Kenneth Arrow described transaction costs most succinctly: Nobel laureate in Economics 1972 for his contributions to general theory equilibrium and for work in the field of information theory. In his opinion, these are the costs of “keeping the economic system moving.” This definition reflects the essence of transaction costs and emphasizes their integral nature, but for analysis it is practically useless. To present these costs in operational form, we will describe their most significant categories and groups.

Costs of coordination and motivation (Milgrom-Roberts classification)

Institutions solve problems of motivation and coordination in conditions of uncertainty of choice and limited rationality of agents, so one can try to classify the transaction costs that arise according to the nature of the problem they generate. A similar attempt was made Paul Milgrom and John Roberts(31 Milgrom P., Roberts J. Economics, organization and management: In 2 vols. T. 1. St. Petersburg: Economic School, 1999). According to their classification, transaction costs belong to one of two types: coordination costs or motivation costs

Coordination costs are the costs aimed at ensuring the temporal and spatial correspondence of the participants in the transaction.

Costs of motivation- these are the costs of ensuring control, monitoring, collecting information about partners’ compliance with mutual obligations under the contract, etc. Like coordination costs, they can arise both in the market and within the company, which is associated with two factors - incompleteness and imperfection of information, and also by the opportunism of the participants in the interaction..

Costsex ante Andex post (North-Eggertsson classification)

Using the Milgrom-Roberts classification, it is possible to identify potential sources of transaction costs, but it is difficult to even qualitatively assess these costs themselves in a specific transaction. For this, another classification is needed - simple and clear. North-Eggertsson classification It is the only one built on the observable external signs of a certain activity, which generates corresponding costs and makes it possible to trace them as the stages of contractual relations are implemented. This classification identifies six categories of transaction costs:

· costs of searching for information (search activities);

· costs of negotiations (bargaining activities);

· costs of contract making activities;

· monitoring costs;

· costs of enforcement of contracts;

· costs of protection against 3rd parties.

Let's consider them sequentially.

· costs of searching for information (search activities);

Exist four main areas of search:

· acceptable price;

· information about the quality of available goods and services;

· information about the “quality” of sellers;

· information about the “quality” of buyers.

The costs associated with activities in these areas are borne by all economic entities - both individuals and firms.

The search can also be carried out on open anonymous market , and through social media , which include agents (including the use friendships) .

Idiosyncratic search. This search is primarily based on personal connections and/or ascribed characteristics rather than institutionalized industry standards and norms. Due to low trust in the latter, information collected in this way cannot be used to analyze the effectiveness of other relationships. Therefore, the costs associated with search are idiosyncratic in nature (hence the name search).

Comprehensive search. This search is typical for industries with a higher level of organization, but it is rarely formalized in written standards and rules and is surrounded by bureaucratic procedures (for example, the industry specialization of a region with a low level of entry and exit of new firms). Information obtained through personal connections is here complemented by information that is trusted by all members of the industry, and the search is most effective.

Routine search. This is a more formalized and bureaucratic way of collecting information about business partners, combined with loosely organized industry procedures. In this case, firms use routines that are already established in the industry and thus overcome uncertainty.

Industry search. This search relies primarily on the procedures of a rigidly structured industry. Firms do not trust information obtained through personal connections. They rely on information provided to them by rating agencies, audit firms, etc. Obviously, the costs of finding partners are much lower in an industry that is strictly structured. However, this narrows the circle of possible partners.

· costs of negotiations (bargaining activities);

Negotiation costs include three categories.

These include the costs of translators, if we are talking about foreign partners, and the costs associated with partners’ misunderstanding of each other due to differences in business culture.

· costs of contract making activities;

Costs associated with fixing the contents of the contract in one way or another.

Unlike the costs of negotiations, the consequences of contractual incompleteness before the conclusion of the contract are almost impossible to calculate. When drawing up a contract, the parties should also take into account that their position on certain issues may be used to obtain information that the parties would not voluntarily disclose.

TO costs of drawing up a contract include legal support for drawing up contracts (up to 10-15% of the contract amount), expenses for wages employees who prepare this contract and their technical support(computers, printers, paper, etc.).

· monitoring costs;

At the stage of contract implementation, the parties bear certain, often very significant, costs of monitoring the activities of their partners.

Monitoring, firstly, provides information about the actions of partners (as well as whether it is necessary to demand compensation, fines, etc.) and, secondly, stimulates good faith performance contractual obligations.

Monitoring the execution of contracts has not only technological, but also cultural specifics, and therefore its intensity varies different countries different. Monitoring intensity characterized by the ratio of the number of managers and administrative workers to the number of workers and employees employed in production in each country.

· costs of enforcement of contracts;

Participants in interaction may try to evade fulfillment of contractual obligations, since these obligations often contradict their immediate interests. Therefore it is necessary enforcement mechanisms to the execution of contracts. The form and effectiveness of coercion depends on the type of contractual relationship.

The organization of a particular system of coercion in different countries is associated with different costs (which is determined both by cultural differences between countries and by different costs of access to legal system). In the current Russian economic practice, litigation is, in fact, a continuation of negotiations, which also requires certain investments, strategic behavior, and trade.

Forcing partners to fulfill obligations

Exist two mechanisms such coercion.

Reputational enforcement mechanism. It is based on the firm's interest in maintaining good relations with past, present and future partners. For reputational monitoring of a firm's behavior to be effective, information flows must spread quickly and reliably throughout the business community (say, an industry), and the number of leading firms must be more or less constant. High barriers to entry and exit from the industry and the territorial proximity of firms create the preconditions for effective reputational enforcement.

We can now move on to the task of classifying transaction costs. It makes most sense to tie the classification of transaction costs to the stages of concluding a transaction. O. Williamson talks about transaction costs ex ante And ex postn, i.e., those arising before and after the conclusion of the transaction. If the stages of concluding a transaction are the following: searching for a partner, coordinating interests, formalizing the transaction, monitoring its implementation, then the classification of transaction costs can be presented in the form of a table.

Constructing a classification of transaction costs based on the stages of concluding a contract allows us to clarify the issue of their quantitative assessment at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. For example, when concluding a transaction for renting an apartment, which involves the transfer by the owner of the apartment to the tenant of the right to use it, transaction costs for the tenant will take the following forms.

The costs of searching for information about apartments for rent, about prices on the housing market: buying specialized publications and calling advertisements or contacting a real estate company, which independently selects several options for a commission - costs in cash and time.

Costs of negotiating with the owners of apartments selected based on the results of the first stage special conditions rent - time costs, can be transferred to the intermediary and in this case take monetary form.

The costs of assessing the quality of housing during a visit to selected apartments - time and transportation costs can also be transferred to the intermediary.

The costs of legal registration of the employment contract and its notarization are costs in monetary form.

The costs of preventing the owner's opportunism, expressed in the desire to change the terms of the lease, for example, to increase the rent, are time costs, psychological costs.

The costs of protecting the right to use an apartment transferred for the duration of the contract in the event that the owner makes claims to the tenant regarding the maintenance of the apartment and/or wants to terminate the contract early are the costs of time and monetary costs associated with going to court.

