grounds that are designed to test new developments;
• enterprises engaged in the wide production of tested and approved samples.

Highlights of the military-industrial complex

1. Boundaries for placing objects. As a rule, all such enterprises and institutions are located far from the central regions of the state. Such measures are necessary for the safety of ordinary citizens and maintaining confidentiality.
2. Rule of secrecy. All important objects are always well guarded; the cities in which they are located do not even appear on the map. They have no name and are simply numbered with a serial number.
3. Enterprises that are part of the Russian military-industrial complex necessarily have backups located chaotically in different parts of the country.

Defense industry specialization

• Construction complex: production of concrete slabs, floors and other materials.
• Chemical industry: the production of reagents, toxic substances that, for example, can be sprayed into the air, hitting the enemy at a long distance.
• MShK: supplies missiles, ships, cars, aircraft and armored vehicles, produces communications equipment, etc.
• FEC: engaged in the production of nuclear fuel.
• Light industry: uniform tailoring, production different types technical fabrics.

complex of Russia

We list several strategically important enterprises:

• Plant named after M.L. Mil, specializing in the production of helicopters, located in the Moscow region.
• PKO "Heat Exchanger" is located in the city of Nizhny Novgorod.
• Central Research Institute of Precision Engineering, built in Klimovsk.
• NPP "Rubin", operates in Penza.
• STC "Plant Leninets", located in St. Petersburg.

A breakthrough in artificial intelligence technology

It would seem that just recently, transcendental artificial intelligence technologies were used only in modern developments by the world's leading engineers in the field of targeting and identifying targets. Innovative discoveries by institutions of the military-industrial complex made it possible to create a special device to increase the mass of the cargo carried and to facilitate the movement of soldiers - an exoskeleton. A similar technology has been used for several years to restore patients who are unable to walk and move without assistance. The exoskeleton is an advanced development in most countries of the world in the field of defense technology. Its use will significantly increase the abilities of the human body.

Discoveries in the field of microelectronics

Developments in the field of microelectronics have long been the prerogative of defense companies around the world. Many secret devices saw the light of day as civilian products many years after their invention. The motion sensors used in the smart homes that are so popular today have long been the basis of the defense capabilities of many countries. They were used to protect borders from intruders and promptly respond to crossings state border. And now such sensors are used on modern technology to detect approaching objects. It is worth noting that this equipment can be used both in military sphere, and consumer.

Unmanned Drones: A Brief Introduction

Unmanned drones are the basis of modern military reconnaissance. They are intended for exploring the area. High-quality images and information obtained almost instantly allow you to calculate and determine the exact location of the enemy and their infrastructure structures.

For some time now, unmanned devices have been used in civilian industries. An example would be shooting entertainment events or celebrations from a bird's eye view, as well as geodetic surveying of the area, etc.

Purpose and application of military-industrial complex in the civilian sphere

Developments within the military-industrial complex make it possible to simplify the difficult task of researchers, archaeologists, and historians. Deep-sea vehicles, originally designed to assist submarines, clear mines and other similar activities, are now being used to explore the depths of the sea and search for new species of living creatures at depths that scientists could not previously approach.

In conclusion, we can say that defense technologies have been the engine of progress throughout the existence of mankind. Many activities that were previously intended for attack or defense have become firmly established in everyday life.

DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF RUSSIA IN MODERN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Kazakov Pavel Ivanovich

Master's student, Department of Economic Theory, Moscow State University railways, Moscow

Zolotareva Vera Petrovna

scientific supervisor, Ph.D. economy Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of Economic Theory, Moscow State Transport University

Moscow

The military-industrial complex (hereinafter - MIC) occupies a special place and plays a significant role in the development of the economy and ensuring the national security of the country, which consists in protecting its independence, state and territorial integrity.

The main task of the functioning of the defense industry is defined as the creation and production of modern competitive weapons, military and special equipment (hereinafter referred to as military and special equipment), ensuring the rearmament of the Armed Forces, other troops and formations of Russia and strengthening positions in the global arms market.

The defense industry concentrates most of the advanced technologies for military and civilian purposes and concentrates highly qualified personnel in the domestic scientific and industrial sphere. The total number of workers employed in defense industry organizations is about 2 million people, including about 1.3 million people employed directly in the defense industries. The share of workers under the age of 35 in 2011 amounted to about 27% of the total number of defense industry workers. The average age of defense industry workers was 46 years. The age composition of employees of defense industry enterprises is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Age composition of employees of defense industry enterprises (%)

Defense-industrial complex organizations retain a significant scientific and technical reserve, which makes it possible to make technological breakthroughs in a number of areas (nuclear, laser, aviation, space technologies, special materials and alloys, etc.). The critical directions for the development of the technological base of the defense industry not only coincide, but also often form key directions scientific and technological progress in general.

In accordance with the current edition of the consolidated register of defense industry organizations, approved by order of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia dated February 5, 2013 No. 137, 1340 organizations are classified as defense industry organizations. The departmental and sectoral structure of the consolidated register of defense industry organizations is presented in Figures 2 and 3.

An important part of the development program for defense industry enterprises today is the technical re-equipment of production and the investment of funds in the development of innovative technologies, without which in the near future it will be impossible to produce new generation products comparable or superior in their tactical and technical characteristics products of competing countries in the arms market, which currently are the USA, France, England, Germany and Israel.

Figure 2. Departmental structure of defense industry enterprises (pcs.)

Figure 3. Industry structure of defense industry enterprises (%)

The main component of the financial well-being of an enterprise is determined by the funds allocated within the framework of the state defense order (hereinafter referred to as the State Defense Order), unconditional execution which is the main task facing the defense industrial enterprises Russian Federation. Currently, about 45% of the volumes of industrial products of the defense industry are military products, which are supplied for internal needs to government customers at regulated prices, about 22% are supplied through military-technical cooperation (hereinafter - MTC), about 33% are civilian products in interests of such important sectors of the economy as transport, communications and telecommunications, fuel and energy sectors, healthcare, etc.

A large contribution to the formation of the budget of defense organizations is made by the export of mechanical and technical products, primarily through the military-technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign countries. The defense complex is one of the largest and most stable sources of foreign exchange financial resources through the export of military equipment. The main supplies of defense industry products fall to the countries of Eastern Europe, North Africa and China. India retains its status as one of Russia's key partners in the field of military-technical cooperation. Recent confirmation of this is the signing of military contracts between Russia and India worth almost $3 billion.

Russia occupies a leading position in the global arms market. In 2012, exports Russian weapons amounted to a record $14 billion, and the amount of new contracts for the supply of military equipment to third countries today already exceeds $15 billion.

Many Russian defense enterprises, as part of the conversion carried out in the 90s, reoriented part of their production to the production of civilian consumer goods. Profit received from the sale of civilian products, as a rule, is invested in the development of the enterprise, improvement of material and technical parts, preparation of production, modernization of equipment, purchase of new high-tech equipment, financing the development of new types of civilian products. For example, output and provision of civil and dual-use services enterprise OJSC "VPK "NPO Mashinostroeniya" in 2011 amounted to 15.1% of the total volume of products produced by the Corporation. According to the innovative development program for the period until 2015, the volume of output of civil and dual-use products and services should increase by another 1.5 times.

The level of government support for the defense industry indicates that the portfolio of orders in the development and production of military equipment will increase. In the coming years, Russian military enterprises will receive up to 3 trillion. rubles for modernization and technical re-equipment. This is exactly the amount included in the Federal Target Program for the Development of the Defense-Industrial Complex for 2011-2020 (FTP-2020).

The main objective of the program is to ensure the production of high-tech military products that are competitive in their combat and operational characteristics. At the same time, in 2011, Russia adopted an unprecedented amount of funding (approximately 20 trillion rubles) and the nature of its tasks. Government program weapons until 2020 (GPV-2020). The largest in history modern Russia The state program in the defense industry is designed to equip the Russian army modern means conduct of combat operations and, ultimately, bring it to a new look, fully consistent with global trends in the development of means of armed struggle.

To summarize, we can conclude that the situation at enterprises of the domestic defense industry is gradually improving. The industry has emerged from a protracted crisis, new types of weapons are being developed and launched into series, and exports of Russian military hardware are growing. The state fully fulfills its obligations to defense enterprises, which are financed in full from the funds allocated in the federal budget. As part of the program for the accelerated development of the defense industry, a large-scale reconstruction of fixed assets and modernization of the production and technological base are being carried out.