Thus, quantification Transaction costs arising from rental housing can be obtained either by analyzing the income of intermediary firms, or by summing up direct monetary costs and time costs, multiplied by the average hourly wage. For example, in Moscow in the mid-90s, transaction costs were approximately equal to a month’s rent, i.e. amounted to the equivalent of 200-500 dollars.

D. North's theory of state

The main exponent of the institutional approach to the economic role of the state is D. North, and one of the most important premises underlying his analysis of the state is the close relationship between the state, property rights and economic efficiency. In this regard, the identification of two boundaries is of particular importance production capabilities, namely, technical And structural.

The level of knowledge, technology used, and available resources set the technical production possibility frontier, while the system of property rights sets the structural or organizational production possibility frontier, which is achieved by selecting from among the many possible types of economic organization those that provide the greatest economic efficiency. The effectiveness of a property rights system is determined by the proximity of the structural production possibilities frontier to the technical frontier (Figure 1.3). The system of property rights itself is determined by the state.

According to this theory, the state is an economic agent with a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence, extending over a territory whose boundaries are determined by its ability to collect taxes, and its main function is the specification and protection of property rights. The state arises as a result social contract, in which, in exchange for a reward in the form of taxes, an economic agent with a comparative advantage in the implementation of violence provides society with the specification and protection of property rights.

There are three main restrictions of the state:

1. costs of obtaining information (here we will consider two types of information, namely, data on the size of the tax base, the difficulty of obtaining which forces the ruler to establish proportional taxation, which has a disincentive effect on economic activity, and information about offenses);

2. costs of opportunism of civil servants;

3. internal and external political competition.

Some of the most well-known formal models illustrating some elements of North's theory of the state are the Findlay-Wilson model and the McGuire-Olson sedentary bandit model.

Findlay-Wilson model

In this model, the output of the private sector is determined by the use of three factors of production, namely, labor L, capital TO and law and order R(it can be understood as government services in the form of specification and protection of property rights). Then the production function will have the following form:

Where G- the labor of civil servants, and the production function for law and order is such that P(0) = 1, i.e., in the absence of the state, the production function would have the form Y= f(K, L) . Total amount of labor N used in the production of private and public goods, i.e. law and order.

The dependence of the volume of output on the amount of labor of civil servants is manifested in the fact that, on the one hand, the supply of labor in the private sector is reduced by the amount of this labor, on the other hand, the legal order created by this labor increases the productivity of labor in the private sector (Fig. 2.3).

In Fig. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical illustration of the relationship between the labor of civil servants and output. In accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal productivity of factors of production, each subsequent unit of labor of civil servants produces an increasingly smaller effect, and after reaching the optimal value, a further increase in this type of labor already reduces output. The optimal value of this value, in accordance with the marginal principle, will occur at the point of equality of the marginal products of labor in the private and public sectors.

This model considers two types of state: a contract state and a state as a monopoly rent maximizer.

Problems of information asymmetry"

An important reason for reducing the intensity of competition and acquisition monopoly power In markets there is incompleteness and asymmetry of information. Information is one of the important types of economic resources. Each economic agent has access to only a limited amount of information.

Incomplete information is an indispensable feature of economic life. More or less incomplete information can affect the conditions and characteristics of the functioning of markets, creating additional transaction costs for economic agents. A special type of incomplete information—asymmetric information—has the greatest impact on market activity. Asymmetry of information creates the possibility of one of the participants in the transaction misusing the counterparty’s lack of information. Asymmetry of information, as opposed to incompleteness itself, leads to a sharp decline in social welfare.

Asymmetric information is common in many business situations. As a rule, the seller of a product knows more about its quality than the buyer. Workers are aware of their skills and abilities better entrepreneurs. Managers know more about a firm's costs, competitive position, and investment climate than business owners.

First, let's consider a situation in which sellers of a product have more accurate information about its quality than buyers. We will see how such asymmetric information causes market imperfections. Then we'll look at how sellers avoid some of the problems associated with asymmetric information by signaling to potential buyers about the quality of their products. Product warranties provide a type of insurance that can be effective if buyers are less informed than sellers. But, as will be shown later, buying insurance can also be difficult if buyers are better informed than sellers. Finally, we show that labor markets can function inefficiently when workers are better informed about their productivity than employers.

Quality uncertainty and the market for “lemons”

For convenience, let's look at the example of used cars.

Let's imagine that we bought a new car for $10,000, drove it 100 miles, and then suddenly realized that you don't really need it. Nothing happened to the car - it worked perfectly and met all your expectations. We just felt that we could do just as well without it and would benefit more if we saved the money to buy other things. So, we decide to sell this car. How much revenue could we get for it? Probably no more than $8,000 even if it's a car new brand, has only 100 miles and a transferable warranty. If we were the buyer, we probably wouldn't pay more than $8,000 for it.

Why does the mere fact of selling a car second hand reduce its value so significantly? To answer this question, let's think about our own doubts as a potential buyer. Why is this car for sale? Has the owner really changed his mind as stated, or is there something wrong with the car? It is possible that this car may be defective.

Used cars are sold much cheaper than new ones because information about their quality is asymmetrical: the seller of such a car knows much more about it than the potential buyer. A buyer may hire a mechanic to check the car, but a seller who has experience with it will still know better. In addition, the very fact of selling this car confirms that it may in fact be a “lemon”, otherwise why sell a reliable car? Therefore, a potential buyer of a used car always has suspicions about its quality, and not without reason.

The importance of asymmetric information about product quality was first analyzed by George Akerlof in his classic paper. Akerlof's analysis extends far beyond the used car market. Markets for insurance, credit, and even labor are also characterized by asymmetric quality information. To understand its significance, let's start with the used car market and then see how the same principles apply to other markets.

The Importance of Asymmetric Information

The example of used cars shows how asymmetric information can lead to market disruption. IN ideal conditions markets perfect competition consumers would have the opportunity to choose between low- and high-quality cars. Some would choose the former because they are cheap, others would prefer to pay more for the latter. Unfortunately, in the real world, consumers have a hard time determining the quality of used cars at the time of purchase, so their prices drop and high-quality cars disappear from the market.

This is just a hypothetical example to illustrate an important issue that arises in many markets. Let us now consider some other examples of information asymmetry and the possible response of government or private firms.

Utilitarianism

The first norm laid down in the market constitution is complex utilitarianism. It presupposes not only the individual’s orientation toward maximizing his utility, but also his awareness of the connection between the utility received and his productive activity, i.e., the norm of complex utilitarianism eliminates the discrepancy between the level of needs and the productive activity of individuals. Such a discrepancy often underlies “revolutions of inadequate expectations” that arise when high consumer standards spread among the population of countries that do not have high production potential and high labor productivity 16. In this situation, the perception of a new standard of consumption, occurring mainly through means mass media, does not affect the dominant model of productive activity in society. Further, simple utilitarianism involves turning utility maximization into rent seeking when conditions are right. Any deviation from the situation of perfect competition, the establishment of restrictions on exchange (tariffs, quotas) turns the efforts of a simple utilitarian to seeking rent, or, in other words, to unproductive profit maximization (directly unproductive profits seeking17). The alternative is precisely complex utilitarianism as a normative and value restriction on the individual’s desire to maximize rent, the individual’s recognition of the permissibility of receiving gains only through his own activities, and not to the detriment of others |8.