Increase in the volume of procurement of military equipment, in accordance with the State Program of Defense 2020, improvement of the placement of state orders and pricing for military products, implementation of the Federal Target Program 2020 in full, implementation of programs for the innovative development of defense industry companies and product policy for the production of competitive civilian equipment, as well as the implementation of measures By vocational training and retention of personnel in the defense industry make it possible to predict in the future sustainable pace development of the defense complex of the Russian Federation.

Bibliography:

1.Annual report JSC "VPK "NPO Mashinostroeniya" for 2012. - [ Electronic resource]. - Access mode. - URL: http://www.npomash.ru/download/godotchet2012.pdf. (date of access: 09/25/13).

2.Dovguchits S.I. On the development of the situation in the defense industry in 2011, the main areas of activity and tasks for the near future // Collection. Defense complex of the Russian Federation: state and development prospects. pp. 213-224.

3.Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation. - [Electronic resource]. - Access mode. - URL: http://www.minpromtorg.gov.ru/docs/mpt/orders/647. (access date 09.25.13).

Top 100 defense companies in Russia - why did the Russian authorities create vertically integrated arms holdings and what came of it?

The analytical service of Realnoe Vremya is completing a cycle of research on enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex, publishing the final material for Victory Day. Having analyzed the top 100 defense companies of the Russian Federation, we learned how they survived the post-war years, the era of privatization in the 1990s and the creation of holdings in the 2000s. From our material you will learn how the former head of Mari El saved the defense plant from bankruptcy seven times. Why were the directors of Almaz-Antey killed and fired? How the Bashkir and Kazan factories were subjected to a “raider takeover” by Moscow, falling into the hands of Denis Manturov and Sergei Chemezov. And why weapons holdings created in the “zero” period are sometimes unable to exist without state defense orders, while exports, meanwhile, may suffer due to Western sanctions.

With the turnover of the Russian defense industry growing by 23%, 15 companies showed negative dynamics

Completing the study of the defense industry of the Russian Federation, we compiled a rating of 100 largest companies and corporations. The total turnover of the companies included in the rating amounted to 2.1 trillion rubles in 2015. Thus, since 2014 it has grown by 23%, then it amounted to 1.7 trillion rubles. The share of turnover of the 10 largest companies in total turnover was 33.3% - in 2014 it was 32.5%.

The top ten giants included: JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey, Aviation Holding Company Sukhoi, Research and Production Corporation Irkut, Ufa Engine Production Association, Production Association Severnoye machine-building enterprise", "Rostov Helicopter Production Complex OJSC "Rostvertol", "Research and Production Corporation "Uralvagonzavod" named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky", "Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant", "United Aircraft Corporation" and "Kazan helicopter factory" The total revenue of these companies in 2015 amounted to 710 billion rubles (in 2014 - 562.4 billion).

Our rating also included three Tatarstan companies. In addition to the already mentioned Kazan Helicopter Plant, this is the Zelenodolsk Plant named after A.M. Gorky" (we wrote about it in detail in our study of the shipbuilding industry of the Russian Federation) and the production association "Plant named after Sergo".

In total, 15 companies showed negative dynamics. Among them are such key companies for the defense industries as St. Petersburg Atomproekt (-43%), Uralvagonzavod (-26%), Tupolev (-21%), Tsentr im. Khrunichev" (-10%), design bureau of the Almaz-Antey concern (-9%), Moscow and Kazan helicopter plants (-4% and -9%, respectively), concern "Sozvezdie" (-3%), "United Shipbuilding corporation" (-2%).

Let us remind you that we wrote about Atomproekt in our study of the nuclear industry. About the Center. Khrunichev" - in About the Constellation Concern - in a study of the communication systems industry. About the United Shipbuilding Corporation - in a study of the shipbuilding industry. It is also worth noting the curious fact of negative dynamics in the Almaz-Antey design bureau, which exists under the largest defense company of the same name and which, unlike its “satellite,” showed one of the best results: +86%.

13 companies became leaders in turnover growth. The most impressive growth - three times - was demonstrated by the Marine Underwater Weapons - Gidropribor concern. Turnover doubled shipyard"Pennant". Revenue from the United Industrial Corporation Oboronprom increased by 189%, and by 180% from the Space Systems Research and Production Company named after. Iosifyan, 179% - from the Kalashnikov concern, 170% - from the Tula Arms Plant.

Almaz-Antey: from the USSR nuclear shield to the scandal with Ukraine, the sale of the S-300 to Syria and Leonid Markelov’s seven-fold rescue of the plant from bankruptcy

However, despite such sharp breakthroughs, they are still far from being the whales of the Russian defense industry. Thus, the holder of the first place in our rating, JSC Concern VKO Almaz-Antey, had a turnover of 136.5 billion rubles in 2015, an increase of 86% over the year (in 2014 it was only 73.3 billion rubles). However, all this with accounts payable of 223 billion rubles. Note that the share of just one corporation from the turnover of all 100 largest defense companies was already 6.4% in 2015 - in 2014 it was only 4.23%.

In general, Almaz-Antey’s turnover is comparable to the turnover of individual defense industries. Thus, within one corporation 10 branches of the electronics industry could fit (its turnover, let us remember, is only 37.6 billion rubles). The revenue volume of Almaz-Antey is almost equal to the total revenue of all companies in the communication systems industry (134.2 billion rubles) and nuclear industry(141.7 billion rubles) and makes up a third of the shipbuilding (470 billion rubles) and space (413.7 billion rubles) industries.

The size of such a defense giant can be used to judge the general policy and military strategy of the Russian Federation in recent years: Almaz-Antey contains enterprises that develop, produce and modernize anti-aircraft missile and radar equipment. Roughly speaking, the corporation is a defense shield: so that the missiles of a potential enemy do not “accidentally” fall on Moscow or Kazan.

Almaz-Antey's turnover is comparable to the turnover of individual defense industries. Photo nationaldefense.ru

Actually, while developing weapons (including nuclear weapons) for the purpose of possibly destroying the enemy, the USSR primarily created a defense complex for nuclear parity with the United States. In the event of a possible war, the main deterrent could be not so much the number and power of missiles that would hit enemy targets, but rather the ability to repel an attack by the enemy himself. However, this does not mean that air defense weapons are likely to be used for attack purposes. It is the complexes produced at the factories of the Almaz-Antey corporation that represent a significant part of the export potential of the defense industry of the Russian Federation and every now and then become a bargaining chip in foreign policy games.

Thus, the S-300 long-range complexes, developed in Soviet times at NPO Almaz - initially ground-based air defense, a family of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) designed for the defense of large industrial and administrative facilities - were supplied to Syria and Iran, which in the light of well-known events, Israel was concerned. The BUK medium-range complex is supplied not only to the countries of the former USSR, but also to Syria, Egypt and Venezuela - and it was with the use of this complex that the Boeing 777 was shot down, which caused another round of tension between Ukraine and Russia. There is no need to talk about the eternal struggle between air defense and missile defense systems between Russia and NATO (USA).

The corporation itself was supposed to be formed back in Yeltsin’s times, but the start of its assembly was given only in 2002; in 2004, the corporation was included in the list of strategic enterprises of the Russian Federation. Initially, the corporation was created on the basis of NPO Antey and NPO Almaz. Antey itself is also a multi-part company, formed in 1983 from three enterprises - the Electromechanical Research Institute, the Strela Research Institute and the Tula Arsenal plant.

The direct base was the Scientific Research Institute of Electromechanical Institute, created during the war years for the development and production of fire guidance systems; in the 1950s, the design bureau spun off from it, which later became the second integral part corporation under the name NPO Almaz (later they produced air defense systems such as S-25, S-75, S-125, S-300, S-400). It was in this research institute that they worked on the creation of the S-300 and the Tor air defense system. By the end of the existence of the USSR, "Antey" included nine enterprises, including the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant "Kupol" (created in 1957, which later produced the Tor air defense system) and the Mari Machine-Building Plant (created in 1939, which later produced the Krug air defense system ", S-300).

“Dome” is one of the most successful components of the corporation; in 2009 its revenue was 3.3 billion rubles (profit 453 million), in 2015 its revenue already amounted to 6.8 billion rubles (profit 2.6 billion). Reporting of the Mari plant in open sources can be found only for 2012, then it amounted to 3.1 billion rubles, but the company closed the year with a loss of 91 million rubles (in 2009 the loss was 123 million rubles). It is unknown whether the plant is profitable today, but the director of the MMR, Boris Efremov, made a reservation in 2014 that the head of Mari El, Leonid Markelov, “saved the plant from bankruptcy at least 7 times”! At the same time, the planned figures for product shipments in 2014 became known - 11.6 billion rubles.

The concern includes 60 enterprises and research institutes. Photo nationaldefense.ru

The opening of three factories worth 120 billion rubles, the murder of directors and the scandalous dismissal of the “diamond head”

Antey was incorporated in 1994, having already absorbed 15 enterprises. In the 2000s, it began to transform into a vertically integrated company. In total, the concern included 60 enterprises and research institutes. From the very beginning, the owner of the concern was the state. Last year the concern opened new plant in Kirov for 20 billion rubles (13 billion - own funds) and a new plant in Nizhny Novgorod. The exact figure of investment in the latest production is unknown, but in 2015 it was reported that 54 billion rubles would be invested in the Kirov and Novgorod plants, so the Novgorod plant cost Almaz-Antey 34 billion rubles. The S-500 will be produced here, primarily under government orders. Funds in the amount of 120 billion rubles were to be spent on both plants and the creation of the North-Western regional center in St. Petersburg; thus, almost 70 billion rubles will be invested in the St. Petersburg project.

By the way, previously the leading company in the Russian Federation in the development and production of air defense systems was OJSC Defensive Systems (part of Oboronprom of the Chemezov Rostec), but currently Defensive Systems owns only part of the package of two members of the concern "Almaz-Antey" companies - "Moscow Radio Engineering Plant" and KB "Kuntsevo". The concern was supposed to include a piece of the assets of Vladimir Yevtushenkov’s AFK Sistema - RTI Sistema, but for now they formally belong to the oligarch’s structures.

In general, it is not easy to keep track of changes in Almaz asset management because its formation, it seems, has not even been completed yet. Judge for yourself, the first general director of the concern (not the chairman of the board of directors!) was Vladislav Menshchikov (who became the head of counterintelligence of the FSB in 2015), who was involved in the creation of the first large vertically integrated defense holding, trying not to conflict with the then head of Rosoboronexport Sergei Chemezov ( although he could obtain an independent license for the concern to export military products).

When the process was completed, in 2014 the concern was headed by Chemezov himself, who steered it until 2016, creating, on Putin’s instructions, from the air defense concern the Aerospace Defense Concern (the concern included several space enterprises in 2015).

In 2016, the concern was headed by former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov (he was lobbied by Chemezov himself - Fradkov could then head Russian Railways).

Last year, even under Chemezov, one of the most scandalous dismissals took place: the head of NPO Almaz lost his job, and “for lapses in work and loss of trust” (the first such case in the defense industry in history), in fact - for failure state defense order. According to observers, Almaz management has delayed work on key projects: sea anti-aircraft missile system"Poliment-Redut" and the near-zone air defense complex "Morpheus".

In 2016, the concern was headed by Mikhail Fradkov. Photo tvc.ru

However, the murders of the heads of enterprises that were part of the concern in the 2000s seem more scandalous: however, it is believed that the heads of a number of defense enterprises (including the general director of the concern Igor Klimov - he was shot) had to die due to a conflict during the sale of defense real estate companies that became part of the concern through bankruptcy proceedings. The conflict, by the way, is with an organized crime group.

It is not surprising that the company ultimately became a victim of geopolitics: in 2014-2015, it was included in the US sanctions list, and part of its Western assets were frozen. Despite this, at the end of 2014 the concern took 11th place in the ranking of the largest defense corporations in the world. The exact figures of the concern’s export contracts are unknown, but in 2015 Almaz-Antey completed tasks by 185% with the total volume of Russian military exports being $14.5 billion (second place in the world).

"Sukhoi": from Stalin's anger to losses of the company's civilian "wing" and sales of fighter jets to China, Algeria and India

In second place in terms of turnover is the Sukhoi Aviation Holding Company, which increased its revenue by 17% to 100.6 billion rubles (net profit 2.6 billion rubles). The company was created in 1934 in the form of the Design Bureau, which was headed by aircraft designer Pavel Sukhoi - almost 900 Su-2 aircraft already flew during the war. During and after the war, armored attack aircraft (Su-6), fighter aircraft (from the cannon-powered Su-3 to the experimental Su-7), and, finally, jet fighters and bombers (from Su-9 to Su-17) appeared.

In 1949, the OKB was liquidated after the accident of the Su-15 aircraft, but almost immediately after the death of Stalin, the bureau was restored, giving birth to the Soviet supersonic jet aviation. Last period Soviet history The OKB began the development of the 4th generation of fighters (from Su-27 to Su-33).

In the 90s, we had to engage in conversion, transferring part of the production to civilian rails (it was only in 2001, however, that the first flights of the Su-80GP cargo and passenger aircraft and the Su-37L agricultural aircraft took place). A separate enterprise, Sukhoi Civil Aircraft, was created, but apparently it was not very successful. The “civil wing” of Sukhoi, despite (or perhaps “thanks to”) the creation of the Sukhoi Superjet aircraft, closed 2015 with a loss of 23.5 billion rubles! At the same time, the net loss under IFRS has only been growing since 2008: then it amounted to $114.713 million, in 2015 - $383.242 million.

In 2016, by the way, Kamil Gainutdinov, a native of the Tatarstan airline Tulpar Air, who was responsible for business planning and marketing there, sat in the chair of the head of the “civilian” Sukhoi.

In 2016, Kamil Gainutdinov, a native of the Tatarstan airline Tulpar Air, sat in the chair of the head of the “civilian” Sukhoi. Photo aviation21.ru

But let’s return to the defense “wing” of Sukhoi. In Nuclear Industry Research, we have already written about an ambitious and expensive space project. aircraft RSC Energia, and so for it the Sukhoi Design Bureau developed the Clipper - a multi-purpose manned reusable spaceship The European Space Agency was thinking of investing £100 million annually in the project. But in the end, the project “didn’t take off” and was closed.

To date, JSC Sukhoi Company has completed all stages of the reorganization “in the form of the merger of three subsidiaries- JSC Sukhoi Design Bureau, JSC KnAAPO im. Yu.A. Gagarin" and JSC "NAPO im. V.P. Chkalov" and received a notice of termination of the activities of the listed companies as independent legal entities from January 1, 2013." As a result, Sukhoi became the largest Russian aviation holding company, taking third place in the world in terms of production of modern fighters back in 2006. In 2006, Sukhoi itself entered the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC, owned by the state represented by the Federal Property Management Agency), founded by Putin and the then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, and now managed by the Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov. We will tell you further about the corporation that took 9th place in our ranking.

In 2008, Sukhoi recognized projects for the production of the 4th generation Su-35BM fighter, the Su-34 front-line bomber, and the 5th generation PAK FA fighter (not counting the Sukhoi Superjet civil short-haul airliner) as promising.

Let's look at the final numbers. Su-35BM - the cost of each aircraft is 2 billion rubles, 64 have already been produced. 50 pieces were purchased by the Russian Ministry of Defense for an amount of over 60 billion rubles. 24 fighters will go to China (four already flew in December 2016), the contract value is about $2 billion.

Su-34 - cost “more than a billion rubles” (in 2010 the figure was 35 million in dollars), each is sold for export for 30-50 million dollars. In 2008, the first 5-year contract worth 33.6 billion rubles was signed for the supply of 32 aircraft ( mass production at the Novosibirsk Aviation Plant). The second government contract was concluded in 2012 - for the supply of 92 bombers by 2020 (so, approximately, for 100 billion rubles). Export is still in the plans, the likely buyer is Algeria, the contract price for 12 cars is 500-600 million dollars.

And finally, the PAK FA fighter - the cost of its development program is 60 billion rubles ($2.8 billion at the 2010 exchange rate). Initially, however, they spent 30 billion rubles, but the same amount was required. There is no serial production yet, but it is said that India intended to buy these aircraft for $100 million apiece.

The cost of the PAK FA fighter development program is 60 billion rubles. Photo militaryrussia.ru

For all deliveries to the world market from 2008 to 2015, Sukhoi is in third place ($12.73 billion), behind two American corporations Lockheed Martin ($15.6 billion) and Boeing ($13.3 billion). The company periodically becomes a hostage to geopolitics: in 2006, the US State Department imposed sanctions against it (and Chemezov’s Rosoboronexport) for supplying aircraft to Iran.

Irkut: from the most massive bomber of the war to the shock therapy of “perestroika”, exports worth $80 billion and losses from the amphibious aircraft

Third place is occupied by another aircraft manufacturing enterprise - the Irkut Research and Production Corporation, whose turnover increased in 2015 by 40% to 82.7 billion rubles. Like Sukhoi, Irkut is also owned by UAC (85.4%), almost 10% is owned by Vnesheconombank (previously 9.45% was owned by Sukhoi). The basis of the corporation was the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, established in 1932. His first aircraft was the I-14 monoplane fighter.