Utilitarianism:

simple- the individual’s desire to maximize his utility regardless of his productive activity;

difficult"- maximization by an individual of his utility based on productive activity.

Purposeful action

If the norm of utilitarianism specifies the goal function of the individual, then the norm of goal-oriented rational activity specifies it, connecting the maximization of utility with the solution of specific problems. Let us recall that goal-oriented behavior involves the use by an individual of a certain behavior of objects of the external world and people as “conditions” and “means” to achieve his rationally set and thoughtful goal. In conditions of incomplete information and limited cognitive abilities to process it (i.e., incomplete rationality), goal-oriented behavior turns into manipulation by an individual who has more information, his counterpart.

In this way, the individual seeks to turn others into means to achieve his goal - maximizing utility. Classic examples of the use of information asymmetry by some agents to the detriment of others are the market for used cars (“lemons”) and insurance associated with the situation of “moral hazard.” 19 Such behavior is called opportunism, “the pursuit of personal interest using deceit, overt deception, or more subtle form"20. Guarantees against the transformation of goal-oriented behavior into opportunism can be either structural or formal legal:

The completeness of information available to all participants in the exchange and their perfect cognitive abilities;

Use of special procedures when concluding a contract.

The last aspect is the subject of a special study of the theory of optimal contract and will be considered later, so we will limit ourselves here to just stating that the second element of the market constitution is purposeful action, eligible full rationality.

There is no generally accepted typology of transaction costs yet. Each researcher paid attention to the most interesting, from his point of view, elements. Thus, J. Stigler identified information costs, O. Williamson - the costs of opportunistic behavior, M. Jensen and W. Meckling - the costs of monitoring the agent’s behavior and the costs of his self-restraint, I. Barzel - the costs of measurement, P. Milgrom and J. Roberts - the costs of influence, G. Hansmann - costs of collective decision making. K. Dalman included in their composition the costs of collecting and processing information, the costs of negotiations and decision-making, the costs of monitoring and legal protection of the execution of the contract.

Reasons for the emergence of transaction costs.

Transaction costs are costs that arise as a result of the uncertainty and instability of the process of interaction between market actors at various levels, i.e., between the institutions of society, government and business.

In this definition:

firstly, the emphasis is on the fact that the source of transaction costs is the uncertainty and instability of the process of interaction between economic agents, hence their dynamism. In an economy where all interactions are precisely determined and predictable, transaction costs are zero;

secondly, it is emphasized that transaction costs arise as a result of interaction between market actors at various levels, hence their market nature;

thirdly, the definition specifies market subjects, the interaction between which leads to the emergence of transaction costs - these are the institutions of society, government and business, hence the institutional nature of transaction costs.

Let us highlight the main external and internal costs of the company.

Costs external to the company:

• 1. Costs of searching for market information;
• 2. Negotiation costs;
• 3. Costs of ensuring the fulfillment of the contract and compensation for damage in case of non-compliance with its terms;
• 4. Costs associated with opportunistic behavior;
• 5. Costs of specification and protection of property rights;
• 6. Measurement costs;
• 7. Costs of access to resources (material, financial and intellectual);
• 8. Costs of obtaining individual benefits and privileges;
• 9. Costs of servicing “shadow” transactions (costs of registering tax evasion, payment for cashing out funds, etc.);
• 10. Costs of enterprises and organizations for the formation of a “consensus ideology” in the team - in the spirit of compliance with certain rules and norms.

Internal transaction costs:

• 1. Costs of eliminating incomplete information (about the internal environment) and costs associated with making imprudent management decisions;
• 2. Costs of concluding labor contracts and preventing opportunistic post-contractual behavior:
  • a) labor risks (shirking and formalistic sabotage);
  • b) management risks (expanded consumption);
• 3. Costs associated with the transfer of authority and responsibility or the elimination of loss of control, as well as the costs of control.

Each type of internal transaction costs is divided into two categories:

costs of carrying out certain activities;

costs of eliminating the consequences of not carrying out this activity and lost profits.

To classify on the basis of causality, the concept of transaction costs can be used, in which they represent the costs of drawing up and concluding a contract (ex ante), as well as the costs of supervising compliance with this contract and enforcing its implementation (ex post), as opposed to production costs, which are costs actual execution of the contract.

Life cycle of transaction costs. As shown above, transaction costs have their own logic of occurrence and existence, and, accordingly, we can talk about their life cycle.

The following phases of the transaction cost function cycle are distinguished:

the rise phase, which characterizes the stable distribution of control within the organization;

a decline phase, which causes an unstable distribution of control or, generally speaking, a loss of control;

a phase of stagnation that results in command and control control emanating from one center of the organization.

The boom and bust phases lead, respectively, to minimum and maximum transaction costs, which, in turn, determine the rise and fall of the organization's production value.

The stagnation phase corresponds to command-administrative production, where transaction costs are not optimal. According to R. Coase, K. Menard and O. Williamson, only with minimal transaction costs does the value of production increase.

However, it is necessary to take into account the speed of transactions. In this regard, it can be assumed that the higher the transaction circulation speed, the faster their cycle moves into the recovery phase, associated with minimal transaction costs.

Let's consider the most well-known classifications of transaction costs.

Classification of transaction costs is possible, for example, according to the attributes of transactions (frequency, duration, uncertainty, specificity of assets).

Classification by Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts. Coordination costs are carried out to ensure the alignment of plans, and motivational costs - to ensure the alignment of incentives.

O. Williamson's classification highlights such an aspect of transactions as their contractual nature, therefore all transaction costs are considered in connection with the contractual process.

Table 4

Classifications of transaction costs by Milgrom, D. Roberts and O. Williamson

Classification by T. Eggertsson. For a more complete understanding of the essence of transaction costs, let us turn to their classification according to D. North and T. Eggertsson. It was first proposed by North, and clearly formulated by Eggertsson in the book “Economic behavior and institutions.” This is the only classification based on tangible external signs of a certain activity that generates corresponding costs. According to North and Eggertsson, transaction costs include:

information search costs;

negotiation costs;

costs of drawing up a contract;

monitoring costs;

costs of enforcement;

costs of protecting property rights.

• 1. Costs of searching for information. There are four types of factors that are associated with search:
  • a) reasonable price;
  • b) quality information about available goods and services;
  • c) quality information about sellers;
  • d) quality information about customers.

Quantitative information about sellers and buyers is represented by the first two positions. Qualitative information about sellers and buyers means information about their behavior - whether they are honest, how they fulfill their obligations, what their circumstances are (maybe one is on the verge of collapse, while the other, on the contrary, is thriving).

• 2. Negotiation costs. In market conditions, you bargain to minimize costs and look for your partner’s limiting indifference curve (what price he can reach when trading), because each of the bargainers has both a certain asking price and a certain reserve price, and they are trying to approach in different ways as close as possible to the limit - the lowest or the highest.
• 3. Costs of drawing up a contract. These are your costs for ensuring that the text of the contract records how in certain cases (foreseen by you) your partner will behave and how external circumstances will develop.
• 4. Monitoring costs.
• 5. Coercion costs. These are the costs of forcing the other party to fulfill the terms of the contract. Because people seek to act in their own interests, and information is by definition incomplete, situations often arise where a contract is not fulfilled in part or in full. The state maintains arbitration courts, ordinary criminal courts, and a system of threats of violence - the prison system... The coercion system is largely financed by the state.
• 6. Costs of protecting property rights. This is the only static form of transaction costs, as opposed to the dynamic costs associated with securing contracts.