In 1941, the Moscow Aviation Plant No. 39 was evacuated to Irkutsk, and on the basis of both plants, Plant No. 39 named after. I.V. Stalin. During the war, the plant produced the most popular dive bomber, the Pe-2 (from 1941 to 1945, 11,247 of these aircraft were produced - the Finns called it “Pekka-Emelya”), the aircraft can be seen in the film “Chronicle of a Dive Bomber.” During the war, long-range bombers Il-4 and Il-6 also rolled off the production line. After the war - the Tu-14 torpedo bomber, the Il-28 bomber (a carrier of nuclear weapons), the supersonic Yak-28, the An-12 and An-24 transport aircraft, the 3rd generation Mig-27 fighter.

In 1992, the plant was privatized, and the same year the 4th generation Su-30 fighter entered the series. However, with the beginning of perestroika, everything went downhill. As I recalled former director aircraft plant, the first secretary of the Irkutsk regional committee, who arrived from a Moscow business trip, said that most of the regional committees would be closed: “Something incredible is happening in Moscow. What we have done so far, everything we have lived by, turned out to be fundamentally wrong and wrong. I'm shocked". In fact, Moscow has withdrawn itself from managing the aviation industry, among other things.

The plant managed to produce a couple of Su-30s, when a “massive reduction in state defense orders” followed, and most enterprises producing military products lost funding and were faced with the need to “decide their own fate.” The aircraft industry's production volumes fell six-fold, and plant managers began repurposing conveyors. At the same Irkutsk aircraft plant, they began producing the new generation Be-200 amphibious aircraft, and having produced the export version of the Su-30MK, the plant managed to conclude an “unprecedented international contract” with India in 1996, securing itself work for years to come.

In addition to the plant, the structure of the Irkut Corporation includes two more branches and the OKB im. A.S. Yakovlev." Photo irkut.com

In 2000, licensed production of the Su-30 was organized in India, and export contracts appeared with Malaysia and Algeria. In 2016, they presented the “mainline aircraft of the 21st century” - MC-21 (almost $5 billion was invested in the development). The cost of each aircraft is 72-85 million dollars. The first contracts were concluded in 2016 - for 175 aircraft (Ilyushins Finance, Aeroflot, Nordwind Airlines, etc.). In just 20 years, the company intends to sell up to 1,000 aircraft. A simple calculation shows that the plant is counting on $80 billion.

Irkut itself continues to produce aircraft from the Sukhoi Design Bureau. In addition to the plant, the structure of the Irkut Corporation includes two more branches and the OKB im. A.S. Yakovlev - the last one was absorbed by Irkut in 2006. Although officially 81.4% of OKB's current assets belong to CJSC DCC (there is a liquidation commission), 75.46% are under the management of Irkut. In the OKB itself, after the takeover, staff was reduced (4.5 times), liquidated production base, sold out the real estate (which explains the emergence liquidation commission). This effectively ended the independent history of the legendary design bureau, which developed the Yak-1, Yak-3, Yak-7, Yak-9 aircraft - the basis of the USSR fighter aviation during the war.

Despite the huge turnover, in 2015 the corporation suffered a loss of 2 billion rubles. The largest share of revenue comes from sales of the Su-30 (42.9%), light attack aircraft Yak-130 (17.7%), MS-21 (16.7%). It is unknown what caused the loss. Perhaps with the completion of the MS-21 program (it is presented as a competitor to the Boeing 737 and A320), since everything seems to be great with the Su-30. The production of one Su-30 aircraft costs $83 million (on Indian soil) and $50 million in the Russian Federation. There are 91 such aircraft (of various modifications) in service with the Russian Armed Forces. Deliveries also go to India (a total of 225 units delivered, more than 80 more ordered), Indonesia (11 units), China (97 units) and Kazakhstan (6 units). The Su-30 is also in service with Algeria (52 units), Vietnam (29 units), etc.

It is possible that the losses were associated with the liquidation of a joint venture with Airbus (created in 2005 - liquidated in December 2016), within the framework of which the Be-200 amphibious aircraft was promoted abroad (it turned out to be “too expensive an aircraft”). Moreover, the project was frozen even before the sanctions. Let us remind you that they hit the “parent company” UAC. The failure of the Be-200 brought Irkut losses of $50 million.

In 2016, they presented the “mainline aircraft of the 21st century” - MC-21 (almost $5 billion was invested in the development). Photo absoluttv.ru

UMPO: from the Soviet Renault tank and Bashkir privatization to the “raider takeover” by Moscow and the status of “best exporter”

The fourth largest company is the Ufa Engine-Building Production Association, owned by United Engine Corporation JSC, which, in turn, belongs to Oboronprom, controlled by Sergei Chemezov’s Rostec. In 2015, the Ufa company increased revenue by 38% - to 67.5 billion rubles. The company was founded in 1925 on the basis of the former Russian Renault JSC in Rybinsk (the first soviet tank- a copy of the French Renault FT-17).

During the war years, the Ufa plant, where combine harvester engines were initially produced, became its backup, and a number of other engine factories were gradually evacuated here from the European part of the USSR. In the post-war years, the plant created centrifuges for uranium enrichment as part of the USSR atomic project.

In 1993, the enterprise was privatized, Ufa calmly took the state stake and transferred it to OJSC Management Company"Ufa Motors" Ufa classified software as objects joint management of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus according to the legislation of the Republic of Belarus itself, and Moscow believed that the object was federal property and could be privatized only by decision of the government of the Russian Federation as “the largest manufacturer of aircraft engines for military aircraft.” It’s no wonder that in the “zero” software became the subject of a struggle between the Bashkir authorities and Moscow!

In 2007, the courts sided with the Republic of Belarus, refusing to satisfy the claim by the Federal Property Management Agency. Subsequently, just during the active PR exposure of the President of the Republic of Belarus Murtaza Rakhimov, the transfer of a defense asset “for next to nothing” as a result of a complex scheme actually into “private hands” was called a “scam.” Bashkir officials were accused of a “raider takeover,” naming the name of Rail Sarbaev, the right hand and “wallet” of the Rakhimov family.

In 2008, the Republic of Belarus began to lose control over the asset, the software became part of a subsidiary of Oboronprom, and in 2010 the state corporation gained full control over the facility through an additional share issue, despite the fact that no one ever settled the dispute in the courts. Moscow’s attack on UMPO was connected with the intention to produce helicopter engines in Ufa (on behalf of Vladimir Putin) - the project was estimated at 7 billion rubles, the engines were supposed to go into series production in 2014. In 2011, UMPO was appointed the leading enterprise for the production of engines for military aircraft.

Ufa classified the software as an object of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus according to the legislation of the Republic of Belarus itself, and Moscow believed that the object was federal property. Photo bashinform.ru

To date, UMPO is considered the main developer of engines for Sukhoi and Irkut. Here they produce engines for 4++ generation fighters Su-35/Su-35S and a “promising engine” for the fifth generation fighter T-50 (PAK FA). UMPO is also involved in the project to create the PD-14 engine for the MS-21 civil aircraft and to produce helicopter engines of the VK-2500 type. The association also mass-produces turbojet engines for the Su-35S (AL-41F-1S), Su-27 (AL-31F) family aircraft, the Su-30 family (AL-31F and AL-31FP), individual units for Ka helicopters " and "Mi".

The main export partner of the software is still India, whose company Hindustan Aeronauticus Limited UMPO helped set up the production of engines for the Su-30. Contracts are concluded with China, Venezuela and Algeria. Thus, in 2011, the volume of exports to UMPO amounted to 14.39 billion rubles. With a turnover of 21 billion rubles at that time, it is clear that foreign contracts became the main source of revenue for the company. Rostec named UMPO the best exporter in 2014 - at the end of 2013, the export volume amounted to $631 million. In 2015, export supplies exceeded 60% of the company's turnover - they amounted to almost 40 billion rubles. Internal contracts - 27.8 billion rubles.

Basically, profits in terms of exports increased from the sale of engines to China (1.5 times - to 16.8 billion rubles), to India (by 25% - to 19.7 billion rubles), Algerian contracts increased 23 times, amounting to revenue volume of 5.2 billion rubles. It is obvious that Western sanctions cannot in any way affect UMPO’s business - there are no Western countries.

We wrote in detail about the holder of the fifth place in our rating - with revenue in 2015 of 62.5 billion rubles (an increase of 21%) and a profit of 2 billion rubles - the company PA "Northern Machine-Building Enterprise" in Severodvinsk in a study of the shipbuilding industry. In that rating, Sevmash took first place. Sevmash is also controlled through the United Shipbuilding Corporation by the Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov. USC was created under Sergei Naryshkin, then from 2008 to 2011 it was headed by Igor Sechin.

The main export partner of the software is India. Photo umpo.ru

"Rostvertol": the birth of the Kazan "daughter" during the war, helicopters for Afghanistan and the "comradeship" of Chemezov with Manturov

In sixth place is another Russian aircraft manufacturer - Rostov Helicopter Production Complex Open Joint Stock Company Rostvertol, which increased its turnover in 2015 by 54% to 56.8 billion rubles. Rostvertol is also not an “orphan” and is part of Sergei Chemezov’s “Rostec” “defense family” - through the Russian Helicopters holding company (owns 73.9% of Rostvertol shares) and Oboronprom (another 21.98%).

The enterprise was created exactly two months before the start of World War II in 1939; in 1944, production of UT-2M and Po-2 (U-2) aircraft began here. The U-2 biplane was one of the most popular aircraft in the world; a total of 33 thousand of these “Stalinist falcons” were produced; it was also produced in Kazan, at the evacuated plant No. 387 (which later became the base of the Kazan Helicopter Plant). It was known both as a night bomber, and as a reconnaissance aircraft, and as a communications aircraft. Soviet pilots also flew the U-2 during the Korean War.

After the war, Yak-14 landing gliders and Il-40 attack aircraft rolled off the plant's assembly line (the latter was not produced for long; production was discontinued in 1956). Finally, the Rostov plant was the first to mass-produce the Mi-1 helicopter (it was also produced by the Kazan aircraft plant No. 387 in 1952-1953). In the USSR, this plant also produced the Mi-6 (a heavy landing helicopter, also used for industry), which, by the way, participated in the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant, and, of course, Mi-26.

The Mi-26 later turned out to be the largest mass-produced transport helicopter in the world. Mi-26s took part in the Afghan war and both Chechen wars. It was during the second Chechen war that the largest disaster in terms of the number of casualties in the history of military aviation of the USSR and Russia occurred: the Mi-26 was shot down by militants with a missile from the Igla air defense system (created, alas, also by Soviet designers from KBM in Kolomna, now also included in the " Rostec"), 127 people were killed.

In the 1990s, the company’s staff decided to privatize the company and “during the period of a general decline in production, the trade union committee, together with the administration, was looking for ways out of the critical situation.” But it cannot be said that the plant’s property passed into the hands of the collective. Thus, 20% of the shares came under the control of Sergei Nedoroslev, who created the legendary Kaskol group of companies back in 1988, which subsequently bought up stakes in RSC Energia (10%), Energomash (20%), and the Sokol aircraft manufacturing plant. (40%), Irkut Corporation (40%). Nedoroslev himself recalled that the plant’s products were then undervalued. A new Mi-8 could be bought at the factory for 2-3 million dollars; in good condition, such a helicopter cost 500 thousand dollars. And similar analogues were sold abroad for $15 million.

In the 1990s, 20% of the shares came under the control of Sergei Nedoroslev, who created the legendary Kaskol group of companies. Photo kremlin.ru

Nedoroslev's ideas on uniting helicopter factories into a single holding in the 1990s were shared by the future minister Denis Manturov (then working as deputy director of the Ulan-Ude aircraft plant - 8th place in our ranking). In 2001, Manturov became deputy chairman of Gosinkor, where the state-owned stakes in helicopter plants were transferred. In 2002, Gosinkor, together with Rosoboronexport, created the Oboronprom Management Company. According to Forbes, Manturov was helped in consolidating helicopter assets by his close acquaintance and friendship with Sergei Chemezov, which began in the late 1990s. Rostvertol was purchased by Oboronprom for $20 million. Not only Nedoroslev, but also AFK Sistema (lost 49% of Kamov Design Bureau) had to part with their helicopter assets. The Putin government allocated 10 billion rubles for the development of the holding.

The mistake with Saddam Hussein, the “needle of state defense orders” and the resentment of George Bush

Today, Rostvertol mass-produces the same Mi-26, Mi-24 (the first Soviet combat helicopter, unofficially called “Crocodile”), Mi-28 (“Night Hunter”, a Soviet attack helicopter). Let's go over the numbers again.

The cost of one Mi-28 is 24 million dollars. The first foreign contract was not implemented due to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq - the USSR was going to supply the Mi-28 to Saddam Hussein. The second potential contract with India also died without being born: it turned out that the Mi-28 was inferior to the American Apaches (the main propeller quickly overheated, the side electronic systems were not debugged). Finally, they were going to deliver to Algeria - 42 vehicles were ordered in 2014. In 2012, a contract was signed with Iraq for the supply of 15 Mi-28 aircraft (new design) worth $4.3 billion. More than 90 helicopters were supplied under the Russian Air Force state defense order. A simple calculation puts the figure at $3.5 billion as of 2017.

However, in May 2017, information appeared about an increase in the state defense order for the Mi-28 to 300 vehicles - that’s almost $7.2 billion. The cost of the Mi-26 is $20-25 million; in 2011, it was assumed that export sales would amount to $5.6 billion by 2015. If we count the number of military helicopters in the countries where they were sold (plus those that have not yet been delivered, but firm contracts have been signed), it turns out that 50 helicopters were exported (most of them to Algeria). At least 42 helicopters were delivered under the state defense order. It turns out that the company was supposed to earn $1.8 billion by 2016. This, alas, is three times less than the figure of 5.6 billion rubles.

Finally, the Mi-24 is one of the most popular helicopters of the plant (it was actively used in the Afghan war and during the Chechen wars), 3,500 have already been produced to date. Before 2000, 23 helicopters were sold for export; how many were sold after is unknown. But given the relatively outdated model, they are unlikely to capture the imagination.

Currently, Rostvertol’s share in the global helicopter market is estimated at 2.5%, but the plant itself admits that if previously the ratio between machines delivered under the state defense order and for export was 50% to 50%, now it is 65 by 35%. Whether this indicates a decrease in export revenue or an increase in state defense orders, however, is difficult to judge.

Currently, Rostvertol's share in the global helicopter market is estimated at 2.5%. Photo rostec.ru

In 2016, due to sanctions, the plant completely replaced Ukrainian-made engines with domestic ones. In recent years, the United States itself has not imposed any sanctions against Rostvertol. But at the beginning of the Afghan war in 2002, after an attack on the World War II towers shopping center, the United States was offended by the Rostov plant, having discovered Russian helicopters in service with Syria, Libya and Sudan, countries, as the State Department believed, that support terrorism. At the same time, the American troops themselves used Rostvertol Mi-26 helicopters in the Afghan war!

"Uralvagonzavod": from the legendary T-34 to the "romance with Putin", the attack of Alfa Bank, billions of losses and the "armored holding"

The seventh largest defense company in the Russian Federation is the Uralvagonzavod Research and Production Corporation (also from the “Chemezov family” Rostec). The plant was founded in the Stalinist 1930s, and at first it was staffed by prisoners. In 1936, the plant started with the production of heavy railway cars; during the war years, many military factories were evacuated to it, and gradually the Ural plant freed up civilian sites for the production of military products. First of all, tanks - until the end of World War II, Uralvagonzavod produced 25.2 thousand legendary T-34s, the main tanks of the Red Army.

After the war, the plant again switched to civilian production, but did not forget about tanks: the T-54, T-55 (the first tank with anti-nuclear protection), and T-62 were produced. Since 1974, the T-72, the most popular 2nd generation battle tank, has gone into production, still in service in the countries of the former USSR and the Warsaw Pact, as well as India, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

In 2009, the plant began developing the T-14, known as the Armata, but mass production began only this year. The cost of the tank is 250 million rubles. In 2016, the state ordered the company a batch of tanks until 2020 in the amount of 2,300 units (so far they have ordered a batch of 100 units). The tank will be exported only after the secrecy stamp is removed and only after the needs of the state defense order are met. Thus, until 2020, the company secured itself with orders for Armata worth 575 billion rubles.

In addition, the plant also produces the Soviet T-90 tank (Vladimir), which became the best-selling tank on the world market in the 2000s. The cost of the tank at first was 70 million rubles, in 2011 it increased to 118 million (this also led to a difficult financial situation for the plant), but since the end of 2011 the purchase of tanks for the Russian Armed Forces has been stopped. T-90s were exported to India: in 2001 a contract was signed for $1 billion, in 2006 - two more for $3.3 billion, and so on. In total, contracts worth more than $6 billion were concluded with India - by 2020, 2,000 T-90 tanks should be in service with the Indian army. In 2008, a contract worth $8 billion was signed with Algeria. The remaining foreign customers are not named (this year it was reported that a contract had appeared with one of the countries in the Middle East).