It is also necessary to mention the classification of C. Menard:

• 1. costs of isolation;
• 2. information costs
• 3. costs of scale;
• 4. costs of behavior.
• 4. Ways to minimize transaction costs

In a market economy, which is characterized by the development social division labor, concentration and centralization of production and capital, the revival of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the strengthening of the economic role of the state, transaction costs are acquiring a clear upward trend.

At the same time, there is an incentive to reduce them, since this creates significant competitive advantages. In countries where transaction costs are very high, doing business is difficult, and you have to look for ways to reduce these costs.

In modern competitive economies, low transaction costs and the latest means of communication are the main means of ensuring the competitiveness of products.

North identifies three milestones in the historical reduction of transaction costs:

• 1. The emergence of institutions that made non-personalized exchange possible;
• 2. The adoption by the state of mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of property rights;
• 3. Realization of benefits from the achievements of modern science.

Human history shows the development of institutions that structured the interactions of individuals, making possible increased productivity and economic growth. In other words, it was economic institutions that made possible the growth of markets or the improvement (introduction) of new technologies. Political institutions have increased security of property rights and strengthened mechanisms for enforcing contracts. Historically, observed declines in transaction costs have reflected both voluntary and coercive solutions to exchange problems.

A form of government in which the state assumed the protection and guarantee of property rights arose in Western Europe, and in particular in the Netherlands and England. Generally Western Europe has been luckier than other parts of the world due to competitive forces.

The fundamental revolution, defined as the second economic revolution, occurred in the second half of the 19th century. This revolution was a consequence of changes in the stock of knowledge that arose as a result of the development and implementation (application in practice) of scientific disciplines.

The result was the influence of science on technology and a fundamental transformation in the organization and structure of production and distribution.

The overall result for countries that have been able to take advantage of such technologies is increasing returns and therefore high rates of economic growth, i.e., the characteristics of the economies of Western countries are evident.

But it was possible to take advantage of these technologies and realize their potential only under the condition of a general restructuring of the economy.

The remaining countries that failed to reorganize the economy were unable to realize their productive potential, which led to their underdevelopment and political instability.

Vertical integration is one of the most well-known methods for minimizing transaction costs.

Studying vertical integration has both theoretical and practical difficulties. Vertical integration has never had a strong place in value theory; This is because it is an anomaly within conventional neoclassical assumptions: if competitive markets operate at zero cost, as is generally assumed in theoretical analysis, then why is integration necessary?

The argument in favor of technological interdependence is the most direct and usual: successive processes, naturally coinciding in time and space, dictate certain patterns of efficient production; it is assumed that this entails the requirement of common ownership. Such technical complementarity is perhaps more important where continuous production is involved (chemistry, metallurgy, etc.) than in discrete and assembleable mechanical engineering.

The firm has relatively effective conflict resolution mechanisms. For example, when resolving minor conflicts (say, differences in interpretation), a strong-willed decision by the administration is often better than a bargaining trial.

When resolving interorganizational conflicts, a strong-willed solution can be used in rare cases, if applicable at all. First of all, for such a solution to be possible, both parties must agree to arbitration, and such an agreement can be expensive.

Rules regarding evidence and arguments and procedural rules must be established. In addition, if this method of resolving interorganizational conflicts becomes common, then arbitration turns into a kind of vertical integration, and the arbitrator, if not called a manager, actually becomes one. In contrast, strong-willed intraorganizational decisions are commonplace.

The advantages of integration do not lie in the fact that non-integrated firms are deprived of the possibility of technological savings (on the organization continuous production), but in the fact that integration harmonizes interests (reconciles differences, however, often in an orderly manner) and allows the use of an effective (adaptive, consistent) decision-making process. In general, arguments for integration based on “security of supply” considerations tend to boil down to the issue of completeness of contracts.

The mechanism of vertical integration has been studied in sufficient detail in the theory of transaction costs. The most important integration factor is the specific assets of interacting organizations.

O. Williamson gives three conditions for vertical integration:

• 1. Incomplete contracts. This means that it is impossible or too expensive to capture all the consequences of future transactions in all possible states of the world. Almost every contract is incomplete due to uncertainty and the costs of acquiring information;
• 2. Opportunism on the part of partners;
• 3. Specificity of assets (fixed assets, personnel, know-how).

According to Williamson's definition, an asset is specific if it is used in the production of a particular product and its use in the production of another product is impossible or would be costly. Such an asset is practically tied to a specific production. These assets ensure: the efficiency of using highly specialized equipment that produces products that can only be sold within the framework of an integrated structure; proximity to the location of related industries; presence of complementary specializations work force and established cooperation in the field of R&D.

In the absence of asset specificity, a market contract between supplier and manufacturer is sufficient.

Competition among suppliers and buyers of nonspecific assets minimizes the costs associated with incomplete contracts. Once asset specificity arises, the parties are bound by a bilateral relationship and are fully exposed to the threats posed by incomplete contracts. The problem can be solved by integrating production facilities connected by specific assets into one enterprise.

Transaction cost theory predicts that when asset specificity is high, vertical integration is more efficient than market contracting. This is a very important explanation of vertical integration from an efficiency point of view.

Williamson also discussed the limits of integration, namely increasing bureaucratic costs and weakening individual motivation.

The theory of property rights, whose representatives are O. Hart and S. Grossman, goes further in explaining the economic motives for integration. They apply negotiation theory to explain what happens when businesses merge. Grossman and Hart argue that the distribution of surpluses from different types of integration influences firms' incentives to invest. An enterprise that gains ownership through the integration process has an increased incentive to invest, while an enterprise that loses ownership will underinvest. Conclusion: Ownership rights should belong to the party who has a more productive investment project.

Among the economists who criticized the theory of vertical integration, the name of G. Demsets should be mentioned. In his opinion, transaction cost theory overestimates the importance of opportunism and asset specificity. Demset empirically evaluates the impact of asset specificity on vertical integration. The results of his assessment do not support the hypothesis of the transaction cost theory.

Vertical integration can also serve as a means to avoid taxes on the sale of intermediate products or to circumvent quota programs and price controls.

Vertical integration may be advantageous due to incomplete definition of property rights. Reconciling the divergent interests of the two parties by internalizing the transaction through a vertical acquisition promises to eliminate the bargaining costs that arise from uncertain ownership.

In the absence of trust, alternative types of sanctions will be too costly, and many opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation will be missed. In general, one might expect that vertical integration is more likely to be prevalent in low rather than high trust cultural environments.

World experience shows that the only path to success leading to the formation of competitive industrial structures is the concentration of capital and production capacity, their integration according to the vertical technological principle. And this is especially true in the conditions of the transition economy of our country, which has to go from current state to vertically integrated economic system based on efficient and competitive corporate structures.

In general, a vertical integration system is more effective than a horizontal one, since it significantly affects the dynamics and quality of the company’s industrial growth; integrated capital completes its circulation faster than the sum of private capital. We also note that the development of information technologies, neurolinguistic programming, distribution of control within an organization, transactional analysis, process model of management, the Internet and modeling of regulatory structures.