Until 2020, the company secured itself with orders for Armata worth 575 billion rubles. Photo photo.rae2015.ru

The enterprise was corporatized only in 2007, from a federal state unitary enterprise to an open joint stock company. In the same year, the plant signed a contract with JSC Russian Railways for the supply of 40 thousand cars worth 68 billion rubles (70% of Russian Railways' needs). However, in 2009, due to the lack of orders from Russian Railways, Uralvagonzavod found itself on the verge of default - the debt amounted to 66 billion rubles. The Russian authorities were forced to pour 4.4 billion rubles into the plant, and by the end of 2009, increase the authorized capital by 10 billion rubles. The corporation managed to repay the debt to the government of the Russian Federation in 2010.

Later, Uralvagonzavod began to cooperate with Transneft in the transportation of petroleum products (supply of 8.5 thousand tanks). In 2011, the plant became known for the participation of its employees in a direct line with Putin: the head of the assembly shop, Igor Kholmanskikh, suggested that Putin “go out with the men and defend their stability.” On May 18, 2012, Vladimir Putin appointed Kholmansky as plenipotentiary representative in the Ural Federal District.

Alas, Putin’s hand did not help. So, in 2009, the loss was 7 billion rubles, in 2011, in the wake of “Putin’s love,” the plant showed a profit of 8 billion rubles, in 2012 - 9.5 billion rubles, but in 2013, profits dropped sharply to 443 million rubles. The black streak began in 2014, when the plant showed a loss of 4.8 billion rubles; in 2015, the loss turned out to be astronomical - 10 billion rubles! The company explained this by American sanctions - the United States added Uralvagonzavod to the list in the summer of 2014.

In April 2015, more than 5 thousand employees (out of 30 thousand) were on forced leave. In May 2015, Alfa Bank intended to go to court for bankruptcy of the enterprise - Uralvagonzavod owed the bank 6 billion rubles. But in 2016, the bank of Mikhail Fridman and Peter Aven went to the world. Obviously, the Russian authorities did not allow the defense enterprise to go bankrupt - the Russian government issued state guarantees for 7 billion rubles. And in December 2016, Putin, chartered to pull the plant out of bankruptcy, transferred the enterprise to the Rostec State Corporation.

Chemezov intends to create an “armored holding company” based on UVZ. While Chemezov began to transfer the plant from the Rosimushchestvo pipe to Rostec, it turned out that UVZ had created a company called UVZ-logistic, which bought cars for itself, since Russian Railways had not bought them for two or three years in a row: “This was done for in order not to stop production." In May 2017, it became known that they were again trying to bankrupt the plant - this time due to an amount of 12 million rubles.

In 2011, the plant became known for the participation of Igor Kholmanskikh in direct line with Putin. Photo gazeta.ru

UUAZ: from fighters for the Red Army and cruise missiles to an attempt to withdraw assets in the “era of privatization” and the departure of workers to Kazan

Eighth place is occupied by the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant, which increased its revenue by a third - up to 50 billion rubles. It is also part of the Russian Helicopters holding company (a subsidiary of Oboronprom, part of Rostec).

The plant began its activities in the late 1930s, repairing I-16 fighters and SB bombers. During the war, together with the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, he produced parts for the Pe-2, then began production of aircraft of the main strike force of the Red Army fighter aviation - the single-engine La-5 and La-7.

After the war, the plant became one of the Soviet centers for the production of Kamov Design Bureau helicopters - Ka-15 and Ka-18, and from the 1960s - cruise missiles. By the mid-1970s, it produced 250 Ka-25 ship-based anti-submarine helicopters for the USSR Navy. Since the 1970s, it began producing Mi-8 helicopters; until 1991, about 4 thousand vehicles were produced. At the same time, in the 1980s, MiG-27 fighters were produced in Ulan-Ude (together with the Irkutsk Aviation Plant). And in collaboration with Sukhoi Design Bureau - Su-25 attack aircraft, which were subsequently based on the cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov.

At the beginning of the 1990s, having stopped producing the Su-25, the plant produced the Su-39, but until now the last fighters have not gone into production (due to the lack of a government order). Helicopter production continued after the collapse of the USSR thanks to the development of the Kazan branch of the Design Bureau named after. Mile to the Mi-8AMT helicopter (based on the most popular twin-engine helicopter Mi-8MT). Until now, various modifications and modernized versions of the Mi-8 have been produced here.

UUAZ survived the turbulence of the 1990s, temporarily losing its blade production workshop (considered the most profitable), which came under the control of OJSC VIK or the Helicopter Innovation and Industrial Company. “VIK” was created by part of the management of the aircraft plant itself, which as a result approved the deal to sell the workshop to the outside. The workshop itself continued to operate, selling products to the plant, but the proceeds eventually went elsewhere. At that time, part of the shares of the plant were bought by Nedoroslev; the future Minister of Industry Denis Manturov, a friend of Sergei Chemezov, who was the first - at the age of 29 - to propose the idea of ​​a helicopter holding, worked as a deputy director at the plant itself.

In May of this year, information appeared in the local media about a serious financial situation plant Photo ato.ru

While Manturov went to work at the Moscow Helicopter Plant, workshops were divided up in Ulan-Ude. In 1998, one of the leaders of VIK, Leonid Belykh, became the head of UUAZ itself. “VIK” did not return to the plant, but, according to local observers, it even more crushed important production sites. In the mid-2000s, when Chemezov and Manturov began consolidating the helicopter assets of the Russian Federation, Oboronprom purchased 49.18% of UUAZ shares. Currently, Russian Helicopters JSC owns 100% of the aircraft plant.

However, the plant went to Chemezov and Manturov without at least one key workshop. Having decided to buy out assets from OJSC VIK, Muscovites encountered opposition from local managers who accused them of a “raider takeover”, so the value of VIK’s assets increased from 16 million rubles to 780 million rubles. At the same time, they bought the workshop with money from the plant itself.

In May of this year, information appeared in the local media about the difficult financial situation of the plant: allegedly, having abandoned the production of promising aircraft, the management “was fixated on the aging Mi helicopters.” At the same time, specialists losing their jobs go... to Kazan: “The Kazan aircraft plant takes engineers and skilled workers with both hands - no resume is needed if you have work experience. And we make the same helicopters. There’s just a call, and the family moves to Tatarstan,” say the participants in the events.

According to those dissatisfied, KVZ, which is located closer to Moscow and is better at lobbying for its orders, is partly to blame for the problems of UUAZ. In addition, Kazan “advanced in the development of new generation helicopters” (Mi-38 and Ansat). Although, due to the reduction in orders, “it’s also not easy in Kazan - they decided not to fire people yet, but to temporarily transfer them to part-time work.”

Nevertheless, with revenue of 50 billion rubles, the company’s profit in Ulan-Ude in 2015 amounted to 17 billion rubles (at KVZ the profit was 12.4 billion rubles, although in 2016 it decreased 10 times). UUAZ director Leonid Belykh himself reports that by 2020 investments in the enterprise will exceed 12 billion rubles (will go to 12 investment projects), in 2015 the volume of investments amounted to 2.8 billion rubles. The plant's priorities include replacing the production of Mi-8/18 with Mi-171A2 helicopters.

UUAZ director Leonid Belykh (right) reports that by 2020, investments in the enterprise will exceed 12 billion rubles. Photo 03grb.ru

On the other hand, the Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant “due to the difficulty in forming a portfolio of orders” in 2016 could, according to forecasts, reduce production by 15-25% and, accordingly, reduce profits. One of the difficulties of UUAZ (which produced 75 helicopters last year) is the decline in export orders. In 2016, it was planned to produce only 53-55 vehicles (all under state defense orders) - production volumes will indeed not exceed 2015 figures. The Chinese contract concluded in November last year (six vehicles) is also unlikely to help.

UAC: from Putin’s launch and criticism of antimonopoly officials to the first profits and the injection of hundreds of billions into Superjet

The United Aircraft Corporation took ninth place in terms of revenue in our ranking. The UAC, created in 2006 on behalf of Vladimir Putin, was headed by then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. It included Sukhoi, MiG Corporation (12th place in our ranking), Ilyushin (56th place), Tupolev (39th place - a drop in revenue by 21%), Irkut , KAPO Gorbunova, etc. In total - 20 companies. The idea of ​​unification was criticized by the then head of the FAS, Igor Artemyev, who said that “the developers of the UAC concept decided to eliminate internal competition between Russian enterprises for the sake of joint participation in competition with foreign manufacturers.”