Minimization of transaction costs is facilitated mainly by vertical and horizontal integration, diversification (and partly combining production), transition to a divisional management structure, allocation of external ventures, as well as network organization, subcontracting relationships, inter-company cooperation, ensuring strong ties vertically and horizontally.

The role of the state in minimizing transaction costs.

The costs of using the market mechanism negatively affect the socio-economic development of society, inhibiting the increase in production efficiency and the growth of the population's standard of living.

Transaction costs act as a type of indirect taxes, the growth of which negatively changes the structure of personal and industrial consumption. In this regard, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the state in reducing transaction costs in the private sector of the economy.

In the 20th century, the role of the state in countries with mature market economy(compared to the 19th century) increased sharply, which turned the state into a subject economic relations.

Deepening and expanding the legislative activity of the state in economic sphere society ensures resource savings in the interaction of economic agents. Therefore, cooperation problems are most often resolved without intermediaries in the form of courts, arbitration, authorities state power etc., which entails a reduction in transaction costs. The state, using all its power and authority, began to collect, process and use in practice the most valuable economic information, ensuring accessibility to it for other economic entities, which naturally reduced the level of economic uncertainty and, as a consequence, the level of transaction costs.

At the same time, thanks to the strong social policy of the state, a qualified workforce was formed, endowed with a sense of civic responsibility, alien to the ideology of opportunism, and this also inevitably helps to reduce the transaction costs of the enterprise.

The role of the state is especially great in the production of goods and services for public purposes (for example, intended for the defense of the country or environmental protection measures). However, while recognizing the importance of the economic role of the state in reducing transaction costs, it should be borne in mind that the state as a social institution has a lot of shortcomings, just like the market mechanism taken by itself. Therefore, the state, through its activities, can not only reduce, but also certain conditions contribute to the growth of transaction costs. This is explained by the fact that the state personifies itself in officials who, like everyone else, are guided by personal benefits: to have good earnings, recognition, weight in the team and society, power.

The shortcomings of the state mechanism are analyzed in particular detail in the theory of public choice, developed by the American economist J. Buchanan and his followers.

Among the most important shortcomings of the state as a subject of economic relations, in his opinion, are:

• 1. The imperfection of the political process is expressed in lobbying, bureaucracy, and the search for political rent;
• 2. Limited control over the bureaucracy on the part of political parties and the public, as a result of which the official in his activities, as a rule, puts his own, and not public interest, and the rapid growth of bureaucracy creates more and more new problems in this area;
• 3. The inability of the state to foresee and effectively control the immediate and long-term consequences of decisions made.

As we see, the state is not always able to ensure the efficient distribution and use of public resources, which causes an increase in transaction costs. Accordingly, a reduction in the latter is possible with a change in the economic functions of the state and a radical restructuring of the economic block of the state apparatus.

Today in Russia a mixed type economy is being formed, consisting of the public and private sectors. With the advent of the market, the problem of transaction costs arises and, as a consequence, the problem of the relationship between the above sectors of the economy.

The task of economists and politicians is to find the optimal relationship between the state and the market for any period characterized by certain features of external and internal environment. Let us also note the direct connection between benefits and transaction costs.

In neo-institutional economic theory, the unit of analysis is an act of economic interaction, a deal, a transaction. Moreover, the category “transaction” covers both material and contractual aspects of exchange. It is understood extremely broadly and is used to refer to both the exchange of goods and various types activities, as well as the exchange of legal obligations, transactions of both long-term and short-term nature, both requiring detailed documentation and involving interaction, which is certainly present in the processes of self-organization and self-regulation.

The concept of “transaction” was introduced into economic theory by J. Commons. In his opinion, a transaction is not just an exchange of goods, but the alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society, based on the assumption that institutions ensure the spread of the will of an individual subject beyond the boundaries of the areas of his influence on the environment through his actions, i.e., beyond the scope of his physical control, therefore turn out to be transactions, as opposed to individual behavior as such or the exchange of goods.

Domestic neo-institutionalist scholars adhere to an almost similar view. For example, Shastitko A. believes that a transaction should be understood as the activity of a subject in the form of alienation and appropriation of property rights, freedoms accepted in society, which are carried out in the process of planning, monitoring the fulfillment of promises, as well as adaptation to unforeseen circumstances.

Commons J. distinguished three main types of transactions:

1. The transaction of the transaction serves to carry out the actual alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms, and its implementation requires mutual consent of the parties, based on the economic interest of each of them. In a transaction, the condition of symmetry of mutual actions, including relationships, between subjects is observed. The distinctive feature of a transaction, according to Commons, is not production, but the transfer of goods from hand to hand.

2. Control transaction. In it, the key is the internal interactions that arise in the management of subordination. They are not symmetrical, at least in terms of formal characteristics - the right to make decisions belongs to only one side. The asymmetry of behavior in these interactions is a consequence of the asymmetry of the position of the parties and, accordingly, the asymmetry of legal relations.

3. Rationing transaction - it preserves asymmetry legal status parties, but the place of the managing party is taken by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. Rationing transactions include: drawing up a company budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by a representative body, an arbitration court decision regarding a dispute arising between existing entities through which wealth is distributed, as well as interactions arising in the processes of self-organization and self-regulation. In the latter, the public union as a collective body has a stronger position in the market both in relation to its constituent entities and in relation to those not participating in it.

Williamson O. evaluates all transactions by the frequency of transactions and the specificity of assets. Based on these two parameters, he divides transactions into four main types.

The first is a one-time (or elementary) exchange on an anonymous market. In this case, the frequency of transactions is rare and there is no specificity of assets.

The second is the repeated exchange of mass goods. In this case, the transaction frequency increases. There is still no specificity of the asset.

The third is a recurring contract associated with investments in specific assets. A specific asset is created specifically for a specific transaction. This means that the next best opportunity to use that asset has a much lower return and is associated with risk. Specific assets are those among the entire population, the next use of which is much less profitable. When a contract to sell a non-specific asset is terminated, the seller does not incur any particular loss. But termination of a contract for the sale of a specific asset leads to significant losses for it. Therefore, in the process of negotiations regarding the conclusion of such contracts, the seller will demand: either monetary compensation in the amount of capitalization of his risk; or legal guarantees of the safety of the contract; or decision-making rights and the ability to bear joint risks.

And the fourth is investing in idiosyncratic (unique, exclusive assets). . Idiosyncratic is an asset that, when used alternatively (when removed from a given transaction), loses value altogether or its value becomes insignificant. These assets include half of production investments, investments in a specific technological process.

As for the recurring contract for the use of a specific asset, it, according to O. Williamson, entails a “fundamental transformation” when, instead of market type connectivity, an extra-market partnership type of connection arises - communicative interactions leading to mutual dependence of subjects in the market network. He believes that more than half of all transactions in value account for transactions in relationships of mutual dependence, and in frequency 90-95% account for one-time or repeated transactions of mass goods. Those. In practice, in economics there is not just a market in the traditional understanding of neoclassics, but a dense network of institutional interactions based on relations of mutual dependence.

It follows that, if we consider the IS market from the standpoint of the duration of transactions, it can be divided conditionally into two sectors. The first is the sector of relatively rare but long-lasting transactions of mutual dependence. They are the ones who make the environment more stable and predictable. Figuratively speaking, it is these long-term transactions that form the “skeleton of the market.” And the second sector is associated with massive, but shorter transactions. Transactions in this sector support market efficiency by creating a competitive background of economic relations among IS subjects.

The development of the market occurs through the constant “flow” of transactions from the first sector to the second and vice versa. Moving from the first level (one-time exchange on an anonymous market) to the fourth (investments in idiosyncratic assets, which can be communication links), the subject reduces production costs, saving on scale, and in order to compensate for the risk, increases transaction costs. In other words, movement in this direction ensures a reduction in transformation costs and, other things being equal, an increase in transaction costs, because the risk of significant disruptions in market activity in the event of a contract termination increases many times over.

A natural consequence of the process of evolution in the market of ICC subjects is the desire to increase the number of transactions in the first sector and the time of their existence. But, on the other hand, this entails a decrease in the mobility of subjects and the consolidation of various types of their associations capable of occupying a monopoly position in the market. Following the basic laws of economic theory, at some point conditions are created for an imbalance between sectors, associations of entities are destroyed, and the number of long-term transactions in the first sector decreases. Transactions “flow” into the first sector, the number of massive and shorter transactions increases until equilibrium is achieved. This process is cyclical. And the current state of the market for IS subjects is characterized by a movement towards an equilibrium state through transactions of the first sector. This is evidenced by the problem of creating self-regulatory organizations in construction, which is actively discussed today in the literature and at the state level.

Transactions (that is, types of interaction) can be characterized by a number of characteristics. They can be:

General or specific (concerning standard or fairly unique resources);

Fleeting or long-term, one-time or regularly recurring;

Weakly or strongly dependent on unpredictable future events;

Autonomous or closely intertwined with other transactions;

With easily or difficultly measurable end results (allowing for more or less effective control over the participants’ fulfillment of their obligations).

Transactions differ in what demands they make on the limited rational abilities of economic agents and what scope they leave for their opportunistic behavior. For each type of transaction, special coordinating and protective mechanisms are created to mitigate the friction and losses associated with it.

Let's take a closer look at each of these signs.

1. Degree of specificity. According to Becker G., in economics it is common to call a resource that is of interest to many producers. Its market value depends little on where it is used. A specific resource is a resource that can only be used by a given specific manufacturer. For everyone else, it has zero value. It can be special not only in relation to one single company, but also in relation to any one industry, region, or country. The degree of specificity is judged by how much the value of the asset would be reduced if it were used in another place. Some resources may also be “designated” for a single user, not because they are of interest only to him, but because there is no current demand for them from other users. Activities related to specific resources are complex, since their owner incurs high transaction costs associated, for example, with the inability to sometimes refuse a deal with a supplier of this kind of resource. In the figurative expression of R.I. Kapelyushnikov, he finds himself, as it were, “locked” into a deal with his current partner. Therefore, transactions with specific resources usually require thoughtful, sometimes very expensive measures to protect the interests of the owners.

2. The degree of regularity and duration of transactions. If the transaction is one-time and its execution takes a short time, the relationship will be built primarily on an impersonal, formalized basis (say, using standard contracts). When a transaction between the same partners is repeated regularly and/or its execution requires them to be in close contact for a long time, then each of the participants has the opportunity to get to know the other better and begin to take his interests into account more fully. Their relationship becomes less formal, more personalized. Many issues are resolved through personal communication, which avoids the costs that arise when using formal mechanisms such as court, arbitration or actions of other government regulatory bodies.

3. Degree of uncertainty. Economic entities that interact are limitedly rational, that is, their ability to foresee the future is not absolute. At the time of concluding a long-term transaction, there is usually great uncertainty regarding the future state of the market. This encourages entities to detail contracts, thinking through all possible situations, or leaving a number of positions open, which, in turn, requires additional protection measures.

4. The degree of measurability of transaction characteristics. Any product or service has a certain consumer value that can be measured to varying degrees. For example, it is easier to determine the consumer value of oil than the managerial potential of the management of a construction organization. It is precisely the difficulty of measurement that is associated with high transaction costs when purchasing hard-to-measure goods.

5. Degree of interdependence of transactions. Transactions can be autonomous or closely intertwined with many others within the business process of manufacturing a product. Violation of the chain of interconnected transactions can lead to the loss of the entire business chain. And the stronger the subject’s dependence on the decisions of others, the greater the costs required to coordinate his actions and the actions of others, and to insure against possible changes in a series of contracts. The more general, short-term, definite, controlled and autonomous a transaction is, the more reason there is either to do without its legal registration at all, or to limit oneself to drawing up a simple standard contract. On the contrary, the more specialized, repetitive, uncertain, difficult to measure and interconnected it is, the stronger the incentives to establish long-term relationships on a formal and informal basis. Accordingly, the lower or higher the level of costs in transactions.

Naturally, the size of the actual costs related to transactions is determined by the characteristics of the transactions themselves. In other words, the costs present in transactions - transaction costs - are the costs of economic interaction, no matter in what forms it takes place.

The total costs of society consist of the costs of land, labor, capital and entrepreneurial abilities necessary, firstly, to transform physical properties various goods (their color, chemical composition, location, etc.) and, secondly, to establish interaction between the economic agents themselves (delimitation, protection, transfer and unification of property rights). If the level of “transformation” costs (as North D. called them) is determined primarily by technological factors, then the level of transaction costs is determined by institutional ones. As Arrow K. aptly puts it, transaction costs are “the costs of keeping economic systems running.”

The concept of transaction costs was introduced by R. Coase in the 30s of the 20th century. It has been used to explain the existence of such counter-market hierarchical structures, as a company. As previously emphasized, Coase R. associated the formation of these “islands of consciousness” with relative advantages in terms of savings on transaction costs. He saw the specifics of the company's functioning in the suppression of the price mechanism and its replacement with a system of internal administrative control.

Among the integral costs that economic science deals with, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of costs:

Transformation costs – “production costs”;

Transaction costs.

Transformation costs are sometimes called production costs. But this analogy can be recognized only conditionally, since the most significant production costs include both transformation and transaction costs. But for this study This division is sufficient; here transformation costs are understood as production costs, but not integral ones.

Transformation costs are the costs that accompany the process of physical change in a material, resulting in a product that has a certain value. These costs include not only the costs of processing the material, but also the costs associated with planning and coordinating the production process, if the latter concerns technology and not the interactions of subjects.

Transaction costs are the costs that ensure the transfer of property rights from one hand to another and the protection of these rights. Unlike transformation costs, transaction costs are not associated with the value creation process itself. They provide the transaction. Relatively speaking, transformation costs create goods whose properties are valuable for an individual or a collective agent of the economy (enterprise, firm, association).

There are several definitions of transaction costs.

Coase R. defined transaction costs as the costs of market functioning. Prior to this, economic theory assumed that the market was free, that market agents did not invest anything in it, that the price mechanism ensured coordination, bringing signals to market agents absolutely free of charge or at prices that could be neglected. Coase contrasted transaction costs, which he attributed only to the market, with the so-called “agency costs” that arise within the firm, for example, the costs of opportunistic behavior.