UAC was set a goal to increase the total revenue of enterprises from $2.5 billion (revenue at the time of merger in 2006) to $7-8 billion within 10 years. Did it work or not? Let's do the math. The parent company's revenue in 2015 amounted to 49.3 billion rubles, having increased by 24% since 2014. At the same time, the company closed the year with a loss of 9.4 billion rubles. This, of course, cannot be compared with the 2011 loss of 147 billion rubles, but UAC ended 2013 and 2014 with a profit. According to the consolidated statements of UAC for 2016, total revenue amounted to 394.6 billion rubles, revenue according to IFRS - 416.9 billion rubles (in 2015 - 346.1 billion rubles). Gross profit according to IFRS in 2016 was 78.6 billion rubles. With the weighted average dollar exchange rate for 2016 being 67 rubles, UAC's revenue in 2016 amounted to only $6.2 billion. On the other hand, in terms of the 2006 dollar exchange rate, UAC's turnover in 2006 was 67.9 billion rubles.

Export revenue in 2016 more than doubled to 203 billion rubles, so in 2015 UAC received at least 100 billion rubles from export sales. The share of exports in total revenue in 2015 was 28.9%, in 2016 - already 48.6%. In 2015, UAC sold 156 aircraft (in 2014 - 159 units). In 2015, 90 Su-30, Su-34, MiG-29 and Yak-130 aircraft were supplied to the Russian Ministry of Defense under the state defense order. 34 aircraft were exported.

The company confirms that the main factor in the growth of turnover was export supplies, and the revenue of the civil segment (the main product is the short-haul aircraft SSJ100) increased to 69 billion rubles. According to the company’s calculations, the share of the Ministry of Defense in 2016 amounted to 43% of revenue (47% in 2015). There are no all the figures for the state defense contract for 2016, but it can be assumed that approximately twice as many aircraft were delivered for export. The main result was achieved, the UAC assures, through the sale abroad of Su-35 and Su-30 aircraft and the supply of SSJ100 to foreign customers.

The main product of the civil segment is the short-haul aircraft SSJ100. Photo: superjet100.info

At the same time, in 2015, 100 billion rubles were poured into the corporation for additional capitalization (which reduced the loan burden). In 2017-2019, another 400 billion rubles will be poured into the UAC - mainly for the implementation of the Superjet and MS-21 programs.

KVZ: from deliveries of the U-2 to the front and the release of the legendary Mi-8 to the “Chemezov attack” in the 2000s, layoffs of people and the sale of helicopter assets abroad

And finally, the top ten largest defense companies in Russia are being closed by the Kazan Helicopter Plant, whose turnover fell in 2015 by 9% to 49 billion rubles. Given that the turnover of the Admiralty Shipyards of St. Petersburg, on the contrary, increased by 23% to 45.3 billion rubles, there is a possibility that by the end of 2016, KVZ will fall out of the “defense top ten”: revenue in 2016 amounted to only 25 billion rubles . Profit fell almost 100 times, from 12.3 billion to 129.8 million rubles.

It doesn’t make sense for Tatarstan residents to talk much about the history of KVZ, so I’ll keep it short. It was created on the basis of Leningrad plant No. 38, during the war it delivered 11 thousand U-2s to the front, increasing production volume in the year of victory by 3.5 times (up to 350 units per month). After the war, the plant smoothly transitioned to civilian production, producing 9 thousand combines, and began producing Mi-1 helicopters. With the creation of the Mi-4, the plant began export deliveries, and in the 1960s they began producing the legendary Mi-8.

In the 1990s, the plant was privatized and corporatized. In 1993, they formed a joint stock company and carried out an issue of shares, and in 1998 - an additional issue (exactly in the same year, due to the denomination, the cost of helicopters valuable papers collapsed 1000 times). By the end of the 1990s, almost a third of KVZ shares belonged to the State Property Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan (another 6.3% through an offshore company), 17% belonged to the company’s employees. The register of shareholders also included Bank Credit Suisse First Boston, Russian Credit, and ONEXIM.

Alexander Lavrentyev gave up his share of shares only at the end of 2006. Photo by Maxim Platonov

In 1993, the plant began developing and producing Ansat and Aktai helicopters. As in the case of the Ufa MPO, KVZ also became the object of the division of the region with Moscow. In the mid-2000s, Manturov and Chemezov, combining helicopter assets, made an offer to Kazan that they could not refuse. As a result, in 2005, the Tatarstan authorities exchanged their stake in the plant for 15% of Oboronprom (overseeing the helicopter holding), and the head of the plant, Alexander Lavrentyev, who at that time owned a third of the shares, gave up his share only at the end of 2006. Today, Russian Helicopters JSC has already transferred 99.6% of the shares of the Kazan plant.

The reluctance to part with the helicopter asset was explained by the plant’s export successes: by 2001, KVZ managed to earn about $1 billion from export sales of almost 600 aircraft. It is significant that the Kazan shareholders explained the decision to give the plant into “Chemezov’s hands” by the state defense order: the plant was supported by exports (90%), relations with Rosoboronexport had not worked out until then - in those years, Rosoboronexport was headed by Sergei Chemezov, who therefore knew , which necessary buttons for Kazan residents should press.

At first, promises regarding the state defense order were fulfilled. From 2007 to 2011, the plant’s revenue grew (from 6 to 30 billion rubles). In 2011, the head of Russian Helicopters, Andrei Reus, promised to increase the state defense order by 1.5 times in 2012. KVZ, following this, invested 1.5 billion rubles in production in 2011. The volume of helicopter production by 2012 almost reached the level of 100 aircraft (with the ability to produce 120 helicopters), but as a result it remained at this level until 2014. The peak point was 2013, when KVZ sold 107 helicopters. In 2012, the share of state defense orders in revenue was 2%, in 2013 - 3.4%, in 2014 - already 24.7%, but in 2015 it collapsed to 1%. In 2015, the plant rolled back to 2005, last year independence - and sold only 70 helicopters (same as in 2016).

The reason was not only a decrease in state defense orders (in 2014 - 13.3 billion rubles, in 2015 - only 971.5 million rubles), but also in a drop in export revenue. Market experts explained this by the full implementation of previous contracts with India for $2.8 billion, and with the United States (63 helicopters for the Afghan army were purchased despite sanctions from the US State Department). In addition, the promotion of civilian versions of Ansat had just begun at that time, and the market for Mi-8/17 helicopters was already saturated. The plant’s staff had to be reduced by 500 people in 2015, and the head of Russian Helicopters JSC wrote a letter to Rostec about the “critical situation with loading production capacity"UAZ and the Kazan Helicopter Plant, the main product range of which is helicopters of the Mi-8/17/171 type."

In November 2016, the management of KVZ announced its intention to change direction from defense to civilian (apparently in order to get off the “needle of state defense orders”). In the same 2016, Chemezov and Manturov made a knight's move, announcing their intention to sell the consolidated helicopter holding - they planned to sell 49% of the shares to a strategic investor. With the value of the stake at $600 million, 49% would have to be paid more than $1 billion. The announcement of the search for an investor came against the backdrop of a general drop in sales of helicopter factories by 21.8%: 212 helicopters were delivered in 2015 (59 machines less than in 2014). The order portfolio decreased by 9.5% to 494 helicopters worth 396.1 billion rubles. In the summer of 2016, 25% of the shares were sold for $600 million Russian Foundation direct investment. In February 2017, it became known that another 12% of Russian Helicopters shares were sold to “Middle Eastern investors” for $300 million, and another 13% would be offered to Indian or Chinese investment companies. Thus, Oboronprom will get rid of not 49%, but 50% of helicopter shares.

In November 2016, KVZ management announced its intention to change direction from defense to civilian. Photo by Maxim Platonov

It is still unknown whether Chemezov and Manturov will sell other defense assets that they have been consolidating for many years and turning into a vertically integrated holding. It is also unknown whether the initial desire was to consolidate defense assets with the aim of selling to an investor. Moreover, it is usually effectively functioning consolidated assets that are brought to the market, and not companies showing billions in losses - why were Russian Helicopters not sold in 2012-2013? Let us also note that all 10 large holdings of the Russian defense industry are in one way or another controlled by Denis Manturov and/or Sergei Chemezov, behind whom with one hundred percent probability one can discern only the only person who would give the go-ahead for the sale of defense assets abroad or prohibit the transfer strategic companies into the hands of foreigners. And this man’s name is Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

Sergey Afanasyev

December 20, 2019, The results of the bank’s work in 2019 and plans for the next year were discussed.