The next stage in the development of the theory of transaction costs occurs in the 50s of the 20th century. It is associated with a whole group of names, including Alchian A., Demsetz G., Stigler J., Williamson O., Arrow K. . These scientists combined the costs of operating a firm and the market into one category, contrasting them with transformation costs.

Currently, transaction costs are understood by the vast majority of scientists integrally, as the costs of system functioning. The most general definition of transaction costs is the cost of resources for planning, adapting and monitoring the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by individuals in the process of alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms accepted in society.

It should be noted that today there is no generally accepted classification of transaction costs. Each of the researchers paid attention to the most interesting, from his point of view, elements. For example, Stigler J. identified among them “information costs”, Williamson O. - “costs of opportunistic behavior”, Jensen M. and Meckling U. - “costs of monitoring the behavior of an agent and the costs of his self-restraint”, Barzel J. - “measurement costs ", [listed in 219], Milgrom P. and Roberts J. - “costs of influence", Hansmann G. - “costs of collective decision-making”, and Dalman K. included in their composition “costs of collecting and processing information, costs of negotiations and decision-making, costs of control and legal protection of the execution of the contract” [cited in 79]. Let us dwell on the most recognized classifications in the scientific community.

Menard Cl. identifies four types of transaction costs:

Separation costs caused by varying degrees of technological divisibility of production operations;

Information costs, including encoding costs, signal transmission costs, decoding costs and training costs to use the information system;

The costs of scale are due to the existence of systems of impersonal exchange, requiring a system for enforcing contracts;

Costs of opportunistic behavior.

Milgrom P. and Roberts J. proposed dividing them into two categories: costs associated with coordination and costs associated with motivation. Coordination costs, in turn, contain three components, and motivational costs have two.

Coordination costs include:

Costs of determining contract details. In essence, this is a market survey in order to determine the qualitative characteristics of the offer that can satisfy the need before the final choice is made in favor of a particular product.

Costs of identifying partners. They are associated with some kind of examination of partners who supply the required services or goods (their location, ability to fulfill a given contract, required prices, etc.).

Costs of direct coordination. When concluding a complex contract, it becomes necessary to create some kind of structure within which the parties come together to conclude the contract. Its task is to ensure the negotiation process. This can be either a structure that has legal status, or a certain communicative structure, the operation of which is ensured with the help of social, public institutions.

The second group of costs – motivational costs – is associated with costs arising in the selection process:

Costs of incomplete information. The limited rationality of subjects cannot provide complete and comprehensive information. Hence, the incompleteness of this information can lead to a refusal to complete a transaction or to acquire a good. In other words, the level of uncertainty may be so high that subjects would rather abandon transactions than spend resources, such as time, on obtaining additional information and reducing uncertainty.

Costs associated with opportunism. Opportunistic is the behavior of a subject not related to moral considerations, which is expressed in the strategic manipulation of information in conditions of uncertainty and conscious asymmetric distribution of information, as well as concealment of actions taken. Most often they appear within the company, but are also possible in market contracts. These are, for example, attempts to reduce the costs associated with overcoming a partner’s dishonesty. The subject tries to reduce them either by hiring controllers or by more detailed elaboration of the contract being concluded.

Wallis J. and North D. classified transaction costs in relation to the contractual process: those arising before the exchange; arising in the process of exchange; arising after exchange .

The classification of transaction costs by E. Furubotn and R. Richter is built depending on the area in which these costs arise:

Market transaction costs, which include the costs of searching for information, the costs of negotiations and decision-making, control and monitoring;

Managerial transaction costs arising in the management process;

Political transaction costs associated with the political-legal environment.

It must be said that in the economic literature there are many classifications of transaction costs, including those by domestic authors. But for the most part, they “fit” into the systems of views on this issue outlined above.

Perhaps the only classification that summarizes all types of transaction costs identified today is the classification of Eggertsson Tr. . In addition, it is distinguished by its simplicity and tangibility, as it is built on the principle of analogy with external signs activities that generate corresponding costs. According to Eggertsson Tr., transaction costs are:

Costs of searching for information. Within this group, the author identifies the costs associated with searching for an acceptable price and quality information: about available goods and services; about sellers and buyers;

Negotiation costs. Negotiation leads to clarification of the so-called. “true position”, which in the economic sense is the marginal indifference curve or marginal isoquant (in the case of a firm);

Contracting costs. This is the cost of predicting the future behavior of entities participating in contracts and stipulating them, for example, in the form of some kind of dispute resolution mechanism. In other words, contracts “reserve” some provision for unforeseen circumstances. The size of these costs is the highest among all others, it is about 5-10% of the transaction volume when investing in specific assets;

Monitoring costs. Monitoring costs arise after the conclusion of a contract and are associated with monitoring the execution of the contract by each of the entities that entered into it;

Coercion costs. Since each subject strives to act in his own interests, and information is by definition incomplete, situations of incomplete or partial fulfillment of the contract often arise. And in the institutional environment, a system is formed that forces partners to comply with the terms of the contract. These are government bodies, professional, public self-regulatory organizations. In a weak state, a so-called alternative system of coercion arises - private - various types of criminal structures. The costs of enforcing contracts in developed economies for economic agents are predominantly low, as economies of scale manifest themselves;

Costs of protecting property rights. They arise both in the process of protection from offenders - then this is a function of the state, but they can also take place during the development of a system of actions related to precautions in relation to the state, which is most typical for the Russian economy (instability in observing the principle of succession in power, high politicization of the economy, lack of development of the legislative system, decision-making at the level of state legislative bodies, sometimes contradicting previously adopted and received the status of fundamental norms and institutions, a tendency to revise formal norms in relation to a changing market situation, finally, persistent distrust in the values ​​​​declared by the state machine, etc. .).

Table 16 presents a systematization of the most famous modern science and classifications of transaction costs recognized in the scientific community. However, the actual statement of the fact of the existence of transaction costs in the process of interaction between subjects does not yet solve the problem. It is important to identify possible ways to save them. Let's look at some of them.

Table 16

Various classifications of transaction costs

It was previously emphasized that measurement costs include two parts. One part is classified as transaction costs, while the other is determined by the characteristics production process– production costs. In this regard, measurement costs are most often associated with quality measurement. At the same time, the subject, as a rule, does not bear all of the costs in full - neither production nor transaction. In an attempt to obtain more complete information about quality, he pays an increasingly higher price for it up to a certain limit. That is, until the moment when his costs for acquiring more accurate information turn out to be equal to the expected increase in value from owning this product. Naturally, a subject entering into a transaction is interested in minimizing measurement costs. What allows him to do this are several established institutions in society, which ensure a situation of measurement based on trust. First of all, these are different standards.

Examples of measurement based on trust can be associated not only with state standards, but also with certain business practices, for example, with the creation and activities of self-regulatory organizations in the market, including the ISK market. Savings in transaction costs associated with measurement problems in the latter case occur indirectly. But this is the only way, since replacing it with direct measurement is practically impossible, since it is impossible for each specific subject to independently carry out the process of change in each of the specific contracts.

Information costs, or information search costs (search and monitoring costs, as well as, to some extent, negotiation costs and coercion costs) partially overlap with measurement costs. The emergence of information costs is due to the incompleteness of information and the asymmetry of its distribution between interacting agents. Saving this type of costs is also possible in the direction of developing standards, but mainly proprietary ones, which include standards of conduct for participants in professional communities, associations that self-regulate activities in the market by accepting increased requirements in terms of providing comprehensive and reliable information, business ethics etc.