November 18, 2019, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order To the team of the State Machine-Building Design Bureau "Vympel" named after I.I. Toropov The design bureau turns 70 years old.

February 27, 2019, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order During the trip, the Deputy Prime Minister visited a number of enterprises and held a series of meetings on the diversification of shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing, as well as on the progress of implementation of individual investment projects.

February 13, 2019, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order The Deputy Prime Minister visited the Era Military Innovation Technopolis in Anapa, where he inspected the constructed laboratories, talked with operators of scientific companies and held a meeting on the organization of interaction between universities and defense industry enterprises with the Russian Ministry of Defense when carrying out research and development on the basis of VIT Era.

February 12, 2019, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order To the team of JSC NPO High-Precision Complexes February 12, 2019 marks the 10th anniversary of the formation of JSC NPO High-Precision Complexes.

February 1, 2019, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order Yuri Borisov met with scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences Issues of conducting scientific research in the interests of national defense and ensuring state security were discussed.

January 22, 2019, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order The results of the bank's work last year and plans for the subsequent period were discussed.

December 28, 2018, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order The President of Russia signed the Federal Law developed by the Government on improving procurement planning for state defense orders Federal Law of December 27, 2018 No. 571-FZ. The draft federal law was submitted to the State Duma by Government Order No. 1393-r dated July 7, 2018. The federal law establishes that procurement under the state defense order in terms of orders for the creation, modernization, supply, repair, maintenance and disposal of weapons, military and special equipment are not taken into account when forming, approving and maintaining procurement plans and schedules provided for by the legislation on contract system in the field of procurement of goods, works, services for state and municipal needs.

October 13, 2018, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order On introducing to the State Duma a bill on administrative liability for violations of the execution of government contracts in the field of state defense procurement Order of October 13, 2018 No. 2201-r. The purpose of the bill is to strengthen control over the implementation of government contracts in the field of state defense procurement, increase performance discipline, preventing violations during its implementation.

October 7, 2018, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order The Deputy Prime Minister told the winners of the “Leaders of Russia” competition about the structure of the Russian defense industry, its current state, main problems and development prospects.

August 21, 2018, Defense-industrial complex. State defense order The forum is being held for the fourth time. This year, more than 1.2 thousand Russian and foreign participants presented about 18 thousand samples of their products.

Introduction........................................................ ........................................................ ...............3

1. Composition of the defense industry complex of the Russian Federation.................................................... ........................................................ ...5

2. Legislative basis.................................................... ....................................6

3. Federal executive authorities in the management of the military-industrial complex.................................................... ........................................16

3.1. Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation................................................... ...........................17

3.2. Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation...................................19

3.2.1.Department of the military-industrial complex....................................19

3.2.2. Federal Agency for Industry...................................................22

3.3. Federal Space Agency........................................................ ..........24

3.4. Federal Atomic Energy Agency................................................................. 25

3.5. Federal Agency for the Supply of Military, Special Equipment and Materials.................................................... ........................................................ 28

3.6. Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation.................................29

4. Expert Council on the problems of legislative support for the development of the military-industrial complex under the Chairman of the Federation Council................................................... ........................................................ ...........................39

Conclusion................................................. ........................................................ .......44

Introduction.

One of the most important means of ensuring national security is its armed forces, and the military-industrial complex as a whole. National security - one of the main needs of the state and society - today is becoming extremely important for the successful implementation of its political, socio-economic and spiritual-ideological tasks. This implies the need for constant attention on the part of the state to the problems of the development of the military-industrial complex (DIC), the development and production of weapons and military equipment, the necessary level of scientific, technical and military-technical potential that ensures Russia the role of a great power in the world. The need for such an understanding and real actions by the country's political leadership is also due to the actions of Western countries, and primarily the United States, seeking to change the balance of armed forces in their favor, both in the West and on the southern borders of Russia.

The state is obliged to develop the main directions and prospects for the development of the military-industrial complex. It is intended to determine the directions of the state defense-industrial policy, the required level of the country’s military-technical potential, taking into account the emerging international situation.

At the same time, it is important to take into account the historical experience of creating and developing the defense industry, accumulated in the USSR and over the last 15 years of the existence of the Russian state. Without taking into account the positive and negative aspects of this experience, it is impossible to determine the development strategy of the defense-industrial complex. This largely determines the relevance of the chosen research topic and the need to analyze the problems of the defense industry in the public policy of modern Russia. At the same time, it is important to take into account the accumulated Foreign experience in this domain. Another relevant factor, along with those mentioned above, is a significant increase in the importance in armed struggle and confrontation between states of information policy, the introduction and use of a wide range of means of information warfare, both open and hidden, not obvious technologies. As a result, today the criteria for protecting states from military threats are not fully consistent modern methods, methods and forms of military confrontation. This, in turn, forces the political leadership of the world's leading states to intensify efforts to improve and develop their defense-industrial complexes and solve their socio-economic and political problems. It should also be noted that a feature of the functioning of the military-industrial complex is the desire of a number of international terrorist organizations to use its advanced technologies, especially means of mass destruction, for their own criminal purposes. After September 11, 2001, the tragic events of hostage takings (in Moscow in October 2002, in Beslan in September 2004) it became finally clear that the Cold War was being replaced by a war of a completely different nature - the war against international terrorism . Therefore, the use of military force is one of the ways to counter such evil as the global spread of terrorist and extremist movements and groups.

All these objective factors necessitate the state’s constant attention to the problems of the defense industry, and the scientific community to analyze current problems of the political and socio-economic development of the Russian military-industrial complex, and search for ways to increase its efficiency.

The object of the study is the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation as an important tool for ensuring the national security of the state.

Subject of research - system government controlled Russian military-industrial complex.

1. Composition of the defense industry complex of the Russian Federation.

Today, the military-industrial complex (hereinafter - MIC) of Russia is a multifunctional research and production industry, capable of developing and producing modern views and types of weapons, military and special equipment (hereinafter referred to as military and special equipment), as well as produce a variety of high-tech civilian products. Its basis is strategic enterprises and strategic joint stock companies. The list of these enterprises and societies was approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 4, 2004 No. 1009 (as amended on November 19, 2007). This list contains more than 1000 items, including:

federal state unitary enterprises those engaged in the production of products (works, services) of strategic importance for ensuring the defense capability and security of the state, protecting morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation;

· open joint-stock companies, the shares of which are federally owned and the participation of the Russian Federation in the management of which ensures strategic interests, the defense capability and security of the state, the protection of morals, health, rights and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation.

The defense industry consists of several industries:

1. Aviation industry.

2. Rocket and space industry.

3. Ammunition and special chemicals industry.

4. Weapons industry.

5. Radio industry.

6. Communications industry.

7. Electronics industry.

8. Shipbuilding industry.

9. Intersectoral structures and enterprises.

2. Legislative framework.

The main law regulating the basis of the existence and functioning of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation is the Federal Law of May 31, 1996 N 61-FZ “On Defense”.

This Federal Law defines the foundations and organization of the defense of the Russian Federation, the powers of the bodies state power of the Russian Federation, the functions of state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, organizations and their officials, the rights and obligations of citizens of the Russian Federation in the field of defense, forces and means attracted for defense, responsibility for violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of defense, as well as other norms, concerning defense.

Defense means a system of political, economic, military, social, legal and other measures to prepare for armed defense and armed defense of the Russian Federation, the integrity and inviolability of its territory.

Defense is organized and carried out in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, this Federal Law, the laws of the Russian Federation and other regulatory legal acts.

For defense purposes, military duty of citizens of the Russian Federation and military transport duty of federal executive authorities, local government bodies and organizations are established, regardless of the form of ownership, as well as owners Vehicle.

For defense purposes, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are created. The internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, troops civil defense(hereinafter referred to as other troops).

To carry out certain tasks in the field of defense, engineering, technical and road construction military formations under federal executive authorities (hereinafter referred to as military formations), the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, federal security service agencies, the federal agency for special communications and information, and federal government agencies are involved. security, the federal body for ensuring mobilization training of state authorities of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the bodies), as well as special formations created for wartime.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies carry out tasks in the field of defense in accordance with the Plan of Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The creation and existence of formations that have a military organization or weapons and military equipment or which provide for military service not provided for by federal laws, are prohibited and prosecuted by law.

Lands, forests, waters and others Natural resources, provided to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies are federal property.

Lands, forests, waters and other natural resources owned by constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local governments, in private property, may be withdrawn for the needs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies only in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.