The costs of property rights (including the costs of coercion, partly the costs of negotiations) are generated by the imperfection of both the mechanism for protecting property rights and the mechanism for vesting these rights. The latter is especially relevant for Russia due to the very period of its development and its qualitative characteristics. And in this case, the direction of their savings may be the previously mentioned standards of professional communities, which may also include a number of functions delegated by the state to regulate market activities. For example, licensing of activities, if we specify this in relation to the subjects of the insurance policy, is so actively discussed today in this professional environment.

Search costs are associated with the acquisition of background economic information, i.e. information that is not directly related to a specific transaction. Background information is not included in the transaction costs of property rights, but is included in the transaction information costs. Background economic information is not related to a specific exchange of property rights, to a specific transaction, but forms the institutional background of the subject’s attitude to the transaction. Its significance is essential for making a specific decision. Here, a direction for reducing costs could be the voluntary assumption by self-regulatory organizations of functions to provide this kind of information about the institutional background, as well as consulting members of this professional community.

Coercion costs, which include the costs of economic agents to protect their property rights and their contracts. Professional communities and, in particular, self-regulatory organizations in the ISK are quite capable of representing the interests of their members in the relevant government bodies, thereby ensuring a reduction in this type of costs for all participants as a whole.

Control costs are especially high when opportunities and incentives for opportunistic behavior exist. For example, in the case of the production of a unique product; a dynamic market with uncertain demand and unpredictable price movements; asymmetry of information in the market, which makes contracts external to the subject ineffective.

Rising transaction costs due to the inefficiency of external contracts limit the scope of the market. However, as the firm grows, the number of employed workers and the fragmentation of the production process increase. As a result, the direct connection between work and its result is lost. Self-control of workers over the intensity of their own work ceases to serve as a way to increase production efficiency; a controlling authority is forced to take its place. The costs of monitoring the degree of labor intensity of each production link appear and grow. The larger the firm becomes, the higher these control costs become. Eventually, the costs of enforcing internal contracts exceed transaction costs, the attractiveness of market contracts compared to internal ones increases, and internal ones are replaced by external ones. In this case self-regulatory organization through carries the characteristics of both an external and an internal subject. As an external subject, it independently carries out the activities prescribed by the participants; as an internal subject, a self-regulatory organization aims to express the interests of participants in the professional community, thereby reducing their transaction costs of monitoring external and internal contracts.

Agency costs here have a slightly different meaning than described in the literature. According to most publications, one subject delegates his rights to another chosen by him, concluding an agreement with him, due to the fact that he himself is not able to dispose of the entire volume of his property. As a result, the second acts in the market on behalf of the first. Here, transaction agency costs include the wages of the second subject if he receives them for property management activities. But, first of all, these include the losses incurred by the first subject, firstly, due to the incomplete coincidence of his interests with the interests of the subject-agent; and secondly, due to the asymmetry of information between them. The second knows more about his capabilities and the specifics of his behavior than the first, because the latter, having hired the second, cannot control him all the time. Asymmetry manifests itself in the realization of its interests by the second subject to the detriment of the interests of the first subject. But in the case of professional communities, self-regulatory public organizations, associations, the second component of agency costs (the difference in goals and interests) is leveled by the very principle of their creation, since it is to protect the interests of community members that they are formed.

The classification of transaction costs by possible areas of savings is presented in Table 17.

Thus, there is no unity in the concept of transaction costs and in their classification representation in science today. There are also more complex definitions of transaction costs and their classification [for example, 92, 105, 106, 140, 154, etc.]. But in most modern studies in the field of institutional economic theory, the term “transaction costs” is used in the sense proposed by O. Williamson. These are all the costs in all transactions that arise both within the company and on the market. This is enough to prove the right to the existence of the basic provisions of neo-institutional economic theory, of which he is rightfully considered the founder. But in order to adapt what is stated in the paragraph to the practice of activities of ICC subjects, the term “transaction costs” requires clarification. As Demsetz X. notes, “... with such rather inappropriate word usage, one has to resort to textual explanations in order to make a distinction where this can be done through a single label word.”

Based on the last statement in the monograph, transaction costs are understood as costs (explicit and implicit) associated with ensuring the functioning of institutional interactions of IS subjects as an economic system, costs of coordination and motivation.

Such costs are associated with searching for information about a product or service, searching for a partner in a transaction, negotiations, organizing contracts and monitoring their implementation, forming a system corporate standards, the process of self-regulation of the activities of IS subjects on the market as a whole.

Within the framework of the methodological principles of activity theory, neo-institutional economic theory and the theory of transaction costs set out in this chapter, it is further necessary to consider the investment and construction complex as a system.

Table 17

Classification of transaction costs by content and possible areas of savings

The role of transaction costs in economics is often compared to the role of friction in physics: “Just as friction interferes with the movement of physical objects, dispersing energy in the form of heat, so transaction costs prevent the movement of resources to the users for whom they are of greatest value, “dispersing” the utility of these resources during the economic process. Just as every known physical object is given a form that helps either to minimize friction or to obtain some useful effect due to it (a wheel, for example, serves both), so in fact any institution known to us arises as a reaction to the presence of transaction costs and in order, presumably, to minimize their impact, thereby increasing the benefits of the exchange. ...An economist who ignores the existence of transaction costs will face the same difficulties in explaining economic behavior, which would be encountered by a physicist who ignores the fact of friction when describing the movement of physical objects.”

1. Separation costs arising from the inseparability problem. In joint activities, it is difficult to measure the productivity of each factor of production; detailed differentiation is impossible when determining fees for certain types of services (for example, transport).

2. Information costs, including the costs of encoding, transmitting signals, decoding and training in using the information system.

3. The costs of market scale, with the growth of which the establishment of “trust” is both problematic and too expensive.

4. Behavioral costs associated with the problem of selfish behavior of agents in a competitive situation (for example, cheating), which often results in benefits for the deceivers and losses for the deceived.

Based on the timing of the contracting process, transaction costs are divided into three categories by D. North and J. Wallis:

1. Preliminary (exante) - refers to the period before the transaction, for example, collecting information about prices, possible alternatives, reliability of the counterparty, etc.

2. The second part (exinterim) occurs at the time of execution of the transaction and the exchange process, for example, negotiations and conclusion of a contract, receipt of notarized documents, insurance, settlements, etc.

3. The third part relates to the period after the conclusion of the transaction (expost), for example, the costs of protecting contracts, monitoring their implementation, quality control, etc.

E. Furubotn and R. Richter classify transaction costs depending on the area in which they arise:

Firstly, market transaction costs, including the costs of searching and processing information, the costs of negotiations and decision-making, the costs of control and monitoring. It should be noted that this classification of market transaction costs corresponds to the three stages of the contracting process identified in the North-Wallis classification. Secondly, management transaction costs, including the costs of development, implementation, maintenance and change organizational structure. Third, political transaction costs, including the costs of creating, maintaining and changing the formal and informal political organization of the system, as well as ensuring the functioning of the political system, including the institutions of legislation, defense, justice, transport and education.